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TRUTH &C

THE WAR

1 BY E-D -MOREL V

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
The Library of Congress

http://www.archive.org/details/truthwar01more

Copyright by]

THE ^UTH07l

[J. Russell & Sons

Truth and the War

■

By

E. D. MOREL

Author of "Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy" ("Morocco in
Diplomacy") (The National Labour Press) ; "Nigeria :
its Peoples and its Problems" (Smith, Elder & Co.);
"Red Rubber: the Story of the Rubber Slave Trade flourish-
ing on the Congo in the year of grace 1907" (T. Fisher
Unwin) ; "King Leopold's Rule in Africa " (Heinemann) ;
"Affairs of West Africa " (Heinemann) ; The British Case
in French Congo" (Heinemann), etc., etc.

yU

LONDON :

AT THE NATIONAL LABOUR PRESS LTD
1916

PUBLICATIONS BY THE SAME AUTHOR
BOORS

Nigeria: Its Peoples and its Problems

London: Smith Elder & Co.: Two Editions, 1911-12

"There have been few travellers, indeed, who have given us so accurate a
picture of the great African region, or who have discussed the problems
arising from it with so much sound sense and sympathy." — The Nation.

"A fascinating book." — Public Opinion.

Red Rubber: The Story of the %ubber Sla^e Trade
in the Congo

T. Fisher Unwin: Five Editions, 1906-08

"If there are any who are not yet believers in the reality of the Congo
Government's misdeeds, Mr. Morel's new book may be recommended as
a certain means of conviction. To the author, more than to any man
alive, is due the ventilation of this crime against civilisation. He has
fought a long uphill battle against apathy, misrepresentation, and the
power of an unscrupulous purse. And he has been successful. He has
made Congo Reform a part of the sworn creed of many of our chief
public men." — The Spectator.

King Leopold's Rule in Africa

London: Heinemann, 1904

"An amazing book to be written in the dawn of the Twentieth Century
of the Christian era." — Morning Post.

Great Britain and the Congo

London: Smith Elder & Co., 1905

The British Case in French Congo

London: Heinemann, 1903

Affairs of West Africa

London: Heinemann, 1902

French Edition: "Problemes de 1'Ouest Africain"

Translated by A. Duchene, Chief of the Staff of the African Department of the
French Colonial Office.

Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy, 1 9 1 5

London: The National Labour Press, 1/-; Three Large
Editions

"The most tremendous indictgagnt of the methods of secret diplomacy
ever written." — Bradford pimeir.

"Mr. Morel may claim truly that he foresaw the war and warned us
against it." — The Forward.

(First published in 191 2 under the title of "Morocco in
Diplomacy" and containing in an Annexe a complete
collection of official documents relating to Morocco from
the Madrid Convention of 1880 to the Franco-German
Agreement of November, 191 1: Smith Elder & Co., 6/-)

TO MY SONS

THIS VOLUME IS

DEDICATED

IN THE HOPE THAT THEY MAY HELP TO FREE HUMANITY
FROM THE CURSE OF MILITARISM AND WAR.

INTRODUCTION

By Philip Snowden, M.P.

<C/ B SRUTH," it has been said, "is the first casualty of
A war." When hostilities break out the one object
of each belligerent nation is victory. "All is fair in war,"
and to secure and maintain national unity in support of
the war every means are taken by the respective Govern-
ments to suppress criticism which, however honest and
true, may be thought by them to be calculated to create a
doubt as to the wholly disinterested and blameless position
of their own country. It becomes a most unpatriotic act
to continue to hold and to express opinions about the
foreign policy of the statesmen of one's own country,
which have been held and proclaimed for years before the
war by large bodies of men and women, and which were
then regarded as perfectly reasonable and useful criticism.
This suppression of the truth during a war is justified
as being in the interests of one's own country. The test
of a person's patriotism is willingness to subscribe to the
declaration "My country, right or wrong." Patriotism
within the limits of morality is a noble sentiment. But,
as John Bright said in one of his finest passages, "the
moral law was not written for individuals only, but for
nations, and for nations as great as we are." When
patriotism leads men and nations to ignore facts, and to
refuse to hear or acknowledge the truth, it becomes a sin,
for which the penalty will certainly sooner or later have to
be paid. Lord Hugh Cecil recently wrote, "Mankind has
suffered the prodigious evils the war has brought upon us
mainly because human beings in general, and especially
Germans, have come to love their countries more than
they ought to do — more than they love God and His laws."

INTRODUCTION

There have been a few people in all the belligerent
countries who have refused to forswear the principles they
have held and proclaimed in times of peace, and who,
when their prophecies have been fulfilled, have refused to
deny that they ever made them. If there has been in the
past foreign policy of this country, as well as in the
foreign policies of other nations, something wrong, which
has contributed to the present war, then it will be fatal for
the future peace of Europe not to admit that truth. If
another war is to be averted, there will have to be a
thorough searching out of all the causes of this war, with
the object of removing them. If a perverted patriotism
is to be allowed to blind the people of any country to the
mistakes or sins of their own Governments, then the
likelihood of a permanent peace is very remote.

Among the men who have kept the impartial and
judicial mind during these awful days since August, 1914,
none has rendered greater service to the future of peace
and internationalism than the writer of this volume. I
do not expect that his attitude can be generally approved
now, nor the value of his work appreciated. But Time
will do justice to both. There is a certain type of very
limited mental development which has not learnt that there
are more numerals than two. If a word of criticism of
the policy of one's own country is put forward, such
persons immediately jump to the conclusion that the critic
is the friend of every other nation, and that the object of
his criticism is to condemn his own country and to defend
all others. Criticism of the policy of statesmen is the
highest patriotism, for it is aimed at removing those
mistakes which detract from the reputation of our own
country abroad and the well-being of our own people at
home.

That is the spirit in which this book has been written.
It has been written, not in the interests of the enemy, but
in the interests of Great Britain. At a time when the
public mind was calm and so free from passion as to be
able to take an impartial view of international policy and

INTRODUCTION

problems, the writer's past work for oppressed peoples,
and his great knowledge of and authority on international
questions, would have secured for him a wide and respect-
ful hearing. I write these few words of introduction to
beseech for the book such a reception in these troublous
times. The matters with which it deals are of tremendous,
of the most vital importance. Without a popular know-
ledge of these facts it will be impossible for the people
of this country to take an intelligent part in the settlement
of the war.

We do not ask for the endorsement of all that is said
in this volume. Let the statements stand upon their
merits. Many parts of the book have already been before
the public for some time. So far as I know, the facts
have never been challenged. But where there are such
tremendous issues involved, it is surely in the interests of
truth that there should be full and free discussion, and that
every side of the question should be stated and discussed.
It is only by such full and frank discussion that we can
hope to obtain a settlement after this war which will be
permanent, because it is based upon Truth.

IX

PERSONAL FOREWORD

During the past twelve months I have been one of the
best-abused men in the British Isles. Not even my friend
and colleague, Mr. J. Ramsay Macdonald, has had to
endure such malignant misrepresentation. No dishonour
too profound, no motive too base, but has been attributed
to me.

My offence is a double one. It is that I have partici-
pated in a movement which seeks to influence public
opinion in favour of the kind of settlement calculated to
produce a lasting peace, and not a typical patched-up
peace, solving none of the national problems peculiar to
each belligerent State, in their relations with one another,
such as diplomacy has given us in the past. It is that in
my personal capacity I have sought, both before and
since the war, to be fair to our present enemies, and, in
the interest of my country, to point out that the sole
responsibility for the war cannot, in justice, be wholly
imputed to them. To both counts I plead guilty without
any sort of reservation. I have deliberately so acted, and
I shall continue deliberately to so act.

My critics have delved into my family history, and
doubtless disappointed at finding no trace of German
influence, either through consanguinity or associations of
any sort, kind, or description whatsoever, they have dis-
covered, to their own satisfaction, some stigma in the
circumstance that I was born of a French father and of
an English mother, and that twenty years ago I dropped
the second portion of a double-barrelled family name,
retaining the first — a circumstance of no earthly concern
to anyone but myself and my relatives. Both these facts,
neither of the least public importance, had been publicly
accessible for many years.1 I might add this. It is pre-
cisely because I am, in part, of French descent,2 and have
in consequence very deep natural sympathy with the

1 Vide "Who's Who."

2 My father died when I was an infant, and I was educated
in England.

PERSONAL FOREWORD

French people, that I have criticised for some years the
tendency of the powerful influences at work in France, in
Russia, and in Britain, to strengthen the bellicose and
reactionary influences in French political life and pro-
portionately to weaken the elements which, in the former
country, were endeavouring- to establish friendly relations
with Germany. For I believed implicitly in the truth
enunciated seventeen years ago by the great Russian
student Bloch,1 that owing in part to her peculiar economic
position, but especially to her stagnant population, France,
above all Powers, should avoid entanglement in a great
war. I believed with Bloch, that for France a great war
under modern conditions, involving the loss of the flower
of her youth, would mean " not merely national danger,
but absolute ruin." And believing this, I thought that
the party in France which was seeking to reach a per-
1 manent accommodation with Germany, was the party which
had the truest interests of France at heart. 1 thought
that the party in Russia which was palpably using France
for its own ends, both financially and politically, consti-
tuted a real danger to the French people. I shared in
that respect the views of the greatest Russian of his age,
whose fears that the Franco-Russian Alliance would be
"a great injury to France"2 appeared to me only too
likely to be realised. I thought that the influences in
the British diplomatic and journalistic world, which were
inimical to a permanent improvement in Franco-German
relations lest France should fall into Germany's " orbit,"
were both cruelly unjust to France, and amazingly short-
sighted from the point of view of British national interests.
In short, my belief that British national interests lay in a
thorough understanding with Germany on the principle
of live and let live, and in assisting rather than hindering
a Franco-German rapprochement, was accentuated by the
conviction, to which I was personally susceptible, that,
short of such an understanding, France, under the existing
system of alliances, would be the chief victim of a general
European war. I ministered to those convictions to the
best of my ability and opportunity, from 191 1, when I
was released from my Congo work, until the outbreak of
war.

1 "Modern Weapons and Modern War." (Grant Richards.)

2 Letter to an Italian Press correspondent on the Franco-Russian
Alliance. Sept. 22, 1901 ("What is Religion?" And other new
Articles and Letters." By Leo Tolstoy. The Free Age Press,
Christchurch.)

PERSONAL FOREWORD

In their anxiety to cast discredit upon me my detrac-
tors have not even hesitated to attack the bona-fides of
one of the most generous and at the same time one of
the most powerful movements, supported by those who
were most far-seeing and morally conscious among men
eminent in British public life, which ever inspired the
people of this country — the agitation against the mis-
government of the Congo. That in so doing my detractors
were striking at their own Government, at their own
Legislature, and at their own country, has not deterred
them. Their attempts to belittle the deep moral and
spiritual significance of that movement, and grotesquely
to distort its aims, would be puerile, were it not so pathetic
and, in the true sense of the word, unpatriotic.

When these particular insinuations were first mooted,
in a paper which, under two successive editors, played an
active and honourable part in the struggle, I dealt with
them. The personal charges I have ignored. I am con-
tent to wait. But as my writings since the war broke out
have been both misquoted and distorted, I have collected
and presented them in this volume. I believe they embody
a number of facts and inferences which sooner or later
the public of this country will realise to have been the
expression of the truth, and to have been submitted with
honesty of purpose. The articles and speeches are here
reproduced as they were written or uttered, with none but
trifling verbal alterations, and they are reproduced in their
sequence. A few new chapters have been added.

In this Personal Foreword I wish to indicate as clearly
as I am able, the mental processes which have led me to
view in a different light to that in which the majority of
my countrymen at present regard them, alike the catas-
trophe which has overwhelmed civilisation, and the reme-
dies which need to be applied if civilisation is to be spared
the prolongation of the war until Europe crumbles into
ruin, or a repetition of it at no distant date. I am not
prompted to do so by egotism, but by the feeling that I
owe something of the sort alike to old friends and ac-
quaintances, some of whom condemn or misapprehend my
present actions, and to new friends and acquaintances who
honour me with their confidence.

From the year 1899 to the outbreak of the war, my
life was almost wholly absorbed in journalistic, literary,
and other work relating to the affairs of Africa. Of that

PERSONAL FOREWORD

work, records exist in my own published writings, and in
the writings of others in this country and abroad. From
early in 1912 until the outbreak of the war, I was partly
engaged at the Colonial Office in connection with the West
African Lands Commission, presided over by Sir Kenelm
Digby, and of which I was appointed a member by Mr.
Lewis Harcourt, then Colonial Secretary, together with
Sir Walter Napier, Sir Frederick Hodgson, Sir William
Taylor, Mr. Joshua Wedgwood, M.P., and others.

A considerable portion of the period referred to was
devoted to the unravelling and the remedying of the great-
est crime perpetrated upon the African race since the days
of the oversea slave trade. I refer to the maladministra-
tion by the late Leopold II. of the "Congo Free State";
the exposure of that so-called State's misdeeds, and its
final removal from the map of Africa. In the course of
that task, which I did not initiate,1 but with which I
became prominently identified as Honorary Secretary of
the Congo Reform Association,2 I was brought into close
contact with the methods of international diplomacy, and
with the proceedings of diplomats. The full story of the
liberation of the Congo — a region as large as Europe
minus Russia — from the grip of one of the most atrocious
systems of slavery the world has ever known, which re-
duced its population by some twelve millions in a quarter
of a century, and converted vast areas into absolute
desert, has yet to be written. I was engaged in writing
it when the war broke out. If it is ever written, the
struggle will be seen to have resolved itself into a kind of
duel, not only with Leopold II. , himself the astutest of all
contemporary diplomatists, but with the European diplo-
matic machine itself. For the true conditions of the Congo
were known, or became in due course known, to every
Chancellory in Europe. In diplomatic circles there was
neither ignorance of nor dispute about the facts. The
diplomatic machine itself, however, could not be induced

1 The late Sir Charles Dilke and the late Mr. R .H. Foxbourne,
Secretary of the Aborigines Protection Society, ' were the originators.

2 The first President was Earl Beauchamp, the second Lord
Monkswell. The Association was created in 1904 and dissolved in
1913. Among those who, in the course of the Association's nine
years' existence, served upon its Executive Committee were the
following : — Mr. Alfred Emmott (now Lord Emmott of Oldham), the
Bishops of Winchester and Liverpool, Dr. Scott Lidgett and Dr.
Clifford, Sir George White, Sir Gilbert Parker, Mr. J. Ramsay
Macdonald, Mr. T. L. Gilmour, etc.

PERSONAL FOREWORD

for many years to move. But for the constantly growing
pressure of public opinion here, in Belgium, in the United
States, and to some extent in Italy, which impelled certain
definite steps involving certain definite results, these in
turn producing other developments, the machine would
never have moved at all. It is to the credit of British
diplomacy that it did move — but it did so only as a result
of public pressure. And public pressure alone kept it
moving, slowly, with prolonged delays and frequent
vacillations.

The experience of pursuing a specific aim and steering
a single course in season and out of season for eleven
years on end through the tortuosities of diplomatic
shuffling, of removing one obstacle only to find another in
its place, of personal intercourse with diplomatists here
and elsewhere, with journalists in their councils and
obedient to their will, with permanent officials, Ministers,
and politicians, and with the flotsam and jetsam which
crowd the diplomatic corridors — this experience gave me
an insight into the workings of what is called "Diplo-
macy," granted, I think, to few men outside the ring,
and not to all within it.

The experience taught me many things. I had sup-
posed that once the facts officially established as the result
of popular demand, the "scrap of paper" upon which the
great Powers had inscribed their solemn vow to safeguard
the rights and liberties of the Congo peoples, would be
honoured in full by some at least of the signatories. But
I was not long in discovering that the acknowledged
truth was not to be the determining factor in the solution
of the problem, which, I observed, did not depend upon
the plighted troth of Governments or upon the proven
martyrdom of millions of men, women, and children, but
upon the ambitions, intrigues, jealousies, fears and sus-
picions of rival diplomatists. I found that the destruc-
tion of human life in Africa, even on a scale so unprece-
dented, was used merely as a counter upon the diplomatic
chess-board of Europe, that the appeal to humanity „
justice, and common sense was regarded intrinsically as
valueless, and that joint action to redeem Europe's honour
was paralysed by considerations remote from the issue at
staKe.

It was given me to see behind the veil, and to realise
how utterly at the mercy of a Bureaucracy working in
darkness and in secrecy, were the peoples, not of Africa
only, but of Europe; a Bureaucracy rooted in obsolete

PERSONAL FOREWORD

traditions, badly informed, out of touch with and
supremely indifferent to the human pulse, cynically and
openly contemptuous of moral conduct, deeming the finest
of arts the art successfully to lie, living in a world walled
round by narrow prejudices, and absorbed in the prosecu-
tion of rivalries for the attainment of objects bearing not
the remotest relation to the well-being or fundamental
needs of the masses, whose destinies that Bureaucracy
held in the hollow of its hands. ,

Such was my apprenticeship in the sphere of inter-
national diplomacy. I am fain to confess that when in
September, 1914, I read, with the rest of the world, the
famous phrase of the German Chancellor about the "scrap
of paper," it struck me then, and it strikes me now, less
on the score of its immorality than on the score of its
honesty. It is the one statement, perhaps, in the whole
official collection of despatches to which the word "honest"
is completely applicable ; the professional diplomatist in
the crisis of the hour and under the stress of poignant
emotion, proclaiming the dishonesty of diplomacy, not of
German diplomacy alone but of "Diplomacy" itself, which
in no land, under no Government, at no period, has
honoured its written word when its own arbitrary inter-
pretation of what constitutes the "national interest" has
seemed to counsel repudiation.

But this impression which I here record must not be
misunderstood. German diplomacy has been as immoral,
as short-sighted, as treacherous as any other. And it has
added to those defects, habitual to Diplomacy itself, a
brutality of manifestation peculiarly its own, combined
with an almost phenomenal incapacity to understand, still
less to appreciate, the psychology of the nations with
whom it has had to deal. But to each people belongs the
task of purging its own Augean stables. To denounce
the mote in a neighbour's eye is cheap enough, but it is
apt, not only to prevent your detecting the mote in your
own, but to induce the belief that no mote exists. That
is the malady from which every belligerent nation is now
suffering, and paying for in blood and tears.

The Congo Reform Association, having accomplished
its labours with the completion of the reforms promised by
the Belgian Government after the substitution of Belgian
national control over the Congo for the personal despotism
of King Leopold, voluntarily dissolved in 1913. Shortly

PERSONAL FOREWORD

after my return, in the spring of 191 1, from visiting our
great African protectorate of Nigeria ; Britain, France, and
Germany were suddenly plunged into the second crisis
over Morocco,1 and for several weeks they stood on the
brink of war. It was a case of another violated inter-
national treaty, another "scrap of paper," and, like the
Congo one, dedicated by the signatory Governments to
"Almighty God." But the circumstances differed. The
Congo International Treaty was violated by the chief
party to it at the expense of all the other parties, and at
the expense of the natives. But as none of the other
parties concerned had material interests to serve in the
Congo, as the only real victims were the natives, the other
parties had collectively abstained from dealing with the
offender. In the Morocco International Treaty four Euro-
pean Powers were directly interested. Three of them —
France, England, and Spain — had pushed cynicism to the
length of concluding a secret pact providing for the political
and economic partition of Morocco, which made their sig-
natures at the foot of an international treaty proclaiming
the independence and integrity of Morocco a more than
usually dishonest farce. They had concealed this pact, not
only from the fourth interested party — Germany — but from
their own Parliaments and peoples. When, therefore,
Germany intervened, public opinion in France and Eng-
land, ignoring the true facts and cleverly played upon by
the officially inspired Press, quite honestly regarded
German action as wantonly provocative and designed to
force a war, or at least to break up the "Entente" — so-
called.2

A painstaking investigation of the whole diplomatic
history of Morocco revealed a record of treachery and
deceit towards the British and French peoples, towards
Morocco and the rest of the world, by the French and
British Foreign Offices, with few parallels even in the annals
of diplomacy. The individual diplomatists concerned were
doubtless in their private lives the most estimable and
upright of men. But, as Mr. Arthur Ponsonby somewhere
puts it, the mischief is that the detestable system of
intrigue and secrecy in which diplomatists live, move, and
have their official being is such that it sets up wholly false
ethical values, and imposes a standard of morals which

1 The first had occurred in 1905-06.

2 Public opinion in Spain was incensed against France and not
against Germany, for reasons set forth in my book,

[?] xvii

PERSONAL FOREWORD

would not be tolerated for a moment among decent men
in social life. It seems to be a case of the impeccable
Dr. Jekyll becoming- the objectionable Mr. Hyde when he
has breathed for a certain time the atmosphere prevailing1
in the Foreign Offices of Europe. It is possible in that
atmosphere for men honest in their social relations, to
betray the honour of their country and the cause of inter-
national justice ; to draw up secret instruments, which if
made public would be repudiated by the peoples, and to
sacrifice the interests of the peoples by involving them in
liabilities affecting their future and the future of their
children in the most vital fashion, and to deny, when
questioned, that they have done so.

The investigation also conveyed the certainty, at any
rate to the investigator, that after the words that had been
uttered and the facts that had transpired, a European war
in the near future, a war which would involve the British
people, was virtually inevitable unless certain things
occurred. The only possible way to save the situation, so
it seemed to me, was by making the true facts known to
the British public, in the hope that the publication of them
might lead to a revulsion of feeling, and to a clearer com-
prehension of the German case ; and thereby provoking
a full and frank discussion in Parliament as to the real
character of our official relations with France, and, there-
fore, contingently with Russia, to whose Government
official France was bound in a military and political
alliance.

To these ends I laboured entirely single-handed, and
obeying no outside inspiration, and following a series of
articles in British and French magazines and newspapers,
I published, four months after France and Germany had
reached an agreement on the matter immediately under
dispute, my book, "Morocco and Diplomacy."1 Its dedica-
tion2 indicatedsthe purpose of the book, and in writing it I
believed that I was performing a useful and patriotic, if
somewhat painful task. My objects were not misjudged at

1 Smith, Elder & Co., 1912. Since re-issued as "Ten Years of
Secret Diplomacy." (National Labour Press, is.)

2 "To those who believe the establishment of friendlier
relations between Britain and Germany to be essential to the
prosperity and welfare of the British and German peoples, and to
the maintenance of the world's peace, and to those who are
persuaded that the acceptance of national liabilities towards foreign
Powers by secret commitments withheld from the British people,
is both a menace to the security of the State and a betrayal of
the national trust, this volume is respectfully dedicated."

PERSONAL FOREWORD

the time, even by those who disagreed with the deductions
I drew from the marshalling of facts, which to this day
remain absolutely unchallenged. The bulk of the news-
paper comment was wholly favourable — with the excep-
tion, of course, of the organs which had played the most
prominent part in misleading the public. It is noteworthy
that none of the latter attempted to dispute the accuracy
of the facts presented.

Various intimations reached me that the book had not
been without value in affecting influential opinion, and it
may have contributed to the attempts to reach a modus
vivendi, which afterwards took place. But Parliament did
not respond. The matter was allowed to lapse. The
original errors and falsities took root, and to this day are
continually repeated. There was no public opinion suffi-
ciently organised and in earnest outside Parliament, still
less within it. The crisis had brought England as well
as France and Germany, to the very edge of the preci-
pice. In France a Yellow Book was issued, and an
exhaustive debate, lasting several days, took place both in
the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate. In England a
timid request for papers was curtly refused, and nothing
in the nature of Parliamentary discussion was ever at-
tempted. It is a satisfaction to me, albeit a somewhat
melancholy one, that since the war broke out, a consider-
able demand for my book has arisen, and that every
diligent searcher after truth has either recognised the
accuracy of my analysis of the facts, or, at least, has
admitted its value. In "The Policy of the Entente : 1904-
14, "] the Hon. Bertrand Russell, when treating of
Morocco, remarks of my book that : "Any new account
not designed simply to whitewash the English and French
Governments can only repeat what is to be found" in it,
"even when, like what follows, it is derived entirely from
other sources." Mr. Charles W. Hay ward endorses it
unreservedly in his volume, "What is Diplomacy?"2
His condemnation of Anglo-French diplomacy is couched
in more vigorous language than my own. He concludes
that the crisis of 191 1 was "infamously provoked," and
that in the dispute "the honour is entirely Germany's."
Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson does not believe that "any in-
structed and impartial student will accept what appears to
be the current English view, that the attitude of Germany

1 The National Labour Press : is.

2 Grant Richards Ltd. : 2s. 6d.

xix

PERSONAL FOREWORD

in this episode was a piece of sheer aggression without
excuse, and that the other Powers were acting throughout
justly, honestly, and straightforwardly."1 Mr. George
Armstrong's2 censure is more direct. Prefacing it by the
statement that, "despite the elaborate investigations and
expositions of Mr. E. D. Morel, knowledge of this extra-
ordinary chapter in our diplomatic history is far from
general," and adding that the "publications of the British,
French, and Belgian Foreign Offices" have "completely
confirmee the accuracy" of my statements, he scathingly
denounces the action of our Foreign Office, and concludes
by asking : —

"Could a more damning illustration be imagined of the
possibilities of secret diplomacy as an agent for the em-
broilment of the nations in quarrels in which they have
no interest?"

Mr. G. P. Gooch3 permits me to quote as his considered
opinion that my "critical examination of European diplo-
macy in Morocco deserves the most careful study ; it is
not only one of the few cardinal works on our recent
foreign policy,^ but it supplies several important links in
the chain of events which led up to the war."

And although there are some intellectuals, posing as
historians, who continue studiously to ignore, since they
cannot refute, my contribution to this international
tragedy, which was to become one of the chief com-
bustibles in the great conflagration, I am satisfied that its
endorsement in the works referred to is but the prelude to
a wider recognition that what I wrote was true both in
substance and in fact, and that in writing it I could have
had no motive other than that of serving the interests of
the British people, of the French people, and of inter-
national concord.

It has since transpired that at the very time I was
engaged in making the investigation which resulted in the
appearance of "Morocco in Diplomacy," the Belgian
diplomatic representatives in Berlin, London, and Paris
were expressing to their Government,4 precisely the same

1 "The European Anarchy." (George Allen & Unwin : 2s. 6d.)

2 "Our Ultimate Aim in the War." (George Allen & Unwin:
zs. 6d.)

3 Author of "History of Our Time," "History and Historians
in the Nineteenth Century," and many other historical works.

4 First published in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, and
afterwards by E. S. Mittler & Sons, Berlin. An English edition,
"Belgium and the European Crisis," has been published by the
same firm. That a Spanish edition has been published is apparent

PERSONAL FOREWORD

views in regard to the character of Anglo-French diplo-
macy in this matter as I had been led to form ; that they
were consumed by the same fears as I was in respect to the
outcome, and that they had come to the same conclusions
as I had, reluctantly, and by the sheer weight of evidence
arrived at. And their despatches, be it noted, were
written while the events examined and summarised by me
were in process of accomplishment. I think it may be
safely asserted that never have the statements of an
author dealing with a complicated and intricate inter-
national problem, and without reference to any sources of
information not publicly accessible, received, in that
author's lifetime, such startling and unexpected corrobora-
tion from contemporary diplomatic documents.

That was my second intervention in public affairs, as
affected by and concerned with international diplomacy
lne motive which inspired both was the same In the
case of the Congo I sought, with the help of others, to
emancipate an enslaved race, by ascertaining and publish-
ing the facts and by forcing them upon' the attention of
my countrymen and the world. I also caressed the hope
that it the international conscience could be sufficiently
aroused to bring the intriguing Governments into line on
this primarily human issue, in which the honour of all the
great nations (Russia excepted) was closely involved ■ the
co-operation thus secured might lead to something-' like
agreement between the Governments for an inter-
national treatment of problems, both administrative
economic, and political, connected with the future of
African and Asiatic territories. I felt that if this could be
accomplished, the interests of the native races would
receive greater consideration, and that the chance of
critical disputes arising between the European Govern-

h™ * T.?"' artide *2 -the Cambridge Magazine, and editions
have doubtless, appeared in every European language. Beyond a
brief reference to these documents in The Timet when Thev first
Daolrs Th" reference . theret° has been suppressed in ourneis
K"v? u^7, ex1Stence is unknown to the great mass of
<<Nri f pU?1CVbut- lo"g extracts have been published ?n the
Notes from the Foreign Press," issued by Mrs. Buxton Thev

Ye'ars oTsecrS S ^ Intf?d"Ction to t^third edition of ™2
call fo? their n, 7 TaCy' ^ * Urged that Parliament should
call tor their production as a State-paper. Copious extracts are

&^n.^!S5w*~8 10 them in this volume> -~

PERSONAL FOREWORD

merits would be diminished, seeing that, with one excep-
tion, all the serious European crises of the previous two
decades had originated in quarrels over the disposal, or
exploitation, of areas in Africa and Asia. The first of
these objects was finally attained. The hope that the
dangers and the disgrace resulting from the Congo experi-
ment might lead the Powers seriously to envisage the
possibility of a common policy in Asia and Africa was not,
unhappily, realised.

In the case of Morocco, the demonstration I sought
generally to make was the helplessness of the peoples of
Europe in the face of a secretive and immoral diplomacy,
which might at any moment produce a situation leading
to the wholesale massacre of multitudes. In the present
volume I submit a series of facts and arguments designed
to show that sole responsibility for the war is imputable
to no one country, but to the egotism, ambitions, and
stupidity of the ruling classes in all countries, and to a
common system of international intercourse between
States, which makes it impossible for the peoples, who
neither desire nor make war, to prevent that egotism and
those ambitions from plunging them into fratricidal and
insensate strife. Between the enslavement and exploita-
tion of African peoples at the hands of an evil King and his
bodyguard of financial vampires, and the enslavement and
exploitation of European peoples for whom the issues of
life and death have become, by an abuse of power, the sport
of a handful of public officials, whom no tolerable system
of government should invest with such authority, there is
a difference, not of principle, but only of manifestation and
setting. I assisted in overthrowing the worst example
of the former which has occurred in the last 120 years. I
hope to assist, in however small a way, in swelling the
stream of public purpose which will sweep away the latter.
My standpoint in both cases is identical. The Leopoldian
rule in the Congo was an odious and wicked wrong perpe-
trated upon a section of the human race. The present war
is an abominable outrage upon the whole human race.

And if I am told that in issuing a collection of studies
which establish that all the rights are not on one side
and all the wrongs on the other, but that responsibility
for this terrible war is much more universal than popular
opinion in any of the belligerent countries is yet prepared
to admit, I am injuring the "national cause," my reply
is this : —

PERSONAL FOREWORD

The only cause I recognise as ''national" will be helped
and not injured by this, or any other effort similarly
inspired. That cause is the welfare of the mass of the
British people, who support the fabric of the British Com-
monwealth ; the millions who are suffering and dying on
land and on the sea; the millions who labour and suffer in
the factory, the workshop, the slum ; the men and boys in
the trenches ; the women who wait and watch with strain-
ing hearts ; the children, and the unborn. Their claim to
happiness, their claim to relief, their claim to a tolerable
future, is the only claim that appeals to me in the national
sense. And associated with them, in common rights and
in common wrongs, are those, who, in other lands, also
suffer and perish — victims one and all of the meaningless
phrase, the empty pomp, the poisonous boast of war;
victims one and all of the barbarous Statecraft, the per-
verted religion, the selfish exploitation of caste, and creed,
and vested interest.

CONTENTS

PAGE

Dedication v

Introduction by Philip Snowden, M.P vii

Personal Foreword xi

PART I.

CHAPTER

I. The Outbreak of the War i

II. Belgian Neutrality and European Military

Strategy 14

III. Was Germany Wholly Responsible? 28

IV. Denials and Avowals 35

V. "What will ye do in the end thereof?" 42

VI. France and Germany Before the War 47

VII. The "Pro-German" Taunt 52

VIII. Militarism and the Beast of the Apocalypse 60

IX. The Morocco Intrigue 71

X. European Militarism, 1905-14 91

XI. Germany's Position Before the War Judged by

Frenchmen 97

XII. Secret Diplomacy 104

XIII. An Appeal to President Wilson 114

XIV. Is Truth or is Fiction the Greater National

Interest? 126

XV. Russia's Military Preparations 138

XVI. Russia and the French Three Years' Military

Service Law 148

XVII. European Navalism 156

XVIII. The Spectre of Fear 161

CONTENTS
PART II.

CHAPTER PAGE

XIX. The Union of Democratic Control 169

XX. A Plea for Sanity of Thought 183

XXI. The Interests of Belgium 189

XXII. What is the Object of the War? 196

XXIII. Reactionaries in Germany and Britain 202

XXIV. The Penal Policy 207

XXV. Hate as a Creed «... 215

XXVI. "The Trade War" 2.22

XXVII. German Competition 228

XXVIII. Our National and Imperial Problem 235

XXIX. The Alleged "Conflict of Ideals" 242

XXX. Germany's Human and Economic Problem 249

XXXI. The Eternal International Irritant 255

XXXII. The Way Out •• 261

XXXIII. The Betrayal of the Nation, 1906-11 273

XXXIV. The Betrayal of the Nation, 1912-14 286

XXXV. The Two Roads 301

Epilogue •'•■•■ 3 1(>

I ndex 3 2 '

PART I

CHAPTER I.
The Outbreak of the War1

You cannot afford to disinterest yourselves from foreign affairs. You
cannot afford to remain indifferent to the mechanical organisation
by which that branch of your national affairs is conducted. The last
20 years have seen a steady democratisation of our great public
departments. But the Foreign Office has remained outside that ten-
dency. It continues to be managed under a close Caste-System.
Wealth and aristocratic connections are still considered, the first
always, the second almost always, the indispensable attributes to a
diplomatic career. It is a career closed to men of brains, education,
and intelligence who do not possess those attributes. . . It is my
profound conviction that one of the paramount interests of the people
of this country, and of the people of Germany, is that the friction
which has unhappily existed for some years between them should be
replaced by an honourable understanding. — Extract from the Author's
" Adoption " address to the General Council of the Birkenhead
Liberal Association, November S, igi2.

What is the policy of Great Britain supposing the forces against
Peace prevail? . . . We have not been assured that, come what
may, Great Britain is no party to this dispute and will not allow her-
self to be dragged into it. In the light of the events which took
place last year, when this country found itself within measurable
distance of war with Germany in connection with the Franco-Ger-
man dispute over Morocco, we are warranted in asking that such
an assurance should be given to us. We are, I submit, warranted
in asking that we may be authoritatively assured that if the war
parties on the Continent succeed in dragging the statesmen of
Europe into a desolating conflict, Great Britain stands absolutely
free from any entanglement with any Continental Power. — The
Author, speaking at Birkenhead on the Balkan crisis, December 3,

1Q12.

One of the greatest difficulties will be seen on consideration to be
that of reconciling Colonial participation in British foreign policy,
with a more considerable measure of public control over foreign policy
at home. It is increasingly a matter of legitimate complaint that
the foreign policy of this country is decided outside the nation's know-
ledge, or its will, and that the power of the House of Commons
adequately to discuss or criticise foreign policy has sunk almost to
microscopic proportions. A growing body of thought resents the
perfunctory and occasional manner in which the country is permitted
a rare glimpse into the aims and methods of our foreign policy. This
body of thought is disposed to question the compatibility between
democratic institutions, and the conclusion, without the cognisance
of the House of Commons, of treaties and conventions with foreign

xBeing a letter written to the Executive of the Birkenhead Liberal
Association, published in full in the Birkenhead papers of October
14, 1914. The letter was afterwards, in response to numerous re-
quests, reproduced in pamphlet form.

2 TRUTH AND THE WAR

Powers, which, under certain circumstances, may involve the nation
in war. This feeling has been immensely strengthened by the know-
ledge, which has since become accessible, that the official explana-
tion of our attitude in the Franco-German dispute -over Morocco
last summer twelvemonth, will not now stand the test of reasoned
debate in any public assembly. If it be reasonable that the
Dominions should be consulted in foreign policy, as the natural sequel
to their participation in the defence of the Empire, then, a fortiori, is
it reasonable that the British people should be consulted and kept
informed through the elected representatives of the nation. — The
Author, speaking on " Democracy and Empire," at the Liverpool
Reform Club, as Jhe guest of the New Century Society, January
14, 1Q13.

Now one would think that a nation, faced with these facts which
are not in dispute, would bend its whole energies upon evolving effec-
tive machinery to stop this dry-rot in the national building. And
here I come to the point which I should wish, if you will allow me,
to impress upon you. Under present circumstances we cannot evolve
that machinery, and we never shall evolve it until we realise the
absurd insufficiency of our existing institutions. We have 45 millions
of people in these islands, and we are trying with one Parliament to
do for them what one Parliament would be utterly incapable of accom-
plishing even if it had nothing else to think about than the domestic
needs of these people. . . But this is only half the picture. This
Parliament is the Imperial Parliament as well as the domestic Par-
liament. It is directly responsible, with the Government of India,
for the welfare of 300 millions of people. It is directly responsible,
with the Egyptian Government, for 14 millions of Egyptians and
Sudanese. It is wholly responsible for 43 millions of coloured peoples
in the Crown Colonies and Protectorates. Then this Parliament is
also supposed to be responsible for the conduct and character of our
relations with foreign Powers, and for the great defensive Services,
the Navy and Army, which exist to protect not these shores alone,
but the Empire. . . If you will let your mind dwell upon this situa-
tion for a moment you cannot but realise that we are attempting
the impossible, and that if we go on with the attempt much longer
there will come a point when the over-weighted machine must break
down. There will come a point when any Government, I do not
care what Party it represents, will find the task of Government im-
possible ; and when, if you have in power a statesman of the type
of Palmerston or Disraeli, or the pale prototype or either, he will
plunge you, or try to plunge you, into a great war as the only way
of escape from an intolerable situation. — The Author, speaking on
" Our Social Conditions," at Birkenhead, December 12, 1913.

October 5, 1914.

I AM in receipt of your letter of the 2nd inst., in
which you intimate, in effect, that my prospective
candidature is no longer acceptable to the Liberals of
Birkenhead. Your letter is couched in the courteous and
generous terms which the uniform kindness I have
received from yourselves would have led me to expect.

I would wish to preface my remarks on the wider issue
by saying that I detest as heartily as anyone can do the

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 3

odious and immoral doctrines preached by the politico-
militarist school of Prussia, and inculcated by the philo-
sophy of Nietzsche and Treitschke which have contributed,
exactly to what degree it is difficult to say, but largely
there can be no doubt, to the armed tension of Europe ;
that I condemn as vigorously as anyone can do the blunder-
ing brutality of German diplomatic methods ; that I abhor
as intensely as anyone can do the violation of Belgian
territory and the ruthless treatment meted out tjo the
Belgian civilian population and to certain Belgian towns
by the German armies. Were every counter allegation,
precedently and subsequently brought against the Belgian
civil population by Germany, true, it would not lessen Ger-
many's responsibility one iota. Nor is Germany's moral
responsibility by one fraction lowered because the Russian
troops are alleged to be perpetrating wholesale excesses in
East Prussia. These monstrosities are the accompani-
ment of all wars. Perpetrated in Belgium they reach to
a high pinnacle of shame because Belgian neutrality was
guaranteed by international treaty, above all because Bel-
gium was innocent of any provocative act whatever;1 and I

1 The German Government has since published a number of
official documents discovered in the Brussels archives, on the strength
of which it seeks to establish that the Belgian Government had com-
mitted itself to the Entente long before the war, and had com-
promised Belgium's neutrality. Even if these documents did prove
the German contention, they would not justify Germany's invasion
of Belgium, since they were admittedly discovered months after that
invasion took place. The utmost that they can be held to prove is
that the Belgian Government feared a request from the German
Government for a passage through Belgium of the German armies
in the event of a general European war ; that certain consultations
took place between the Belgian and British military authorities in
that connection, and that the British General Staff had taken pre-
cautions to secure all the topographical and other information
required in view of the contingency of the Entente armies operating
in Belgian territory with or without the active co-operation of the
Belgian army. Whether a neutral Power, potentially threatened,
commits a technical breach of its neutrality^ by consulting with certain
Powers from among the guarantors of its neutrality, is a matter for
the international jurist. That Belgium, seeing herself drifting into
a position of national peril by the increasing tension of the European
situation, would have been well advised to make a public appeal to
all the guaranteeing Powers years ago is undoubted. And if
Belgian foreign policy had been effectually controlled by the Belgian
democracy, one may assume that such an appeal would have been
made. It is equally clear that if any of the Great Powers, who were
not only aware of Belgium's peril, but were contributors towards it,
had been sincerely desirous of shielding their protegde from the con-
sequences of their own rivalries, diplomacy would have raised the
whole question of Belgium de novo, as it was raised by Gladstone

4 TRUTH AND THE WAR

am wholly in accord with the view that future conditions
of peace should include heavy compensation to Belg-ium
for the material damage inflicted upon her and for the
wrongs which she has suffered. I favour this the more
since, as I shall presently show, I believe that the British
Government is also heavily in Belgium's debt; a debt
which the issue of loans and hospitality to refugees do
not liquidate.

These sentiments, however, cannot blind me to the
facts that Germany is not peculiar in possessing a politico-
militarist school whose influence is pestilential ; that we
heard of Machiavelli before we heard of Nietzsche; that a
German Association comprising some 300 of the intellec-
tual elite of Germany published last year a scathing
onslaught upon Bernhardt (1), who himself complains in
his preface that his book is necessary because his views
are not shared by the mass of his countrymen ; that the
sanctity of international law has been flouted by every

and Granville in 1870. But Germany has no ground of complaint
on the score of any technical violation of Belgian neutrality, which
may, or may not, be involved in the Anglo-Belgian military con-
versations preceding the war ; seeing that down to the very last
moment Germany's official representatives continued to assure the
Belgian Government that Belgian neutrality would be respected by
German}^. The documents which Germany has unearthed, then,
while they do strengthen the conviction that Belgium has been,
fundamentally, a victim to the "balance of power," cannot be
regarded as palliating in any way whatsoever Germany's action.
They emphasise, however, that the British Foreign Office was fully
cognisant of what the situation of Belgium would be in the event of
a general European war, and that the British military authorities
were concerning themselves with the matter, as it was their manifest
duty to do, from the time — 1906 — when the military consultations
between the British and French General Staffs were authorised by a
section of the British Cabinet without the knowledge of the Cabinet
as a whole. These documents accentuate, therefore, the moral
responsibility of the Entente Powers towards Belgium, and should
be borne in mind by the reader when perusing Chapters I., II.,
XXXIII., XXXIV., 'and XXXV. of this volume. It is generally
understood that facsimiles of these documents have been widely dis-
tributed throughout the world. The American edition bears the
imprint : "The International Monthly." .Inc. 1123 Broadway, New
York. These documents are quite distinct from the reports of the
Belgian diplomatists in foreign capitals, referred to in Chapters IX.
and XV.

1 Der deutsche chauvinismus. By Professor Otfried Nippold on
behalf of the V eroffentlichungen des verbandes fur Internationale
verstandigung. (Stuttgart : Druck von W. Kohlhammer : 1913). It
is a collection of the utterances of the chief German Jingoes with
appropriate comments,

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 5

Government in turn whenever it considered its vital inter-
ests affected ; that the last decade alone has witnessed a
perfect epidemic of Treaty breaking, and finally, that
despite its bragging- and sabre-rattling, its offensive
diplomatic procedure and the unpleasant claim of its ruler
to co-partnership with the Almighty, Germany is, in point
of fact, the only great European Power which, during the
last forty years, has not indulged in the pastime of war,
apart from the guerilla campaign against a Hottentot
tribe in South-West Africa. I conclude from this that
neither the German people nor yet their Government, have
a monopoly of immorality, treachery, violence, and general
wickedness; that to encourage the state of mind which
fosters this notion is to render a dis-service and not a
service to our people, between whom and the German
people, I, for my part, deem it not unpatriotic to hope for
reconciliation and co-operation in happier days ; is to
impair the judgment and distort the vision of our people
who require no such stimulus to do their duty whatever it
may be ; and is to excite a temper calculated to encourage
a repetition of the errors and a perpetuation of the systems
which have occasioned this cataclysm. Nor do I believe
that militarism, Prussian or other, can be destroyed by
militarism; or that particular constitutions can be imposed
upon a people from outside ; or that the idea that a nation
of eighty millions can be dismembered and reduced to a
position of permanent political inferiority is other than a
delusion. I should not find it possible to support a policy
which proclaimed these aims to be its own and which was
unprepared, after the defeat of the enemy and after the
fear of invasion had passed away, to sacrifice innumerable
lives in the attempt to secure them. If these opinions
conflict with true Liberalism, then it is evident that I have,
somehow, missed what I conceived the spirit of Liberalism
to be.

The real point of divergence between us, I gather, is
concerned rather with the past than with the future. It
is a matter of sincere grief to me that divergence should
exist on what I regard as a matter of principle and one of
immense import to the democracy of this country. On
this point I must be forgiven for speaking quite plainly. I
hold that no Government, certainly no Liberal Govern-
ment, is entitled to undertake obligations towards foreign
Powers involving the use, in certain contingencies, of the
armed forces of the Crown, without consulting Parliament.

(3)

6 TRUTH AND THE WAR

And I submit that when a Government, be it Liberal
or Conservative, having- contracted such liabilities with-
out consulting Parliament, repeatedly states in Parliament
that it has not done so, and only confesses that it has on
the very eve of war, a situation arises whose implications
are really fundamental, because they go to the very root of
our public life and of our national institutions. It is a
situation which is not affected by the necessity of vigor-
ously prosecutjng a war once entered upon — on that all
are agreed. Nor is it affected by the views which may
be generally held as to the causes, the origin, or the
expediency of this war ; nor yet by the ultimate results
which may ensue from the war. It is far simpler and
more direct. I content myself with saying that I am un-
able to accommodate myself to that situation, and on no
consideration whatever could I remain silent on such an
issue.

I may, perhaps, be allowed to recall to you that my
opinions as to the injustice and danger to the democracy
of an autocratic and secret foreign policy have never been
concealed from the Birkenhead electorate. I have fre-
quently adverted to the subject in my speeches, and I have
never had reason to suppose that my statements were
disapproved by my audiences, or that they were incom-
patible with that general exposition of Liberal principles
by me to which you are good enough to make generous
allusion in your letter. My public attitude on that grave
and urgent problem had, moreover, preceded my adoption
as prospective Liberal candidate for Birkenhead. My
public contributions to the secret transactions between the
British and French Foreign Departments which had
characterized the Morocco imbroglio were known in
Birkenhead before my adoption, and my views on the
whole subject of secret diplomacy had been stated beyond
possibility of misconception.

Now, despite the belief, confirmed by official utterances,
that the era of secret engagements towards France had
finally disappeared with the French acquisition of
Morocco, ,rumours arose last year,1 and again in the
opening months of this year,2 that our Foreign Office
had secretly committed us to render assistance to France
in the event of a European War. As France was herself
committed to Russia, this, if true, implied the additional

1 1913-
2i9i4.

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 7

and equally grave objection that our Foreign Policy would
thereby become influenced by that of Russia, towards
which Power the Foreign Policy of France had become
manifestly subservient. The prospect was the more alarm-
ing in view of what had happened and was happening in
Persia. Rumour did not point to the conclusion of a
Treaty, but, as one of the several questions put to the
Prime Minister defined it, to the giving of :

.... assurances which in the contingency of a great
European War would involve heavy military obligations
on this country. ... an obligation arising owing to an
assurance given by the Ministry in the course of diplo-
matic negotiations, to send a very large armed force out
of this country to operate in Europe.

These questions will be found in Hansard 1913, vol. I.,
cols. 42-43; vol.. 1., cols. 1316-7; 1914, voJ. Ixi., col.
1499; vol. lxiii. , cols. 457-8. The replies were categori-
cal. On March nth, 1913, the Prime Minister denied
that such obligations had been contracted or such assur-
ances given. A fortnight later the Prime Minister repeated
the denial in detail. On April 28 of this year the Foreign
Secretary declared that the position had not altered. On
June 11 he assured the House that the Prime Minister's
statement " remains as true to-day as it was a year ago."
These definite affirmations, although treated scoffingly
enough in a great Tory newspaper, assumed, not without
presumptive evidence, to be in the closest touch with
certain influential permanent officials in the Foreign
Office, seemed to dispose once and for all of the truth of
the rumours in question to which I had personally lent
credence.1

On August 3 last, when the tramp of armed legions
had begun to shake the plains of Europe, the Foreign
Secretary revealed to the House of Commons, amid shouts
of approval from the Tory benches, that he had contracted
liabilities towards France as far back as 1906; that they

1 The secret transactions with France are dealt with in Chapters
XXXIII. and XXXIV. The following publications may also be
referred to: "The Candid Review," May, August and November,
1915 ; "The Policy of the Entente," by the Hon. Bertrand Russell
(National Labour Press, 1916, is.); "Belgium and the Scrap of
Paper," by H. N. Brailsford (National Labour Press, 1915, id.);
"What is Diplomacy?" by Charles Hay ward (Grant Richards Ltd.,
1916, 2S. 6d.); "The European Anarchy," by G. Lowes Dickinson
(George Allen and Unwin, 2s. 6d.) ; "La guerre qui vient," by
Francis Delaisi (Paris, 8 rue Saint Joseph, 1911, 25 centimes), etc.

8 TRUTH AND THE WAR

had been renewed on divers occasions since, and that the
final seal had been placed upon them on the previous day,
August 2. These liabilities had taken the form of (a)
authorizing- a plan of military operations on the Contin-
ent of Europe between the British and French General
Staffs, (b) authorizing an arrangement between the
Admiralty and the French Naval Authorities involving a
strategic disposition of the French Fleet favourably
affecting our naval position in the Mediterranean, but
leaving the French northern and western coastline unde-
fended, (c) undertaking to attack the German Fleet if
the German Fleet made a descent upon the French coasts
or interfered with French shipping.

It came, therefore, to this. While negative assurances
were given to the House of Commons, positive acts
diametrically opposed to these assurances had been con-
certed by the War Office and the Admiralty with the
authority of the Foreign Office. All the obligations of an
open alliance had been incurred, but incurred by the most
dangerous and subtle of methods ; incurred in such a
way as to leave the Cabinet free to deny the existence of
any formal parchment recording them, and free to repre-
sent its policy at home and abroad as one of contractual
detachment from the rival Continental groups. When, in
the early days of August, the situation into which the
Government as a whole had drifted, became for the first
time clearly apparent to the Cabinet, two of its members
found themselves unable to concur in what they regarded
as a breach of faith to themselves and to the nation.1
Their standpoint, in a very differing degree of setting and
circumstance, is my own. To-morrow it will, I venture to
predict, be the standpoint of the Democracy of .this
country. For while the policy of contracting obligations
of this kind towards Continental Powers may or may not
be wise, a system which allows of so terrific \ responsi-
bility being assumed by a section of the Cabinet behind
the back of Parliament is not a system which Democracy
can tolerate with safety to itself. And a system which
permits of responsible Ministers rising in Parliament to
deny that which has been planned, prepared, and executed
is not a system to which I, as a believer in the principle

1 The Right Hon. John Burns and Lord Mcrley. Mr. Charles
Trevelyan, a junior member of the Government, also resigned. Other
members of the Cabinet also resigned, but reconsidered their position
when Belgium was invaded : Vide Chapter XXXIV.

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 9

of government by the people for the people, can give my
allegiance. The overwhelming significance of the avowals
of August 3 are to-day obscured amidst the passions
aroused by the war. But they constitute a challenge to
the basic principles of popular government, and Democ-
racy cannot remain indifferent to that challeng-e. It must
take it up. If Liberalism is not behind it when it does
so Liberalism will disappear from our political life.

It is possible that public opinion would have supported
a case for a military and naval understanding with France,
frankly placed before Parliament, on the basis of a Minis-
terial survey of the international situation. But in my
judgment it is quite certain that the support would have
been limited to sanctioning the defence of France if wan-
tonly attacked by Germany on an issue affecting those
two countries alone. There would have been a refusal
to sanction the extension of our liabilities to contingencies
arising out of France's relations with Russia, the one
Power which had nothing to lose and everything to gam
from a general European War. In that way would the
European situation, so far as the Western Powers were
concerned, have been saved. A really Liberal Foreign
Policy, untrammelled by secret obligations, would have
bent all its energies, during the years which followed the
Morocco crisis of 191 1, in an effort to secure that the
impending clash (the portents were writ large upon
the horizon) between Slav and Teuton in the
Balkans should not fling Western Europe into the abyss.
Our Foreign Policy was not free to take that course. It
has been fettered by a naval and military understanding
which bound us to the side, not of France alone, but to
that of Russia, whose general mobilization order of July
31 was the precipitating cause of the war. These fetters
they were which effectually strangled the Foreign Secre-
tary's strenuous efforts to preserve the peace of Europe
during the crisis. He was tied to France, and through
France to Russia. France is at war because of her con-
tract with Russia. We, who deem ourselves at war
because of the outrage upon Belgium, are at war for
precisely the same reason as the French.

The one good thing which might have evolved from
the evil thing which our entanglement itself was, would
have been a frank avowal of its existence in the early days

,o TRUTH AND THE WAR

of the crisis. One of the most pregnant passages in the
White Book is that in which the Russian Foreign Minis-
ter holds this language to our Ambassador :

"He (M. Sazanoff) did not believe that Germany really
wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we
took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would
be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would
flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war."
(No. 17.)

The Minister added, in reply to a remark by our Ambassa-
dor, that :

"unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could
count upon our neutrality."

The fact that we had sacrificed our neutrality in
advance by commitments secret and unsanctioned, but in-
volving the honour of individual Ministers, was the fatal
handicap to a serious attempt to deal with the Belgian
issue, both in the years which preceded and in the opening
days of the crisis. This, and this alone, is the explanation
of the extraordinary manner in which the Belgian issue
was handled. What was the position of Belgium in the
event of a European conflagration involving the Western
Powers? It was a position of exitreme precariousness
despite the international neutrality guarantee of 1839, re-
newed in 1870 for one year only. It was a position which
the actual division of Europe into two rival groups ren-
dered, indeed, almost desperate. For nothing was more
certain than that if the embers, which these rivalries pro-
moted, ever burst forth into stupendous fire, treaties and
conventions, along with constitutions, frontiers, and even
dynasties would be swallowed up in the flames. That, were
this conflagration to eventuate, it would be on the Belgian
plains that the future destinies of Europe would be
decided, was the view of every strategist of repute in
every country. It is noteworthy, however, that the
experts have always omitted from their calculations the
counter-balancing effect of a timely and explicit declara-
tion of British policy. Experts upon international military
strategy are not concerned with the moralities, but with
the manner in which the great killing machines which
Democracy tolerates and feeds to its own undoing, will be

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR n

V:': i .

1 " . ~ '

set in motion when potentates and diplomatists fall out
and the pressure of the war captains becomes irresistible.
And the experts were all but unanimous in concluding that
in the event of a general European War waged on the
basis of the existing divisions in Europe — i.e., an Austro-
German combination on the one side and a Franco-
Russian combination on the other — Germany, to stand any
chance of victory, must strike instantly at France, and
could only hope to strike successfully by striking through
Belgium owing to the impossibility of forcing the defences
of the French frontier. All this was notorious. Equally
notorious was the fact that Germany was perfecting her
military railways and making other strategic preparations
on the Belgian frontier to be ready for the eventuality.
The facts have been published again and again. Mr.
Churchill told us on September 21 last (at Liverpool) that
he had known them for three years, and, of course, he
spoke for his colleagues ; for those of them, at least, whose
business it is to be informed on these matters.

The position of Belgium, then, was such as imperiously
necessitated a clear and unambiguous attitude on the part
of those responsible for directing the Foreign Policy of
Great Britain. The mere existence of the old neutrality
treaty was obviously insufficient to safeguard Belgium's
position since, as Mr. Churchill has told us, the Govern-
ment was aware that Germany would thrust aside that
treaty if, on the outbreak of a European War she were
faced with a Russo^-French combination, a combination
which, in view of the experts, would ensure her defeat
unless she could disable France rapidly by an advance
through Belgium.

Confronted with these circumstances it was a duty owed
by the British Government to its own people, to Belgium,
and to the world, to intimate in clear language to all
whom it might concern, its firm intention of using the
whole might of the Empire against any Power whose
strategic military exigencies might tempt its rulers, in
the event of a general European War, to violate the
neutrality of Belgium. It was the one influence which,
had it been timely exercised — for example, at any moment
within the last two years when our relations with Ger-
many were recovering from the Moroccan trouble — could
have prevented the situation on the Belgian-German fron-
tier from developing to the danger point. There are

i2 TRUTH AND THE WAR

precedents for such warnings conveyed in friendly terms
in time of peace. If the warning- had been disregarded
and German preparations on the Belgian frontier had
persisted, our course was clear. If it had been regarded
we should have had an admirable opportunity of removing
from Germany — under circumstances permitting of the
practicability of the course, not at a moment when an
acute crisis had reached breaking point — the latent fear
that England might encourage a Russo-French aggres-
sion upon her; and thus played the disinterested r61e of
Peace-maker among the nations. Even if such a declara-
tion had been made in the opening days of the crisis it
might still have had a potent effect, because Germany
believed at that moment that we should remain neutral.

But such an attitude was only possible to a Foreign
Policy which, apart from the Belgian issue, was unfettered
by commitments to either European group ; or to a
Foreign Policy which had sought and received national
sanction to an alliance with France, but an alliance limited
to the defence of legitimate French interests, an alliance
unaffected by Russian aims and actions in the Balkans,
an alliance designed to save France from being sacrificed
to a Slav-Teuton quarrel, and in saving France, saving
Belgium, and confining the theatre of potential war to
Eastern and Central Europe.

Such an attitude, unhappily, was not possible, because
our neutrality had been bartered away. Hence it came
about that as on the general issue, so on the Belgian issue,
we maintained a doubtful attitude until the position had
become hopelessly compromised, and until the opportunity
of saving Belgium was lost. Although, as Mr. Churchill
had said, we had been aware of Belgium's peril for three
years, a glance at the White Book will show that the
Belgian question was never raised at all until July 31 last.
On that day we asked Germany, whom for three years we
had been aware would not respect Belgian neutrality in
the event of a war with Russia and France, whether she
would respect it ! We asked France the same question,
although the French plan of campaign had been concerted
with the British General Staff ! And even on that day —
the day upon which war became irrevocable through the
issue of a general mobilization order for all the Russian
armies — the Belgian issue was not presented as a question
of vital British national policy; it might not be a
"decisive" but merely an "important" factor in deter-

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 13

mining our action. (No. 119.) A day later yet — August 1
— it was intimated that the British official attitude on the
Belgian issue would depend upon "public feeling." (No.

The blood of our gallant sons is poured out to-day as
the immediate consequence of the outrage committed upon
Belgium. But the time will come when the country will
ask of those in authority this question : "What did you
do to prevent that outrage?" For my part I put that
question now, and I find the answer in an autocratic and
secret foreign policy to which I have been consistently
opposed, and which I intend to help in rooting out of our
national life.

I believe I am doing a greater service to those who
suffer from its effects and with whom I had hoped to be
associated later on in the accomplishment of that purpose,
by speaking now than by remaining silent, even at the
price of forfeiting your and their good-will. I cannot play
the hypocrite among you.

At any rate, that is the message which seems to come
to me from those dreadful fields of senseless carnage
where millions expiate the sins, the faults, and follies of
the few.

CHAPTER II.

Belgian Neutrality and European Military
Strategy1

Three years ago he gave some attention to the military aspects of the
problem, and he was quite sure that Germany would violate the
neutrality of Belgium. All her plans were made in cold blood to do
that. — Mr. Churchill at Liverpool, September 21, 1914.

German preparations for invading France had been made years
ago. They always intended to go through Belgium. — Mr. Bonar Law
at Belfast, September 2Q, 1914.

The German Staff had for years made no secret of this intention
(going through Belgium), and French military critics had accepted
it as a truism. — Nelson's "History of the War," by Mr. John Buchan
(Thomas Nelson and Sons).

I HAVE been asked by various correspondents for
further information in corroboration of the assertion con-
tained in my letter that military experts were agreed upon
the necessity for Germany — from the standpoint of military
strategy — to seek a passage through Belgian territory in
order to attack France in the hypothesis of a general
European war, and that the German preparations in view
of that eventuality were notorious. Mr. Churchill's
avowal really dispenses me from pursuing the matter,
for in effect it is an avowal that the German intentions and
preparations were known to the British War Office, as,
of course, they were; and to every War Office, for that
matter, in Europe. But, as my correspondents do not
appear wholly satisfied, I append these notes, which make
no pretence to being exhaustive.

The military situation of Germany in the hypothesis
of a general European war has been frequently and
minutely discussed and depicted, as have the measures
taken by her strategists to cope with it, by eminent sol-
diers in many lands, from General Langlois (French) to
General Nogi (Japanese). The German plans, their
character and nature and their inevitability (from

1 Originally published as an Appendix to the pamphlet containing
the Author's letter of resignation to the Birkenhead Liberal Associa-
tion (vide Chapter I).

14

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY AND THE WAR 15

the military standpoint) have been very fully
described and explained by British students of
war and by British publicists in touch with
authoritative military opinion. The best known of
these writing's, perhaps, are those of Colonel Repington,
the military writer on the Times, whose reputation is
international, and whose alleged close association with
high military circles in this country has been the subject of
Parliamentary observation; and of Mr. Hilaire Belloc.
Mr. Belloc's article in the London Magazine of May,
1 91 2, is almost a military classic. The columns of the
Times have abounded in allusions to this subject. The
issues of that paper for January 23 and 30 and February
20, 191 1, and December 3, 1912, as also the Fortnightly
Review for August, 191 1, and the Morning Post (which
has many Service connections) of January 12, 191 1, may
be consulted with advantage. The Belgian papers, the
French military journals of that year and the ensuing
one, and the Belgian Parliamentary debates can also be
referred to; and amongst the published works of military
writers, Colonel Boucher's L'Allemagne en pdril — a signi-
ficant title — published early this year in Paris and Nancy.
But the material is too abundant even to summarise here.

Broadly speaking, these writings and utterances dis-
play a unanimity in estimating the situation and its implica-
tions, and in regarding a German demand for a right of
way through Belgium as being axiomatic in the event of
a general European war. Nor is there any occasion for
surprise in the fact. An explanatory resume may, how-
ever, serve the process of clarification.

Throughout the nineteenth century the danger of
a violation of Belgian neutrality arose from French neces-
sities, strategically considered, of course; these notes are
merely concerned with the strategical side of the question.
In point of fact, the neutralisation of Belgium arose from
the aggressive tendencies of French policy of that time.
In 1870 Napoleon III. and his generals are supposed to
have made all arrangements for a French invasion of Bel-
gium, which the publication that year of the famous draft-
treaty drawn up in 1866 by Benedetti, the French Am-
bassador at Berlin, and Lord Granville's ensuing act in
requiring both France and Prussia to pledge themselves
anew in regard to Belgian neutrality, nipped in the bud.1

1 Vide inter alia: "The Life of Lord Granville," by Lord
Edmond Fitzmaurice ; "Life of Gladstone," by Lord Morley ;
"Modern Europe," by Alison Phillips, etc.

1 6 TRUTH AND THE WAR

Down to the opening years of the present twentieth
century, German strategy, in the hypothesis of another war
with France, would appear to have been based upon a
concentrated offensive through Alsace-Lorraine, whose
annexation as the result of the war of 1870 was, by the
way, insisted upon by the German military chiefs from
the point of view of strategic defence, it being through
those provinces that the French invasions of Germany in
previous times had usually been directed.

But a series of new developments were destined gradu-
ally to transform the entire military outlook as between
Germany and France and to revolutionise the strategic
plans both of the German and of the French General Staffs.
These determining influences have been at once political
and military. The Franco-Russian Alliance, the lessons
of the Russo-Japanese war, the formidable character of
the French defences on the Franco-German frontier, the
perfecting of modern gun-fire, the immense increase in
military effectives, and the need of greater space for their
deployment, are the principal factors, all inter-connected,
which caused these changes.

By general consent, military opinion had reached the
following conclusions. The French lines inside the French
frontier where it faces the German, had become virtually
impassable by an attacking army, however strong, under
modern conditions of warfare, which involves the deploy-
ment of immense forces — greater than at any period in
the world's history — and which gives to the defence,
owing to the destructive character, long range, and invisi-
bility of modern gunfire, a great superiority over the
attack. Between Verdun and Luneville and between
Epinal and Belfort — i.e., along almost the entire length
of the French lines — there was hardly a spot not com-
manded by the fire of heavy guns. The area presents
serious natural obstacles, and these had been enormously
aggravated by an uninterrupted series of batteries, forts,
and entrenched positions. Three narrow gaps did exist :
the Belfort gap, the Luneville-Neufchateau gap, and the
Stenay gap, north of Verdun. But, by common admission,
they were impracticable as avenues of invasion. I need
not go into technical details : they have been set forth at
considerable length by a number of expert writers. As
Colonel Repington has pointed out (191 1), the difficulties
were such as to "almost preclude the notion that the
German strategist will be content to run his head against

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY AND THE WAR 17

a French line of battle in the three narrow trouees left
open to a German invasion."

The problem, then, which faced the German Govern-
ment and the German General Staff, as portrayed by a
mass of authoritative military opinion, may now be briefly
examined in the light of the historical events of the past
twenty years. A general European war waged on the
basis of the existing divisions of Europe meant that Ger-
many would have to face a Franco-Russian combination
of very great numerical superiority. The vulnerability of
the German military position in such circumstances was
Bismarck's haunting obsession, and his policy was cease-
lessly directed to prevent their occurrence. The brilliant
course of studies which Sir Charles Dilke published in the
Fortnightly Review in 1887, and which caused a great
flutter in the diplomatic dovecotes, did much to enlighten
British public opinion on the subject, and the British
Government of the day fully appreciated it. In
the light of actual events it is, indeed, both
curious and instructive to peruse the English
papers of that period, which was one of great
tension. They indicate an appreciation of the anxieties
bulking so largely in the minds of German statesmen, and
a realisation of what the German position would become
if a Franco-Russian alliance were consummated. [In
recent years — i.e., since the actual consummation of that
alliance — all this has been entirely banished from con-
sideration and public discussion, owing to the changed
character of Anglo-German relations. But the problem
itself did not change with the changed character of those
relations.] Thus we find the Standard (February 17,
1887), whose then relations with the Foreign Office were
believed to be close, declaring : —

"Russia can afford to wait. So can France. Ger-
many cannot. Germany must see to its own safety, and
Prince Bismarck cannot reasonably be expected to pass his
declining days impotently watching the silent conspiracy,
for the silent growth of the power of France and the
power of Russia against the Fatherland."

Curiously enough, the German Chancellor used almost
identical language in the Reichstag in 191 4. "France
could wait, but we not. A French inroad on our flank in
the Lower Rhine could have been fatal to us. So we were

18 TRUTH AND THE WAR

forced to set aside the just protests of the Luxemburg
and Belgian Governments."1

Bismarck's success in staving off the danger was not
perpetuated by those who came after him. A Franco-
Russian military alliance was born. Thenceforth the
situation of Germany became one of permanent and un-
questionable peril. The consciousness of that peril became
the dominant factor in the considerations of German states-
men, and under its influence "Prussian militarism" be-
came, in the opinion of all Germans, much as many of
them might detest its manifestations, the one bulwark of
the nation against the dangers which encompassed it.
Writing in 191 1, Colonel Repington remarked: "The
possibility of a war on two fronts is the nightmare of
German strategists, and considering the pace at which
Russia has been building up her field armies since 1905, the
nightmare is not likely to be soon conjured away." An
admission of that kind from a military writer of unques-
tioned authority, who has never troubled to conceal his
anti-German sentiments, speaks for itself. To it may be
added the conclusions of Colonel Boucher in his work,
Germany in Peril, already alluded to. After pointing out
that Germany could not attack France except through
Belgium, and could not attack Russia without having
France "on her back," he concludes: "Germany is, in
a word, condemned to stifle on her own soil from her
surplus production, from her surplus population, and from
the very hugeness of her power." A prospect, it will be
concluded, not altogether pleasing for the party concerned.

From the date of the conclusion of the Franco-Russian
Alliance, German strategy could have but one intelligible
object — to prepare for an immediate offensive against
France in the hope of striking a rapid and overwhelming
blow at the Western foe before the Russian avalanche had
time to gather the full force of its momentum. Any other
policy on the part of the German military chiefs would,
in the opinion of the experts — and no particular knowledge
of military stategy is required to demonstrate its obvious-
ness— have been suicidal from the military point of view

1 It is interesting to recall that within a fortnight of the out-
break of war a general offensive in Lorraine and Alsace was initiated
by the French on a large scale. After seizing the passes of the
Vosges, they took successively Dannemarie, Thann, Mulhouse, and
Saarburg, and overran Upper Alsace almost to the Rhine. They
were then defeated with heavy loss and under circumstances which
have not yet transpired.

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY AND THE WAR 19

in the hypothesis of a general European war. The German
General Staff bent its energies, therefore, upon securing
the mechanical means for that accomplishment. This neces-
sitated raising the military machine — especially in regard to
rapidity of mobilisation and in the construction of strategic
railways — to the highest possible pitch of efficiency. But
the factors already alluded to, arising from the develop-
ments of the past decade, had added immeasurably to the
difficulties of the German General Staff and to the military
danger of the German situation in the hypothesis of a
general European war. At a period which may be said
roughly to date back seven years, or possibly a year or
two earlier, Germany, owing to these developments, found
herself, militarily speaking, compelled to realise that her
armies could not force the French lines inside the French
frontier; in other words, that a German blow at France
by way of the Franco-German frontier was impracticable.
Germany's strategic necessities (i.e., an immediate offen-
sive against France) remaining, of course, unaffected by
this realisation, her General Staff had to work out a plan
for an offensive against France from other bases. What
were the other possible bases? They were Switzerland,
Belgium, and Luxemburg. Switzerland was out of the
question for obvious reasons. There remained Belgium
and Luxemburg. An offensive against France was,
thenceforth, possible only through Luxemburg and Bel-
gium. Failing that, German strategy, in the event of a
general European war on the existing basis of international
relationships, would have to abandon all idea of an offensive
against France, and content itself with standing on the
defensive to await the French onslaught. Germany's
alternative was thus either to give up all idea of striking
a decisive blow at France before Russia had time to con-
centrate her masses and set them in motion, or to obtain
a passage through neutral territory, peacefully if possible,
by force if necessary. In adopting the former attitude she
would have laid herself open to a French invasion through
Alsace-Lorraine, a difficult feat, but not, in expert opinion,
an impracticable one, such as a German forcing of the
French lines had become. She would also have laid her-
self open to a possible invasion through Belgian and
Luxemburg territory, and in view of French records in
the past, Germany's rulers and her General Staff held,
not unreasonably perhaps, that they would be criminal to
run that risk. Rightly or wrongly, the German Govern-

2o TRUTH AND THE WAR

ment and the German military chiefs concluded that Ger-
many could not forego an immediate offensive against
France in the hypothesis of a general European war, with-
out endangering the national existence of their country.

Let me here remark once again that I am engaged in
describing the military situation of Germany in Europe
from 1906 onwards, as known to the Military Depart-
ments of all the European Governments, our own included ;
and as depicted for us by authoritative military opinion
in Europe, including auhoritative British military
opinion. I am not discussing the moralities of the matter
at all. My views as to the moral side of the invasion of
Belgium are given in my letter.1 But those who suppose
that British policy in regard to the passage through Bel-
gium of German or French armies has always been the
fixed quantity it is now represented as being, would do well
to refresh their memories by perusing the literature of
1887, when France and Germany were on the eve of war
over the Schnaebele incident, i.e., before the conclusion
of the Franco-Russian Alliance and before the other
material factors touched upon in these notes had, in com-
bination, rendered a German offensive against France over
the Franco-German frontier — even then extremely hazard-
ous— virtually impossible. A study of the writings of that
time will show that "scraps of paper" are regarded with
very different eyes, according to circumstances, by those
whose purpose it is to influence public opinion either in
one direction or in another. I cannot find, in referring to
contemporary writings, that the suggestion of a possible
demand by Germany, or France, of a right of way through
Belgium should be treated by Great Britain, if such a
demand arose, otherwise than from the point of view of
British interests, and it was argued by many at that time
that British interests would be met by guarantees of a
restoration of the status quo at the conclusion of the war.
British official opinion of those days was probably inter-
preted in the famous letter signed by "Diplomaticus,"
which appeared in the Standard of February 4, 1887, and
which received strong editorial support. Its thesis, that
it would be "madness" for Great Britain to oppose a
passage of German troops through Belgium, was, generally
speaking, endorsed. The Pall Mall Gazette went even
further. After pointing out that considerable importance
was likely to be attached to this thesis, "owing to its
1 Vide Chapter I.

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY AND THE WAR 21

being understood that the Standard is at present the
Governmental and Salisburian organ," the Pall Mall
Gazette went on to argue that the treaties of 1831 and
1839 did not impose upon Great Britain any "obligation"
as regards Belgian neutrality. It editorial of February 4,
1887, concludes an analytical examination of those treaties
as follows : —

"There is, therefore, no English guarantee to Belgium.
It is possible, perhaps, to 'construct' such a guarantee;
but the case may be summed up as follows : (1) England
is under no guarantee whatever except such as is
common to Austria, France, Russia, and Germany; and
(2) that guarantee is not specifically of the neutrality of
Belgium at all; and (3) is given not to Belgium, but to
the Netherlands."

The Spectator of February 5, 1887, remarked : "The
probability is that we shall insist on her (Belgium) not be-
coming the theatre of war, but shall not bar — as, indeed,
we cannot bar — the traversing of her soil."1

I resume, with apologies for this digression. When
once the German strategists had become fully persuaded
that an offensive against France via the Franco-German
frontier had become impracticable, the situation was
accepted, and the German General Staff turned its whole
attention to working out a plan for an offensive against
France via Belgium and Luxemburg, i.e., on the line of
advance Aix-la-Chapelle — Treves. I do not suppose that
the German General Staff invited the military attaches
of the various Powers, or the foreign newspaper repre-
sentatives, to examine on the spot the actual steps which
were being taken. But, apart from that, there appears
to have been no particular secrecy about the German
preparations. How in the nature of things could secrecy

1 Palmerston, who signed the 1839 treaty, appeared to attach but
mediocre importance to it. Replying to Disraeli on June 8, 1855,
about the proposed neutralisation of the Danubian principalities, he
said : "There certainly are instances in Europe of such propositions,
and it has been agreed by treaty that Belgium and Switzerland should
be declared neutral ; but I am not disposed to attach very much
importance to such engagements, for the history of the world shows
that when a quarrel arises and a nation makes war, and thinks it
advantageous to traverse with its army such neutral territory, the
declarations of neutrality are not apt to be very religiously respected."
(Quoted by Brailsford in his "Belgium and the Scrap of Paper.")
The quotation may be commended to those who argue that
Germany's exclusion from the comity of nations is both possible and
desirable after the war.

(4)

22 TRUTH AND THE WAR

have been secured? The matter was openly debated — in
diplomatic terms, of course — in the Belgian Chamber at
the end of 1912, when the Belgian Minister of War made a
notable statement, and the Belgian Press teemed with
articles on the whole subject both in 191 1 and 1912, much
difference of opinion manifesting itself. Indeed, during
the course of the struggle in England to obtain humane
treatment for the natives of the Congo and the observance
by King Leopold and the Belgian Government of the
clauses of the Berlin and Brussels Acts, it was a constant
practice on the part of the apologists of Leopoldianism
in England to allege that the British reform movement
was to be deprecated because it would "drive Belgium into
the arms of Germany."

To talk about Germany's "secret preparations" in this
respect is picturesque, and helps to keep up the idea of
Machiavellism about German policy which it is considered
desirable to maintain. But in point of actual fact,
although German diplomacy was, throughout, dishonest,
as diplomacy always is, Germany's preparations on the
Belgian frontier became in due course as notorious as the
object of them had precedently become. The strategists
and military writers knew all about them in substance,
and their knowledge could only have been acquired through
the usual military and secret service channels. Moreover,
German military writers themselves do not appear to have
been in the least concerned to disguise the facts. For
example, General Van Faulkenhausen, in his Der Grosse
Krieg der Zelztzeit (quoted in the Times, 191 1), assumed,
as a matter of course, that Belgian territory would be
violated in the event of a general European war. Military
writers, British and others, told us that when Germany
perceived she must revolutionise her whole military plans,
she forthwith began a great work of strategic railway con-
struction, flanking the whole front Aix-la-Chapelle —
Treves, linking up these new lines with the main lines
and military centres at Mainz, Cologne, Bonn, and
Coblentz. They told us, as far back as 191 1, that the
detraining platforms at Metz had been gradually trebled,
and that between Aix-la-Chapelle and Trois Vierges a fresh
base of concentration for an army was in course of pre-
paration; that, in addition to these railways, "double
lined and metalled for heavy traffic," sidings had been
provided at all the stations and at suitable points between
them; that between Montjoie and St. Vith landing spaces

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY AND THE WAR 23

sufficient for over 120,000 men had been provided; that
small stations (such as Munster, Rotgen, Montjoie, etc.,
etc.), with no traffic at all, had been provided with plat-
forms, "some of which extended over half a mile." They
told us of entrenched camps in proximity to the Belgian
frontier, of the accumulation of trucks, stores, and so on
and so forth.

A word has now to be said about French policy and
strategy on the hypothesis of a general European war. It
has been recently suggested in various quarters that if
Germany had not attacked France, France would not have
attacked Germany. But this can only be in the nature of
an after-thought. Had there been even a question of
France's remaining neutral if Russia became involved with
Germany, no general war would have taken place, Belgium
would not now be the theatre for the contending armies of
four Powers, and Britain would not be lamenting the death
of thousands of her gallant sons. That the German
Government did not desire war with France, the White
Book and the accessory documents in combination
definitely establish. When, on August 1, there seemed a
chance that the British Government might be disposed to
attempt to use its good offices with a view to securing
French neutrality in the event of a Russo-German conflict,
the rulers of Germany instantly responded. The German
Ambassador in London wired the Chancellor that he had
told Sir Edward Grey he (the Ambassador) thought Ger-
many would agree. The Chancellor wired back confirm-
ing. The Kaiser wired to King George to the same effect
(vide documents h, i, j, in Price's The Diplomatic History
of the War). The hope turned out to have been due to a
misunderstanding between Sir Edward Grey and the Ger-
man Ambassador in the course of a telephonic conversation
(vide Sir Edward Grey's statement in the House on
August 28).

The language used by the French Ambassador at
Petrograd to Sir George Buchanan, the British
Ambassador, on July 24 (No. 6 White Book), and by
M. Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, to Sir
Edward Grey on July 30 (No. 105 White Book), are
explicit in the sense that the French Government had no
intention of remaining neutral. So much for that.

As to French strategy. Since the Franco-Russian
Alliance, French military writers have been divided in their
views as to the strategy to be followed by the French

24 TRUTH AND THE WAR

armies in the event of a general European war. Two of
the most recent French military works are those by Lieut. -
Colonel A. Grouard and by Colonel Arthur Boucher respec-
tively.1 Lieut. -Colonel Grouard, while admitting that
upon the outbreak of such a war France would probably
be invaded before her preparations were complete, argues,
nevertheless, that the offensive should be taken "as rapidly
as possible," and that the efforts of the French should be
directed against Southern Alsace, with Thionville as main
objective. No attempt should be made to cross the Rhine
until the French armies held the complete mastery of the
left bank of that river. The capture of Thionville would
be followed by an attack upon Germersheim, and with the
capture of the latter place, the interests of France would be
to secure terms of peace based upon the restoration of
Alsace-Lorraine. Colonel Boucher (author of two previous
and well-known works, The Offensive against Germany
and France Victorious in the War of To-Morrow) also
believes in making all preparations for a rapid counter-
offensive. "If by the eleventh day Germany has not
crossed our frontier, it is we who will cross hers by taking
the direct offensive." Both authors appear to regard it
as a matter of course that France will intervene in a Russo-
German war. Colonel Boucher is particularly emphatic.
He points out — with a veracity which some British writers
have failed to imitate — that Germany's new military lav/
of 1913 was "to guard against the Slav danger." Ger-
many, he says, "does not doubt that France, remaining
immutably faithful to her treaties, would support her ally
with all her strength, choosing, however, the most favour-
able moment to intervene. ..."

With the penetrating logic and philosophy peculiar to
the French mind, Colonel Boucher has given what is, per-
haps, the truest picture of the conditions which prevailed
in Europe at the dawn of the year of grace 1914. The
passage is worth reproducing in full : —

"Strange is the situation in which France finds her-
self ! It is regret at having lost her two fine provinces of
Alsace and Lorraine, which have remained so piously
attached to us; it is our unshakable determination to
succeed in wresting them from the domination of their
invaders and our hope to see once again the Tricolour

1 La guerre e'ventuelle (Paris, Librairie Chapelot, 1913) and
L' Allemagne en piril, op. cit.

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY AND THE WAR 25

waving from their public buildings; it is, therefore, a
question of sentiment which is, above all, the cause of our
hostility towards Germany, and this hostility compels
us to undertake in the Triple Entente, covered by
France and Russia, the protection of the vital
interests of our allies and friends. For if we are
victorious, Europe is for ever delivered from German
domination; simultaneously Slavism has hurled
Germanism to earth; Russia becomes completely free to
consolidate her immense Empire by increasing it. If we
are victorious, England remains the mistress of the seas;
her fleet has no longer anything to fear from that of
Germany; her trade is sheltered from competition. In
order to resist attacks which threaten her on all sides,
Germany is compelled to develop her military power to the
supreme point, and, in the ultimate resort, this power
becomes concentrated against us. ..."

Enough has now, I think, been said to answer the
query raised by my correspondents. But in order to link
up the strategic situation of Germany in the reader's mind
with the international position as established by the exist-
ing divisions of Europe, and thus to clarify the whole
story, it may be useful to recapitulate the leading points.
Point I. The Franco-Russian Alliance was the product of
various causes. A discussion of them would be out of
place here. The alliance has been alternately represented
to the British public as defensive and offensive, according
to the tendencies prevailing in governing circles at the
moment. It has been regarded in Germany as a permanent
menace, and as tilting the so-called "balance of power"
heavily against her. From the moment of its conclusion
Germany's military position became, in strict fact, what-
ever it may have been in motive, a defensive attitude
against vastly superior potential forces.1 Point II '. If that
alliance — the exact terms of which have not been published
— implied French aid to Russia in the event of a Teuton-
Slav conflict over the Balkans and over the position of
Austro-Hung-ary (as we see by the White Book that it
did), then an immediate offensive by Germany against
France was axiomatic, and was known so to be by every
Government in Europe. Point HI. The only feasible line,
strategically speaking, of German advance against France
lay, in the opinion of experts, through Belgium and

1 Vide Mr. Llovd George's speeches in 1908 and 1914 — Chapters
X. and XXXIII.

2b TRUTH AND THE WAR

Luxemburg., Point IV. The German General Staff was
known to have made all preparations for that eventuality,
and a request by Germany to Belgium for a right of way
was as certain in 191 4 as it was probable in 1887. These,
for the past decade, have been the fixed and positive factors
of the European situation in the hypothesis of war —
eliminating the factor of British policy towards that
eventuality and in the causes which might bring it about.
The uncertain factor in the European situation has been the
attitude of the Liberal Cabinet, and the more closely the
effects of that attitude are studied through a restored
faculty of critical judgment in the minds of the British
people, the more certainly will that attitude be condemned.
It made extension of the war to the western area inevitable.
For, on the one hand, our diplomacy, secretly pledged to
France (and, therefore, to Russia, without, be it noted,
even a knowledge of the exact text of the French and
Russian Alliance !), refused to declare itself, despite the
repeated requests of the French and Russian Governments.
And, on the other, our diplomacy, thus secretly pledged,
was prevented from playing cards on the table with Ger-
many in the matter of Belgium, which was the key to the
situation, as these notes prove. Not only did our diplo-
macy fail to raise the Belgian issue with Germany until
the very last moment, and then only in a manner lacking
both in definiteness and precision, although it was aware
that Belgium would be involved as a matter of course if
war broke out; but when our diplomacy did eventually raise
that issue it declined to say that Great Britain would
remain neutral even if Belgian neutrality were not violated,
and even if Germany, as the result of a victorious war,
refrained from availing herself of her victory in order to
secure any of the French Colonial possessions (No. 123), 1

1 The inquiry was made by the German Ambassador on August 1,
1914. Sir E. Grey afterwards stated, in effect, that the German
Ambassador's inquiries were made on his own personal initiative and
lacked official authority. (August 27.) This incident remains one of
the unexplained mysteries of the negotiations. Why was the con-
versation recorded and subsequently published in the White Book-
where it stands out as one of the really crucial documents — if it had
been merely informal? Is it usual for an Ambassador to make
pregnant proposals off his own bat? Considerable care is taken in
connection with several documents in the White Book to differentiate
between a personal communication and an official communication ;
for instance, in No. 3 it is recorded that the Austrian Ambassador
"explained privately," and in No. 10 we are told that the German
Ambassador "asked me privately." Why, then, does the interview

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY AND THE WAR 27

and it made no effort whatsoever to secure the neutrality
of France in a Russo-German quarrel. If British diplo-
matic policy, nominally in the hands of Sir Edward Grey,
but really in the hands of the permanent officials, was a
peace policy, it failed through sheer incapacity and incom-
petence. If it was a war policy, its success is its
condemnation.

of August 1 — as published in No. 123 — contain no indication to the
effect that the Ambassador was merely speaking in his personal
capacity? It is, moreover, apparent from the German Ambassador's
telegram to his Government (dated 8.30 p.m., August 1, vide
Price, p. 411) that he had been acting on "instructions," and the
general character of his inquiries — as recorded in No. 1.23 — cannot
be said to have been in disaccord with the tone of the telegrams the
Kaiser and the German Minister for Foreign Affairs were even then
despatching from Berlin. It would have been a simple matter, one
would have thought, if Sir E. Grey was doubtful about the German
Ambassador's authority, to have ascertained by wire whether the
Ambassador was speaking for himself or for his Government. It
would have constituted at least an attempt to save Belgium and
England's entry into the war

CHAPTER III.
Was Germany wholly responsible?1

It is clear that the closer the stud}' of the negotiations which led up
to the world disaster are studied, the more impossible it is to put
the blame entirely upon the shoulders of any one European State ;
and the more the evidence is sifted, the stronger becomes the con-
viction that the responsibility for the failure of diplomacy to save
the civilisation of Europe must be laid at the door of all the
European Chancelleries without distinction. — "The Diplomatic
History of the War," by M . Philips Price (George Allen and Unwin :
second edition).

THERE is a disposition to regard the discussion of
the immediate origin of the war as out of place.
But hardly a day passes without some eminent author or
historian contributing his quota to the subject, the con-
clusion being invariably that Germany and Germany alone
was to blame. To hazard a doubt as to the accuracy of
some of the facts put forward in support of this conclusion
is denounced as unpatriotic. But is it unpatriotic to hope
for an eventual reconciliation beween the British and
German peoples ? The British and German peoples hold with
unquestionable sincerity that each is wholly in the right. It
might or might not be desirable to withhold discussion
until the combatants on either side — for the most part as
innocent of the causes which flung them into the death-
grapple as the unborn babe — were mercifully released
from their present occupation. That must be a matter
of opinion. But in actual fact, non-combatant diplomatists
and publicists on both sides decline to do so, and their
main object appears to be to pile fresh fuel on to the flames
of hatred. Under the circumstances it cannot be wrong
to ask for enlightenment on a point of very considerable
importance, and which remains — for many of us at least —
wrapped in doubt and obscurity.

May I indicate it? Until the other day most people
who have really studied the available evidence would, I
imagine, have agreed in fixing the main responsibility for

1 The Labour Leader, October 8, 1914.

28

WAS GERMANY WHOLLY RESPONSIBLE? 29

the immediate origin of the war upon Austria's intem-
perance in dealing- with Servia, upon Germany's inability
or unwillingness to hold Austria back, and upon Russia's
sudden orders for a general mobilisation after the Austro-
Russian "conversations," momentarily broken off, had
been resumed.

But with the appearance of Sir M. de Bunsen's
despatch, issued as a special White Paper (Cd. 7596), we
are virtually asked to revise that view and to conclude
that Austria was Germany's catspaw, and that Germany
rushed into war, compelling Austria to follow, when Aus-
tria had, in effect, given way to Russia's demands. I am
unaware that a single newspaper in this country has read
anything but this in Sir M. de Bunsen's despatch.

The more that despatch is studied, however, the more
difficult does it become for some of us to reconcile its
tenour with contemporary documents. For example, in
discussing the actions of the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment, Sir M. de Bunsen remarks : —

"Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and
declaration of war against Servia by a partial Russian
mobilisation against Austria. Austria met this move by
completing her own mobilisation, and Russia again
responded with results which have passed into history."
(p. 2.)

The first sentence agrees with the White Book (Cd.
7467). But if "completing her own mobilisation" means,
as I assume it to mean, general mobilisation, then the
inference here is that the Austrian general mobilisation
preceded the Russian. But Sir M. de Bunsen's despatch in
the White Book announcing the Austrian general mobilisa-
tion is dated August 1 (No. 127), and Russia gave orders
for a general mobilisation in the night of July 30, and
announced it in the morning of July 31 (Nos. 11 2-1 13).1
Which is right? Obviously the date is of capital im-
portance.2

Sir M. de Bunsen further states :

"Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg
and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute

1 Mr. Stephen Graham was in a village as far away from St.
Petersburg as the Mongolian frontier, and the telegram to mobilize
came through at 4 a.m. on July 31. (Vide: Times, September 11,
1914, and Price "The Diplomatic History of the War."

2 Mr. Philips Price has since called attention also to this grave
discrepancy in the second edition of his valuable work.

30 TRUTH AND THE WAR

to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between
Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on July 31 by
means of her double ultimatum to St. Petersburg and
Paris." (p. 3.)

What is singular in the above passage is the omission
of the Russian general mobilisation order, which was,
admittedly, the immediate cause of the German ultimatum.
Can any useful purpose be served by sliding over what
Germany alleges to have been the determining factor in
her action, viz., the Russian general mobilisation?

Again, if Austria was as anxious to come to terms as
Sir M. de Bunsen states, how is it that Sir G. Buchanan,
in reporting the general Russian mobilisation order, should
have given as its compelling cause, a :

"... report received from Russian Ambassador in
Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield
to intervention of Powers, and that she is moving troops
against Russia as well as against Servia. " (No. 113.)

In fine, Sir M. de Bunsen reports the Russian Am-
bassador at Vienna to be "working hard for peace" (p. 3)
and as conducting negotiations in the most hopeful spirit
of compromise, at the very moment when, according to
Sir M. de Bunsen 's colleague at St. Petersburg, this same
Russian Ambassador is telegraphing his Government that
Austria is utterly irreconcilable ! These things do not
hang together. What is the explanation?

Again, how are we to explain Sir M. de Bunsen's main
implication, viz., a Germany determined to drag Austria
into war, together with his casual treatment of the Russian
general mobilisation, with the despatches from his
colleagues, at Berlin and St. Petersburg, which do not
harmonise in the least with his? To mention but one
instance. Sir G. Buchanan seems to have been under no
illusion as to the probable consequences of a general
Russian mobilisation. He told M. Sazanoff as early as
July 25 :—

"... that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be
content with mere mobilisation or give time to Russia to
carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once."
(No. 17.)

And if justice in controversy is permissible in a state of
war, it is but the barest justice to Germany's statesmen to

WAS GERMANY WHOLLY RESPONSIBLE? 31

recall that they never concealed what the consequences of
a Russian general mobilisation would be from the British
Ambassador, as the White Book bears witness. A Russian
general mobilisation, therefore, meant war (whether
Germany was justified in regarding it as tantamount to a
declaration of war is another matter). It meant war in the
opinion of the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. But
the event is barely referred to in Sir M. de Bunsen's
subsequent presentation of the siuation preceding the out-
break, and v/hen he does refer to it the reference is accom-
panied by a confusion of dates which seems to affect his
presentation in a very vital manner.1

I pass over the charges of secret mobilising brought
against Germany by Russia and against Russia by Ger-
many, because it is not yet possible to compare their
respective accuracy. But numerous quotations might be
given from the White Book, did space allow, which con-
flict squarely with Sir M. de Bunsen's implications, or with
the implications which have been read into his despatch —

1There is an impartial and exhaustive analysis in "The Diplomatic
History of the War" (supra) of the official and unofficial evidence as to
the respective dates of mobilization by the various belligerent Govern-
ments. From this analysis — the accuracy of which has not, so far
as I know, been disputed — it is possible to obtain a clear idea of the
actual facts. In reading the summary which follows, the reader
must bear in mind that Germany's capacity to give rapid effect to a
mobilization order was greater than that of any of the other
belligerents. On the other hand, the attempts which have been made
to represent Germany's fears of Russia, and the panic which swept
over Berlin when news of the general Russian mobilization was
received on July 31, as "pro-German" concoctions, because Russian
mobilizing powers were necessarily slower than Germany's, must be
accepted with caution. As a matter of fact, within five days of the
outbreak of war, two powerful Russian armies had invaded East
Prussia. They defeated the Germans at Gumbinnen, invested
Koenigsberg, and occupied Tilsit. Before the end of August, Petro-
grad was wild with joy, and ,£20,000 had been raised to present to
the first Russian soldier who entered Berlin.

July 25 — Austria mobilizes against Serbia (i.e, partial mobiliza-
tion).

July 28 — Russia mobilizes against Austria (i.e., partial mobiliza-
tion).

July 30 (in the night) — Russia issues a general mobilization
order (i.e., against Germany and Austria).

July 31 — Germany proclaims a state of martial law.

July 31 (midnight) — Germany summarily demands a demobiliza-
tion of the Russian army within 12 hours, in default of which
Germany will mobilize.

July 31 (at the earliest; the British White Book gives August 1)
— Austria orders a general mobilization (i.e., against Russia).

August 1 (afternoon) — Germany issues a general mobilization
order.

32 TRUTH AND THE WAR

whichever may be preferred. Apart from the White Book,
documents exist which strengthen the doubts raised by a
study of Sir M. de Bunsen's despatch. For example, the
Times' Berlin correspondent, who can hardly be suspected
of German sympathies, reported on July 27 (Times, July
28) :—

"Germany is certainly and no doubt sincerely working;
for peace. ' '

And the Times, commenting thereon, declared : —

"If this be the case, as we trust and believe it to be,
peace ought, with a little further exertion, to be secured."

Again, the former Berlin correspondent of the New
Statesman, writing from London, in the issue of that
periodical dated August 25, states : —

"Now that war is come I can commit an indiscretion
and recount an incident over which before my lips were
sealed. There was some agitation in the reactionary Press
for the suppression of the Socialist peace meetings on the
ground that they weakened the policy of the country. On
the morning of the day on which the meetings were held
an important official of the Social Democratic Party was
summoned to the office of the Imperial Minister of the
Interior and there informed that not only had the Govern-
ment no intention of forbidding the peace meetings, but
that all precautions would be taken against their dis-
turbance, and that the Government hoped that the
Socialists would continue their agitation with the utmost
energy. And this they did up to the moment when martial
law was declared and further action was useless."

The accuracy of that statement has since been con-
firmed in a letter which has reached Mr. Ramsay Mac-
donald from Sweden from one of the German Socialist
leaders. On August 1 the Westminster Gazette published
from its correspondent in Berlin, Mr. Crozier Long, the
text of a despatch to the German Ambassador at Vienna,
communicated to Mr. Long by the German Government,
and reading as follows : —

"Berlin, July 30, 1914. — The report of Count Pour-
tales [German Ambassador at St. Petersburg] does not
harmonise with the account which your Excellency has
given of the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment. Apparently there is a misunderstanding, which I

WAS GERMANY WHOLLY RESPONSIBLE? 33

beg you to clear up. We cannot expect Austria-Hungary
to negotiate with Servia, with which she is in a state of
war. The refusal, however, to exchange views with St.
Petersburg would be a grave mistake. We are indeed
ready to fufil our duty. As an ally we must, however,
refuse to be drawn into a world conflagration through
Austria-Hungary not respecting our advice. Your
Excellency will express this to Count Berchtold with all
emphasis, and great seriousness. — Bethmann-Hollweg. "

Are we to conclude that the Times was misinformed;
the German Socialists (but to what purpose, if so?) pur-
posely misled, and the telegram of July 30 communicated
to Mr. Crozier Long a forgery? It may well be, but I
am not aware that it has been so stated — still less proved.
The telegram bears out the repeated assurances given to
Sir E. Goschen by the German Chancellor as to the efforts
the German Government was making to hang upon Aus-
tria-Hungary's coat-tails, and although those efforts may
not have been as energetic as they might and should, and
although they were handicapped by the German Govern-
ment's original and fatal miscalculation as to Russia's
intentions if Austria pushed her quarrel with Servia to the
uttermost, Sir Edward Grey certainly believed in their
genuine character. Otherwise, he would hardly have tele-
graphed as he did to the British Ambassador at Berlin on
July 29 :—

"If he [the German Chancellor] can induce Austria to
satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come
into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude
to his Excellency for having saved the peace of Europe."
(No. 77.)

Finally, can Sir M. de Bunsen's despatch be recon-
ciled with, for example, the repeated statements of Austro-
Hungarian statesmen that the underlying issues of the
quarrel with Servia involved the very existence of the
Dual Monarchy; with such despatches as Nos. 18, 76, and
95, in the latter of which Sir M. de Bunsen himself tele-
graphed (July) :—

"The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the
German Ambassador at Vienna is instructed to speak
severely to the Austro-Hungarian Government against
acting in a manner calculated to provoke European war."

34 TRUTH AND THE WAR

And with No. 97, in which Sir G. Buchanan reports that
in the course of an interview with M. Sazonoff, the German
Ambassador "completely broke down on seeing that war
was inevitable." According to Sir M. de Bunsen's later
interpretation of the position, that German representative
should have rejoiced.

My object in writing is simply to ask whether a further
consideration of accessible data may not cause a modifica-
tion of the judgment occasioned by Sir M. de Bunsen's
despatch. For my part, I believe strongly that it is never
impossible to appeal to the British sense of fair-play, what-
ever the circumstances of the moment may be, and even
the horrors of his appalling catastrophe will not leave such
enduring bitterness behind them as a charge of calculated
perfidy, if that charge is unjust and untrue. I do not say
that it is. But there are many others besides myself who
cannot reconcile the implications of that despatch with
other contemporary documents. We are all aware of
Germany's blunders and Germany's faults. But this
charge suggests a perfidiousness which, in the absence of
conclusively-corroborative evidence and in the face of
contradictory evidence, is not credible as now presented.

CHAPTER IV.
Denials and Avowals1

In the debate on the Address on March 10, 1913, Lord Hugh
Cecil said : The right hon. gentleman and his colleague are generally
believed — I speak with the utmost diffidence in regard to allegations
which may not be well founded — to have entered into an arrange-
ment, or, to speak more accurately, to have given assurances, which
in the contingency of a great European war would involve heavy
military obligations on this country. We do not suspect the Prime
Minister or the Foreign Secretary of pursuing anything but a pacific
foreign policy, and we are far from saying that their policy is in any
way an aggressive one ; but certainly we believe, if the stories current
are true, the policy, if it is not to be regarded as an aggressive one,
is adventurous.

The Prime Minister : Will the noble lord define a little more
definitely what he means?

Lord H. Cecil : I am only anxious not to use words w_hich will
convey anything but perfectly fair criticism in a matter of this sort,
and any ambiguity in what I have said is due to the fact that I do
not wish to go beyond the necessities of the case.

The Prime Minister : I do not complain.

Lord H. Cecil : There is a very general belief that this country
is under an obligation, not a treaty obligation, but an obligation
arising owing to an assurance given by the Ministry in the course
of diplomatic negotiations, to send a very large armed force out of
this country to operate in Europe. This is the general belief.
It would be very presumptuous of anyone who has not access to all
the facts in the possession of the Government. . . .

The Prime Minister : I ought to say that it is not true.

Lord H. Cecil : I am very glad to have elicited that explanation.
(Hansard, 1913. Vol. L., cols. 42, 43.)

On March 24, 1913, Sir William Byles asked the Prime Minister :
Whether he will say if this country is under any, and, if so, what
obligation to France to send an armed force in certain contingencies
to operate in Europe ; and if so, what are the limits of our agree-
ments, whether by assurance or treaty, with the French nation.

Mr. King asked the Prime Minister : (1) Whether the foreign
policy of this country is at the present time unhampered by any
treaties, agreements, or obligations under which British military
forces would, in certain eventualities, be called upon to be landed on
the Continent and join there in military operations ; and (2) whether,
in 1905, 1908, or 191 1, this country spontaneously offered to France
the assistance of the British army, to be landed on the Continent to
support France in the event of European hostilities?

1 The Labour Leader, December 3, 1914. Written in reply to
an attack upon the Author by Professor Conway.

35

36 TRUTH AND THE WAR

The Prime Minister : As has been repeatedly stated, this country
is not under any obligation not public and known to Parliament
which compels it to take part in any war. In other words, if war
arises between European Powers there are no unpublished agree-
ments which will restrict or hamper the freedom of the Govern-
ment or of Parliament to decide whether or not Great Britain should
participate in a war. The use that would be made of the naval
and military forces if the Government and Parliament decided to
take part in a war is, for obvious reasons, not a matter about which
public statements can be made beforehand.

— (Hansard, 1913. Vol. L., cols. 1316-7.)

On April 28, 1914, Mr. King asked the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs : Whether he is aware that demands have recently
been put forward for a further military understanding between the
Powers of the Triple Entente with a view to concerted action on the
Continent in case of certain eventualities, and whether the policy of
this country still remains one of freedom from all obligations to
engage in military operations on the Continent?

Sir E. Grey : The answer to the first part of the question is
in the negative, and as regards the latter part the position now
remains the same as stated by the Prime Minister in answer to a
question in this House on March 24, 1913.

— (Hansard, 1914. Vol. LXI., col. 1499-)

On June 11, 1914, Mr. King asked the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs whether any naval agreement had been recently
entered into between Russia and Great Britain ; and whether any
negotiations with a view to a naval agreement have recently taken
place or are now taking place between Russia and Great Britain?

Sir William Byles asked the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs whether he can make any statement with regard to an alleged
naval agreement between Great Britain and Russia ; how far such
an agreement would affect our relations with Germany ; and will he
lay papers?

Sir Edward Grey : The hon. member for North Somerset asked a
similar question last year with regard to military forces, and the
hon. member for North Salford asked a similar question also on the
same day as he has again done to-day. The Prime Minister then
replied that, if war arose between European Powers, there were no
unpublished agreements which would restrict or hamper the freedom
of the Government or of Parliament to decide whether or not Great
Britain should participate in a war. The answer covers both
the questions on the Paper. It remains as true to-day as it was
a year ago. No negotiations have since been concluded with any
Power that would make the statement less true. No such negotia-
tions are in progress, and none are likely to be entered upon so far
as I can judge. But if any agreement were to be concluded that
made it necessary to withdraw or modify the Prime Minister's
statement of last year which I have quoted, it ought, in my opinion,
to be, and I suppose that it would be, laid before Parliament.

—(Hansard. Vol. LXIII., cols. 457-8.)

PROFESSOR CONWAY charges me with mis-
representing "plain facts." He finds the proof
of this in a passage of my letter of resignation
to the Birkenhead Liberal Association, which the
Labour Leader reproduced. In the particular

DENIALS AND AVOWALS 37

passage which he quotes I had endeavoured to
summarise in "plain," i.e., in non-diplomatic language,
the revelations, uttered in diplomatic language, by the
Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons on August 3.
I gather Professor Conway's main argument to be that
the Anglo-French military and naval "conversations,"
authorised by the Foreign Secretary and by some of his
colleagues, had no substantial bearing upon the formation
of British foreign policy, because, in authorising them, the
Foreign Secretary had expressly reserved the ultimate
freedom of the Government and of the House of Com-
mons to endorse them or otherwise. The fact that the
Foreign Secretary declined to take the final plunge until
August 2, although pressed to do so by the French Ambas-
sador, appears to Professor Conway to convey additional
evidence of his contention. Indeed, your correspondent
goes so far as to say : —

"... Down to August 2 it was entirely open to the
House of Commons to decide as it liked the whole policy
to be pursued in relation to the crisis."

Let us, then, examine once again, since Professor Con-
way will have it so (although for my part, it appears to me
not wholly desirable at this moment), the "plain facts"
which I have so "wantonly" misrepresented. And let us
examine them in such a way that the plain man, who is
neither professor nor diplomatist, may root them in his
mind once and for all.

The House of Commons, and through the House of
Commons, the country, was solemnly assured on four
occasions, twice in 1913, and twice in 1914, that our
foreign policy was entirely free from any sort or kind of
secret obligation towards a Continental Power calculated
to involve the blood of its manhood being squandered on
the plains of Europe, if the various Governments of the
Continent found it impossible at a given moment to control
their tempers and their appetites. Similar assurances were
given by other members of the Cabinet. At least I pre-
sume so, judging from my own personal experience. Mr.
Runciman, President of the Board of Agriculture, sitting
by my side and speaking on behalf of my candidature at
Birkenhead on April 14, 191 3, denied "in the most
categorical way" (to use his own words) the existence of a
"secret understanding with any foreign Power." At the
conclusion of his speech, a speech mainly devoted to
denouncing Conscription and "inevitable wars," which he

(5)

38 TRUTH AND THE WAR

described as wars "in which we are involved owing to
some understanding with other Powers," I expressed
my relief to have heard his declaration.

I pause here to ask, and to suggest that my readers
should ask themselves why were the questions which
elicited these assurances put to Ministers in the House?
Why did Mr. Runciman make that "categorical" state-
ment at Birkenhead ? It was because there were a certain
number of men inside and outside the House of Commons
who had reason to believe that there did exist an
unavowed military and naval understanding authorised
by the British and French Foreign Offices, and that that
understanding was the dominating factor in British
foreign policy. In my own case — for Mr. Runciman's
declaration was the result of precedent public statements
made by me — a study of French newspapers and maga-
zines, together with information received from French
correspondents, coupled with a pretty complete know-
ledge of the undersides of the Moroccan affair of 1912,
had convinced me that the secret diplomacy of the two
Foreign Offices, which had almost precipitated the two
peoples into war in 191 1, had not ceased with the French
acquisition of Morocco (in violation of "a scrap of paper"
called the Algeciras Act), but was persisting ; and that
the existence of a secret military and naval understanding
was looked upon in French military circles as a fact — not
to say a "plain fact."

To resume. From March 10, 191 3, the date of the
Prime Minister's first denial of a military understanding
with France, to June 28, when the heir to the Austrian
throne was murdered at Sarajevo, the position of Great
Britain in the hypothesis of a European war, so far as
the House knew it, was one of complete freedom from any
entanglement with France. And that, too, was Great
Britain's position so far as the House knew it, from June
28 until the afternoon of August 3. Between July 20,
when the crisis, according to the White Book, may be said
to have begun, and August 3, not the slightest intimation
was conveyed to the House that the position of Great
Britain in the hypothesis of a European war was other
than it had precedently been described as being — the latest
declaration to that effect dated a fortnight before the
Sarajevo crime. To argue, therefore, as Professor Conway
argues, that under these circumstances, it was "entirely
open" to the House down to August 2, to "decide

DENIALS AND AVOWALS 39

the whole policy to be pursued in relation to the crisis,"
appears to me — I don't wish to be impolite — just nonsense.

On August 3 the Foreign Secretary delivered an im-
passioned plea in favour of British intervention on behalf
of France. He revealed the "conversations." He revealed
the strategic concentration of the French Fleet in the
Mediterranean as being due to our "friendship" with
France. He drew a heartrending picture of battered anl
bombarded French coasts, defenceless because of that
Mediterranean concentration. He avowed that he had on
the previous day undertaken that the British Navy would
intervene if France's potential enemy, Germany, indulged
in such battering and bombardment, and he wound up by
declaring, in effect, that in his opinion the honour of the
country was engaged.

Those are the "plain facts" and no casuistry will get
over them or under them.

Let us now examine the setting in which these plain
facts are placed. What was the psychological atmosphere
on that fateful 3rd of August? A state of war already
existed in Europe. In England the public mind was
excited and on edge. For days the war-Press, headed by
the Times, had been steadily flogging up bellicosity. The
Tory Party in the House was solid for British interven-
tion; so, too, had become a section of the Liberals. In
what condition was the House of Commons to exercise
a discriminating judgment, when the statesman responsible
for the conduct of the country's foreign relations, and en-
joying a greater personal influence over the House of
Commons than any of his contemporaries, made the
oratorical effort of his life under circumstances favourable
to the case he urged? But, apart from that, it was, in
any event, too late. The House of Commons was pre-
sented, in every practical sense, with accomplished facts.
It could only have rejected the appeal on behalf of France
by rejecting the Minister who made it, and the Cabinet.
What House of Commons could have done so — even had
this particular House wanted to do so, which it did not —
in the face of a national emergency so momentous ?

Again, of what conceivable value were the reserves
attached to these authorised military and naval conversa-
tions? "Conversations" is a diplomatic formula. Between
diplomatists "conversations" signify discussion, negotia-
tion— talk, in short, which may have its sequel in acts,
but which may not. " Conversations" between military

4o TRUTH AND THE WAR

men belonging to different countries, who have to work
out in a country which is foreign to one of the parties
practical details relating to the movement of large bodies
of troops, are acts involving further acts, setting in train
complicated and delicate machinery in a hundred different
centres. When two Governments authorise their
Military and Naval Staffs to "converse" as to eventual
military and naval action against a common potential
foe, they set in motion the entire mechanism of their fight-
ing services. A relationship of a particularly intimate
character is thereby set up which reacts, and is bound to
react in an infinity of direct and indirect ways, upon the
policy of the two Governments. Mutual obligations —
in a material, if not in an official sense — are incurred. The
Governments which authorise such "conversations" have
taken a definite step which they can only retrace at the
expense of turning friendly relations into unfriendly ones.
If such "conversations" merely consisted in academic and
periodical debates over hypothetical strategic movements,
round a map-strewn table, one might at a stretch regard
them as innocuous. But when they consist, as they do
and must consist, of a careful survey of the actual field
of potential operations ; of the selection of points for con-
centration and defence ; of the selection of ports for dis-
embarkation; of the settlement of a multitude of plans,
interlinked one with the other, vitally affecing the disposi-
tion of both armies — their binding character is apparent.
These particular "conversations" meant the elabora-
tion of an entire plan of campaign, replete in every detail,
affecting the disembarkation and transport over rail and
road of an expeditionary force of 165,000 men — or what-
ever the exact number may have been — with the enormous
quantities of cannon, horses, motors, waggons, stores,
and all the impedimenta of a modern army. And as with
the military, so with the naval "conversations." You
may speak of an understanding whereby France concen-
trated her fleet in the Mediterranean and left her western
and northern coast-line undefended, in order to leave us
freer to concentrate in the North Sea, as a "conversation"
of no binding force until authorised by Parliament. But
it is the sort of "conversation" which decides the destinies
of nations, and, when carried on in secret, leaves the
nations concerned entirely helpless to control the outcome.
The secret "conversations," begun in 1906 and thence-
forth persisted in, constituted, morally speaking, a pledge

DENIALS AND AVOWALS 41

given to France by the most powerful personalities in the
British Liberal Ministry, to join with France in the event
of war between France and her only potential foe, Ger-
many. Materially speaking, they constituted an Anglo-
French military and naval alliance. I can understand the
argument which says that it was right to give that pledge.
I can even understand the argument that it was right,
having given that pledge, to deny to the House of Com-
mons that it had been given. But I do not understand
the argument which says that the moral obligation and the
material fact alike meant nothing, until at the eleventh
hour the House of Commons became aware of both, and
endorsed them.

Whatever may have been the combination of circum-
stances and ideas which militated against the irrevocable
plunge being taken until August 2, it cannot affect the
"plain facts." No carefully-edited and summarised pre-
sentment of diplomatic conversations can affect those
"plain facts" in the remotest degree. At first, the motives
for refusing to make the declaration demanded by both
France and Russia from the beginning were probably
mixed. Towards the culmination of the crisis, they were
probably due to the fierce struggle going on in the
Cabinet between the pro-War party and the anti-War
party, which, no doubt, our children will be greatly bene-
fited by knowing. The irrevocable step could, obviously,
not have been taken until the bulk of the Cabinet was
agreed to support it, and until a stage in the course of
outside events had been reached, when the House of
Commons was in the psychological condition to endorse it.

CHAPTER V.
"What will ye do in the end thereof?"1

"The prophets prophesy falsely and the priests bear rule by
their means, and My people love to have it so, and what will ye
do in the end thereof?"1

IN the end thereof — what will ye do in the end thereof?
For some of us this question clamours with our
awakened conscience in the morning-, obtrudes itself into
our daily tasks, and haunts us as we seek our rest.

What shall mark the close of this colossal tragedy
which has plunged all Europe into mourning, and the
consequences of which, even the immediate and visible
consequences, our imagination can hardly grasp, so
catastrophic are they for millions of us, for our civilisation,
our hopes, our faiths?

This tragedy was precipitated in a panic of mutual
fears. But its seeds were sown in a futile and wicked
Statecraft which, in every land, has held up before the
peoples the foulest of idols — material security resting upon
bayonets.

Will that Statecraft be shattered with the realisation
of its criminal imbecility? Will that idol be overthrown
now that it has been stripped of its gaudy coverings and
stands revealed to us in all its hideous nakedness? Will
the peoples begin to understand that their real enemies
are not their neighbours against whom they hurl shot and
shell; but that their real enemies are those same groups
of men who, in every land, by faults of temper, by inces-
sant secret plots and counter-plots, by the cult of a false
philosophy, and by the maintenance of an impossible
system of official intercourse, hound the peoples to mutual
destruction?

Or, when the prophets and the high-priests have
decreed the cessation of the slaughter, shall we, in sheer
exhaustion and nausea, in utter weariness of body, mind,
and spirit, suffer ourselves to be led back into the old

1 Speech at a public meeting held in the Friends' Meeting House,
Manchester, December 17, 1914.

42

IN THE END THEREOF— 43

paths, to worship at the old shrines, to renew allegiance to
the old traditions?

Upon the answer to those questions the salvation of
humanity depends. And it rests with the peoples what
the answer shall be. ■

Amongst the masses who listened to the toscin of war
reverberating throughout Europe in the closing days of
July, there was singularly little hatred — at first. But
war is the perfected mechanism of hate, and the blood-
fumes are potent. Hate ; hate and fear reign supreme in
the council chambers of the nations to-day. Among the
plains and valleys of Europe, littered with the piteous
evidence of human carnage and human error, among those
who actually fight the battles decreed by others, hate is
swallowed up in the awfulness of experience, in a loathing
of horrors unsurpassed. It is not among the brave men
who sway backwards and forwards in this Titanic and
inconstant struggle, from the marshes of Flanders to the
plains of Poland, that hate sits enthroned. For these men,
despite the wall of fire and steel which separates them,
are linked together in a catholicity of suffering. They
kill and maim a foe they mostly do not see, just as, in
happier times, they sow and reap, and labour at the desk
and in the mill ; in response to what they regard as a
mysterious and inexorable law. It is not from them,
perishing by shot and shell, by festering wounds, by
exposure and bitter cold, it is not from them, assuredly,
that protests would arise if the Christian rulers of the
Twentieth Century, approximating in compassion certain
generals of antiquity, were to call a truce, the while they
composed their differences; or, even from no higher
motive than a sense of burning shame that the bloody
arbitrament they have provoked should be prosecuted
during the celebration of the advent of the Prince of
Peace.

No ! It is not on the battlefield, but in the council
chambers of the nations where the directing wills preside
of those whose collective wisdom and forbearance, whose
collective understanding and tolerance, whose collective
conception of the God they profess to worship, have
brought humanity to this pass. Here, indeed, is the spirit
of hate, a potent influence.

It finds expression, on either side, in the talk of
"crushing," of annihilation, of reducing the foe to ever-
lasting impotence.

44 TRUTH AND THE WAR

That way madness lies. If hate is to be the last word
in this unholy business ; if hate is to be the dominating
inspiration of the terms of settlement, then the settlement
will be no settlement, the peace will be no peace.

A few years, it may be a decade or two, and once
again will the peasant be called from the plough, the
artisan from the workshop, the clerk from his desk. Once
again will the prophets cry from the council chambers their
devilish appeal. " If ye would secure peace, prepare for
war! " Once again will the high-priests in every land
convert their pulpits into Pagan shrines and trample under
foot the Christ.

But will the people "love to have it so" — again? Do
they "love to have it so" to-day? I do not believe it.
The people acquiesce. They do not love. How can they
love the pestilence which sweeps from their lives the most
precious gifts of life, which plunges them into the storms
of grief, smites them with the paralysis of desolation,
drives them into poverty and misery?

Did the people, the masses of the people, on either
side desire this war? Would the atmosphere which made
war possible have been produced but for the poison dis-
tilled, month by month, year by year, into their minds
by the professional non-combatant libertines of the pen ;
but for the insanity of the monstrous expansion of arma-
ments, bleeding white the peoples for their own ultimate
destruction, which was all that the genius of statesmen
could evolve in response to increasing manifestations,
everywhere, in favour of a peaceful settlement of inter-
national disputes? The toiling millions in our great cities,
the peasants and labourers of the countryside, whose
capacities, in vast majority, are concentrated upon securing
the wherewithal to feed and clothe and house themselves,
and upon catching such stray beams of sunlight as may
haply come their way — what part or lot have they in
checking or controlling, or even understanding the forces
which hurl them into the abyss of war, changing the grey-
ness of their lives to the blackest darkness?

That fatal Sunday of August 2 found me in a small
Continental town. Its irregular, ill-paved streets were
full of men and women and children, mostly weeping;
though the younger children only wondered. At every door
stood little groups of people with faces drawn and pitiful.
Reservists uttering their last farewells, putting gently
aside encircling arms, taking the last pledge from quiver-

IN THE END THEREOF— 45

ing lips. Above all, permeating- all, a consciousness of
some invisible, irresistible presence, inhuman, pitiless ;
some monstrous, unseen hand stretched out, tearing- son
from mother, husband from wife, father from children.
And one realised with an icy chill at one's heart that the
inevitable had really happened ; that because one of the
great ones of the earth had fallen beneath the hand of the
assassin in a far-distant country, because the other great
ones of the earth had quarrelled as the result of that
crime, because the rulers of Christian Europe had for
years been squandering the substance of their peoples
in piling up weapons destructive of human life until all
Europe was one vast arsenal, and had planned and
schemed against one another through their appointed
agents; that because of such things, these humble folk in
this small town in which I moved were stricken down,
their lives rent and shattered.

Twenty-four hours later I passed through the empty
House of Commons, a short hour before those fateful
words were to be spoken — wisely or unwisely, I argue not
to-night — which have already resulted in the loss of
thousands of British lives, in sorrow crossing the thresh-
hold of tens of thousands of British homes. And, here
again, the hand of death seemed to hover, outstretched,
menacing, prophetic in the dim recesses of the silent
Chamber. Outside — you will remember it was Bank
Holiday, black Monday our posterity will call it — a crowd
filled the streets, interested but uncomprehending, laugh-
ing, joking, chatting, gazing at the buildings which,
doubtless, some of them were seeing for the first time,
thoroughly enjoying themselves, while, a few yards aivay,
their destinies hung in the balance.

No. It is not true. The mass of the people do not
"love to have it so."

Kept in ignorance until the quarrels of their governors
have passed the limits of adjustment, they are stung to
fear, lashed into fury, flogged into hatred by the potent
machinery existing for this purpose.

Against such a combination they are helpless.

And what have we done in the past, you and I, who,
compared with them, have leisure for constructive thought
and constructive action, what have we done to stand
between their helplessness and the forces making for war?
What are we doing to-day to stand between their help-
lessness and the forces, now so strongly in the ascendant,

46 TRUTH AND THE WAR

making for a perpetuation of the evils which generate
war?

To-night we pray. But when we leave this hall, what
then? What of the morrow and the to-morrows? We
may construct some tiny oasis in this desert of human
suffering. We may alleviate some private grief. We
may remove some trifling effect of this immense disaster.

But what are we prepared to do, what are we prepared
to sacrifice, to make a return of such disaster impossible?
To save the next generation from what this generation
has not been spared ? To save the people from their help-
lessness? To make them understand that they have the
power to help themselves if they will but exercise it?
What part are we prepared to play in the greatest work
which lies open to human endeavour in the world to-day ?

Let us pray for sound judgment. Let us pray for
courage to denounce and expose what may be faulty and
wrong and in need of reform in our own records and pro-
cedure. It is cheap to denounce the shortcomings of
others. Let us pray to be delivered from unctuous
rectitude, from cant and hypocrisy, from smug self-
righteousness and self-satisfaction.

Let us so labour and strive for humanity in this,
humanity's dark hour, that, if not we ourselves, then our
sons, building upon the foundations we have laid, shall,
despite the prophets, contribute in giving to the world a
variant from the old despairing message, a variant which
shall contribute a new message, a new message of assured
hope, pointing to a certain goal.

And that message shall be this : " The prophets may
prophesy falsely, but the priests heed them not, and the
people reject their teaching, and the end thereof shall be
peace among the children of men."

So be it.

CHAPTER VI.
France and Germany before the War1

With the Triple Alliance the German felt safe for a long while.
There was a time when the German deemed himself, thanks to it,
in perfect security. . . . He does not feel nearly so safe now. Facing
the Triple Alliance, the Franco-Russian Alliance has come into
existence, then the Triple Entente. The encircling manoeuvres of
Delcasse" took place. All this has got on his nerves. And let us not
forget that he is profoundly convinced that he — the German — can
remain secure and pacific, but that the Frenchman on the other hand
becomes aggressive as soon as he feels himself secure. . . Hitherto
we have desired two contradictory things : on the one hand to keep
the peace. . . On the other we have never consented to admit,
even to ourselves, much less to declare publicly that we accept
the Treaty of Frankfurt or the territorial statu quo. We accepted
and indirectly recognised the accomplished fact in signing an alliance
which implied it. But at the same time we hailed that alliance as
making the Revanche certain. . . The Germans conclude that
France desires the Revanche, and that prudence alones prevents us
from saying so right out. They feel that we are on the watch, ready
to profit from the opportunity which ensures us the victory. I
ask every honest Frenchman, are they wrong? Would you in your
inmost soul assert that they are wrong? — "Faites un roi sinon faites
la paix," by Marcel Sembat. (Paris, Eugene Figuiere et cie. 12th
edition, 1913.)

Thus, we see, when the time comes, and it may come soon, when
Slavism desires to make an end of Germanism, the friendship of
Russia can save us if we are fully determined to fulfil all our duties
towards her. Germany does not doubt that France, remaining
immutably attached to her treaties, would support her ally with all
her strength, choosing, however, the most favourable moment for
intervention. — (L'Allemagne en peril," by Colonel Arthur Boucher,
1914 ; op. cit.)

SLOWLY, but surely, the international conditions
existing- before the war are revealed, and their
connection with the great catastrophe becomes clear to the
dullest understanding.

How often have we heard and read the phrase "Ger-
many's unprovoked attack upon France "? How per-
sistent has been the attempt to suggest that France would
not have dreamed of a military offensive against Germany
if the German Government had not initiated the offensive
against her !

1 The Labour Leader, March 11, 1915.
47

48 TRUTH AND THE WAR

What is the story incessantly dinned into the ears of
our people? Is not this a fair summarised version of it?

"Germany has been preparing for this war for forty
years, waiting for the psychological moment to declare
it. In the opening days of August the moment came.
With a cynicism which has never been equalled she im-
mediately rushed upon France. What had France done
to her? Nothing. Did the French desire war? They
were the most peaceable people in Europe. Could Germany
have had any other motive for this monstrous act of
aggression than sheer greed of conquest? She had plotted
for decades to strike at France successfully, and when
the time seemed to her ripe she made her onslaught with-
out the ghost of an excuse."

And do not innumerable Frenchmen hold the same
view — the view that France would have remained neutral
if Germany had left France alone and confined her atten-
tion to Russia? Did not my good friend Peaix-Seailles
endeavour to sustain that thesis in the last issue of the
Socialist Review?

Well, what remains of it now, after Sir Edward Grey's
reply to Mr. Jowett's second question? Sir Edward Grey
informed Mr. Jowett that although His Majesty's Gov-
ernment did not know the terms of the Franco-Russian
Alliance, they did know : —

"that the French Government could not contemplate an
attitude of neutrality in the event of Russia being attacked
by Germany as well as by Austria."

Let us then in common decency consign the untruth
of a France wantonly attacked by Germany with no excuse
to the lethal chamber, where, in company with so many
others, it can find oblivion.

Germany attacked France because, if she had not done
so, France would have attacked her. That is the truth.
Does it exonerate Germany for her share in building up
the system which has led to eighteen millions of men being
whirled into mutual destruction because one man was
shot in the streets of a Bosnian town? Assuredly not.
But then, neither does it absolve other Governments from
their share in that abomination. Does it exonerate Ger-
many from launching her legions at France through
Belgian territory, after having first asked for a peaceful
passage, which, apparently, we did not officially regard as
especially diabolical in 1887? Assuredly not. But then

FRANCE AND GERMANY BEFORE THE WAR 49

neither does it exonerate the diplomatists of other countries
who have since told us that they were thoroughly aware
that Belgium would fall a victim to the European group
system in the event of a war between the two groups, and
who did not stir a finger to save her from that fate.

What this categorical statement of Sir Edward Grey's
does, however, bring home to all that have ears to hear
and eyes to see is the absurdity of attempting any longer
to describe the extension of a Balkan squabble to the
West of Europe — involving the Belgian, British, and
French peoples in the calamity of war — as the outcome of
German determination to subjugate Europe.

And what it does further suggest is the absurdity of
imagining that the "crushing" of Germany, if by that
phrase is meant the attempted "dismemberment" or
national extinction of Germany, is calculated to eliminate
the diplomatic cult of the "Balance of Power," which is
now clearly seen to be the snag upon which European
civilisation has split.

What Sir Edward Grey's reply to Mr. Jowett does
demonstrate beyond all question is that the German
Government and the German people (for, apparently, they
speak with one voice) are expressing their real conviction
when they state that they, too, are fighting for their
national existence; that they are just as sincere in their
belief as other Governments and peoples may be, that this
war is, for them, a defensive and not an offensive one.

That the German Government would have performed
an act of the highest political wisdom in maintaining a
strict military defensive on the Franco-German frontier,
and thereby refrained from perpetrating the grave immo-
rality of an invasion of Belgium is my belief. But was such
an act, under such circumstances, humanly possible? It
would not have saved Germany from a French attack, nor
from British attack if Germany had ventured to use her
Fleet against the French, for on August 2 Sir Edward
Grey gave the French Ambassador the assurance that if
the German Fleet attacked French coasts or shipping the
British Fleet would intervene.

The German Government was thus faced with this
situation : (a) That of maintaining a military defensive
against France (for all the military experts were in agree-
ment that an invasion of France via the Franco-German
frontier was a virtual impossibility), thus throwing to the
winds the entire strategic plans of its military advisers ;
(b) That of foregoing the use of its navy.

50 TRUTH AND THE WAR

Does anyone believe that any Government in such cir-
cumstances would, or could, have consented to such a
course? How could it have faced the agitation led by the
heads of its fighting Services ; an agitation which would
have been based upon the cry that Germany, confronted
with two powerful antagonists, was being betrayed at
the supreme hour of peril by its rulers? Is it exhibiting
bias, or pro-Germanism, or anti-patriotism, or any of the
other 'isms, to describe Germany's position and France's
position at the height of the crisis as having been, in effect
and respectively this : —

Germany : Compelled to a military defensive, fatal to
the national security in the opinion of its military advisers,
(a) owing to the invulnerability of the French frontier ; (b)
owing to Belgian neutrality : Compelled to abandon any
idea of using her Fleet against France owing to the British
threat.

France : (a) Free to adopt a military offensive or
defensive; to choose the psychological moment when
Russian pressure had paved the way for a French assault
upon the German lines, against which the entire French
military strength would have been massed; (b) Free to
dispose of her Fleet as she listed; to use it against German
shipping; to use it against Germany's ally in the Adriatic
— with complete immunity, owing to British support.

I continue to think that the German Government would
have been wiser from the point of view of its own
interests in facing these odds and in running these risks,
because, had it done so, French public opinion and British
public opinion would have split in two, neutral opinion
would have been strongly on Germany's side, and I doubt
whether the French and British Foreign Offices could
have sustained their respective parts.

Even setting aside, for the sake of argument merely,
the influence of fear, which, as we know, swept through
Berlin when the news of the Russian general mobilisation
arrived, I ask once more : Could the German Government,
or any Government, have had the courage or, indeed, the
power, to have taken such a line under such circumstances ?

I am not concerned with defending the German
Government; its many precedent diplomatic follies and the
aggressive language of its militarists were largely respon-
sible for the situation in which it found itself in the opening
days of August. All I am concerned with is to picture to
myself, and to try to induce others to picture to them-

FRANCE AND GERMANY BEFORE THE WAR 51

selves, what that situation at that moment was, and what
were the alternatives with which the German Government
was faced.

And my object in doing- so is to suggest two things,
which, if they came to be believed by the public of this
country, would necessarily affect the public view as to the
extent of German culpability, and would strengthen
opinion in favour — as Professor Pigou put it the other
day — of an honourable and not a penal settlement ; and
this, in turn, would be calculated to save innumerable
lives.

My suggestions, then, are these : First, that the in-
creasing light which is being thrown on the pre-war situa-
tion must strengthen conviction in all minds capable of
rational thought that the genesis of this war is to be
sought, not in original sin grafted on the German
Government or nation, but in a universal reign of fear,
produced by the imbecilities of international diplomacy,
ostensibly pursuing an ideal of "Balance" which is as
unexplainable as it is unattainable, and doing so by means
of a militarism which, from being the handmaiden, has
become the master of the diplomatists themselves.

Secondly, that this increasing light must strengthen the
conviction of all whom the blood-lust does not blind, that
humanity can advance not one single step nearer the goal
of its emancipation from the errors of the past by the
massacre of another million or two of human beings.

CHAPTER VII.
The "pro-German" Taunt1

The speech of my noble friend, with all the authority of the name
he bears and with all the weight of his own character and position
in the country, will be read with delight by all the partisans of
Russia throughout Europe ; and at the same time not without
regret by those who are allied to us in opposing that Power. I say
that my noble friend has, as far as in him lies, this night rendered
signal service to the Emperor of Russia by aiding him in this war
with the Allies. He has done his utmost to encourage the Emperor
of Russia to resist a compliance with those demands which England,
France, and Austria consider just. — (Lord Clarendon on Earl Grey's
peace speech in the Lords' debate of May 25, 1855).

If he — Lord Malmesbury — might be permitted to speak of the
right hon. gentleman as an abstraction, he would say that no
longer ago than the preceding night he dreamed he heard a man,
whom all his admirers said was the greatest orator of the day,
address an august assembly in a tone and manner, with a force
of words, with a colouring of expression, and, he might add, with
a distortion of facts, which were worthy of any Russian Minister,
and which would have gained such Minister even' Cross of St.
Andrew that the Russian Government has to bestow. When he
awoke in the morning after his dream, he felt so humiliated as an
Englishman that he would not believe what he had heard, until he
read it first in the morning newspapers — (Lord Malmesbury, refer-
ring in the Lords' debate of May 25, 1855, to Gladstone's peace speech
in the Commons.)

LET us face quite frankly this charge of being "pro-
German" (or, as Mr. Perris puts it in his letter to you,
of endeavouring "to excuse the ways of the Prussian
Junker") which is levelled at anyone who attempts to
re-establish a sense of perspective in the public mind in
regard to this war; whether the charge be conveyed in
the form adopted by the anonymous gentlemen of the
"anti-German League" who write from Southampton or
in the "more-in-sorrow-than-in-anger" form of Mr. Perris,
whose interesting little volume, "Our Foreign Policy and
Sir Edward Grey's Failure," stands on my bookshelves.
I dissent altogether from the view that it is in the hig-hest

1 The Labour Leader, March 25, 1915. Written in connection
with an attack upon the Author by Mr. G. H. Perris.

52

THE "PRO-GERMAN" TAUNT 53

degree injudicious to pen a line or to say a word which
suggests that Germany is not the sole responsible author
of the war.

I dissent for three reasons, all of which appear to me
closely concerned with the interests of the British people
and not at all with the interests of the "Prussian Junker."
First, because it is not true that Germany is the sole
responsible author of this war, although her governing
classes possess a considerable measure of responsibility
for it. The interests of the British people are not
permanently served by the propagation of an untruth,
however popular it may be at the moment. Secondly,
because the more deeply rooted becomes the belief that
Germany is the sole responsible author of this war, initiated
by her in order to "subjugate Europe," the more will
public opinion gravitate towards the "unconditional
surrender" policy; and that policy means an indefinite
prolongation of the war and, consequently, an immense
additional loss of life. And this appals me very much,
whereas the charge of being "pro-German" does rot appal
me in the least. Thirdly, because the policy of "uncon-
ditional surrender" is a policy which means a bad settle-
ment; a settlement which would settle nothing, even if
it could be enforced, which would pave the way for fresh
convulsions, and which, both in its external and internal
implications, would, in the ultimate resort, bring disaster
upon the British Commonwealth. It is not, therefore, to
serve the interests of the "Prussian Junker," but to serve
the interests of the British people that some of us feel
constrained to urge upon our countrymen that the enemy
is not the monster of popular caricature. Apparently there
are men in Germany who are acting precisely as we are :
who are reacting, as we are endeavouring to do, against
the doctrine of blind hate of Britain. Their efforts are
lauded in our patriotic Press. Ours are denounced as
"pro-German."

I wonder whether those who abjure us to tread as
delicately as any Agag lest we be called "pro-German"
and, therefore, run the risk of impairing what little
influence we may possess, realise the illogicality of their
advice? If Germany is the sole responsible author of the
war, and started it in order to "subjugate Europe," why
in the world are we bothering our heads about secret
diplomacy and democratic control of foreign policy; about
the "Balance of Power/' the study of international

54 TRUTH AND THE WAR

relations, the private armament interest and so forth?
Does not the fact that a growing multitude in these Islands
is troubling itself about these things prove conclusively
that many of us do not believe that responsibility for the
war is solely attributable to the "Prussian Junker," but
that it is attributable to a universal system of statecraft
conducted behind the back of the peoples, rooted in a false
philosophy, and reposing upon the universal fallacy that
national security is obtainable only through gigantic
armament? Very well. Why, then, having attained this
degree of sanity, should we shrink from the next step;
from examining how Germany's position, as well as the
position of other Powers, was affected by that universal
system both before and during the crisis' of last July?
Why should we shrink from trying, as Marcel Sembat puts
it in his famous book, to place ourselves in the "skin of
a German"? Shall we ever be in a position to contribute
towards the buildfng up of a happier, saner, Europe if,
while working not only for general reforms, but for
British reforms and, thereby, implicitly admitting that both
are required, we keep up the pretence that Germany is the
sole villain of the piece? The two things are incompatible.
You cannot at the one and the same time (i.e., if your
argument is a stage towards effective action) maintain (a)
that the ruling classes of Europe, including those of your
own country, are partners in responsibility for this System
which you desire to overthrow, and (b) that the governing
classes of all Europe were lambs and Germany alone the
ravening wolf; that all, save the rulers of Germany, had
but one desire, to live in harmony and preserve the peace
of the world.

Now if Germany was not the sole responsible author
of the war she must have a case, and if we wish to construct
for the future we must understand that case. If it is in
the interest of the British people that Germany should be
crushed and pulverised, dismembered, reduced to
impotence nationally and economically — all of which
courses are daily being recommended and all of which
may be comprised in the policy of "unconditional
surrender"; then, of course, it is no use trying to under-
stand what Germany's position was in the "Balance"
prior to the outbreak of war, what were her national
necessities, what her fears. Let us, clothed in the mantle
of our own impeccability, turn a blind eye to all but her
visible faults and punish her for those faults to the utter-

THE "PRO-GERMAN" TAUNT 55

most. But is it? I contend that it can never be to the
interest of any civilised people that another civilised
people should be so treated, whatever may be the faults
that the rulers of the latter have committed. In the case
of Britain and Germany, I contend that, apart from moral
considerations, it would be national insanity were such a
policy to receive national endorsement.

I imagine there are a great many people at present
who, for the satisfaction of grinding Germany to powder,
are prepared to contemplate with relative equanimity Japan
forcing a defensive and offensive alliance upon China
which would leave her mistress of China's external and
internal policy, as the preliminary step to converting
China's fabulous millions of human material into a vast
host equipped with all the modern engines of human
destruction, the secret of whose manufacture has been
obligingly furnished to the Japanese by the Anglo-German
armament ring. I imagine there are a great many people
at present who, provided Germany may be stamped flat,
are prepared cheerfully to acquiesce in a settlement which
would find Russia with the whole of Poland as a Russian
satrapy, Danzig a Russian port, Russia installed at
Constantinople, from thence dictating the destinies of the
Levant, commanding all the overland routes to India; a
Russia possessed of an army of ten million men, partly
equipped with British, and largely with French, money,
and with a powerful fleet in the Black Sea built by British
firms. But that there are such people is no valid reason
why we should all be required to qualify for a lunatic
asylum.

When our Foreign Office revived the "Balance of
Power," so far as England was concerned, it threw in its
lot unconditionally (the characteristic of our foreign
policy during the past decade has been the wholesale
surrender of national assets without adequate com-
pensating advantages) with Russia and France against
the central European Powers; above all, when it invited
the Japanese to join in the struggles of Europe, our
Foreign Office successfully manoeuvred the British people
within the portals of the aforesaid asylum. But that is no
reason why the British people should persist in remaining
permanent inmates of that building. If they do not wish
to be so they must resolutely make up their minds to
examine the German case with honesty and fairness;
realise that it cannot be disposed of by military defeat;

56 TRUTH AND THE WAR

realise, too, that the river of blood which now separates
the two peoples must be bridged.

What was Germany's position in the "Balance of
Power" system before the war? It was this. She had
an alliance with Austria and with Italy. But it had long
been notorious (except, apparently, to Mr. Perris) that
Italy's interest in the triplice had become purely formal.
It had decayed with the modification of the causes which
originated it, and with Delcasse's pledge of a free hand in
Tripoli, latterly taken advantage of. Facing her were
Russia and France. Far from being in a condition to
dictate to Europe, she was strategically very vulnerable;
and, with an unfriendly Britain, the "Balance," instead
of being in her favour, was tilted against her. In the
last ten years the military and naval expenditure of France
and Russia in combination has largely exceeded the
military and naval expenditure of Germany and Austria
in combination. The naval question had embittered Anglo-
German relations. British official policy became pro-
nouncedly hostile over the Morocco affair — no conceivable
British interest or compensating advantage being thereby
secured : that by the way. Thereafter British official
policy, although outwardly the relations of the two
Governments had improved, was a doubtful element in
Germany's calculations. I am not here discussing the
extent to which the policy of Germany's rulers were
responsible for the dangerous position in which she found
herself; whether she was justified in building a fleet or
not. I am simply stating what that position was. The
element in the situation dominating all others was the
growing Russian menace. In the two years preceding the
war it had become acute, and Germany's fears were
genuine. Our mentors in the Press affect to ridicule that
feeling, forgetting that for the best part of half a century
British foreign policy was wholly inspired by fear of
Russia — although, unlike the Germans, we have never had
the felicity of Russia as a next-door neighbour. If we
could feel fear of Russia because of India, why not
Germany because of Germany ? Germany's fears were well
founded. The Pan-Slavists and the Grand Ducal Party
had triumphed over the Peace Party (it was largely, almost
entirely, an affair of warring personalities and personal
grudges prevailing in the diplomatic world), including the
elements in the Imperial household favourable to peace. I
have no space to set out the story here, but it has been

THE "PRO-GERMAN" TAUNT 57

a commonplace in the Chancelleries since the spring of
1 91 2 that the War Party in Russia had gained the
ascendancy and that a collision with Austria, and
consequently with Germany, to whom the annihilation of
Austria would have been the death warrant, was merely
a matter of time.

From that period onwards the whole question has
been : Would the three eagles tear and rend one another
alone, or would the Western Powers be dragged in ? The
key to the situation was France — nationally pacific in the
main, governmentally under the heel of Russia, and
clinging to the "revanche." Could France be induced,
like Italy,1 to stand aside in a quarrel not her own, or
would the French Government — which has never disclosed
the terms of its treaty with Russia to the French people
— be involved? If the former, then there would be no
German attack upon France or, a fortiori, upon Belgium.
If the latter, Germany would strike first at the foe whose
rapidity of mobilisation more nearly approximated to her
own. These were commonplaces before the war. Why
affect ignorance of them now?

. And this brings me to Mr. Perris' letter. What is the
use of Mr. Perris telling me that I am defending a
"preventive war" ? A "preventive war" is a mere phrase.
You might just as well apply it to official Britain's policy
as to official Germany's policy in the catastrophe which
has overwhelmed Europe. What is official Britain waging
but a preventive war : a "Balance of Power" war as the
Times keeps on reminding us at intervals — speaking, of
course, for the Foreign Office? What is a "Balance of
Power" war but a "preventive" war? What I said in my
article was that France would have attacked Germany if
Germany, thanks to her more rapid mobilisation and her
more efficient preparations, had not taken the initiative.
But that is no "dogmatic" assertion of my own. France
made it clear from the first that she would not remain
neutral. (I have set out the official quotations in detail
before and may be excused from doing so again.) Sir
Edward Grey confirmed the fact in his reply to Mr. Jowett
the other day. What does a country do when it is not
neutral? It joins in the fray, choosing, if it is allowed to
do so, the psychological moment best suited to its
interests. France was not allowed to choose that moment,
and no one ever supposed she would be. Mr. Perris seems
1 Italy had not then come in.

58 TRUTH AND THE WAR.

to think that the "aggressor" in a war is necessarily the
party who fires the first shot. But this is by no means the
case, and the history of many wars disprove it. Was
Japan the "aggressor" in her war with Russia because
she opened the ball before even declaring war? Again, it
is not I who am talking "solemn nonsense" when I state
that the German Staff was convinced that a military
defensive in a general European war — i.e., a war which
found Germany faced with Russia on one side and France
on the other — would have been fatal to German national
security. I merely state a fact — the fact that that was
the opinion of the German Staff : that their whole strategy
was founded on that belief. I am not qualified to criticise
that opinion from a military point of view; but such an
authority as Colonel Repington — from what I have read
of his writings — does not appear to have thought that it
was "nonsense."

To conclude. I was concerned to show that Sir E.
Grey's reply to Mr. Jowett provided the final proof that
France did not intend to remain neutral in a Russo-
German war : in other words, that France would have
intervened on behalf of Russia when the moment was ripe
in the judgment of her military advisers. I endeavoured to
make it clear that, such being the case, the fact of Germany
having initiated the military offensive instead of waiting
for the military offensive to be taken against her, was not
evidence of a desire on Germany's part to "subjugate
Europe," and could not honestly be described as
constituting a "wanton aggression" upon France, but was
the axiomatic outcome of Germany's position in the
"Balance."

I might, of course, have added a great deal more on
that point. I might have added that when the still
unexplained mystery of the misunderstood telephone
conversation between Sir Edward Grey and the German
Ambassador occurred, as the result of which the latter
imagined that the British Government proposed using its
good offices to press neutrality upon France, the rulers of
Germany clutched at the opportunity of leaving France
alone, as a strong swimmer in a current clutches at a
friendly log, the Kaiser immediately telegraphing to King
George, and the Chancellor to the German Ambassador,
that the western progress of their military machine would
be stayed if Britain guaranteed French neutrality. Was
that action reconcilable with a plot to "subjugate Europe" ?

THE "PRO-GERMAN" TAUNT 59

The authenticity of these telegrams has never been
questioned to my knowledge. Their text is to be found in
Price's "Diplomatic History of the War."

Let me repeat, then, once again, that my object in
calling attention to these things is the object stated in
the earlier part of this article, and no other. I have no
friends among "Prussian Junkers." I have not, like a
number of men prominent in British public life have done,
dined at the Kaiser's table or hobnobbed with the Kaiser
at teaparties or reviews. I have not even a financial
interest in the armament ring. What I do possess is a
profound conviction that an ultimate reconciliation
between Britain and Germany is essential to the future
peace of the world, and to the truest interests of this
country.

Ministering to that conviction, I intend to do my little
best to urge the necessity for the exercise of common sense
and common fairness on this side, if that result is to be
attained.

CHAPTER VIII.
Militarism and the Beast of the Apocalypse*

I HAVE said that to attribute the sole responsibility for
this war to Germany was to perpetrate an injustice and
an untruth. I have also said that the French Government
was resolved not to remain neutral in the event of a Russo-
German war. I contended that such being the case the
German military offensive against France last August could
not honestly be described as wanton aggression, and
furnished no evidence per se of a desire on Germany's part,
"to sujugate Europe." I also explained that in my
judgment the truth ought to be insisted upon, not in the
interests of "Prussian Junkers," but in the interests of the
British people; and I gave the reasons which led me to
form that judgment.

Since then two Ministerial utterances bearing upon the
subject have been made; one by Sir Edward Grey,2 the
other by Lord Haldane.8 In both statements Germany's
sole responsibility for the war has been reiterated. In par-
ticular her antecedent military preparations have been
pointed to as something peculiar and special to Germany
and as providing conclusive proof of premeditation. We
have had presented to us once again the familiar picture of
the ravening wolf of German militarism, set in the midst
of a flock of meek pacifist sheep — the other European
Powers. It is only the psychology of a state of war which
permits of such statements passing muster for an instant.
Of the intelligent people — as distinct from the people who
allow others to do their thinking for them — who accept
these statements, I make bold to say that a considerable
number hypnotise themselves into believing them because
they wish to believe them. But the danger is that the
constant beating of this particular drum will strengthen all
the elements in British civilian life which, inspired by
the anger and grief resultant from the loss of loved ones

i The Labour Leader, April 15, 1915.

2 March 22, 1915.

8 Daily Chronicle, April 1, 1915.

60

MILITARISM AND THE BEAST 61

in the field, by blind sentiments of revenge, and by policy,
are pressing for the infliction of such terms upon Germany
as the price of peace, as would defeat the very ends
proclaimed to be those of the Government when it joined in
the war; prepare the way for fresh convulsions and
perpetuate the armaments of Europe. That is why an
effort must be made to deal with these statements.

Not only has Germany been making formidable pre-
parations for war for a considerable time past, but she
has made them with that meticulous thoroughness which
the Germans import into all their activities. This is not
in itself a proof of premeditation. It is a proof of
efficiency. German militarism is militarism carried to the
highest point of efficiency. It does not differentiate
otherwise from the militarism of other nations. What is
"militarism"? It is the product of a statecraft rooted in
a philosophy which regards nations as antagonistic units
and which imposes upon the peoples the burden of armed
force. That armed force may be concentrated upon land
or upon the sea. But whether upon land or upon the sea
its justification is defended on the ground that to secure
peace each State must be stronger than its neighbour. As
German militarism is the most efficiently organised, so it
is probably the most ruthless, for ruthlessness and efficiency
in militarism go hand in hand. The more efficient the
militarism the more ruthless its action, because inter alia
every fresh invention of man which can be applied to the
destruction of man will be developed to its utmost capacity
by the efficient militarist. Our own First Sea Lord has
recognised very clearly that modern war must be ruthless.
In an interview accorded in 19101 to his friend, the late Mr.
W. T. Stead, he declared : "The humanising of war ! You
might as well talk of humanising hell ! ... If I am in
command when war breaks out I shall issue as my orders :
'The essence of war is violence. Moderation in war is
imbecility. Hit first, hit hard, and hit anywhere.' "
Barely a fortnight before the outbreak of this war Sir Percy
Scott justified from the same point of view the action
which Germany is now adopting in sinking ships, other
than ships of war, by means of submarines and mines.
Discussing the potentiality of a proclamation to that effect
on the part of a Continental Power at war with an island
Power, he said : —

"Such a proclamation would, in my opinion, be

1 Review of Reviews, February, 1910.

62 TRUTH AND THE WAR

perfectly in order, and, once it had been made, if any
British or neutral ships disregarded it and attempted to
run the blockade, they could not be held to be engaged in
the peaceful avocations, referred to by Lord Sydenham, and
if they were sunk in the attempt, it could not be described
as a relapse into savagery or piracy in its blackest form."1

It was not a German who wrote : —

"War is the divinely appointed means by which
environment may be readjusted until ethically fitted and
best becomes synonymous."

It was a well-known British military writer, Colonel
Maude.2 It was not a German who wrote : —

"The worst of all errors in war is a mistaken spirit of
benevolence. ' '

It was an equally well-known British military writer,
Major Stewart Murray.3 It was not a German who
wrote : —

"The proper strategy consists in the first place of inflict-
ing as terrible blows as possible upon the enemy's army,
and then in causing the inhabitants so much suffering that
they must long for peace and force their Government to
demand it."

It was a well-known British military critic, Dr. Miller
Maguire.4

"Militarism" is not a German product. It is just as
much a British product. But in our case it finds, owing
to geographical position* its chief expression on the sea.5
The plain fact of the matter is that a systematic endeavour
to represent your enemy, whoever he may be, as outside
the pale of human kind, is an absolute necessity to-day
for any Government which has involved its people in war.
It is only by such means that the willingness of millions
of people who have nothing to gain and everything to lose
by war can be induced to tolerate war. And so God and
the humanities are alternately invoked to describe the
enemy as a fiend among the nations, and fear and hatred
act as chief recruiting sergeants.

Germany prepared for this war. She carried her pre-
parations to the highest maximum of efficiency, and she

1 Times, July 16, 1914.

2 "Armaments and Arbitration."

3 "The Future Peace of the Anglo-Saxons."
* Times, July 12, 1900.

s This was written before Great Britain had also become a
conscript Power.

MILITARISM AND THE BEAST 63

is waging war with the ruthlessness which modern war,
in the opinion of prominent men of other nations, de-
mands, All that is self-evident. But that does not in the
least degree fasten upon Germany sole responsibility for
the outbreak of war, nor does it in the least degree prove
that Germany in going to war did so in order to "sub-
jugate Europe." And this for quite a number of reasons,
the first of which is palpable to all those whose mental
condition remains normal.

It is not only Germany that has been preparing for
war, but all Europe — France, Russia, Britain. The only
difference in actual fact between Germany's conduct in the
past forty years and the conduct of the other Powers men-
tioned, is that the latter have not only been preparing for
war, but have waged war, whereas Germany has been
content with preparation.1 France has been waging war
continuously for the past quarter of a century. She has
conquered Tonquin, Madagascar, Morocco, Tunis, together
with enormous tracts of country in West and West-
Central Africa. Russia has waged a great war against
Japan. The British Government has conquered the South
African Republics and incorporated them within the
British Empire.

And, I repeat, all Europe has been preparing for war.
The history of the last decade is a history of constantly
increasing preparation for war on the part of all the
Powers, coupled with a steadily-growing apprehension at
these preparations on the part of all the peoples
concerned. It is often stated that Britain alone was
unprepared. Britain was not unprepared on the basis
of the national policy precedently accepted by both parties
in the State, i.e., a paramount navy and a small expedi-
tionary force for use on the Continent. The British Navy
was fully prepared. Mr. Churchill has told us in minute
detail the extent of our pre-war preparations.

"The German Army was not more ready for an offen-
sive war on a gigantic scale than was the British Fleet for
national defence."

That the Germans may have regarded their Army in
the same light as we regard our Navy as an instrument
of national defence does not, of course, figure in Mr.
Churchill's presentation.

1 With the single exception of the guerilla warfare against the
Hottentots and half-breeds in German S.W. Africa.

64 TRUTH AND THE WAR

But, it is said Germany's preparations were made for
the purpose of provoking war, and the preparations of all
the other Powers — upon some of which I shall dwell later
— were made in order to prevent war. How comes it,
then, that the other Powers have not only prepared but
waged war, and that Germany has not? How comes it
that Germany did not wage war upon her neighbours whom
she desired to subjugate when she could have done so
with every guarantee of military success ? She could have
smashed France with ease in 1887, and our official classes,
judging from statements in such papers as the Standard
and the Spectator, would have been rather pleased than
otherwise.1 It was in the Nineteenth Century for March
of that year that Professor Edward Dicey wrote :

"The German Empire, as we know it now, came into
existence with the Franco-German War. In the course
of seventeen years it has become very strong and very
formidable, not only as a military but as a political power.
That it may become yet more strong and more formidable
is my heartfelt wish as it must be that of every English-
man who understands the conditions of our own tenure
of power, and who realises the dangers to which Europe
is exposed by the aggrandisement of Russia."

Germany could have smashed France with equal ease
when Russia, exhausted by the Japanese War, was in-
capable of stirring a finger to help her. Germany could
have smashed France with equal ease when we were
engaged in annexing the South African Republics. I do
not know whether it be true that the Kaiser resisted
suggestions from Russia and France to form a coalition
against us at that time; but I have met British people
who believed it, and the statement has been made in print
in this country more than once. "A friend in need is a
friend indeed" was the letterpress figuring above a photo-
graph of the Kaiser in the Daily Mail of November 1 1 ,
1899. Why, if Germany desired to "subjugate Europe"
did she wait until August, 1914, when her military
supremacy, as I shall show later on, was less assured than
at any period during the previous thirty years? How can
these things be reconciled with the present charge against
Germany of having bided her time and deliberately pro-
voked a war when she thought the psychological moment
had come? They cannot be.
1 Vide Chapter II.

MILITARISM AND THE BEAST 65

The curious thing- is that from the very circles whence
these charges emanate come assertions which entirely
dispose of them. Our patriotic Press has conjured up a
Kaiser on all fours with "Boney," a sinister, implacable
plotter, who concealed unholy ambitions beneath a
spurious mask of good-will. They want to send him to St.
Helena; to try him for murder; to expel his dynasty from
Europe. But that is not the opinion of Lord Haldane,
and it is not the opinion of the French either. Lord
Haldane, in the course of an interview with an American
journalist, has recently delivered himself of the following
utterance :

"In past years I think the Kaiser undoubtedly opposed
war. But I am afraid his opposition to it gradually
weakened. He appears to have settled into the war mood
two years ago.1

Of singular interest this statement. Up to two years
ago, then, the conspiring Kaiser conspired for peace.
That is said by a British Cabinet Minister who knew the
Kaiser personally and has eaten of the salt at his table.
Let us retain the declaration in our minds. Lord Haldane's
statement is the more interesting for his subsequent
reference to Document No. 6 of the Yellow Book, in which
is recorded a conversation said to have taken place between
the Kaiser, the King of the Belgians, and General Von
Moltke in the early part of November, 191 3. The
conversation is reported by the French Ambassador at
Berlin. The accuracy of its transcription has been denied
in Germany. We need not attach overmuch importance
either to the conversation or to the denial; for obviously
we can check neither the one nor the other. But for the
sake of argument let us admit that it did take place, and
that it is truthfully transcribed. The conversation is less
important than the statement of the French Ambassador,
who goes quite as far as Lord Haldane, for he speaks of

"William the Second, whose personal influence has been
exerted in many critical circumstances in favour of the
maintenance of peace. . . . "2

Like Lord Haldane, the French Ambassador declares
(on the strength of the conversation he reports) that these
pacific sentiments had changed. But that is not the only

1 Daily Chronicle, April i, 1915.

3 Vide similar French statements in Chapter XI.

66 TRUTH AND THE WAR

statement in the Yellow Book corroborative of Lord
Haldane. We are told in Document 5 that if war did not
break out in 191 1 over Morocco it was largely because of
the "pacific desires of the Emperor and the Chancellor."

Thus far, then, our examination establishes that the
Beast of the Apocalypse, otherwise the German Emperor
— and we are told that who says Kaiser says German
officialdom — was, until quite recently, a powerful factor
for the preservation of the peace of the world. We are
told so in the French Government's official publication on
the war, and by a British Cabinet Minister, with
exceptional advantages of knowing the truth. What is
left of the "forty years' preparation" legend?

But when did the Kaiser abandon that role, and why ?
These questions remain to be examined. The date is of
importance. Two years ago, says Lord Haldane. That
would take us back to April, 19 13. But another document
in the French Yellow Book suggests an earlier period.
Annexe I. to Document 1 contains an extract from the
French military attache in Berlin written (apparently) in the
early part of 191 2, and describing the effect of the Morocco
affair upon the mind of Germany. He says : —

"We discover every day how deep and lasting are the
sentiments of wounded rancour against us provoked by
the events of last year."

The "events of last year" were the events connected
with the Morocco dispute, when the French Government,
with the assistance of British officialdom, tore up the Treaty
of Algeciras, filled Morocco with French troops, and defied
Germany. The French military attache continues : —

"The resentment felt in every part of the country is
the same. . . . The Emperor and the Government yielded ;
public opinion has neither forgiven them nor us. Public
opinion does not intend that such a thing shall occur
again."

It would seem, then, from the above that the Kaiser's
"pacifist desires" which contributed so largely to prevent-
ing war over Morocco were adversely affected by what
is admitted to have been a widespread national resentment
at the manner in which Germany considered she had been
treated over Morocco. And this should be of interest to
all British people.

But we may let that pass, for although important
assuredly, it is not the most important conclusion derivable

MILITARISM AND THE BEAST 67

from what precedes. The point of really capital importance
is this. Throughout the lengthy period during which
Germany considered herself safe, owing to her military
strength, Germany was pacific, and the German Emperor's
influence was exerted in the interests of peace, "in many
critical circumstances." That is vouched by the French
Yellow Book and by Lord Haldane, in official statements,
published and delivered — bear this in mind — while war is
actually raging. If one desired to cite statements to the
same effect made by British and French Authorities, before
the war broke out, one could fill an issue of the Labour
Leader with comparative ease. It was only when, in the
opinion (rightly or wrongly) of the rulers of Germany,
Germany's position in Europe was no longer safe owing
to the proportionate growth in the striking forces and in
the disposition of her potential foes, i.e., during the past
three or four years — that, according to those French and
British statements, official Germany ceased to be pacific.

The significance of these conclusions is immense. If
the French Yellow Book and Lord Haldane are, in this
particular, recording the truth, the charge of decades of
premeditation and of a blow struck when it was most likely
to succeed — timed with that intent — can no longer be
sustained if we have regard for truth and honesty. But
that is not all. If Germany was pacific when she deemed
herself secure, and ceased to be so when she deemed herself
insecure, this war, so far as Germany's part in it is con-
cerned, is a war not due to vile and disorderly ambitions,
but is a war due to fear.

Let us see what light can be derived from official figures
and from non-German publications in this regard.

But before doing so it is essential that we should refer
once again to the Morocco affair in the light of what has
transpired since. On February 29, 1912, I penned these
concluding sentences to the Introduction of my book on
Morocco : —

"The Morocco problem is not settled. In one sense
it may be said to be only beginning. It will loom largely
on the horizon during the lifetime of the present
generation."

A year has passed since the contents of the above
chapter appeared, and the interval has seen a continuance
of the systematic effort to ascribe the "armed peace" of
Europe solely to Germany's ambitions and to her

68 TRUTH AND THE WAR

Emperor's Machiavellism. The following Notes may,
therefore, be usefully added to what precedes.

I. Europe's universal preparation for war. The
famous Note to the Powers of August 24, 1898, which will
always redound to the credit of the Tsar, is the clearest
avowal of all Europe's folly.

In proportion — the Imperial circular reads — as the armaments
of each Power increase, so they less and less fulfil the objects which
the Governments have set before themselves. Economic crises, due
in great part to the system of armaments a outrance and the continual
danger which lies in this accumulation of war-material, are trans-
forming the armed peace of our days into a crushing burden which
the people have more and more difficulty in bearing. It appears
evident, then, that if this state of things continues, it will inevitably
lead to the very cataclysm which it is desired to avert, and the horrors
of which make every thinking being shudder in anticipation.

But can a solitary human being, knowing anything at
all of contemporary history, contend that Germany had
been solely, or even prominently, responsible for the
condition of affairs lamented by the Tsar in 1898? Which
were the three Governments that had filled the world with
the clamour of their disputes in the twenty odd years
preceding the Tsar's circular, keeping all Europe on tenter-
hooks and incurring chief responsibility for the enormous
increase in armaments — the subject of the Imperial
lamentations? They were the Governments of Britain,
Russia, and France. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877;
the acute Anglo-Russian friction arising therefrom in 1878;
the bitter quarrels between those two Powers resulting from
Russia's advance into Asia, culminating in the Pendjeh
affair in 1885; the kidnapping of the Prince of Bulgaria
by Russian agents in 1886; the Franco-Italian dispute over
Tunis in 1881 ; Anglo-French rivalry in Egypt, in Siam,
in West Africa, and on the Nile — these had been the chief
contributory causes of the "armed peace" and world
ferment which had converted Europe, even at that period,
into an arsenal. It is a ridiculous and puerile distortion
of history to pretend otherwise. As a matter of fact you
will hardly pick up a volume of European history, or a
treatise on Germany, written before the war by English
authors, which does not fully recognise that the creation
of modern Germany has been one of the most powerful
factors making for peace in Europe.

II. Did the Kaiser propose or oppose a European
coalition against Britain at the time of the Boer war?
Shortly after the contents of this Chapter had appeared in
the Labour Leader, I received, in connection with my

MILITARISM AND THE BEAST 69

reference to this subject (supra) the following comments
from a correspondent, who is one of the best informed
authorities on foreign affairs in this country : —

In March, 1914, the Novoe Vremya (the organ of the Pan-
Slavist Party) published an interview with an anonymous Russian
statesman (who was none other than Count Witte, Russia's famous
Finance Minister) suggesting that, in the past, a Russo-German
agreement could easily have been achieved on the basis of a partition
of the Austrian Empire. The interview was, no doubt, intended as a
kite, but the Pesther Lloyd (the official organ of the Austrian Govern-
ment) replied in its issue of March 29, confirming the statement that
such an agreement had been ventilated between Russia and Germany.
It then said: "It is true that this coalition between Russia and
Germany was to be directed against a third Power, but that Power
was not Austria-Hungary, but England. The inspirer of the scheme
was Count Lobanoff, the then Russian Foreign Minister, and Count
Witte, then Minister of Finance, who both worked at the realisation
of the plan. Prince Lobanoff was a convinced friend of the Dual
Monarchy, and a passionate enemy of England, against whom it had
been his life's object to get up a Continental coalition. . . The plan
broke down against the opposition of Austro-Hungary and Germany,
who did not want to take part in any action directed against England.

My correspondent adds an equally interesting item of
French testimony : —

"We have also a reference from the French side in M. R^ne" Pinon's
book, "France and Germany," published in 1913. M. Pinon says:
'History will inquire how it was that, so short a time after
Fashoda, Franco-Russian policy was not able to wrest some advan-
tages from England's embarrassments, and in deciding upon neutrality
did not succeed in getting a full price for its neutrality. It is
possible that the explanation must be sought in the contradictions of
German policy. If Germany had really wished for a rapprochement
with France and Russia for an active collaboration outside Europe,
she could have seized the tempting opportunity.' "

Further light has now been thrown upon this matter
in a speech delivered last autumn by General Botha. On
September 3, 191 5, the Daily News published a cable from
Johannesburg recording a speech by General Botha. No
contradiction has since appeared so far as I know. The
speech had reference to an alleged offer from Germany to
recognise the independence of the ex-Boer republics if the
South African rebellion proved successful; and General
Botha's speech was, very naturally and properly, directed
to an indignant denunciation of the alleged offer.

But, with the apparent intention of lending further
point to his denunciation, General Botha made a very
remarkable statement, so remarkable indeed that the
Daily News, in publishing the despatch, headed it, "An
historic refusal of assistance." The essential passage in
the statement was this : —

(7,)

7o TRUTH AND THE WAR

"At the time of the South African War, other nations
were prepared to assist the Boers, but they stipulated that
Germany should do likewise. The Kaiser refused."

Six weeks after the publication of this utterance, the
Times, commenting editorially upon M. Delcasse's
resignation, declared (October 14) that the latter : —

"with the help of the Tsar, thrust aside German proposals
for a Continental combination against us during the Boer
War."

Where lies the truth — with General Botha or the
Times, with the Northcliffian Daily Mail in 1899 or with
the Northcliffian Times in 1915? The day has gone by
when any serious student of international politics can
accept the obiter dictum of Printing House Square without
the most ample reservations. It is otherwise with General
Botha. No man living is in a better position to know the
facts. Subject to authoritative contradiction, his state-
ment stands.

CHAPTER IX.
The Morocco Intrigue

In so grave an hour, so full of peril for all of us, for all our countries,
I shall not indulge in an elaborate search after responsibilities. We
have ours, and I claim before history that we (Jaures and the French
Socialist Party) had foreseen them and announced them. When we
said that to penetrate into Morocco by violence, by arms, was to
inaugurate in Europe an era of ambitions, covetousness and conflicts,
we were denounced as bad Frenchmen ; but it is we who were
concerned for France. There, alas ! lies our national share of
responsibility. It acquires precision if you recall that the Bosnian-
Herzgovinian question is the occasion of the present struggle between
Austria and Serbia, and that we Frenchmen were not entitled to
utter, and were unable to utter, the least remonstrance when
Austria annexed Bosnia-Herzgovina, because we were committed in
Morocco, and because we desired that our own sin should be forgiven
us by forgiving, on our part, the sins of others. And so our
Foreign Minister said to Austria : "You can take Bosnia-Herzgovina,
provided you let us take Morocco." We hawked our offers of
penitence from capital to capital, from nation to nation. We said to
Italy : "You can go to Tripoli, seeing that I am in Morocco. You
can steal at one end of the street, seeing that I have stolen at the
other end." — Jean Jaures, speaking at Vaise a fortnight before the
outbreak of war and his own assassination.

The clash between the Entente and the Central Empires was
brought about by a series of steps, some great and some small.
Some of those steps were taken by one side, some by the other. One
of the longest steps towards war was taken by the British Govern-
ment's action during the Agadir crisis, culminating in Mr. Lloyd
George's diatribe at the Mansion House. — Hon. Bertrand Russell in
"The Policy of the Entente, 1Q04-14."

But this long series of duplicities and repudiated undertakings
naturally embittered Germany against both France and England.
It is enough to make one despair that humanity will ever evolve far
enough to deserve — by honest use — its one supreme gift of reason, to
see how blind animal passion still renders the majority incapable of
even the elements of justice when considering any opponent's
position. — Mr. Charles Hayward in "What Is Diplomacy?"

THE quarrel which arose between Britain and
Germany in 1905, and again more acutely in 191 1,
over the affairs of Morocco, will be regarded by future
generations as one of those episodes in a nation's history
which leave indelible traces upon its destinies, forging
links of inter-connected circumstances affecting a remote

71

72 TRUTH AND THE WAR

posterity. By Britons the episode will be remembered in
time to come with amazement, anger, and shame.

To the British people, the importance of the episode
was transcendental, and the persistent attempt by certain,
not all, British historians and writers in the Press and
magazines to pass on, even now, to future generations
the utterly distorted narration of the facts which did duty
in 191 1 and 1912, is a monstrous perversion of patriotism.

For the Morocco quarrel marked a turning point in
British history. It was Morocco which caused the
initiation of those secret Franco-British naval and military
"conversations" which, by imperceptible degrees, and
without the knowledge of the Cabinet, let alone Parlia-
ment and the nation, committed us to a course of policy
which immensely increased the dangers of war in Europe,
and made our participation therein practically inevitable.1

It was Morocco which gave a definitely hostile
character to our relations with Germany.

It was Morocco which gave the influences in Britain
favouring a war with Germany their signal opportunity to
inflame public sentiment against Germany — and to inflame
it through the withholding of facts essential to knowledge.

It was Morocco which, as Mr. Ramsay Macdonald has
truly said, "slammed the doors in the face of the peace-
makers in Europe."2

It was Morocco which inaugurated the veritable
holocaust of Treaty obligations culminating in the
invasion of Belgium. No doubt the long immunity
enjoyed by Leopold II. in breaking the Congo Treaty
set the first immoral example. But that was the
case of an individual, and not of a European Government,
defying the public law of Europe.

It cannot be too often insisted upon that the violation
of honourable bonds, which disgraced Europe in the
decade before the war, and which is now ministering to
Europe's destruction, began with the attempt of the
Foreign Offices of France and England to set aside the
public law of Europe in the matter of Morocco. The
attempt achieved success by threatening the Power which
protested with war.

The violation of the Treaty of Berlin by Austria
followed the violation of the Act of Algeciras, and, as in
the former case, was successfully accomplished by the

1 Vide Chapters XXXIII. and XXXIV.

2 Foreword to "Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy" : op. cit.

THE MOROCCO INTRIGUE 73

same method. Austria's offence, morally blameworthy,
was ethically venal by comparison ; for Austria had
preceded her action by decades of administrative effort in
the territories she wrongfully annexed, and she accom-
panied her annexation by substantial monetary com-
pensation to Turkey ; while all the Moors got were
bullets. Tripoli followed Bosnia. In the Tripoli case
the Treaties of Paris and Berlin were both violated.
After Tripoli, Persia. Finally, Belgium. A veritable
basketful! of scraps of paper.

The story of the long Morocco intrigue cannot be fully
grasped unless it is studied in detail. No summary can
convey its full implications. The detailed story is given
in my book. I shall only recall it here in outline. To
make the story intelligible thus treated, it is necessary
to indicate the international framework in which the
intrigue was set up.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a number
of events contributed to make Morocco an object of
interest to four European Powers. These four Powers
were Britain, France, Spain, and Germany. Spain, of
course, had a very long historical connection with
Morocco. The British interest was commercial and
strategic. The British strategic interest was concerned
in preventing any first-class Power from acquiring a footing
on the Mediterranean coast-line of Morocco, thereby
neutralising the commanding position of Gibraltar, and
threatening the ascendancy which Great Britain enjoys
through possession of the Rock. British policy did not
aim at securing political rights in Morocco. The French
interest was of a different character. It was purely
Imperialistic. The ambitions of the French Imperialists
in the early part of the period we are discussing were only
nascent. But they were unmistakable, and from the
Imperial point of view comprehensible, French
Imperialism coveted Tunisia on the east and Morocco on
the West of Algeria, in order to form a great North
African Empire under the French flag. Spain's interest
was sentimental. Germany's interest was wholly
economic. Germany's industrial development was
beginning. German explorers had visited several parts of
interior Morocco and seen in it a rich field for trade and
industrial enterprise.

74 TRUTH AND THE WAR

In 1880 these four Powers, and other Powers indirectly
interested, came to the conclusion that an International
Conference ought to be convened in the general interest
of Europe's relations with this semi-barbarous African
State. The Conference was held at Madrid. The
Sultan's representatives took part in it and, with their
concurrence, various resolutions were adopted. The most
important was that all nations should in future enjoy
equality of commercial treatment in Morocco — the "most
favoured nation" clause having been until that moment
enjoyed by Britain alone.

During the next two decades — 1880 to 1900 — the
policy of the four interested Powers preserved the
character described above. An attempt by Lord
Salisbury to induce the Moorish Government to bring
about some much needed reforms met with failure, owing
to the local opposition of the French official representa-
tives, supported from Paris. The representatives of the
German Government, on the other hand, supported the
British mission. The dream of a French North African
Empire had, in part, materialised. French control had
been established in Tunis at the price of a bitter quarrel
with Italy, which almost led to war, and did lead to Italy
joining the Teutonic combination — thus was born the
Triple Alliance.1 Having absorbed Tunis, French
Imperialism was busily engaged in seeking for pretexts
to interfere with Morocco, and a long coterminous frontier
with Algeria, passing through wild and desert country,
gave many openings for diplomatic and military inter-
vention. Germany^ was developing her trade with
Morocco. Her Consul at Fez had succeeded in negotiat-
ing a commercial Treaty with the Sultan, and a Moorish
embassy had been received at Berlin. The German
Government refused to ratify the Treaty until the
signatory powers to the Madrid Conference had been
consulted and had signified their assent thereto.

The opening years of the new century saw the birth
of the intrigue.

■o •

French foreign policy was then in the hands of M.
Delcass6 — ambitious, impulsive, a very stormy petrel of
international politics, violently Anglophobe one moment
and Germanophobe the next. His personality has been one

1 Crispi's Memoirs can be usefully consulted in this connection.
("The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi" : Hodder and Stoughton).

THE MOROCCO INTRIGUE 75

of the most disturbing influences in Europe. M. Delcasse
sought to clear the approaches to Morocco from two
directions. He made a bargain with Italy, and sought to
make one with Spain. Baulked of Tunis, Italian
Imperialism looked towards Tripoli, and was assured that
France would not oppose an eventual Italian occupation
of Tripoli, if Italy placed no obstacle in the path of
France in Morocco. To Spain M. Delcass6 turned with a
proposal for a Franco-Spanish partition of Morocco.
The negotiations dragged on for a considerable time, and
were on the eve of conclusion when, apparently, the
British Foreign Office heard of them. The upshot was
that the Spanish Government refused to ratify.

Meantime, events were pointing to a new re-shuffling
in the eternal game of beggar-my-neighbour, which
diplomatists call the "Balance of Power." The prolonged
friction between Britain and France was to make way for
accommodation, only to be replaced by an even deadlier
friction between Britain and Germany.

In 1904 the British and French Governments agreed
to compose their differences all over the globe. Not one
of their differences was worth the bones of a single British
or French soldier, or the tears of a single British or
French widow. But one or the other of them had
repeatedly brought both nations to the very brink of war
— twice in connection with West Africa, once about Nilotic
swamps, once over Siam, while the Egyptian squabble was
of long standing, and the dispute about Newfoundland
codfish was a hardy perennial. When, therefore, the
average Englishman and the average Frenchman heard
that their Governments had at last acquired a modicum of
common sense, they were genuinely delighted. And the
simple soul, if cast in a British mould, took rapidly
enough to the new doctrine, which bade him believe that
the Frenchman might become a reformed character with-
out being "rolled in blood and mud." And the simple
soul, if located in a French frame, was equally pleased to
think that the perfidiousness of Albion had been over-
rated.

Simple souls both. For under cover of an amicable
settlement the seeds of the mightiest war of all time were
beingf sown.

By one of the several published arrangements, the
French Government agreed to leave us alone in Egypt.

76 TRUTH AND THE WAR

In return for this concession the British Government
recognised that France, owing to the proximity of
Algeria to Morocco, had special interests in the latter
country. The reference to Morocco was ambiguously
worded except in one particular. . Both Governments
declared they had no intention of altering the "political
status" of that country.

That was "diplomacy."

Shortly afterwards the French and Spanish Govern-
ments issued a joint Declaration, asserting that they
remained "firmly attached" to the • integrity and inde-
pendence of Morocco.

That, too, was "diplomacy."

Secret articles were attached to the Anglo-French
agreement, and a secret convention was attached to the
Franco-Spanish "Declaration."

These provided, in effect, for the realisation of the
ambitions of M. Delcasse and the French Imperialists.
At last Morocco was within their grasp. France and
Spain were to divide Morocco between them. One import-
ant proviso was, however, insisted upon by the British
Government, in accordance with its traditional strategic
policy, already described. France was to be excluded from
the Mediterranean coast-line, which was to fall to Spain.
This was a fly in the ointment from the French
Imperialistic point of view, and accounted, no doubt, for
the fact that M. Delcasse concealed the secret clauses even
from some of his Cabinet colleagues. Throughout the
years that followed, French public opinion allowed itself to
be dragged along by the French Imperialists in the belief
that France was securing, not "a mutilated Morocco,"
as was later to be realised, but the whole of Morocco. And
that is not the least of the deceptions practised upon the
French people by its Foreign Office, with the connivance
of the British Foreign Office.

Apart from the territorial rights they had so calmly
attributed to themselves, the French and Spanish Govern-
ments had also arranged to share the economic spoils of
Morocco between them. As Spain had no money, this
side of the arrangement virtually gave France a lien over
every enterprise connected with the economic development
of the country.

This dishonest triangular robbery at the expense of a
weak native State, and at the expense of the rest of the

THE MOROCCO INTRIGUE 77

world, was, of course, concealed from the Parliaments and
peoples of Britain, France, and Spain. Spain, indeed,
was a decoy duck.

But there was Germany to reckon with.

The German Government had at first declared that it
saw nothing inimical to German interests in the Anglo-
French published agreement. This statement was made
a few days after the publication of the latter, and six
months before the completion of its complement, the
secret convention between France and Spain. When the
Franco-Spanish "Declaration" was published, Germany,
already resenting M. Delcasse^s breach of diplomatic
etiquette in not officially notifying the Anglo-French
published agreement, saw in this further announcement
what appeared to be a studied intention to shut her out
altogether from a say in Moroccan affairs, to which her
position as a participant of the Madrid Conference, and
her interests in the country, entitled her. She began to
suspect the character of the deal. Suspicion changed to
certainty when Parisian indiscretions hinted at the exist-
ence of "secret articles" and at Britain's knowledge of
them; and when M. Delcasse suddenly pitched a veritable
cargo of reforms at the head of the Sultan, and peremp-
torily demanded immediate compliance. Thereupon
the German Government decided to make it clear that
Germany had no intention of being excluded from the
field. The Kaiser went to Tangier, and in a speech to
the Sultan's deputation declared that he looked upon the
Sultan as an entirely independent Sovereign. At the same
time the Sultan, doubtless at Germany's suggestion,
issued a Note to all the signatory Powers of the Madrid
Convention, suggesting- a further international Confer-
ence upon the affairs of his country and Europe's connec-
tion therewith. This the German Government promptly
accepted.

The attitude of the German Government was legally
unassailable. Its argument, as officially put forward,
may -be paraphrased thus : "The future of Morocco is an
international matter, not a Franco-British matter. France
and Britain have come to an agreement amongst them-
selves about Morocco. But this does not dispose of the
question so far as we are concerned. Under cover of that
agreement France is making demands upon the Sultan,
and making- them in a tone which amounts to the assertion

78 TRUTH AND THE WAR

of a mandate to interfere permanently with the govern-
ment of Morocco. Such a mandate she can receive only
from the signatory Powers of the Madrid Convention.
We have given her no such mandate. Our interests in
Morocco are important and growing. But even if they
were not we could not allow ourselves to be elbowed
roughly out of the way in this fashion. We have a right
to be consulted about Morocco, and we do not intend to
be jockeyed out of this right simply because it has suited
England and France in their own interests to make a deal
about a country which, in point of fact, belongs to neither
of them." The man in the street may say : " Why did
not the German Government avow that it knew all about
the secret arrangements and denounce them at the bar of
European public opinion?" The reason is not far to seek.
Governments do not act in that way. They cannot. Such
action on the part of the German Government would have
meant an open breach with France and England, and if
France and England had declared themselves prepared to
stand by what they had done, Germany would have had to
choose between war and an ignominous retreat, although
she was morally and legally in the right. The first lesson
of diplomacy is that you must never speak the truth. You
must proceed by subterfuge. You must pretend you do
not know, when you know all the time. You must profess
to believe that the other party is playing straight, and that
the only difference between you and him is a matter of
interpretation, whereas you are well aware that he has
tricked you; so you trick him into believing you do not
know you have been tricked. All this is of the essence of
" diplomacy."

So once again the British people and the French
people were deceived. The German Government's action
was denounced by the inspired organs of the British and
French Foreign Offices as grossly provocative and
designed to test the solidity of the Anglo-French entente.
The Times easily out-Heroded Herod. Its personal
attacks upon the Emperor were particularly violent.
After refusing to go to the Conference, the British and
French Governments finally consented. Indeed the
French Government, having got rid of M. Delcass£, was
anxious to smooth things over as far as it could. The
Conference met at Algeciras. It was protracted and
stormy. In the end it drew up a plan of reforms, con-

THE MOROCCO INTRIGUE 79

ferred certain strictly limited police powers upon France
and Spain, provided for the international capitalisation of
certain European enterprises in Morocco, and affirmed
once more the integrity and independence of the Sultan.

Here was Sir E. Grey's chance. He was not respon-
sible for the secret arrangements. The Algeciras Act
might, and should, have inaugurated an entirely new
chapter. Sir E. Grey could have said to France :
"The Act of Algeciras makes the secret treaties null and
void. But you have got a footing. If you play your cards
tactfully with Germany, she will recognise your Pro-
tectorate in course of time. Our diplomacy will help you.
But if you rush matters and proceed as though the
Algeciras Act did not exist, we shall not support you. It
is an International Act, which lays down that the Sultan
of Morocco is independent, and that the integrity of his
country must be respected. Our signature is at the foot
of that Act, and we cannot in honour help you to break it.
But go slowly, carry the Germans with you, and we will do
our best to make your path an easy one." It would not
have been a strictly moral course — towards Morocco —
but it would have been at least infinitely better than the
course actually adopted.

Instead, the British Foreign Office chose to regard the
Algeciras Act as a diplomatic defeat, and plunged deeper
into the morass. While the Conference was actually being
held, or immediately after, Sir E. Grey was approached by
the French Ambassador in London, and consented to the
initiation of those secret military and naval "conversa-
tions," which were to have so fatal a sequel.1

The result of the intrigue up to this point (1906) had
been as follows : —

The British people had been committed, without
knowing it, to diplomatic support of the secret ambitions
of the French Foreign Office, in other words to a potential
French Protectorate over Morocco.

They were supporting, without knowing it, a dishonest
Treaty which said one thing and meant another.

They were committed to supporting the quarrel of their
Government with Germany, but, owing to essential facts
being withheld from them, their support was based upon

1 Vide Chapters XXXIII. and XXXIV.

8o TRUTH AND THE WAR

a complete misunderstanding and misapprehension of the
German case.

Diplomatic support of France was in process of being
converted, without their knowing it, into a potential
material support — i.e., the British people were in the
process of being committed to war with Germany on behalf
of France.

Incidentally it may be recalled that five years were to
pass before the British people became first acquainted — in
the columns of a couple of Parisian newspapers — with the
existence of the secret Morocco arrangements, and eight
years were to pass before they learned that, arising out
of those secret agreements, they were morally pledged to
support France in a European war."

The five years which followed Algeciras witnessed the
intrigue following the course of its logical development;
the original lie gathering around in a maze of other lies;
the secret commitments dragging the country nearer and
nearer to the abyss; unavowed and unavowable liabilities
paralyzing our diplomatic action, rendering abortive any
attempt to straighten out Anglo-German relations,
deflecting our national policy into all sorts of unnatural
channels, and poisoning the diplomatic wells of Europe.

The French Imperialists treated the Algeciras Act like
waste paper. They proceeded systematically to conquer
and absorb Morocco, by direct military action and piece-
meal occupation, by fomenting internal discord, and by
financial combinations which strangled the revenues of the
Moorish Government. Every step they took was
applauded, and every criticism thereon in Germany was
denounced, by the officially-inspired British Press. Of
their culminating action, the march upon Fez, Sir E. Grey
hastened to express his official approval in Parliament.
During the whole course of these proceedings the French
Chamber, profoundly uneasy at the turn events were
taking, registered again and again the determination of
France to uphold the Algeciras Act. But in the then
condition of France, with short-lived Cabinet succeeding
short-lived Cabinet, at intervals of six months or less, and
with the militarists and Imperialists steadily working to
the desired end, the Chamber was powerless to stay the
progress of events, or put on the brake.

THE MOROCCO INTRIGUE 81

The German Government was resentful, but embar-
rassed. It sought steadily to avoid a rupture, and appeared
to aim at producing a state of affairs, through successful
bargaining with France in other directions, which would
have enabled it to prepare the way for acquiescing in a
French Protectorate, provided the French Government
would allow it to save its own face with its own public
opinion and to placate its own Imperialists. This the
French Government, owing in part to perpetual changes in
the personnel of Ministers, was either unwilling or unable
to do. The running comments of a neutral. diplomatist
present as true a general picture of what was passing in
Berlin during these years as we are ever likely to get,
although the specific efforts to reach an accommodation are
discussed in detail in my book. The following extracts
are from the despatches of the Belgian Minister at Berlin,
Baron Greindl : —

May 6, 1908. — " The most interesting feature of the
White Book I had the honour of enclosing in my yesterday's
report is the forebearance with which the German
Government pretends to ignore the flagrant contradiction
between the uniformly correct declarations of the French
Government, and the conquest of Morocco which France
is carrying on, on the strength of a so-called European
mandate which no one has given her, and professing to be
swept along by circumstances which she calls fortuitous,
but which, in point of fact, she has carefully provoked. . .
Germany tolerates. She cannot do otherwise. The time
for diplomatic negotiations has gone by. She can only
choose between pretending not to see, and war, which the
Emperor will not have, and which would be condemned by
German public opinion.

April 20, 191 1. — "I do not think there is the least
desire here to play an active part in the Morocco affair.
Any illusions must have disappeared long ago, if they were
ever entertained, as to the value of the Act of Algeciras,
which France signed with the firm intention of never
observing. But the policy of standing aside does not
solely depend upon the Imperial Government. It must be
helped from outside. It is perfectly true that public
opinion is uneasy. . . The Imperial Government has been
criticised for its undue toleration towards France in the

matter of Morocco If the French Government

really desires to avoid the chance of a conflict, it is that
Government's turn to manage affairs with sufficient

82 TRUTH AND THE WAR

prudence and pretended moderation ; not to force Germany
to abandon her inaction.

May 1,1911. — " The anxiety of German public opinion
is real . . . the Imperial Government has long been
criticised for shutting its eyes to France's failure to observe
the Act of Algeciras. . . . What is the significance of
the semi-official warning conveyed to Paris? Does the
present Foreign Secretary, who is much more energetic
than his predecessor, mean to convey that he is not pre-
pared to tolerate any further French encroachments ? . . .
Despite the tendency of the semi-official article, the position
remains a very delicate one. A mistake may force Germany
to take action. Much, too, depends upon the Press. Some
French newspapers show much too openly that it is
intended to make Morocco another Tunisia. The attitude
of the German papers is, generally speaking, very reserved ;
but those inspired by the Pan-Germanists put forward
notions which are most embarrassing to the Imperial
policy."

When the intention to occupy Fez was being openly
discussed by the French Press, the same Belgian diplo-
matist, and also his colleague in London, the Count de
Lalaing, wrote expressing their fear that if that event
should take place, Germany would be compelled to
intervene, as the violation of the Algeciras Act would then
be too flagrant and open, to be ignored.

Baron Greindl writes under date of May 10, 191 1 : —

"France began by making arrangements with
England and Spain in 1904 without taking the trouble
to consult, or even to advise, the other interested Powers.
Until Germany objected it was openly stated that Morocco
would become another Tunis. Alongside the public
arrangement, France signed a secret Treaty with Spain (a
secret very badly kept) for the partition of Morocco. The
Act of Algeciras wrought no change in French projects.
It only compelled France to carry them out more slowly,
step by step, instead of in a single stride, like the Bardo
Treaty was extorted from the Bey of Tunis. Since then the
progressive invasion of Morocco has been methodically
pursued. ... I remain persuaded that Germany desires
to avoid entangling herself irremediably in this Moroccan
affair. But I must repeat what I wrote in my report of
May 1, that the situation is a delicate one. Indeed it is
becoming so more and more. If the Imperial Government
is to justify its inaction in the eyes of German public

THE MOROCCO INTRIGUE 83

opinion, it is essential that the French Government should
not compel the German Government to abandon that
line.

June 17, 191 1. — "The Imperial Government maintains,
therefore, its original standpoint. It is playing the part of
mere spectator, reserving its liberty of action in the event
of the essential clauses of the Act of Algeciras, i.e., the
sovereignty of the Sultan, and the integrity of Morocco
ceasing to exist owing to French action. There remains
nothing of either. When will Germany think it advisable
to say so, and what use will she make of her recovered
liberty ? I am persuaded that her chief desire is to avoid a
war which Morocco is not worth, and which France can
spare Europe by putting into the conquest of Morocco the
dose of hypocrisy which is necessary in order that public
opinion in Germany shall not become excited. Everyone
does not share my opinion ; some of my colleagues are
astonished at the forbearance of Germany."

When it became clear that the French army, after
"relieving" Fez, had no intention of departing therefrom,
Germany sent a gunboat to Agadir to intimate that she was
at the end of her patience, and that the Morocco question
should not be settled without her. Her action, morally
significant, was materially insignificant. The Panther only
carried a complement of 125 men. Moreover, Germany's
action had been preceded by a much more vigorous
demonstration on the part of Spain, whose Government
took umbrage at what it deemed the high-handed action
of the French. Thinking Spain was to be deprived of its
advantages under the secret convention, the Spanish
Government sent a large body of troops to occupy the areas
allotted to Spain under the Treaty. When the little German
gunboat anchored off Agadir, there were 100,000 French
and Spanish troops in Morocco, France was in actual
military occupation of a considerable proportion of the
country, the authority of the Sultan's Government had
entirely disappeared, and the Act of Algeciras existed —
as a memory.

What followed has passed into history and left an
indelible mark upon it. Sir E. Grey's attitude was more
French than the French, more "royalist than the King."
He professed to see in Germany's action a menace to

84 TRUTH AND THE WAR

British interests and, mirabile dictu, a "reopening" of
the Morocco question ! What the Foreign Office saw in
Germany's action, of course, was a challenge to the secret
arrangement with France, now coming to fruition despite
the Algeciras Act. Sir E. Grey insisted that the British
Government must be a party to the Franco-German
negotiations. However, negotiations began between the
two Governments without the British Government
becoming a party to them. The Times fulminated
daily. Suddenly, in the midst of the negotiations, on July
20, The Times, whose editorials and Paris despatches had
been characterised by almost incredible violence, announced
that Germany was making outrageous " demands " upon
France. It specified those alleged " demands." It
declared that no British Government would tolerate them,
even if a French Government were found feeble enough to
do so ! It pressed for the despatch of warships to Agadir.
The next day Sir E. Grey sent for the German Ambassador.
He adopted The Times' tone and The Times' "facts," and
he hinted that it might be necessary to take steps to protect
British interests. The German Ambassador angrily pro-
tested. The same evening Mr. Lloyd George was put up
by the Foreign Office to make a speech at the Mansion
House. It virtually amounted to a threat of war, should
Germany press her "demands." In its editorial next
morning The Times hailed Mr. Lloyd George as a sort of
national saviour, emphasised in insulting language the
significance of the speech, and compared Germany to Dick
Turpin. Public opinion in all three countries reached fever-
heat and for a few days war seemed imminent.

It was avoided by the pacific elements in the French
Government, headed by M. Caillaux, the French Premier,
who played much the same part in the crisis as M. Rouvier,
the then French Premier, played in the 1905 crisis; by the
German Emperor and by the pacific elements in the German
Government. Rumour has it that Lord Morley took a
vigorous line on behalf of peace at British Cabinet Councils.
Both the German and French Governments encouraged
and, indeed, invited the Socialists and the Social Demo-
crats respectively to organise immense peace demonstra-
tions in Paris and Berlin.

Meantime the Franco-German negotiations continued
and reached a solution in November. Germany recognized
a French Protectorate over Morocco, but bound down
France to observe the open-door for trade and capital

THE MOROCCO INTRIGUE 85

investments in Morocco; received a portion of French
equatorial Africa and ceded a small section of German
equatorial Africa by way of exchange.

The whole story of the intrigue was subsequently
dragged into the light in a series of debates which took
place in the French Chamber, and in the Senate. The
secret treaties were denounced in scathing terms, and the
duplicity of the policy followed was condemned by some
of France's most distinguished public men.

In the course of the debate it transpired that negotia-
tions covering a wide field of Franco-German colonial
interests in Africa, had been proceeding for several
months between the two Governments before the march
upon Fez. They had not reached a conclusion owing in
large measure to the constant changes of Cabinet in
France. It transpired that when the French occupied
Fez, the German Government had given the French
Government the clearest warning that it could no longer
remain passive in view of what Germany regarded as
the culminating destruction of the Algeciras Act ; and
had there and then intimated its willingness to treat on
the basis of a German recognition of a French Pro-
tectorate, provided that Germany received compensation
elsewhere, even as Britain, Spain, and Italy had received
compensation. The French Foreign Minister's state-
ment to the Chamber completely disposed of the notion
— which was the basis of all the British Press attacks
upon Germany, and which even to-day is still repeated
with astounding ignorance or wilful perversion — that the
German Government, in sending a gunboat of 1,000 tons
and 125 men to the most God-forsaken part of the
Atlantic coastline of Morocco, intended to seize a portion
of the country itself.

The French Foreign Minister was equally categorical
as to the character of the so-called "demands" upon
France, as reported in The Times of July 20, and so
precipitately endorsed by Sir E. Grey. There were never
"demands" in the sense suggested by The Times, and
the statement of that paper that the "demands" included
the reversion to Germany of France's right of pre-
emption over the Belgian Congo was a fabrication.

In short, the French Foreign Minister's revelations
disposed of the whole structure erected by Sir E. Grey in
the House of Commons in November, when justifying his

86 TRUTH AND THE WAR

attitude in July. They also disposed of the malevolent
charges of The Times. Unfortunately, these revelations
came one month too late to affect the debate in the House
of Commons. The French Yellow Book, issued at a
much later stage, showed that the famous Times'
despatch could only have been based upon a distorted
account of a confidential conversation which had taken
place between the German Foreign Secretary and the
French Ambassador.

The effect in Germany and in France of the line of action
pursued by our Foreign Office, and of Mr. Lloyd George's
speech, was disastrous from the point of view of the
preservation of European peace. It strengthened the
hands of the French Imperialists and Jingoes and,
generally, of all the influences in France belonging to the
revanche school. It convinced even the most pacific
German Social Democrats, in the words of Mr. Ramsay
Macdonald,1 that "Germany was the victim of an evil
conspiracy, and that our friendship was merely feigned."
Upon the German Jingoes it acted like champagne. Upon
the German governing classes, and upon the German
Emperor, it had a profound effect, as is admitted in the
French Yellow Book on the War without its compilers
realising, apparently, all the significance of their
admission. If it be true, as the French Yellow Book
asserts, that from thence onwards the German Emperor
became convinced that war was inevitable, how many
of those who accept that view have ever paused to inquire
into the circumstances which brought about the con-
viction ?

It is impossible to doubt, especially when we bear
in mind the menacing aspect the near Eastern problem
was then assuming,2 that from this moment the military
party in Germany acquired enormous strength, and that
the military point of view was given additional weight
in the councils of the Empire. Nor can one affect
surprise that it should have been so.

For what was the paramount lesson to be learned
from this episode? It was that Great Britain was
prepared to go all lengths in support of France on an
issue in which French diplomacy — as honourable French-
men recognised and deplored — had behaved dishonestly ;
dishonestly to the French people and dishonestly to

1 Foreword to "Teri Years of Secret Diplomacy" : of. cit,

2 Vide Chapter XV.

THE MOROCCO INTRIGUE 87

Europe ; and had trampled upon an international agree-
ment in order to secure its own ends.

German feelings after Agadir can be more readily under-
stood when we observe the impression which British
diplomacy, and the utterances of the most powerful
section of the British Press, made upon the minds of
neutral diplomatists in the various capitals of Europe.
We may regard their impressions as ill-founded. We
cannot disregard the fact that they did form those
impressions.

In a despatch, dated Berlin, September 23, 1905,
Baron Greindl refers to the "astounding efforts made by
the British Press to prevent a peaceful settlement of the
Morocco affair. ..." He argues therefrom that British
public opinion is "prepared to welcome any combination
Hostile to Germany."

In a long despatch dated October 24, 1905, M. Leghait,
the Belgian Minister in Paris, discusses the European
situation, and that of France in particular, in grave terms.
He expresses the belief that Britain desires "to avoid a
conflict," but doubts whether "her selfish aspirations are
not leading us towards one." Reporting on July 14,
1906, M. E. van Grootven, Belgian charg£ d'affaires in
London, states : —

"Latterly the Foreign Secretary has repeated on
several occasions to the various ambassadors accredited
to London, that Great Britain is bound to France in
regard to Morocco, and that she will fulfil her engage-
ments to the end, even in the event of a Franco-German
war, and at whatever cost."

From Baron Greindl, April 5, 1906 :; —

"The British Press did all that it could to prevent the
Algeciras conference from coming to a head. It has
shown itself more uncompromising than the French news-
papers, and has ceaselessly propagated alleged plans of
German aggression which have never existed. It does
not seem that the British Ambassador at Algeciras made
the slightest effort to find a solution which should con-
ciliate the views of Germany with those of France. It
was, of course, anticipated that England would uphold
French policy ; but her engagements in no way prevented
her from playing the part of moderator."

From the Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister in
London, June 23, 1906, in reference to the efforts of Lord

88 TRUTH AND THE WAR

Avebury and others to improve Anglo-German relations :
"The real effect is virtually nil. The siege of public
opinion has been carried out. The British Press has so
overdone the attacks upon the Emperor, his Government,
and his people that the public remains suspicious."

Reporting from Paris, on February 10, 1907, M.
Leghait speaks of his fear that Germany may risk all :
"to free herself from the grip in which British policy is
squeezing her." M. Cartier, charge d'affaires, writing
from London under date of March 28, 1907, talks in
almost identical language of "British diplomacy, whose
entire resources tend towards the isolation of Germany. ' '

The allusions to the evil consequences of British Press
attacks upon Germany are numerous in subsequent
despatches. Writing from London on May 24, 1907,
the Count de Lalaing particularly censures the Northcliffe
Press. He accuses it of "warping the spirit of a whole
people." He adds: —

"It is evident that official England is secretly pursuing
a hostile policy which aims at the isolation of Germany
. . . but there is an obvious danger in thus openly
embittering public opinion as the aforesaid irresponsible
Press is doing."

Baron Greindl, reporting from Berlin on May 30, 1907,
pays a glowing tribute to the efforts of Sir Frank Lascelles
(then British Ambassador in Berlin, afterwards playing
a leading part as Chairman of the Anglo-German Friend-
ship Society to promote good feeling between the two
countries) to improve relations, but is sceptical of the
result.

It is exasperating and melancholy to read in despatch
after despatch, year after year, the same conviction
animating the entire Belgian diplomatic corps as to the
character of British diplomacy. If the view were confined
to the Belgian Embassy in Berlin, one could put it down
to pro-German prejudice. But exactly the same
impression is seen to prevail at the Belgian Embassies in
Paris and in London. If these Belgian diplomatists
were hopelessly wrong in their estimates, then how hope-
lessly incompetent must our diplomacy have been to
produce the impression they formed of it. The cumulative
significance of their judgment cannot be gleaned from
mere extracts. Extracts do not heighten the adverse
judgment. They minimise its comprehensiveness. Yet

THE MORCCO INTRIGUE 89

in the event of a European war, the Belgians had
obviously most to fear from Germany.

Passing to the events of 191 1, we find Baron
Guillaume, Belgian Minister in Paris, writing on April 29
of that year, remarking in connection with the confusion
reigning in many French Government departments over
Moroccan affairs : —

"England, which thrust France into the Moroccan
morass, contemplates her work with satisfaction."

The Count de Lalaing, writing from London on May
9, 191 1, thinks, on the other hand, that official quarters
in England are becoming anxious lest France should
commit some imprudence which would give Germany
a pretext for intervention. He refers to the frequent
visits of the French Ambassador to the Foreign Office.
Reporting on May 22, he testifies to the excellent
impression made by the visit of the German Emperor and
Empress, who went about in homely fashion without any
fuss or pomp. It was short-lived.

We come to the occupation of Fez, the despatch of
numerous Spanish troops to Morocco, and the arrival of
the Panther at Agadir. A despatch from Baron Guillaume,
dated Paris, July 8, 191 1, serves to explain the attacks
of the British officially inspired Press upon M. Caillaux,
the French Premier. After describing the chaos in
French official circles and explaining that recourse had
been had to British advice, he says : —

"I have reason to believe that M. Caillaux has, perhaps
reached the point of regretting the insistence placed upon
this step, and the attitude taken up by the British Cabinet.
There will be much less chance of reaching an under-
standing with Germany if England takes part in the
discussion, and I feel confident M. Caillaux and M. de
Selves1 regret the complexion which was given to the
Morocco affair by their predecessors. They were ready
to retreat if they could do so without humiliation."

The Count de Lalaing, writing from London under
date of July 24, calls particular attention to the famous
article in The Times of July 20, and to Mr. Lloyd George's
speech. Baron Guillaume sums up the situation as it
appeared to him from Paris on July 28. He thinks that
France is against a final rupture. He expresses great
confidence in the pacific sentiments of the German

1 French Foreign Minister.

9o TRUTH AND THE WAR

Emperor, "notwithstanding the rather frequent exuberance
of some of his actions." He adds : —

"I feel, speaking generally, less faith in the peaceful
desires of Great Britain, who does not dislike to see other
parties devour one another. But in these circumstances
it would be difficult — I will say impossible — not to inter-
vene tnanu militari. . . As I thought from the first day,
the key of the situation is in London. It is only there
that it can assume gravity."

The crisis over, the peril escaped, British sentiment
underwent a notable change. One gathered the
impression, even in circles to which Cabinet opinion was
accessible, that in many quarters, and although the full
facts were not then known, the idea was current that the
Foreign Office had not been very wisely directed. The
Haldane mission was doubtless the outcome of this feeling.
On both sides of the North Sea disinterested and dis-
tinguished men put out great efforts to heal the breach.

Why these various efforts failed, and were bound to
fail, is told in Chapters XXXIII. and XXXIV.

CHAPTER X.
European Militarism, 1905-1914 1

The German Army is vital, not merely to the existence of the
German Empire, but to the very life and independence of the nation
itself, surrounded as Germany is by other nations, each of which
possesses armies about as powerful as her own. We forget that,
while we insist upon a 60 per cent, superiority (so far as our naval
strength is concerned) over Germany being essential to guarantee the
integrity of our own shores — Germany herself has nothing like that
superiority over France alone, and she has, of course, in addition to
reckon with Russia on her eastern frontier. Germany has nothing
which approximates to a two-Power standard. She has, therefore,
become alarmed by recent events, and is spending huge sums of
money on the expansion of her military resources. — Mr. Lloyd
George in the "Daily Chronicle," January 1, 19x4.

IT has been shown that, according to Lord Haldane and
the French Yellow Book, the German Emperor had
consistently worked to preserve the peace of Europe until
within the last three or four years (or, possibly, as Lord
Haldane opines, the last two), when, according to Lord
Haldane, his opposition to war "gradually weakened."
It has been further shown that this official British and
French testimony to the pacific efforts of the German
Emperor, coupled with the theory universally held here
that the national policy of Germany is directed by and
incarnated in the person of the Emperor, indicates that,
until three or four years ago, official Germany was pacific.
The deduction to be drawn from these officially
promulgated premises is that official Germany's pacific
policy coincided with the period during which Germany's
rulers considered Germany's position in Europe to be
nationally secure, and that the alleged abandonment of
that policy coincided with the period during which
Germany's rulers considered that Germany's position in
Europe was no longer nationally secure. The only
conclusion possible from these premises is that if, as
alleged, Germany's official policy ceased to be inspired
with pacific intentions during the past three or four years,
the cause thereof was not a desire to "subjugate" Europe
1 The Labour Leader, April 29, 1915.
91

92 TRUTH AND THE WAR.

— which would have been attempted when Germany's
proportionate strength was greatest — but was inspired by
fear, fear of being "subjugated."

I now wish to quote certain figures which, I am inclined
to think, will support the conclusions above indicated, and
will throw a curious light upon Sir Edward Grey's
statement the other day to the effect that : "We now
know that the German Government had prepared for war
as only people who plan can prepare."1

It will, I suppose, be universally conceded that military
expenditure is a fair test of military preparedness. The
postulate we are asked to accept — nay, that we are told
we have accepted — is that the Teutonic Powers, Germany
especially, of course, have been preparing and planning
for a great war against the other European "group,"
to which, under the senseless system of Statecraft shared
in and praised on numerous occasions by our own
diplomacy, Europe has been divided. Very well. Let us
test that statement by the amount of money the Powers
concerned have spent upon their armies. The issue is a
square one.

TABLE I.

Military Expenditure in the Decade 1905-14.

Austro-
Hungary. Germany. France. Russia.

£ £ £ £

234,668,407 448,025,543 347,348,259 495,144,622

It will be observed that, in the period named, military
preparedness has been expressed by the Teutonic Powers
in an expenditure of ^682,693,950, and by France and
Russia in an expenditure of ^842,492,881. In other
words, France and Russia in combination have, during the
past ten years, spent ^159,798,931 more than Austria and
Germany in preparing for war.

These figures give furiously to think as they stand.
But if we sectionalise them and present them in two
quinquennial periods, i.e., if we show what the military
expenditure of these four Powers was in the period 1905-9,
and in the period 1910-14 respectively, the significance of
these figures will be enhanced. This I will now proceed
to do.

1 March 22, 1915.

EUROPEAN MILITARISM, 1905-1914. 93

TABLE II.
Military Expenditure in the Period 1905-9.

£

Austro-Hungary 105,962,783

Germany 195,647,224

Total ^301,610,007

France 150,530,462

Russia 215,485,152

Total ^366,015,614

Military Expenditure in the Period 1910-14.

Austro-Hungary 128,705,624

Germany 252,378,319

Total £381 ,083,943

France 196,817,797

Russia 279,659,470

Total ^476,477,267

It will be remarked that the first period, 1905-9 — during
which British and French official authorities declare that
official Germany's policy was pacific — the military
expenditure of France and Russia was already considerably
in excess of that of Germany and her Austrian ally. But
not so considerable, apparently — other factors being taken
into consideration — as to cause the rulers of Germany
serious uneasiness. During the second period, however,
that excess progressively increased from ^64,405,607, its
amount at the close of the first period, to ^95,393,324-
Put otherwise, France and Russia have spent during the
past five years ^95,393,324 more than the Teutonic
Powers in preparing for war, which works out at an
average of excess just under ^20,000,000 per annum, not
far short of the entire cost of our own army. During this
latter period it was that Germany's rulers became really
alarmed. With what justification we shall perceive when
we examine the figures in detail.

In 1908 Russia's military expenditure made a
tremendous leap forward, rising from ^40,913,653 to
^'45,227,850, and the same phenomenon was observable
the next year, when another five million pounds was added,
the total for 1909 amounting to ^50,416,915. In 1909-10
the German figures, which had risen from ^37,122,582 in

94 TRUTH AND THE WAR.

1906-7 to ^42, 719,612 in 1908-9, fell to ^40, 604,764. But
Russia's rose again that year to ^51, 140,034, despite the
huge increase in the two former years, and France added,
for her part, another two and a half million pounds. Next
year (1910-11) Germany's figures showed another slight
decrease (^40, 347,037), but Russia maintained and slightly
exceeded the previous year's (^51,349,332), while France
added a further two million and a half pounds. The
position which had been reached in 1912, the year
preceding Germany's immense increase, when, according
to Lord Haldane, the German Emperor's opposition to
war "weakened," was this : Russia and France in
combination were devoting in that single year ^89,259,671
to military preparations, while Germany and Austria were
spending ^67,254,555. In other words, the process of
yearly increase maintained by the first two named Powers
had attained such proportions that, in a single year, Russia
and France were spending ^22,000,000 more than
Germany and Austria.

Then it was that fear gripped the vitals of the rulers
of Germany, and at a single bound the German estimates
went up from ^42,389,775 to ^"68,434,262. 1 The estimates
of the four Powers for the catastrophic year of 19 14 stood
as follows : —

TABLE IV.
Military Expenditure in 191 4.

Austro-Hungary and Germany ^92,865,354

Russia and France ;£i 14,270,338

These figures tell their own tale. They reduce to
absolute absurdity the legend of a Germany arming to the
teeth in order to overawe her innocent and peaceable
neighbours.

Let us, then, summarise the conclusions to be derived
from these researches. First, what is the premise we are
asked to accept and upon which we are asked to base our
whole intellectual approach ? It is that Germany has been
the sole responsible author of this war, which was under-
taken by her rulers to "subjugate Europe." And, further,
that the truth of the premise is to be sought in Germany's
preparations for war, which preparations were on such a
scale and of such a character as to furnish unmistakable
evidence that her rulers deliberately planned and plotted

1 A very large proportion of this expenditure was ear-marked for
fortifications, especially in Silesia, evidence of the fear of Russian
aggression and of the desire to guard against it.

EUROPEAN MILITARISM, 1905-1914. 95

this war and launched it upon Europe when, in their
opinion, the psychological moment had arrived. To
express any doubt as to the accuracy of the premise is to
be a "pro-German." But surely we have the right to
examine the accuracy of the premise ? We are not children
incapable of reasoning powers. Are we not entitled to
look into matters for ourselves? What is one test which
any of us can apply, without any special knowledge or any
special training, provided we give ourselves the trouble?
Obviously one of the very first ways of testing the premise
we are invited to accept is to make an investigation into
the national expenditure upon armaments — i.e., to say
upon preparations for war — of Germany and her ally on
the one part and their potential foes, Russia and France,
on the other. Well, what do we find as a result of this
examination ? We find this : —

Military Expenditure of the Teutonic Powers and of

the Franco-Russian Combination respectively.

From 1905 to 1909.

The Teutonic Powers ^"301,610,007

The Franco-Russian Combination ... £366,015,614
From 1910 to 1914.

The Teutonic Powers .£381,083,943

The Franco-Russian Combination ... £476,477,267

Excess of War-Preparation-Expenditure by the

Franco-Russian Combination over the Teutonic

Powers in the Decade 1905-14,

£159,79&,93i-

I close this article by recalling that Germany's

fears, for which these figures supply an eloquent

explanation, have been understood and, what is more,

freely and publicly acknowledged, by leading British

statesmen in the course of the past decade. Here, for

instance, is another extract from a speech by Mr. Lloyd

George, delivered at the Queen's Hall on July 28, 1908 : —

"Look at the position of Germany. Her army is to

her what our navy is to us — her sole defence against

invasion. She has not got a two-Power standard. She

may have a stronger army than France, than Russia, than

Italy, than Austria, but she is between two great Powers

who, in combination, could pour in a vastly greater

number of troops than she has. Don't forget that when

you wonder why Germany is frightened at alliances and

96 TRUTH AND THE WAR.

understandings and some sort of mysterious workings
which appear in the Press, and hints in the Times and
Daily Mail. . . . Here is Germany, in the middle of
Europe, with France and Russia on either side, and with
a combination of their armies greater than hers. Suppose
we had here a possible combination which would lay us
open to invasion — suppose Germany and France, or
Germany and Russia, or Germany and Austria, had fleets
which, in combination, would be stronger than ours, would
not we be frightened ? Would we not arm ? Of course we
should."

The year 1909 — six months after Mr. Lloyd George's
speech — opened with France and Russia voting
^82,411,963 for their combined armies against Germany's
and Austria's ^54,562,094. But Germany, it seems, is
the only Power which has been preparing for war, and in
so comprehensive a manner that her intention to
"subjugate Europe" is now clearly apparent! And yet,
according to Lord Haldane and the French Yellow Book,
official Germany was working for peace in 1909, although
her potential foes were devoting sums enormously larger
than she was upon military preparations. 1

1 In connection with the figures given above, I desire to express
my indebtedness to Mr. Carl Heath, Secretary of the National Peace
Council. The figures are extracted from the Budgets of the respec-
tive Powers, and they can be checked from the International Peace
Year Book for 1915, published by the National Peace Council. In
the case of the Austro-Hungarian returns, a sum of eight millions
sterling has been added for each year under review, to cover the
expenses of Austria's and of Hungary's "National defence" troops,
the accounts of which are rendered separately from the expenditure
upon the Monarchy's "Common Army," i.e., first line troops.

It has been suggested to me that the Italian figures ought to be
added to the German and Austrian. I disagree. It would be as
logical to add the British figures to the French and Russian. As
already stated, the raison d'itre of Italy's accession to the Teutonic
Powers disappeared years ago, while in Balkan affairs the antagonism
of interests between Austria and Italy had been steadily growing.
But even if the Italian figures were thrown into the scale —
^141,518,105 in the decade 1905-14 — the expenditure of the Teutonic
Powers plus that of Italy, would still show a slightly smaller total
than that of the Franco-Russian combination, which total would, of
course, be swelled were the British figures to be added to it. Italy's
intervention on Austria's behalf in any Balkan dispute had of late
years become unthinkable, as unthinkable as her participation
in a war against Great Britain. The main point to bear in mind,
however, is not that the Franco-Russian combination spent enor-
mously larger sums on military preparations than did the Teutonic
Powers in the decade preceding the war ; but, in view of that fact,
the palpable absurdity of the attempt to saddle Germany with a
responsibility which was collective.

CHAPTER XL

Germany's position before the War
judged by Frenchmen1

We who live behind the rampart of the sea know but little (save
in times of panic) of the fear that besets a State which has no
natural frontiers. ... Germany accomplished a wonderful work
in unifying her people (or, rather, Bismarck and his compeers did
it for her) ; but, even so, she has not escaped from the disadvantages
of her situation ; by land she is easily assailable on three sides.
. . — The Political History of Germany. By J. Holland Rose.
"Germany in the Nineteenth Century." (University Press, Man-
chester, 1915.)

For Germany, the presence of France on one frontier and Russia
on the other creates a crisis that is constant and unchanging. — The
naval and military situation of the British Isles. By "An Islander"
(London : John Murray, 1913).

CONVINCING proof has now been given of the
absurdity of attributing to Germany the desire of
"subjugating Europe" in the face of a military expenditure
by Germany's potential foes in Europe, i.e., the Russo-
French combination, during the past ten years exceeding
hers and her ally, Austria, by more than ;£ 150,000,000
sterling. Mr. Lloyd George's speeches show that six
years ago, when the proportionate excess of military
expenditure by Germany's potential foes was not so large
as it afterwards became, the British Government was fully
alive to the vulnerability of Germany's position and of
Germany's fears; and that her largely increased
expenditure in recent years was natural. I now propose
to deal with some French testimony on that point.

One need not refer to any post-bellum statements by
German public men to appreciate how substantial and how
well founded was the element of fear — fear for the national
safety, which has weighed upon the rulers of Germany
with increasing intensity for the last few years. Surely
we, who until last year had never crossed swords with the
German race, cannot fail to be impressed by the testimony
of military writers belonging to a nation which only forty-

1 The Labour Leader, May 13, 1915.

07

98 TRUTH AND THE WAR

five years ago was engaged in a life and death struggle
with Germany, when we find such writers freely admitting
the perilous position in which Germany stood before the
war? If they could be honest enough to admit the fact
immediately before the war, surely it is puerile for us to
pretend to ignore it now that the war has come ?

One of the most popular military writers in France is
Colonel Arthur Boucher. His three books — "France
Victorious in the War of To-Morrow, " "The Offensive
Against Germany," and "Germany in Peril," ran to many
editions. The last was published early last year. Observe
its title, "Germany in Peril" (" L' ' Allemagne en Peril").
Colonel Boucher is imbued with all the military spirit of
his race. But he is no blind fanatic. He is a generous
foe. He thinks that Germany should have restored
Alsace-Lorraine to France. That, in a French officer, is
natural enough. He looks forward to war with Germany
on that account; but on that account alone. He is not
anxious for war in itself. One gathers that he would
infinitely prefer the "restoration" of Alsace-Lorraine
without a war. He would like to shake hands with
Germany and to see Germany entering a Franco-Russian
alliance.

"Forming a group so strong that no country, no
coalition, could think of struggling against it, they (the
three Powers) could forbid war throughout the world."

He deems it "monstrous" that the three nations should
be thinking of war instead of peace. Incidentally, he pays
the German Emperor a warm tribute as a peacemaker,
which may be read in conjunction with Lord Haldane's
declaration and with the contents of the French Yellow
Book referred to in the last chapter.

"The German Emperor has given positive proof within
recent years of his desire to maintain peace. If a number
of his subjects push for war, a still more considerable
number bless him as the Sovereign of Peace."1

As the title of his book indicates, Colonel Boucher was
fully alive — as a Frenchman — to Germany's peril, and

1 Vide also this pasage in Marcel Sembat (op. cit.) : —

"Conditions are sometimes stronger than the wills of men and
even of Emperors. Do not let us neglect, that is my advice, that
precious element of peace, the Imperial will. If the Emperor
William had been differently inspired, we should have had wrr
already, and — let us be just — he has allowed some fine opportunities
of laying us out to go by. If, instead of making a speech at
Tangier, he had made war, where should we have been?

GERMANY'S POSITION BEFORE THE WAR 99

the conclusions of his book are wholly directed to telling
the Germans how foolish they are to retain Alsace-
Lorraine, and how their obstinacy — as he puts it — in
doing so is their principal source of danger, seeing that
France : —

"is unalterably determined to wrest the people of those
provinces from the yoke of their invaders and to see the
French flag floating once more from the summit of their
public buildings."

Here are some notable passages from the book : —

"Germany is threatened to-day on all her frontiers, and
finds herself in such a position that she can only ensure
her future and face all her foes by seeking first of all to
eliminate us from their number by concentrating, from the
beginning, all her forces against us."

So much for the "wanton aggression" upon France.
One can imagine the contempt with which French military
men must read the diatribes in our "patriotic" newspapers.

"To be in a position to resist attacks which menace her
on all sides Germany is compelled to develop her military
powers to the supreme degree. ... It was to guard
against the Russian danger that Germany made her
(Military) law of 1913."

The latter avowal is particularly noteworthy in view of
the successful attempt to represent to the British public
the German military increases of that year as purely
provocative. But I shall have more to say on that score
when I come to examine the Russian preparations in
1912-14.

Of course, so long as Germany will not give up Alsace
and Lorraine, our French military authority is well content
that France should take the utmost advantage of
Germany's "Russian peril."

"Thus, we see, when the time comes, and it may come
soon, when Slavism desires to make an end of Germanism,
the friendship of Russia can serve us if we are fully
decided to fulfil all our duties towards her. Germany does
not doubt that France, remaining immutably attached to
her treaties, would support her ally with all her strength,
choosing, however, the most favourable moment for
intervention/'

Precisely. Colonel Boucher continues : —

"If Russia attacks Germany, France becomes mistress
of the situation. It will be sufficient for France to draw
her sword at the opportune moment to make it impossible

ioo TRUTH AND THE WAR

for Germany to defend the provinces she took from us."
Indeed, Colonel Boucher is all for a French military
offensive in the event of a Russo-German war. He argues
that the French soldier is always at his best in attacking.
He thinks it bad strategy to wait for the adversary to attack
you; and his second book, "The Offensive Against
Germany," is devoted to discussing the ways and means
of a resolute French military offensive upon the outbreak
of the war. In this respect he is in full agreement with
Lieut. -Colonel Grouard, who, in his "The Ultimate War"
(published in 1913), envisaging a Franco-German war as
the result of the Franco-Russian alliance, strongly pleads
lor a French offensive upon the outbreak of war : —

"In these circumstances the defensive would no longer
be imposed upon us; on the contrary, we should profit by
our numerical superiority1 and take the offensive as rapidly
as possible."

Why do our statesmen and "patriotic" newspapers
persist in holding us up to the world as hypocrites, by
reiterating that Germany's offensive against France was
"wanton"? Do tney imagine that such an attitude
deceives anyone — outside Britain?

The last quotation from Boucher's book which I will
give is this : —

"From whatever aspect Germany's position is studied
it will be realised that her future is of the darkest, and that
she has placed herself in the most perilous situation. Now
of all the factors which contribute towards compromising
the destinies of this great Power, the chief factor is
certainly the hostility of France. To what might Germany
not aspire if she were assured merely of our neutrality ?

In the French Ambassador's despatch recording the
alleged conversation between the Kaiser, the King of the
Belgians, and General Von Moltke, the French
Ambassador reports — at second hand, of course — that
"William II. has been brought to think that war with
France is inevitable, and that it will have to come to it
one day or other." During the conversation the Emperor
is described as having "appeared over-wrought and
irritable." The frank and outspoken writing of our
French military author would seem to indicate other
considerations than a desire to "subjugate Europe" for
this reported attitude of the Emperor's ! Germany could
have peace — but only by an act which no one but an
1 I.e., in the immediate theatre of hostilities.

GERMANY'S POSITION BEFORE THE WAR 101

impulsive Frenchman could imagine to be possible.
Otherwise, war — France using Russia for her ends as
Russia was using France; the two lambs on one side, the
ravening wolf on the other ! Directly Russia was prepared
to "make an end of Germanism" the French armies would
be in readiness to fall upon Germany's flank "at the most
opportune moment." For that moment military and
Chauvinist France had been longing for forty years — and
preparing. As Lieut. -Colonel Grouard puts it : —

"In no army has greater work been accomplished
during the last thirty years than in the French army. Both
as regards the improvement of our armament and in
studying the best conditions for its usage, daily and
incessant progress has been made in every branch of the
military art."

That is true, and if the degree of general efficiency has
been less than in Germany, it has been due, not to lack
of interest or inferior capacity for hard work among
French officers, but to the differences of the national
temperament; to the superior capacity of German
organisation, and to the corruption and intrigues of French
political life and their reaction upon the army, which were
so startlingly exemplified in the Dreyfus case.

Colonel Boucher's testimony is, of course, especially
significant because it is the testimony of a soldier who,
writing in the very year of the war, tells us with complete
frankness, first that Germany's position in Europe is one
of the utmost danger; secondly, that unless Germany will
restore Alsace-Lorraine to France, France is fully deter-
mined to assist Russia to the uttermost in "making an
end of Germanism." What adds to the interest of Colonel
Boucher's writings is the honesty with which he recognises
the efforts made by the German Emperor to preserve peace
and the obvious reluctance with which he himself
contemplates a further war with Germany.

A pendant to Colonel Boucher's book is Marcel
Sembat's. I call it a pendant for this reason — illogical,
I admit — that the two writers are at the poles in political
thought and everything else. Sembat's book (it appeared
in 1 91 3, I believe, and my copy bears the imprint, "twelfth
edition") is a striking illustration of the best side of the
French character (that strange medley of contradictions,
immortalised by de Toqueville), civic courage. No
Englishman, in similar circumstances, would have dared
to talk to his countrymen with such directness as did

(9)

102 TRUTH AND THE WAR

Sembat to his about Alsace-Lorraine. Instead of tearing
him to pieces, they read his book. However, what I
particularly wish to bring- out in connection with Sembat's
volume is the further light it throws upon the position of
Germany just before the war, and upon German
psychology. It is extraordinary that one should be driven
to bring to the notice of British readers the sanity of a
distinguished Frenchman in order to counteract the
insanity of the British newspaper talk of the present day.
For the nonce Sembat imagines himself a German, and
thus describes his sentiments : —

"I experience the sensation of a full national existence
only since the victory of 1870 and the unity of the Empire.
Since then I count for something in the universe, and I
am sheltered. For nothing in the world, you understand ;
at no price, will I allow my unity to be touched. Directly
I am told that German unity is threatened I rise, ready to
sacrifice everything. Am I a Socialist, a Catholic, a
Liberal, a Conservative, I am there if anyone threatens
German unity."

Sembat goes on to show how real in the German mind
had become the Russian menace.

"The German obsession of Russia does not correspond
at all with the hostility, born of their defeat, which many
Frenchmen entertain for Germany. It originates from
bitterness of yesterday, and anxiety for to-morrow. . . .
The German has grown up under the overshadowing threat
of a formidable avalanche suspended over his head; an
avalanche always ready to become detached, to roll down
upon him ; an avalanche of immense savagery, of barbarous
and brutal multitudes threatening to cover his soil, to
swallow up his civilisation and his society."

Sembat remarks that the Russian of his imagination is
the Russian of Tolstoy, Gorki, Turguenieff; not the
autocratic Russia commanding its legions of Asiatic
hordes. But, he adds : —

"If I fail to understand the Russia which haunts
Germany I shall be incapable of understanding the effect
which the Russo-French alliance produces upon the mind
of the Germans."

And he drives home the distinction in its practical
aspects : —

"And, after all, does not the Tsar possess within his
dominions all the barbarians of Turkestan and Central
Asia ? Conquered ? What nonsense ! The day when

GERMANY'S POSITION BEFORE THE WAR 103

European Russians, too Liberal-minded or too Socialistic,
cause the Tsar inconvenience, will he hesitate to lead
against them his sotnias of Cossacks and Turkomans?
That day, it will be Asia, the barbarous Orient, which will
be at the doors of Europe and on the threshold of Germany.
The Franco-Russian Alliance, and the Triple Entente,
appear, therefore, to the German as a compact between
two civilised peoples and barbarism."

Then Sembat goes on to show how the anxiety of the
German people with regard to Russia is increasing, how it
is even outpacing official German anxiety; and, with great
courage, to show how the contradictory attitude of France
must increase that anxiety.

In 1908 Lloyd George, in effect, asked his countrymen
— those same countrymen who are now told to believe that
Germany is the sole responsible author of this war, under-
taken by her "to subjugate Europe," and that the surest
proof of it is to be sought in her great military
preparations : —

"Can't you understand how reasonable are Germany's
fears? If you were placed as Germany is placed, with
Russia on one side and France on the other, her enemies in
the event of a European war, would not you arm, would
not you build?"

And he answered his question himself.
"Of course you would."

Now, looking back at the record of the past ten years
we find that Germany armed, and armed heavily, but that
the Russo-French combination spent 159 million pounds
sterling more upon its armies than Germany and her ally
upon theirs' ; and we find French authors of repute, writing
on the very eve of the war, fully acknowledging, from their
respective points of view, the naturalness of Germany's
fears and the dangers of her position.

We have now cleared the ground for a further
examination of the causes of Germany's anxiety in regard
to the "Russian menace," which will lead us to glance at
the naval expenditure of the Teutonic Powers and of the
Russo-French combination.

Meantime, let me reiterate once more that my object
is to assist in destroying the legend that Germany was
the sole responsible author of this war, undertaken by
her to "subjugate Europe." And that my object in
assisting to destroy this legend is concern, not for the
Prussian Junker, but for the future interests of the British
people.

CHAPTER XII.
Secret Diplomacy1

When a small number of statesmen, conducting the intercourse of
nations in secrecy, have to confess their inability to preserve good
relations, it is not an extravagant proposal to suggest that their
isolated action should be supplemented and reinforced by the
intelligent and well-informed assistance of the peoples themselves. —
Arthur Ponsonby, in "Democracy and Diplomacy" (Methuen and
Co., igi6).

Wars are made by Governments acting under the influence of
the governmental theory. And of this fact .... no better example
could be given than the present war. Before it broke out nobody
outside governmental and journalistic circles was expecting it.
Nobody desired it. And though, now that it is being waged, all the
nations concerned are passionately interested in it, and all believe
themselves to be fighting in a righteous cause, yet no ordinary
citizens in the days preceding the outbreak would have maintained
that there was any good reason for war, and few even knew what
the reasons alleged were or might have been. Even now the nations
have quite opposite views as to which Government was responsible.
We believe it was the German Government ; and with equal convic-
tion, Germans believe it was the British. But nobody believes it
was the mass of the people in any nation. The nations who are
carrying on the war, at the cost of incalculable suffering, would
never have made it if the decision had rested with them. That is
the one indisputable fact. How can such a fact occur? How is^ it
possible for Governments to drag into war peoples who did not desire
war and who have no quarrel with one another? The immediate
answer is simple enough. In no country is there any effective con-
trol by the peoples over foreign policy. That is clear in the case of
the great military Empires. But it is true also of France and of
England, where in other respects Government is more or less under
popular control. The country has no real choice, for it only gets its
information after the decisive action has been taken. — Mr. G. Lowes
Dickinson in "The War and the Way Out" (1914).

I sometimes ask myself whether in the future it will not be
necessary and, indeed, if it would not be a good thing, that the
Foreign Secretary should take the House of Commons in the first
instance, and his countrymen at large in the second, much more
into his confidence than he has done in the past. We have passed
in recent years through European crises, the full gravity of which
was not realised by our people, if realised at all, until after they
had passed into history. I ask myself, can you conduct democratic
Government on these principles? — Mr. Austen Chamberlain,
February 8, 1014.

1 Speech delivered at Devonshire House, Bishopsgate, May 14,
104

SECRET DIPLOMACY 105

It seems contrary to the fundamental principles of a Parlia-
mentary Constitution that a nation should be bound by obligations,
upon the policy or impolicy of which its representatives have had
no power of pronouncing an opinion, since they have been kept
in absolute ignorance of their existence. — Lord Courtney of Penwith,
in "The Working Constitution of the United Kingdom and its
Outgrowth." (igoi.)

I am disposed to deny entirely that there can be any treaty for
which adequate reasons cannot be given to the English people, which
the English people ought to make. A great deal of the reticence of
diplomacy had, I think history shows, much better be spoken out. —
Walter Bagehot, in "The English Constitution." (1872.)

"Everyone may remark what a hope animates the eyes of any
circle, when it is reported, or even confidentially asserted, that Sir
Robert Peel has in his mind privately resolved to go, one day, into
that stable of King Augeas which appals human hearts, so rich
is it, high-piled with the droppings of two hundred years ; and,
Hercules-like, to load a thousand night wagons with it, and turn
running water into it, and swash and shovel at it, and never
leave it till the antique pavement and real basis of the matter show
itself clean again ! . . . To clean out the dead pedantries,
unveracities, indolent somnolent impotencies, and accumulated dung-
mountains there, is the beginning of all practical good whatsoever.
. . . Political reform, if this be not reformed, is naught and a
mere mockery. . . . Nay, there are men now current in political
society, men of weight, though also of wit, who have been heard
to say, 'That there was but one reform for the Foreign Office — to
set a live coal under it,' and with, of course, a fire brigade which
could prevent the undue spread of the devouring element into
neighbouring houses, let that reform it ! In such odour is the
Foreign Office, too, if it were not that the public, oppressed and
nearly stifled with a mere infinitude of bad odours, neglects this
one — in fact, being able nearly always to avoid the street where
it is, escapes this one, and (except as a passing curse once in
the quarter or so) as good as forgets the existence of it." — Carlyle
on the Foreign Office. — "Latter-Day Pamphlets." (1850.)

WAR is anarchy, and armed peace is anarchy. And
the true anarchists of our time are not the crazy
individuals who imagine they can reform society by
removing the figureheads that strut across its stage. They
are the so-called statesmen and leaders of the nations who,
for decades past in every land, have directed man's
increasing ingenuity in arts and crafts, his inventive genius
and his triumph over the forces of nature — to preparations
for his own destruction; who have filled the world with
the clamour of their insensate boasting whenever some
new and still more formidable development in the art of
killing has been perfected in their respective countries;
who, while prating of their love of peace, have bidden their
misguided and unhappy peoples to conspire for the more
efficient slaughter of their neighbours by land and sea,
beneath the sea and from the skies above; and who appear,

106 TRUTH AND THE WAR

even now, incapable of perceiving that if they make not
haste by a collective effort to arrest and control the
elements they have unchained, they risk dragging- down
the civilised world about their ears and of being themselves
overwhelmed in the ruins.

We thrill when wTe read of the deeds of patient heroism
of our men at the front. But we believe, with an intensity
of conviction that nothing can shake, that they were not
created to be slain and mutilated in the flower of their
youth. We do not rejoice with easy and vicarious pride
as we see them pouring down that valley of misery and
abomination. We long with an immensity of longing to
remove them from it. Meanwhile, we labour to ensure
that the settlement, when it does come, of this war shall
be of such a kind, and that changes of such a character
in the official intercourse between Governments shall follow
this war as will prevent the next and succeeding
generations from being swallowed up in the abyss of
desolation which has been dug for the present generation
by the systems to which the peoples have so long been
fettered.

Now there are two main avenues along which we can
advance for the attainment of the end we have in view.
It is essential that both should be used simultaneously,
and that every track which leads into them should be used
also. For there is no royal road to anv reform.

These two main avenues I may call the subjective and
objective : the one — if I may express myself thus
crudely — approachable through internal consciousness, the
other through the consideration of external factors. Upon
some of us will fall naturally the task of attempting to
create something like a thought-revolution on the subject
of war; of attempting- to infuse the spiritual forces in our
midst with constructive strength for the deliverance of
mankind from the forces of destruction; of attempting to
inculcate the truth that if war does and can call forth noble
sentiments — as every cataclysm in human affairs is bound
to do — it is a false philosophy which teaches that those
noble sentiments can only be called forth by wrar, and it is
a mental confusion which can even momentarily regard the
calling forth of such sentiments as compensation for the
odious barbarity of war itself, or for the hypocrisy, the
lying and falsification, the disappearance of all sense of
fairness, generosity, and perspective, the almost incredible
ethical degradation and the moral and spiritual collapse

SECRET DIPLOMACY 107

which accompany a state of war. Upon some of us, I say,
will fall naturally that task — the task of appealing to the
subjective sense in man. And to none more than the
Friends who — as a body — in the midst of the universal
debdcle, keep the light of the spirit burning brightly, and
keep alive within us the Divine figure, that but for them,
almost, would be totally eclipsed by the pagan deity which
casts its sinister shadow over Christian altars in every
belligerent land.

Upon others will devolve the task of endeavouring to
concentrate men's minds on those positive factors in the
life of States — constitutional, organic, economic — which
constitute the propelling causes of war : with a view to
their reform or removal. Amongst those causes none is
more potent, none more elusive, none more difficult to
present in such form as will carry comprehension of its
subtle dangers than secret diplomacy.

Men at all times have been the patient slaves of words
and phrases. The word "diplomacy" conjures up some-
thing mysterious, a sort of official holy of holies, of which
the ordinary mortal must speak with bated breath.

And yet all that diplomacy really means, in its practical
application, is the way in which the particular department
of Government entrusted with the duty of conducting the
official relations of the State with other States does its
work.

The affairs of a nation, like the affairs of a commercial
undertaking, are committed to various departments to look
after. In the case of a nation one department of
Government pays the national bills — I fear with alacrity if
it be question of an increase in armaments, with reluctance
if it be question of improving the housing accommodation
of the working classes. That by the way. Another deals
with local administration, another with education, and so
on. Just so the Foreign Department is charged with the
regulation of the nation's official intercourse with other
nations. Pardon my being so elementary, but, indeed, it
is through slurring over this simple fact that a plain issue
comes to wear an aspect of mystery and complication.

In discussing "diplomacy" we must begin by grasping
the simple fact that what wre are really discussing is not
an abtruse science, a complicated chess gambit, a Chinese
puzzle, or a problem of higher mathematics — although the
diplomats would like us to think that it is all this rolled

io8 TRUTH AND THE WAR

into one — but the methods and systems of work of the
Foreign Department of this nation and of other nations.

Now, while the management of the Foreign Depart-
ments of other nations is necessarily interesting and
important to us, I submit that the management of our own
is infinitely more interesting and more important to us.
Our primary interest and our primary duty is, therefore,
to make ourselves thoroughly acquainted with the manner
in which our own Foreign Department is carried on, what
its composition is, what powers it possesses or has
usurped, what facilities we have for checking and
controlling it.

The Foreign Department of this nation consists of a
Foreign Secretary, who is a member of the Government
of the day — elected on purely domestic issues. His
responsibility is covered by the principle of Cabinet
solidarity, a principle for which there is a good deal to be
said for and against. The Foreign Secretary is assisted
by forty first-class clerks in the Foreign Office and by 120
representatives abroad, consisting of ambassadors,
ministers, councillors, first, second, and third secretaries
and attaches. Of these 161 gentlemen perhaps twelve at
the outside are in a position to exercise a decisive influence
upon the Department's actions. They are the Foreign
Secretary, the Under-Secretaries at the Foreign Office, and
the Ambassadors. We may say, therefore, that the
Foreign Department of this country is managed, and the
foreign relations of this nation are conducted, in all
essential respects by twelve gentlemen.

The next point to consider is this : By whom is the
work of this Department regulated and directed? By
Parliament and the nation ? In theory : yes. In practice :
no. Does the nation collaborate in the Department's
work and control its decisions? In practice : not at all.
Has the nation any means of estimating the mental
processes and material facts by which the decisions of the
Department are arrived at? The nation has not. Can the
nation ascertain as a regular course or at a given moment
what the Department is doing, what action it is contem-
plating, or has adopted, on any particular problem affecting
national interest? Not unless the Department is willing
to impart the information — and it is usually unwilling. Is
the nation consulted upon the arrangements which the
Department concludes with foreign States? No. Is
Parliament enabled to examine and debate the treaties,

SECRET DIPLOMACY 109

conventions, or understandings which the Department has
negotiated with foreign Powers before the Government is
committed to their adoption ? No. Can the Department
commit the nation to treaties, conventions, and under-
standings with foreign States, involving the potential use
of the armed forces of the Crown, without informing the
nation, through Parliament, that it has done so? Yes,
the Department can and does.

Now consider what this means. The work of the
Foreign Department affects the nation more vitally than
does the work of the whole of the other departments of
the State put together. The Department's proceedings
determine the extent of, and the expenditure upon, the
armed forces of the Crown. If the Foreign Department
has committed the nation, without its knowledge, in
liabilities towards foreign Powers, and if the extent of,
and the expenditure upon, the armed forces of the Crown
do not keep pace with the character of the obligations
thus incurred, the nation may suddenly find itself con-
fronted with a position which may lead to irremediable
disaster.

The issue with which the Foreign Department deals,
in the ultimate resort, is the issue of peace and war; and
the issue of peace and war is the issue of national life and
death. There is not a home in this country, there is not
a family, there is not an individual, man, woman, or child,
whose interests, whose life, whose future are not intimately
concerned with the character and conduct of our official
relations with foreign States — i.e., with the conduct of
our Foreign Department. The evolution of our social
problems, the improvement in the conditions of masses
of our population — these things may be arrested and
jeopardised for years by war, and war or peace are largely
determined by the conduct of our own Foreign Depart-
ment. And it is not only the interests of the present
generation which are at stake; the future of our children
and of our children's children may be profoundly affected
by the peculiarities, temperamental and otherwise, the
outlook, the mode of thought influencing the positive
actions of the dozen gentlemen who control the Foreign
Department.

And yet, by some mental aberration, by some vice of
national slackness and looseness of thought, this nation,
which imagines itself to be living under a democratic
constitution, has allowed its Foreign Department to

no TRUTH AND THE WAR

become, in effect, an autocratic institution conducting its
operations in silence and in secrecy behind the back of the
nation, and utterly contemptuous of public opinion (except
when public opinion is too strong for it), which it moulds
into a condition of receptivity to its decisions through the
columns of an inspired and, I fear, largely unscrupulous
popular Press. Moreover, it is a singular fact — to which
I venture to draw your special attention — that the last
decade, which has witnessed so remarkable a democratic
advance in this country, has also witnessed a notable
accentuation of autocracy in the management of our
Foreign Department.

Many factors have contributed to bring about this state
of affairs. On the pretext of removing the functions and
the conduct of the Foreign Department from Party contro-
versy, anything in the nature of real Parliamentary
discussion on foreign affairs — of such debates on foreign
policy as characterised the days of our fathers and grand-
fathers— has virtually disappeared. The hollowness of the
pretext is apparent directly you test it. First, because
foreign policy has not, in point of fact, been an issue in
our elections for many years past; secondly, because such
rare discussions and criticism of foreign policy as has been
heard in the House since the present Government took
office has come either from members of its own party or
from members of the parties associated with its fortunes;
thirdly, because the Government in meeting those
criticisms has been invariably able to rely upon the
uncritical support of the Opposition. The withdrawal of
the issues of our foreign policy from so-called party contro-
versy has, therefore, come to be something quite different
from what it professes to be. It has come to mean the
suppression of Parliamentary discussion of any kind, and
the country has been kept more than ever in the dark as
to the conduct of its Foreign Department. I doubt if at
any period in the last one hundred years the country has
been kept so much in the dark as during the last ten.

The natural result has been a decay of the sense of
Parliamentary responsibility for, and Parliamentary
interest in, foreign policy, and this has had its counterpart
in the country. In the course of the last ten years
Parliament has been moved to real and fruitful activity
only on one particular problem of foreign policy — and that
entirely because pressure upon individual members of
Parliament from their constituencies was such that it broke

SECRET DIPLOMACY in

down all obstacles and let in a rush of healthy democratic
air, not only into the lobbies, but even into the musty,
stuffy atmosphere of Downing Street. On that particular
problem the nation became fully informed by agencies
operating outside the official world, and the nation resolved
that the known and publicly contracted treaty obligations
of this country should be adhered to, and that a great
wrong, for the existence of which we were partly
responsible, should be set right. The nation determined
that Parliament should discuss the Congo question, and in
eight years there were seventeen debates upon it in Parlia-
ment, more time being devoted to that one question than
to any other single problem of foreign policy for fifty years.
There is a moral in that episode which we may do well not
to lose sight of in the work which lies before us in the
future. There is one other factor which testifies to the
utterly undemocratic character of our Foreign Depart-
ment. The Department is run exclusively by members of
the aristocracy and landed gentry. It is the last strong-
hold of aristocracy, monopoly, and privilege in the public
service. How is it that, while the increasing democratisa-
tion of the public services has marked the rise of
Democracy in this country, the Foreign Department has
remained untouched by the process ? It is because British
Democracy, in its climb to power, has totally neglected
this branch of the public service; has failed to realise how
inextricably interwoven is the character, conduct, and
inspiration of our foreign policy with the ordinary, every-
day life of the nation; has looked upon foreign policy as
something occult and outside its ken — and, I may add, has
been encouraged to do so, especially of recent years, in all
sorts of ways. British Democracy is paying for that
mistake to-day, but, as yet, it has no conception of how
heavy the bill will in any case be, or how stupendous it
may become.

I referred a moment ago to the fact that there are 120
representatives of the Foreign Office abroad. And there
you have the vice of the whole system. These 120 gentle-
men, who have many virtues and not a few defects — the
virtues and the defects of their caste — are not the repre-
sentatives of the nation in fact, although they are in name.
They are the representatives of a Department, and the
proceedings of that Department are withheld from the
knowledge of the nation and conducted outside the great
arteries of the national life. Until the nation insists that

ii2 TRUTH AND THE WAR

the men it sends abroad ostensibly to represent its interests
are selected by merit and competition, and not by nomina-
tion and favouritism; that wealth and position shall not
be the determining factors in their appointment; that they
shall not be chosen exclusively from the aristocracy, but
from the best which every class in the community can
produce; above all, that the Department which they serve
shall work in the light and not in darkness, the national
destinies, and the happiness and welfare of every one of us
— rich and poor, high and lowly — will remain as they are
to-day, at the mercy of a particular Department in the
State.

It will be a long fight and a stern one, because just as at
one time English monarchs and their political supporters,
while conceding to the people the right of making laws,
denied to their representatives the right of controlling the
administration of those laws, so do there exist among us
to-day influences, not, indeed, royal influences, but
influences far more powerful, which are resolved to oppose
to their utmost capacity any real and effective national
control over the Department which determines the national
issues of life and death — which they regard as their own
special preserve and co-existent with the supreme power
they wield over the national destinies.

It will be a long fight and a stern one; and if we do
not prepare for it now, lay our plans now, organise now,
not only shall we have no voice in the character of the
settlement which will close the war, but when the war is
over we shall be more helpless than before.

For of this let us be well persuaded : —

"The substitution — to use the words of the Prime
Minister — for force, for the class of competing ambitions,
for groupings and alliances and a precarious equipoise of
a real European partnership, based on the recognition of
equal right and established and enforced by the common
will."

that substitution will never come about until the peoples
have won control over the conduct of their relations with
other peoples.

A secret and autocratic diplomacy stands between the
peoples and the mutual comprehension of each other's
needs. It is the greatest obstacle to the emancipation of
the peoples from the shackles of militarism and war. It

SECRET DIPLOMACY 113

is the greatest obstacle to the solidarity of the human race.
The British people have led the way in many of the
reforms which have powerfully contributed to enlarge the
boundaries of human freedom. If they have the will they
can lead the world in the greatest of all reforms which
lies open to human endeavour to-day.

CHAPTER XIII.
An Appeal to President Wilson1

THERE have been occasions in the life of peoples
when the national soul, bewildered and stricken, has
been saved by a single individual possessing- in himself
the combination of qualities which enabled him to adopt
a clear and definite line of conduct, and to give to his
fellow-countrymen at the psychological moment just that
inspiration and that lead required by the circumstances.

There has never been, until to-day, an occasion when
the international soul, labouring in agony, cried out for
a man to succour it.

But that situation has now arisen, and in the two
hemispheres there is one man, and only one man, who,
by his character and through the great position he enjoys,
can save the soul of the peoples and of the Governments
of Europe.

That man is President Wilson.

I write to the sound of the measured tramp of armed
men. The confused clamour rising from the streets is
shattered by the roll of drums. The martial setting cannot
obliterate the haunting melancholy conveyed by the shrill
whistling of the fifes. It even permeates the sunshine,
and robs it of its balm. For the message of the fifes is
the piercing homage to Death. Death is in the very air
we breathe, we Europeans. Its outstretched wings beat
against the mansion of the rich and the cottage of the
lowly. Death on land and on the sea. Death emerging,
implacable and sinister, from the bowels of the deep. Death
falling, swift and relentless, from the blue vault of heaven.
Death in all the hideous and revolting forms with which
modern man and modern science have equipped it.

Presently these strong, clean-limbed young fellows, the
flower of our people, the hope of our future, who a moment

1 Written in May, 191 5 ; published in the New York Tribune,
July 4, 1915.

114

APPEAL TO PRESIDENT WILSON 115

ago swung past to the sound of the fifes, will be burrowing
in the ground like rodents, slaughtering and being
slaughtered ; covered with vermin ; the festering bodies of
days-dead men at their feet, in front of them, behind them,
huddled in shapeless masses, grotesquely stretching rigid
limbs skyward. The foul smell of burnt and decomposing
flesh will be in their nostrils by day and by night. Flies
in myriads will be settling about them, pumping putridity
into their undressed wounds. They will be foul and mad
with the blood-lust; their bodies repulsive to them; their
nerves shattered by the everlasting roar of the hurtling
shells; their souls blunted and scarred.

Thus, in a hundred cities of Europe to-day. Tramp,
tramp, tramp. The march of death to the sound of the
fife and drum, in the genial sunshine of declining May.
Thus, too, in the far-flung battle lines. Millions of men
who had no quarrel until their rulers invented one, living
like brute-beasts, acting like brute-beasts; fly-blown,
verminous, stinking with uncleansed wounds; physically,
mentally, morally thrown back a thousand years. In the
plains and valleys, on the mountain slopes, multitudes of
corpses, uncovered by the stoppage of the floods and the
melting of the snows, fill the air with the germs of disease.
And that other army grows and grows — the army of the
widows and the orphans; the army of the bereft and
destitute, of the broken-hearted, of those for whom life
henceforth is but a vale of tears.

And still the rulers will not speak.

The war has lasted ten months. It is roughly computed
that three and a half million men — the pick of European
manhood — have been killed outright and as many more
permanently disabled. It cannot be said that any one of
the belligerent States is nearer the accomplishment of the
professed aims of its rulers when they entered the war, as
the outcome of this unprecedented human holocaust and
the colossal wastage of economic resources wrhich has
accompanied it. But of far greater importance is the
question : "What are the various belligerent States fighting
for now? What vital issue to the peoples concerned
could not now be secured by negotiation?"

And that is what no Government will state in explicit
and authoritative terms. No Government will do so, lest,
if it did, its enemies should imagine that the national
interests it supposedly represents would suffer. "The
enemy would conclude that we were weakening" is the

n6 TRUTH AND THE WAR

parrot cry in every capital. No Government will assume
the responsibility of uttering a word which would permit
of the enemy imagining that it is anxious for peace. Yet
the rulers of every belligerent State must be anxious for
peace in their hearts; if only because they must begin to
realise that the edifice of civilisation is tumbling about
their ears and that dynasties and castes run a considerable
risk of being buried in the ruins.

That there is an intense longing for peace among the
peoples — especially among the working classes and the
peasantry — cannot be questioned. But as the entire
machinery at the disposal of the Governments for
influencing public opinion is engaged in fomenting national
passions to the highest pitch of intensity, by representing
the enemy-country as the embodiment of evil and treachery
and by crediting the enemy-country with the purpose of
utterly destroying its adversaries, the very longing for
peace becomes a spur to national fury. Indeed, the
Governments recognise the popular desire for peace and
cunningly pander to it. A "lasting peace," they cry,
"can only be secured by the complete pulverisation of the
enemy" — whereas they know full well that that would
mean the indefinite prolongation of the war and its
renewal at no distant date : for you cannot pulverise a
people. Here in England the very recruiting placards with
which our cities and towns are plastered almost invariably
urge men to join the colours in order to hasten
the advent of peace. It is everywhere the same,
in one form or another. The admitted desire of the peoples
for peace is used to exploit them for prolonging the war.
The Governments decline even to hint at the terms upon
which they would be mutually prepared to discuss the basis
of a possible settlement. And so the slaughter continues
on an even vaster scale. Yet, some day, the Governments
will have to discuss or perish. Meantime they are blind
leaders of the blind; straws upon the elements, they, in
their folly, have unchained ; incapable of controlling them ;
knowing not whither they are drifting.

Every belligerent people — except the Italian — believes
that it is fighting, and every Government asserts that it is
fighting, in self-defence, for national existence, for the
right to preserve its own traditions, its own modes of life,
its own homesteads. If what the Governments assert be
true, then each and all of them are suffering from
hallucination; for assuredly it is in the interest of no

APPEAL TO PRESIDENT WILSON 117

single people that its adversaries should lose their national
existence and be destroyed — since civilised life is built upon
foundations of human exchange, and the lack of clients
with whom to exchange would spell national bankruptcy.
And the truth lies just here. All the belligerent
Governments are under the spell of an hallucination, the
hallucination of fear. The driving force of fear, it was,
which made possible this wicked and suicidal struggle.
I am not in the majority, with those who maintain that
the rulers of Germany deliberately planned this war and
are wholly responsible for it. That they have a large
measure of responsibility for it is patent. That others
share responsibility with them can be gainsaid only by such
as have come under the spell of the hallucination. Fear
caused this war. Fear is prolonging it. Fear is
aggravating its natural bestialities. Fear is making every
chemical laboratory into a chamber for the concoction of
new and more terrifying modes of human destruction. It
may yet evolve some substance capable of destroying an
army corps or of firing a city in a few moments. The end
might thereby be hastened, it is true.

The fear of the Governments is communicated to the
peoples, and millions who are not engaged in killing are
employed in manufacturing implements to kill. To such
a pass has come our civilisation. The civilian population
in every belligerent State is becoming drunken and
maddened by fear. For it is the support by the civilian
population of its rulers which prolongs the war. It is
the civilian population that fears; not the men who fight.
They do not fear. Neither do they hate with the same
intensity, because, being inured by their occupation to
physical bravery, they respect it in their foes. They
respect, too, the keen competition in brains behind the
firing lines. And respect chases out hatred. Moreover,
they know that what the papers print of their adversaries
are mostly lies; and that sickens them. Every day some
incident occurs, even in the hours of carnage, that helps
them to remember that those to whom they are opposed
are men like themselves, full of courage and resource as
themselves, obeying orders even as they themselves,
suffering even as they themselves must suffer. If it rested
with them the war would not last long.

From the civilian population this deep, underlying
fraternity of suffering and a common discipline is hidden.
Fed every day upon the lowest garbage of sensational
(10)

n8 TRUTH AND THE WAR

journalism, its passions stimulated by every imaginable
device, torn by the cruellest tremors for loved ones in the
field and rooted in dull revenge under the stress of
bereavement, the civilian population hates with a hatred
unKnown to most soldiers. And so in blind fear, in blind
hate, the peoples stumble forward along the valley of
abomination and despair, behind their infatuated and
insensate leaders.

No force, it would seem, which either the belligerent
peoples or their Governments can evolve will arrest the
madness which is destroying civilisation. And yet if it
be not arrested disaster beyond the imagination of brain
to grasp will overwhelm Europe. That force must come
from without, and there is but one man who can wield it —
President Wilson.

Rash, impertinent, it may appear for a foreigner to
write thus of your First Citizen, to raise an unknown voice
in hearing of the accumulated cares which weigh so heavily
upon the leading representative of a neutral State — upon
one who is the living embodiment of your true dignity and
your true greatness. Yet in countless European hearts
there beats the hope — the pathetic trust — that in him
humanity may find its saviour — that there may be granted
unto him a message from the Cross. I do but express
feebly enough, what multitudes are thinking, hoping,
awaiting. Formless, vague is the hope. Nevertheless it
is very real. Can shape and substance be given to it?

The belligerent Governments have for decades
encouraged man's progress in invention, his triumphs over
nature in the direction of man's destruction; and now they
have unloosed all the factors of primal savagery armed
with these terrible powers. They see the work of decades
crumbling before their eyes. They shudder at the ethical
degradation; the spiritual collapse which is overwhelming
society. They recoil with horror at the abyss of economic
ruin, of disease and want, of social tumult which yawns
wider at their feet as month follows month, each month
a catastrophe in itself.

And yet each fears to be the first to tread the path
which leads to the international Council Chamber. Each
bases its resolve to go on to the bitter end. Each
repudiates every suggestion to state the terms upon which
it would consent to discuss. None dare take the initiative.

APPEAL TO PRESIDENT WILSON ug

But if they will not speak to one another, would they
severally refuse to lay their views before your President
on the understanding that the collective expression of those
views should be communicated by the President to them
all in a public dispatch? In so doing they would sacrifice
none of their "prestige," to which they cling and which
each deems would be jeopardised if it opened
communication with the others. Did they respond to that
invitation, they would not necessarily, thereby, commit
themselves to acceptance of the President's ultimate
mediation. But it would be a step on that road ; or at least
a step toward an armistice.

The essential is that the peoples in each belligerent
State should be in a position to know what at this moment
the Governments are fighting to attain — not in vague, but
in precise terms. This they cannot now learn because the
Governments will not tell them, save in rhetoric capable
of an infinite variety of interpretation. This, through the
President's initiative, they might ascertain, and they have
suffered and are suffering so greatly, the future outlook
for them is so appalling, that it would be incredible if in
each belligerent State there were not set up, as the result
of that knowledge, currents of opinion sane enough to
endorse what was reasonable in the desires of their
adversaries, and formidable enough to correct what might
be unreasonable in the demands of their own rulers.

For example, despite the clamour of our own Jingo
publicists, literary men and politicians — and do not forget
on your side that we, too, like you, have such elements
among us : that we have our class which wishes for its
own ends to "Prussianise" the nation, and that we, too,
have our unscrupulous and powerful journalists who
constitute the mouthpiece of that class, and who are
prepared, even in the midst of this desperate struggle in
which we are engaged, to throw mud at any and every
Minister of the Crown whom they believe to be opposed to
their policy — despite these "Prussians in our midst," were
the people of this country to learn through such a
demarche on the part of your President that Germany was
prepared to evacuate Belgium and the North of France as
a result of a compromise which would restore her oversea
possessions or pave the way for her acquisition by
negotiation of similar outlets elsewhere; and if they were
to learn that on the strength of assurances such as Sir
Edward Grey offered her on July 30 — when the tramp of

120 TRUTH AND THE WAR

armed legions was already shaking the plains of Europe —
that the British Government "would endeavour to promote
some arrangement, to which Germany could be a party,
by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile
policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France,
Russia, and ourselves (Britain), jointly or separately";
were the British people assured that Germany — on this
basis — was prepared to discuss a cessation of the strife;
were the British people assured of this, I believe there
would arise a popular movement in favour of the conclusion
of peace strong enough to sweep everything before it.

I believe that, because, for the British people this was
a war entered upon on behalf of Belgium; because the
inspiration which moved tens of thousands of young
Britishers to offer up their bodies to Moloch, was
indignation at the violation of Belgium and pity for the
wrongs inflicted upon her; and because the alternative to
such a German offer would mean, in any event, the
continued sacrifice of Belgium, the prolongation of the
German grip upon her if the Franco-British armies could
not break the German line, her utter destruction if,
breaking that line, the Franco-British armies contested,
as they needs must, every yard of Belgian soil with a
desperate energy and with annihilating effects for Belgium.
Indeed, were the interests of Belgium alone at stake, every
humane man and woman on both sides of the Atlantic
should ardently wish that her liberation might come by
negotiation, and not at a price which would leave her one
"vast ruin and cemetery combined."

I would even go so far as to express the conviction that
if the British people became aware through the inter-
mediary of President Wilson that Germany were willing
to accept in principle the creation of an International
Council, upon which both the belligerent and the neutral
Powers would be represented, and before which the
Governments would undertake to bring all their disputes
for adjudication, binding themselves to give publicity to
the Council's proceedings and to exercise diplomatic,
economic and in the ultimate restore coercive action in
support of the Council's decisions; a principle which would
automatically involve the gradual disappearance of
militarism and colossal armaments as the dominant
factors in international politics, and, eventually, the
internationalisation of land armaments and armies; the
British people would, if Germany were thus minded, be

APPEAL TO PRESIDENT WILSON 121

brought to reconsider that claim to absolute dominion over
the natural highways of the globe which has been hitherto
the basis of their foreign policy and the bulwark of their
national freedom, but which cannot in itself alone continue
to be so, in any event, for long, in view of the development
of submarine powers of offence and of airism, the advent
of which have — although we perceive it not in the fury of
the combat — totally altered the British national and
imperial problem. Moreover, it is self-evident that there
can be no internationalisation of land power, if there be
none of sea power.

And is it inconceivable that Germany should be so
minded? No doubt, if you take the view that Germany
cynically planned and executed this war for the purpose
of "subjugating Europe," striking when she thought the
hour had come; it is inconceivable. But not only will
posterity reject that legend; when the mists of passion
have cleared, and when things reassume their true
perspective, when men of the present generation once
again see themselves as they really are, they will wonder
how they came to credit it. That legend will perish, just
as surely as Germany's crime in her relentless treatment of
a small people who had done her no wrong and did but
defend what they had a right to defend, will ring down
the centuries to the detriment of the German name.

If you do not take that view, but place yourself, as
well as a foreigner can with no other sources of information
than those accessible to all men, "in the skin of a
German," to use the expression employed by Marcel
Sembat, the leader of the French Socialists and a member
of the French War Cabinet, in the famous treatise "Faites
la Paix : sinon faites un Roi," which he addressed to his
countrymen a few months before the war, you will discover
manifold reasons why Germany should be willing to make
peace on some such terms as those indicated. If fear, as
I contend, has been at the bottom of the great catastrophe
— fear common to all the Powers which plunged into the
war last August — an "arrangement," to which Germany
would be a party, "by which she could be assured that no
aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her
and her allies" by France, Russia, and Great Britain,
jointly or separately, such an arrangement would remove
those fears from the future. And if the British Government
realised the practical impossibility and, from the point of
view of the British national interest, the undesirability of

i22 TRUTH AND THE WAR

excluding Germany from a place in the sun commensurate
with her legitimate requirements, I cannot conceive that
a single German possessed of common sense would desire
the retention of either Belgium or Northern France, and
I do conceive it likely that tens of thousands of Germans,
smitten with remorse attendant upon the saner vision
ensuing from the advent of peace, would eagerly co-operate
in healing the wounds of that unhappy land.

For the rest, Germany's supreme interest is peace, and
when you have said all there is to be said of her national
faults and of her conduct of the war, the solid fact remains
that this powerful nation had for forty and four years
kept the peace when war broke out last August. Attention
has, of course, been drawn to this many times; but,
considered in the light of international reconstruction and
Germany's attitude thereto, it is a fact of cardinal
importance. No other great Power can boast such a
record. With the sole exception of the guerilla campaign
with a Hottentot tribe in South-West Africa and sundry
skirmishes with primitive tribes in German East Africa,
against which we can set a dozen far more comprehensive
campaigns of a similar kind, Germany had kept her sword
in the scabbard, while her neighbours had been drawing
theirs and laying about them with great energy. She had
rattled it loudly and offensively often enough, especially
when she became nervous at her position in the "balance
of power," as the man who is apprehensive of his neigh-
bour's intent puffs out his chest and assumes a fierce
expression. But she had not drawn it. She could have
drawn it with every chance of success again and again had
the desire of her rulers been the "subjugation" of Europe,
or even of a part of Europe, in the years when her military
strength was incomparably superior to every possible
combination against her. She could have drawn it on a
Balkan issue when Russia, crippled by her war with Japan,
was helpless; she did no more than support her one real
ally in Europe in an offence, but a technical one, against
the sovereignty of the Porte, whose sovereignty,
guaranteed by all the Powers, has been flouted by each
in turn with absolute cynicism whenever it suited their
interests to flout it. Had she desired to crush France she
could have done so in the 'eighties, when the British official
world would have been rather pleased than otherwise. She
could have done so when, embarrassed by the Boer war,
we were incapable of helping France, even had we wished

APPEAL TO PRESIDENT WILSON 123

to do so; or, again, when freed from any danger from
the Russian side after Mukden. She did not do so. Why ?
She was proportionately far stronger as a land Power in
the 'eighties, the 'nineties, and in the first five years of
the present century than in 1914. For just upon half a
century Germany had waged no war. Neither had her
Austrian ally. The personal influence of their rulers had
been exerted time and again, as eminent politicians and
writers in the countries of their present foes have borne
witness, in the cause of peace. Germany's oversea
possessions had been acquired not by wars of conquest,
but by treaty arrangements. Her ally had never been
attracted by the oversea imperialist mirage. During that
period Russian imperialism had waged a sanguinary war
with Japan; British imperialism with the Dutch republics
which had been absorbed in the British Empire; France
had been indulging in wars of conquest against coloured
peoples all over the globe, and as a result had annexed an
area of territory as large as the United States; Italy had
embarked upon two formidable campaigns, the latter
of which was the most cynically immoral venture
of our time. While, her neighbours were fighting,
Germany was building up a marvellous industrial
edifice, which had everything to lose by war, and
a great overseas trade, which was bound to be
temporarily ruined by war.

When these facts are borne in mind — and none can
gainsay them — when it is considered that even Germany's
enormous expenditure upon armaments during the last ten
years falls short by hundreds of millions of the
expenditure of her potential foes under the European
"balance of power" system — that "foul idol," as
Bright once called it — and that she has never once
put forth her great strength, the presumption is
that, judging from her own past conduct, Germany
would welcome an honourable peace, and that if this be
denied her she will drag down the civilised world with
her in her fall. In her position Britishers would do the
same.

Were President Wilson able to lay even the first
foundations of the future bridge across the gulf of existent
Anglo-German enmity the end of this awful tragedy would
be in sight. For Anglo-German enmity has become the
key of the situation. The Balkan question, and with it
the problem of Austro-Russian rivalry, is not insoluble on

!24 TRUTH AND THE WAR

the basis of a settlement founded upon nationality, of home
rule within home rule. We owe the origins of this war
not to the insolubility of Austro-Russian contentions, but
to the seeds of strife sown by two rival diplomatists —
Aerenthal1 and Iswolski2 — watered by the subsequent
intrigues of Hartwig3 and von Tschirsky,4 just as we owe
its world-wide extension to the intrigues, ignorances and
incompatibilities of temper of half a dozen rulers and
diplomats operating in an atmosphere of mutual fears and
concealing their manoeuvres from the gaze of their peoples,
thus giving free rein to the criminal enterprise of a few
powerful publicists and an internationalised armament
ring. Neither are the problems of Alsace-Lorraine or of
Poland insoluble if a solution be sought in the ascertained
desires of the peoples of those disputed areas, and not on
the basis of military considerations, which have never
settled any problem of international politics. The real
problem which faces the world to-day is none of these.
Anglo-German enmity is the real problem.

Neither people can destroy the other, whatever the
politicians or the papers say.

Every belligerent Government must make sacrifices for
peace; must be compelled to do so by its peoples if it will
not of its own accord. But it is at least probable that
elements in the ruling classes of all the belligerent
countries are looking for a golden bridge. And after all
it is the peoples, not the diplomats who blundered them
into war or the publicists who hounded them at each
others' throats, trading on their fears, that are paying
with blood and tears.

Once again, then, the essential is that the Peoples
should mutually and severally be in a position to know
the nature of the adversary's claim. If the Peoples have
the right to make war they also have the right to make
peace.

It is a great thing to ask of President Wilson that he
should endeavour to make himself the medium through
which that knowledge can be acquired. But he is the only
personal force in this distracted planet to whom we can

1 Formerly Austrian Foreign Minister.

2 Formerly Russian Foreign Minister.

3 Russian Minister at Belgrade.

4 German Ambassador at Vienna.

APPEAL TO PRESIDENT WILSON 125

turn. Supported by the American people, fortified by the
deep humanities which inspire him and by the wide and
penetrating grasp of men and things which he possesses
— if he could bring himself to make this effort he would
be the saviour of the world, and his name would be blessed
from generation unto generation.

CHAPTER XIV.

Is Truth or is Fiction the greater
National Interest?1

HAVE received a considerable number of letters in
connection with this series of writing's, and their
general tenour convinces me that the latter are serving a
useful purpose. One valued correspondent, however,
thinks that the ordinary man will conclude that I am
seeking "not only to defend Germany, but to defend
Germany at the expense of England." I have greater
faith in the ordinary man. In my own belief those abstract
entities known as "Germany" and "England" have had
little or nothing to do with this war. To defend Germany's
rulers from the charge of having deliberately brought
about this war for the sake of world-dominion and to
"subjugate Europe," is not to defend them from their
share of responsibility in the catastrophe, or for their
methods, and it is not to defend Germany at the expense
of England. It is to defend Germany against a charge
whose untenability becomes patent when the records and
the acts of the other great European Powers, in the matter
of war preparations and the waging of wars, and in the
matter of a long series of proceedings anterior to the war,
are examined. And to do that is not to do anything
detrimental to the British national interest. It is to do
something which, on the contrary, serves the British
national interest. It is to do something which, in all
humility one may claim, is calculated to serve the interests
of all the peoples of Europe.

For if it can be demonstrated that this charge against
Germany is untrue and that Germany had real cause to
fear aggression, this war is seen to be the outcome, not
of the inherent wickedness of one particular ruler, or
group, or nation, but of a system of Statecraft common to

1 The Labour Leader, May 13, 1915.
126

TRUTH OR FICTION? 127

ail Governments, a system of official intercourse between
Governments, in which all the peoples have helplessly
acquiesced and for which all Governments are directly, and
all peoples indirectly, responsible. And it is only when,
and if, all Governments and all peoples have realised that
the truth lies here that these systems can be overthrown
and the conception of a real union between the nations
can evolve. So long- as one particular nation is credited
with special and peculiar vices by the others, so long will
the others remain blind to the part played by their own
rulers in producing" the situation out of which the war
arose, and so long will every practical effort at the
re-establishment of public law in Europe be doomed to
death in birth. We must build a new structure and we
must use new material. We cannot build a new structure
in Europe without Germany. If, therefore, we do not
build upon a foundation of truth, the Europe which
emerges from this war will be even more unstable than
the Europe produced by the Treaty of Vienna a century
ago. If, therefore, the attempt to make British people
visualise the real position of Germany in the system of
European Statecraft known as the "Balance of Power" as
it existed in the decade preceding the war, involves running
counter to certain current public utterances by individuals
who constitute the British Government for the time being,
or by individual British publicists, that is merely incidental
and unavoidable, and is not pursued as an end in itself
by the writer.

And now to return to the main purport of these
articles. For some years previous to the war, Germany's
chief cause of apprehension lay in the growing ascendency
in Russia of just those very forces, Jingoism (Pan-Slavism)
and Militarism, which we are asked to regard as peculiar
to Germany herself. The recent growth of these forces in
Russia had been principally attributable to three main
factors : the shaky position of the governing autocracy,
driven to seek popularity among the noisy and Jingo
elements in Russian society, in order to stem the rising
tide of social discontent and democratic aspirations; the
restlessness of the fighting services, smarting under the
blow to their prestige inflicted by the war with Japan; the
diplomatic defeat sustained by Russia in the quarrel with
Austria over the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
in 1908-9, which diplomatic defeat had been finally
consummated by Germany's uncompromising support of

i28 TRUTH AND THE WAR

her ally on that occasion. These factors in combination
had given an immense impetus to the reactionary elements
in Russia. The fears engendered thereby in Germany were
shared equally by the mass of the people — it is essential
to bear this clearly in mind — and by the official classes,
and under cover of this fear the reactionary elements in
Germany acquired additional influence, and the General
Staff additional arrogance and power. The more tense
became the situation, the more did the German people in
the mass forget their domestic grievances against the
harsh officialdom and the undemocratic tendencies
characteristic of the dominant partner in the Empire —
Prussia; the more did they rally round the organising
genius of Prussia as the bulwark of their national liberties
and the symbol of their national unity.

The storm clouds on Germany's eastern frontiers
loomed the heavier owing to the attitude of France, the
foreign policy of whose rulers had become notoriously
subservient to the Russian autocracy, and where a
recrudescence of the Chauvinist military spirit among the
rising middle-class generation had been specially marked
— as impartial Frenchmen admit and well-informed
Frenchmen know — since the Morocco quarrel had revealed
a disposition on the part of official Britain to give to the
entente with France the complexion of a virtual offensive
and defensive alliance. Add to this the strained relations
with Britain; the naval rivalry; the determination of official
Britain to look upon the growth of the German navy as
a cause of offence in itself; the boastings of official
Germany about the "trident"; the boastings of official
Britain when the Dreadnought era was ushered in; the
incessant public bickerings of rival Navy Leagues and of
the incendiary Press on both sides — and the genuineness
of Germany's fears can only be denied by those who insist
upon shutting their eyes and closing their ears to the
truth. Germany had substantially contributed to creating
the situation giving rise to her own fears and the fears of
all Europe. But other Powers had substantially
contributed, too. To attempt to strike a balance of
responsibility would be futile. It is sufficient to insist that
Germany feared; that she had good reasons to fear; that
the reasonableness of her fears was admitted by our public
men and by French public men and writers of repute — even
military writers — and that to sweep all this aside on the
pretext that Germany suddenly plunged Europe into war

TRUTH OR FICTION? 129

of diabolical set purpose and for purely selfish aims, is a
perversion of the facts of which history offers few
parallels, and which cannot in the end survive, but which
will, if we persist in being- slaves to it, lead this nation
stumbling along an interminable vista of woe into an
unfathomable pit of disaster.

Before dealing more specifically with the causes, other
than those furnished in the statistical and other data
touched upon in these articles, why the situation in Russia
should have been a matter of increasing uneasiness in
Germany, there is one point which it is necessary to touch
upon, for none is more misunderstood. Comprehension of
Germany's true position in Europe before the war is
impossible unless we fix firmly in our minds that a violent
disruption of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy represented
for Germany just one of those few really vital dangers
which — given the existing division of Europe into groups
— a nation cannot afford to run. From the moment that
Bismarck's long and successful policy of maintaining
friendly relations with Russia became seriously impaired
(the cooling process began in his lifetime and dates from
Russia's disappointment at the result of the Berlin
Congress) the preservation of the Dual Monarchy became
for Germany synonymous with her own preservation. The
consummation of the Russo-French alliance, which was
the consequence of the Russo-German breach, bound up
Germany's fortunes with those of the Dual Monarchy
absolutely. Thenceforth Austria could not be imperilled
without Germany being imperilled. A stricken Austro-
Hungary meant a Germany completely isolated in Europe,
for to Italy's notorious political fickleness had been added,
from the practical point of view, her military weakening
through the bad and mad Tripoli adventure. A glance at
the map will convey a clearer appreciation of this
elementary verity than reams of disquisition. Hence the
internal and external concerns of the Dual Monarchy
were of capital import to Germany, and Germany's
intervention in Austria's favour over the Bosnian crisis of
1908-9, directly Russia's attitude became openly
threatening,- was natural and inevitable — however brutal
and crude in its manifestation.

To assume, as is now currently assumed, that Germany
had become the virtual dictator of Austro-Hungarian
policy, is not warranted by the facts as publicly accessible.
On the contrary, the presumption would seem to be that

i3o TRUTH AND THE WAR

the very obligation under which Germany found herself
to support the Dual Monarchy compelled her to defend
her ally's policy regardless of its wisdom. That a self-
vdlled and dominating personality like Count Tisza, the
Hungarian Premier, who has played so conspicuous a part
in the policy of the Dual Monarchy, would submit to a
Potsdam dictatorship, is absurd on the face of it. Indeed,
the notion of a meek and placid Austria-Hungary, clay in
the hands of the potters at the Wilhelmstrasse, argues a
complete ignorance of the relative situations and
relationships of the Teutonic Powers, and of the character
of their respective governing classes. (A perusal of the
Austrian Red Book in the second edition of Price's
invaluable "Diplomatic History of the War," and of the
interesting volume on the Balkans recently issued by the
Buxton Brothers, should correct the impression.) It has
only taken root here owing to the clumsy and, so to speak,
post-prandial attempt to ignore and set aside, and even
to suppress, the sudden general mobilisation of all the
Russian armies in the very midst of the resumed Austro-
Russian discussions in the last days of July, which swept
Berlin off its feet. The well-informed writer in The Round
Table for September last is much nearer the truth when
he says that Germany had "in a sense lost control over
her ally," and when he speaks of the German Emperor
having become in a measure "the catspaw of Viennese
intrigue." The fact is that Germany had axiomatically to
pay the piper for her ally's mistakes and for those incessant
fluctuations in her policy which, as in Russia, characterised
the rise and fall of this or that set of influences — male and
female — struggling for mastery at the Viennese Court.
Nationally speaking, Germany's position in the balance
impelled her to support the one ally left to her in Europe,
whatever the circumstances, and whether that ally was
right or wrong, wise or unwise.

Indeed, the more contemporary documents are
examined, the more untenable becomes the argument that
Austro-Hungarian policy has been subservient to German
direction, and that, in the crisis of 1914, the Kaiser had
onlvto lift his little finger to ensure obedience to his wishes
at Vienna. If, for example, that very valuable volume,
"The Inner History of the Balkan War," written by a
British officer with peculiar qualifications for the task, be
studied,1 it cannot but induce the conviction that Germany

1 By Lieutenant-Colonel Reginald Rankin. (Constable,)

TRUTH OR FICTION? 131

had the very greatest difficulty in preventing her ally from
kicking over the traces at that time — 191 2-13. As the
author himself puts it, Germany did her best to "hold
back Austria from a policy of violence." That Austrian
statesmen, exasperated by the support given to Serbia,
at least by unofficial Russia, sounded both Germany and
Italy with a view to securing their support of an Austrian
declaration of war against Serbia, we know from the
statement made by Signor Giolitti, on August 9, 1913.
Curiously enough, that statement has been interpreted
as a further proof of German plotting. In point of fact,
it is proof that the Austrian proposal was turned down
by Germany and Italy together. Signor Giolitti says
distinctly that Italy joined with the German Government
to restrain Austria.

Baron Beyens, then Belgian Minister at Berlin, now
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, has also recorded
in his recent book that the : —

"diplomacy of the Wilhelmstrasse (i.e., Berlin) applied
itself, above all, to calm the exasperation and the desire
for intervention at the Ballplatz (i.e., Vienna)."1

More significant still is Baron Beyens' despatch to his
Government on November 30, 191 2, in connection with
the visit of the Archduke Ferdinand (heir to the Austrian
throne, afterwards murdered at Sarajevo). The Belgian
diplomatist writes : —

"The Archduke stated at Berlin that the Austro-
Hungarian monarchy had come to an end of the
concessions it could make to its neighbour. The Emperor
and his councillors showered upon him, none the less,
counsels of moderation which William II., when conducting
his guest to the railway station, summarised in the homely
language which is habitual to him, and in these expressive
words : 'Above all, no foolishness !' There is no doubt
that the Emperor, the Chancellor, and the Foreign
Secretary are passionately pacific."2

But the very success achieved by German diplomacy in
1912-13 militated against similar success in 1914. Counsels
of moderation had averted a European war then ; but they

1 "L'allemagne avant la guerre."

a The Belgian Diplomatic Despatches : op cit,

i32 TRUTH AND THE WAR

had been followed by an intensification of Austro-Serbian
friction, by an even graver strain in Austro-Russian
relations, and in the assassination of Austria's heir and
the Emperor's personal friend, the Archduke. Moreover,
the whole situation in Europe had worsened. I am not
arguing that Germany put all the pressure she might have
placed upon Austria in July, 1914. I do not know, and
I do not suppose there is a solitary human being in this
country who does. But what I do say is that in the very
nature of the case, it was no longer possible for the
German Government to assume so emphatic an attitude
in 1914 as it did in 1912 and 1913; and what I do say is
that I have, for my part, seen not one scintilla of
documentary evidence snowing that Germany instigated
the Dual Monarchy to take up an intransingeant position.
The attitude of the German Government appears to have
been that Austria was justified in coercing Serbia; and
that Russia would not go to extreme lengths in supporting
Serbia against Austria. When later on the German
Government perceived that Russia did intend to
go to all lengths in support of Serbia the German
Government went as far as it dared go without risking
to rupture the alliance, in restraining Austria. I am not
discussing the rights and wrongs of the three Governments
concerned. I am merely endeavouring to disentangle the
truth from the coating of prejudice and passion under
which, for British understanding, it has been concealed.
Let us imagine a broadly parallel case.

Supposing that, after years of friction — friction due to
faults on both sides — between the Indian Government and
Afghanistan, the Prince of Wales had been murdered in
the streets of an Indian town close to the Afghan border,
and supposing the Indian Government, convinced,
rightly or wrongly, that Afghan agents had inspired the
crime; British public opinion, it may safely be asserted,
would have been as convulsed with rage as was public
opinion in Austria-Hungary after Sarajevo. Would the
British Government have gone to a Conference under such
circumstances? And would an ally of Great Britain,
dependent upon Great Britain for its own security, have
risked a rupture with Great Britain by insisting that Great
Britain should do so, especially when the Power, believed
by both Great Britain and her ally to be morally
responsible for Afghanistan's general attitude, interfered
menacingly on Afghanistan's behalf, on the ground that

TRUTH OR FICTION? 133

the inhabitants of Afghanistan were of the same race as
its own subjects?

Wherever in this volume I am concerned with the
attempt to make my countrymen take a juster view, in the
interests of a permanent peace, of German actions and of
German policy, I have scrupulously refrained from
reinforcing my arguments by citing German authorities.
I have invariably relied upon the statements of our own
authorities, or of authorities in allied and friendly
countries. But in this particular matter of Germany's
support to Austria in her quarrel with Serbia after the
murder of the Archduke, it seems to me impossible to
leave uncited the despatch of the German Chancellor to
the German Ambassador at Vienna on July 30, 1914.
This despatch, or what purported to be a copy of it, was
shown by the German Foreign Secretary to Mr. Crozier
Long, the correspondent of the Westminster Gazette, and
appeared in that paper on August 1. Its genuineness has
since been vouched for by the German Chancellor in the
course of one of his speeches in the Reichstag. It reads
as under : the italics are mine : —

"The report of Count Pourtales (German Ambassador
at Petrograd) does not harmonise with the account which
your Excellency has given of the attitude of the Austro-
Hungarian Government. Apparently there is a misunder-
standing, which I beg you to clear up. We cannot
expect Austria-Hungary to negotiate with Serbia, with
which she is in a state of war. The refusal, however, to
exchange views with St. Petersburg would be a grave
mistake. We are, indeed, ready to fulfil our duty. As
an Ally we must, however, refuse to be drawn into a world
conflagration through Austria-Hungary not respecting our
advice. Your Excellency will express this to Count
Berchtold with all emphasis and great seriousness."

An ally in Germany's position, confronted with
powerful potential foes on east and west, could hardly
have gone further.

July 30 was the crucial day in the whole maze of
confused negotiations which the Russian general
mobilisation order [vide Chapter III. and foot-note thereto)
smashed for good and all. This can be seen at a glance.
On that day the German Ambassador — in response to a
suggestion made to him the previous day by Sir Edward
Grey, and communicated by him to Berlin — informed Sir

(")

i34 TRUTH AND THE WAR

E. Grey that the German Government would endeavour
to influence the Austrian Government not to continue its
operations in Serbia after the occupation of Belgrade and
its vicinity. (White Book No. 103.) Thereupon the
German Ambassador telegraphed to Berlin that Sir E.
Grey would make representations to Russia in that sense,
and the German Government communicated with Vienna.
Sir E. Grey wired Petrograd, expressing- the earnest hope
that if this solution were obtainable it might be possible
to suspend military preparations on all sides. The
situation thus appeared to admit of a compromise at the
last moment, although the fact that Russia had partially
mobilised — i.e., had mobilised against Austria — was an
awkward obstacle.

King George showed himself no less eager to bring his
royal influence to bear upon this hopeful suggestion. He
also wired — to Prince Henry — in part as follows : the
italics are mine : —

"My Government is doing all that is possible to induce
Russia and France to stop their military preparations, if
Austria would content herself with occupying Belgrade and
the adjacent portions of Serbian territory as a pledge for
the conclusion of an agreement satisfying her claims, while
at the same time other countries stop their preparations
for war. I count upon the great influence of the Emperor
to obtain from Austria the acceptance of this proposal.
He will thereby prove that Germany and England are
working together for the prevention of an international
calamity. Please assure William that I am doing all that
lies in my power to do in order to preserve the peace of
Europe."

All this, let it be repeated, took place on the morning
and afternoon of July 30, and we know now that Austria
accepted the proposal King George and the British
Government were so anxious she should accept. (No. 50
Austrian Red Book.)

But what was Russia's reply to the proposal? Her
reply was to issue a midnight general mobilisation order
— i.e, mobilisation against Germany — for she had already
mobilised against Austria.

If her Government had waited only twenty-four hours,
the situation was saved, for, in the nature of things,
Austria's reply to the proposal could not have become
known until the 31st.

TRUTH OR FICTION? 135

But, as Mr. Phillips Price remarks, the military party
at Petrograd triumphed on the 30th, and "cut the ground
from under the feet of the diplomats, by the precipitate
issuing of mobilisation orders," just as the military party
triumphed at Berlin on the 31st when Russia's action
became known.

Again, on the 31st, a delay of twenty-four hours might
have saved Europe — and this time the blame was
Germany's.

Russia's fatal order for a general mobilisation at
midnight on the 30th, without even waiting for the
Austrian reply to the Anglo-German proposals — which
reply, as we have seen, was an acceptance — at once
enlarged the area of immediate tension. It produced a
genuine popular panic in Berlin — all the British and
American correspondents who were in Berlin at the time
are agreed on that. That the Russian general
mobilisation did not necessarily mean that Russia had
decided upon war, could not weigh against the sentiment
provoked by the fact that the order had gone forth for a
general mobilisation of all the Russian armies. It was
that fact, and the deadly fears conjured up by past
memories, which governed the entire situation. It was
that fact which gave the military party in Berlin its chance.
At 2 p.m. on the 31st "Kreigzustand," the military state
preceding mobilisation, was proclaimed in Berlin. At
midnight Berlin issued its fatal summons to Petrograd to
demobilise in twelve hours. At 5.30 on August 1 the
g'eneral German mobilisation was announced. At 7 p.m.
the declaration of war on Russia was handed in.

Rash and precipitate as it was, the action of Germany
had not been as rash and precipitate as the British
Ambassador to Russia had warned the Russian
Government it would be, as early as July 25, in the event
of Russian mobilisation. On July 25 Sir George Buchanan
told the Russian Foreign Minister that in his opinion : "If
Russia mobilises Germany would not be content with mere
mobilisation or give Russia time to carry our hers, but
would probably declare war at once." (White Book
No. 17.)

As a matter of fact, the actual declaration of war was
issued some thirty hours after the general Russian
mobilisation became known in Berlin.

136 TRUTH AND THE WAR

Why did the British Ambassador to Russia believe
that a general Russian mobilisation would lead to an
immediate German declaration of war?

It could only have been because he thought that the
effect of such action on the part of the Russian
Government would enable the German Military Staff to
present to the German Government such an overwhelming
case, based upon military exigencies, as the German
Government would be incapable of resisting without
imperilling its position and endangering the throne.

We have been taught to believe that the case of military
exigency which the German military authorities did, in
fact, present, was purely mythical.

But however we may condemn the German ultimatum
to Russia, following the Russian general mobilisation,
events which none can gainsay have proved that there was
nothing mythical in the German military case. So
advanced were the Russian preparations on the German
frontier that on August 3 the Russians attacked Memel;
on August 5 the Russian covering troops crossed the
German frontier near Lyck; on August 7 Rennenkampf's
main army crossed the German frontier at Suwalki, while
Samsonov, one of the most popular generals in the Russian
army, with five army corps, was advancing from Mlawa.
On the 20th the Germans were routed at Gumbinnen after
a four days' battle; on the 21st they were again heavily
defeated between Frankenau and Orlau. By the 25th the
whole of East Prussia up to the Vistula was in Russian
occupation.

The alleged results of that occupation were given in
the Manifesto1 issued last summer by the National
Executive of the German Social Democratic Party, which,
before the war, represented five million German voters, as
follows : —

"Four hundred thousand people in East Prussia have
been forced to flee as refugees; 1,620 civilians have been
murdered, and 433 wounded; 5,410 male civilians (amongst
them helpless old men), 2,587 women, and 2,719 children
have been removed to Russia; 24 towns, 572 villages, and
236 farms, totalling 36,553 buildings, have been entirely
or partly destroyed, and about 200,000 homes have been
entirely or partly plundered and devastated."

1 Published in the Labour Leader and some other papers, July 8,
I9I5-

TRUTH OR FICTION? 137

It is, of course, impossible to check or verify these
detailed statements. They may be exaggerated. All one
can say is that the history of all wars records broadly
similar results following in the wake of an invading army.
Belgium, Poland, Galicia, and East Prussia are not
exceptions to the melancholy rule.

But the military occurrences in East Prussia which
followed so rapidly the outbreak of war lend additional
significance to the warning of the British Ambassador on
July 25, and place the midnight order for the general
mobilisation of the Russian armies in its true perspective
among the events which have brought Europe to its present
pass.

CHAPTER XV.
Russia's Military Preparations1

Everybody knows that hitherto our war plans always bore a defensive
character, but even foreign countries are well aware that the idea of
defensive tactics has now been abandoned, and that the Russian
Army will be active. . . . Russian public opinion has a great interest
in knowing that our country is ready for all eventualities. Si vis
pacem para helium. Russia, in complete union with her Supreme
Leader, wants peace, but she is ready. — "Bourse Gazette of Petrograd,"
March 13, 1914, in the course of an article commonly attributed to
General Sukhomlinoff, then Russian Minister of War.

The hatred towards Austria, which has accumulated in the heart
of the Russian nation, has long been seeking an outlet in war, and is
only being kept back within the limits of the last degree of patience
by the Russian Government with the utmost difficulty. But there is
an end to all things. A moment may arrive when even the Russian
Government will prove impotent to fight down the hatred towards
Austria-Hungary, which fills the Russian people, and then the
crossing of the Austrian frontier by the Russian Army will become
an unavoidable decision. — The "Golos Moskvy," March 12, 1914 — one
of the most influential of Russian Conservative papers.

The extension southwards is for Russia an historical, political,
and economic necessity, and the foreign Power which stands in the
way to this expansion is eo ipso an enemy Power. ... I say quite
briefly and precisely : everywhere at every spot throughout the
Levant, Russia has been, and is still, meeting, in trying to solve her
most vital problem, the Eastern question, the resistance of Germany,
acting either alone or as the Ally of Austria. Hence it has become
quite clear to the Russians that if everything remains as it is, the
road to Constantinople will have to be carried through Berlin. Even
Vienna is but of secondary moment. — Dr. Paul Mitrofanoff — a
Russian professor well known in political circles — in the "Preussische
jahrbucher," May, 1914.

In an article published only two months before the war, the
military correspondent of The Times explained how well founded were
the German fears of Russian aggression. He explained that Russia
had raised her peace effectives by 150,000 men, "making a total peace
strength of about 1,700,000, or approximately double that of
Germany." He added: "The Russian reply to Germany is next
door to a mobilization in time of peace, and it quite accounts for
the embittered outburst of the Cologne Gazette, and for the German
pot calling the Russian kettle black. . . . There are signs that
Russia has done with defensive strategy. . . . The increased number
of guns in the Russian Army Corps, the growing efficiency of the
Army, and the improvements made or planned in strategic railways

1 The Labour Leader, June 24, 191 5.

138

RUSSIA'S MILITARY PREPARATIONS 139

are, again, matters which cannot be left out of account. These
things are well calculated to make the Germans anxious." — Times,
June 3, 1914.

For Englishmen, this war is primarily a struggle between
Germany and France. For the Germans it is emphatically a Russo-
German war. . . . The politics which made the war and the senti-
ment that supported it had reference exclusively to Russia. ... It is
for us in this country of the first importance to follow the direction of
German thought. ... It is not merely a tie of sentiment or kinship
which unites Germany to Austria. Austria is the flying buttress of
her own Imperial fabric. Cut the buttress and the fabric itself will
fall. — Mr. H. N. Brailsford in the "Contemporary Review,"
September, 1914.

INTO the merits and dements of the Austro-Russian
quarrel I do not propose to enter. The origin of the
dispute lay in the personal rivalries and mutual trickeries
of the Austrian and Russian Foreign Offices which
culminated in the formal act of annexation by Austria
(under Aerenthal) of Bosnia and Herzegovina, without the
compensating advantage of an agitation in Russia's
favour, backed by Austria, for the reopening of the
Dardanelles problem, for which the Russian Foreign
Office had been prepared to acquiesce in Austria's technical
breach of the Berlin Treaty. I say "technical," because
Austria had been in occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
for thirty years, and the sovereignty of the Porte in those
old Turkish provinces had become even more nominal
than, for instance, in Egypt. A community of interests
was thenceforth established between Russian diplomacy
and Serbia. Serbia had grievances against Austria apart
from the Bosnian annexation, but her essential case was
— we are prone to forget it — that of a small kingdom
desirous of becoming a large one at the expense of the
territory of a powerful neighbour; an ambition which, in
analogous cases, has been represented to the wider public
as respectable or as disreputable according to the interests
furthered or hindered by such ambition. In lending her
occult influence to the Serbian propaganda aiming at the
dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian State — its
avowed purpose — and in carrying out to the same end
elaborate intrigues in Galicia, as to which I recommend
a perusal of Stepankowsky's pamphlet1 (it has the great

1 "The Russian Plot to Seize Galicia" (Henry James Hall and
Co., 25 South Molton Street, London. Price, 6d.). As to Russia's
treatment of Poles and Ruthenians alike in the portions of Galicia
which she has occupied since the war, I suggest a reference to the
pamphlet entitled "The Resurrection of Poland" (Paris : 71 Rue de
Rennes. Price, 6d.).

i4o TRUTH AND THE WAR

merit of having- been published a few months before the
war), Russian Imperialism may be regarded as justified
by way of reprisals for the Bosnian affair, or it may not.
That must be a matter of opinion. The fact remains that
the future of the Dual Monarchy was unquestionably
involved by these actions of the Russian Government and
its agents, avowed or unavowed, and, such being the case,
Germany's position in the "Balance" became vitally
affected, as already explained.

There was, however, a peace party at Potsdam and at
Petrograd. At the end of 1910 a meeting had been
arranged between the Kaiser and the Tsar, and the
outcome of it was an agreement settling the vexed Bagdad
railway question, so far as Russia and Germany were
concerned. With that one specific cause of Russo-German
difference removed, it might have been thought that the
way was clear for an eventual Russo-Austrian
accommodation through German auspices. But the
bitterness of the Russo-Austrian quarrel — I repeat, an
affair, in the main, of personalities moving like sinister
shadows behind the screen of international politics — did
not lessen. It became more intense. The formation of a
Balkan alliance under Russian cegis occasioned much
alarm in Vienna and disquietude in Berlin. The Serbian
propaganda against the Dual Monarchy became even more
virulent. The German military mission to Turkey — not
the first, and an Englishman was in command of the
Turkish fleet — caused a furious outcry in the Pan-Slavist
Press of Russia. A campaign of invective raged in the
Russian, Austrian, and German Press. These years,
191 1 -1 2, were booming ones for the international "death
providers"; the vultures gathered together, visualising
death and decomposition from afar.

And now, pursuing our investigations into the cause
of German fears, let us glance at the war preparations of
her mighty neighbour, the Colossus which haunted the
imagination of our own governing classes for fifty years,
although our homesteads and our civilisation were far
removed from the shadow of its presence, while Germany
lived beneath it. And my readers, as they peruse the story,
will be careful, I trust, to repeat to themselves : "We are
told that Germany alone made preparations for war; that
Germany's attitude was alone provocative; that Germany
alone planned and schemed; that Germany alone, and
deliberately, set out to fling Europe into the maelstrom

RUSSIA'S MILITARY PREPARATIONS 141

of war, with the fixed intention of 'subjugating-' her
neighbours; that German 'militarism' is a disease
peculiar to Germany; that Germany is and has always
been the ravening wolf in the sheep-pen of European
harmony and sweet reasonableness."

With the opening of 191 3 there came an immense
increase in the already notable recrudescence of Russian
military activity, which The Times and other Tory
newspapers have been good enough to record for us, and
to record with an appearance of glee, eloquent of their
own desires. Synchronising with these symptoms across
her borders, Germany became more and more alarmed and
disturbed. Writing as far back as 191 1, the famous
"Military Correspondent" of The Times remarked: —

"The possibility of a war on two fronts is the nightmare
of German strategists and, considering the pace at which
Russia has been building up her field armies since 1905,
the nightmare is not likely to he soon conjured away."

The underlying note of satisfaction is interesting and
characteristic. I have already dealt with this "building
up" as expressed in £ s. d. Its significance is not fully
translatable by merely quoting figures of expenditure. I
propose to confine myself largely to The Times. In the
Russian supplement (March 28) an article, entitled "The
Russian Army : The New National Spirit," by Lieut. -
Colonel Arivenko, was given much prominence. In it we
were told that : —

"Not only foreign, but even Russian opinion, has but
a vague idea of the profound changes that have taken
place in the Russian Army since the war of 1904-5."

These changes were enumerated. In 1905, service reduced
from four to two and three-quarter years, securing an
increase of 200,000 reservists; 1907, "Reserve units"
transformed; 1907-9, military schools amended and
enlarged, corps of time-expired non-commissioned officers
created (20,000); 1910, new equipment with heavy guns
and new transport, wireless stations, automobiles, aero-
planes, etc. Arivenko assured us that Russia was pacific,
but it would be a mistake to suppose that this tendency
argued an "unpreparedness for war." The "blending of
the new and the old" had given the Russian Army "a
strength perhaps greater than it ever had before" : "in
a possible future conflict it may be hoped that we shall not

1 42 TRUTH AND THE WAR

see a repetition of the reverses of 1904-5." A special
ukase maintained on a war footing the mobilisation of
half the Russian Army on the Austrian frontier, set up in
1912. Another confirmed the Compulsory Service Amend-
ment Act of 1 91 2, providing- that all persons born in the
last quarter of 1892 should join the colours in 1913
instead of 1914. — (The Times, April 11.) The Times
"Military Correspondent" states as a "rumour"
(August 22) that the Army is to be raised to 41 army
corps; the artillery is being increased :

"New formations in the West seem destined to
strengthen the covering troops at least, if not to advance
the line of concentration of the main armies, and there
is talk of seven new cavalry regiments, of improved cadres
for the reserves, and of a transformation of the strategic
railway system."

These measures are given in greater detail in the
Russian Red Book, to wit : three new army corps, a divi-
sion of sharpshooters, and two divisions of infantry — to be
quartered in the Western provinces ; the artillery to be
increased to 15,000 guns; the regular cavalry to be
strengthened by the addition of a cavalry division to each
army corps; the entire system governing the reserves to
be modified in order to make them "a much more powerful,
numerous, and serviceable unit." The St. Petersburg
correspondent states (Times, September 10) : —

"The degree to which the war strength of the Russian
Army will be affected by the changes now coming into
force is not known, but competent observers who put the
peace footing at 1,400,000 are inclined to name 3,500,000
men as the greatest possible war strength. That Russia
has unlimited reserves of untrained men capable of creating
a still vaster army if necessary is, of course, beyond doubt.
By general consent the Russian Army has
never been in better condition. It is well clothed, well
fed, and while the evidence as to the state of its artillery
is inconclusive, its musketry training has been greatly
improved."

Meantime the military relations between Russia and
France were close and continuous. The Grand Duke
Nicholas, who had attended the French manoeuvres in
1912, telegraphed to General Joffre to represent the French
Army at the Russian manoeuvres (Times, June 17).

RUSSIA'S MILITARY PREPARATIONS 143

Alluding to these intimate relations, The Times St. Peters-
burg- correspondent remarks (September 10) : —

"It is also clear that, although for many years past
Staff visits have been interchanged, at no period has there
been such close co-operation on military matters between
the two countries or has each army watched so closely
the development of the other as at present."

It was — as sundry revelations in the French news-
papers subsequently established — owing to Russian
pressure during M. Poincare's visit to Petrograd in
August, 1912, that the Three Years' Law for the French
Army had been decided upon in principle^1) Of course,
all these Russian and French preparations have been
represented here as the result of German action. The
quotation in Chapter XI. from Colonel Boucher's book
disposes of the fiction. But the real point is — and this
has been my central argument — that preparations for war
were being carried on by both rival groups, and not by
Germany alone. In his speech in the Reichstag on
April 8, 1 91 3, introducing the new Army Estimates, the
German Chancellor remarked : —

"Germany was like no other country . . . wedged
in between the Slav world and the French."

Much what Mr. Lloyd George had been impressing
upon a British audience five years before. He
continued : —

"Germany could never compete with Russia, whose
Emperor could always call out more men than Germany.
In any war Germany would stake her confidence upon
the courage and the spirit of the people, but it was
necessary to give figures to show what extraordinary
military efforts Germany's neighbours were making. In
Russia there was a most marvellous economic develop-
ment of the giant Empire, with its inexhaustible natural
resources, and an Army reorganisation such as Russia had
never known, as regarded the excellence of the material,
the organisation, and the speed of conversion from peace
to war strength."

That was symptomatic of German feeling.
A necessarily brief reference to accessible information
in 1913 would be incomplete without recalling Colonel

1 Vide Chapter XVI.

i44 TRUTH AND THE WAR

Seely's reply to Mr. Hunt's question in the House on
June 5. Mr. Hunt asked : —

"What additions had been made during the last two
years to the peace strength of the armies of Russia,
Austria-Hungary, Germany, and France. ?

The reply was as follows : —

Russia.

Additions made 75,000

Present Peace Establishment ... 1,284,000
Future : not yet ascertained.

France.

Additions proposed 183,715

Future Peace Establishment ... 741,572

Germany.

Additions made 3^,373

Additions proposed 136,000

Future Peace Establishment ... 821,964

AUSTRO-HUNGARY.

Additions made 58,505

Present Peace Establishment ... 473,643
Future : not yet ascertained.

The figures, as will be seen, are incomplete, but their
very incompleteness adds eloquence to the totals. Even
on the strength of these incomplete figures, and taking
the Russian and Austrian "present" peace establishments
as the basis of reckoning, we see an enormous numerical
preponderance of units in favour of the Franco-Russian
combination as against the Teutonic Powers; in other
words, we get the same result as when applying the test
of military expenditure. Thus : —

Franco-Russian Combination : 2,025,572.
Teutonic Powers: 1,295,607.
The fatal year 1914 began with an intensification, if
possible, of the Russian preparations, accompanied by
much less reticence in the Russian Press. In March
Russia answered the question which Colonel Seely had
been unable to do the previous June (see above), as to her
"future peace establishment," by extending the period
of service for recruits and by increasing the annual

RUSSIA'S MILITARY PREPARATIONS 145

contingent to 130,000, which increased the permament
peace footing by 500,000 men. On March 12 the Golos
Moskvy, an influential Conservative organ, wrote : —

"The hatred towards Austria which has accumulated
in the hearts of the Russian nation has long been seeking
an outlet in war, and is only being kept back within the
limits of the last degree of patience by the Russian
Government with the utmost difficulty. But there is an
end to all things. A moment may arrive when even the
Russian Government will prove impotent to fight down
the hatred towards Austro-Hungary which fills the
Russian people, and then the crossing of the Austrian
frontiers by the Russian Army will become an unavoidable
decision."

The Novoe Vremya — the organ of the Pan-Slavists —
had already stated (March 7) : "The hour is approaching.
It is necessary to work on the Army from top
to bottom, day and night." That same month was
notable for the introduction of a Bill into the Duma
imposing heavy duties upon imported flour and rye from
Germany. The incendiary utterances of the Russian
Press were studiously kept from British readers, and the
retaliatory utterances of the German Press were given
the widest publicity, especially in The Times and its
compeers — thus continuing to foster the impression here
that the recrimination and intolerance were all on the
German side (see, for example, The Times of March 5
and 6). In March came the announcement of the forth-
coming visits by King George to Paris and by President
Poincare to Petrograd. On March 12 the St. Petersburg
correspondent of The Times reports : —

"According to the newspapers large extraordinary
military and naval credits have been discussed in a secret
sitting of the Duma."

On March 19 we have a further telegram from the
same source, headed by The Times thus : "Russia's Giant
Army. Unprecedented Peace Effectives," and con-
taining the following paragraphs : —

"I understand that the Duma Committee has agreed
to the Bill of Indemnity retrospecfively sanctioning the
prolongation of the service of time-expired men for three
months after the legal limit. The fourth class, which

146 TRUTH AND THE WAR

should have returned home on January 14, is, therefore,
due to be released on April 14. As the conscripts form-
ing- the first class have been with the Colours since last
August and are now able, if necessary, to take the field,
the Russian Army has now attained an effective numerical
strength hitherto unprecedented, being not far short of
1,700,000. . . . There is not the slightest difficulty
in providing an additional 150,000 conscripts this year."

A further telegram, on March 29, states : —

"The Russian Government has drawn up a pro-
gramme which provides that orders shall be placed for
330 aeroplanes."

On April 6 the same correspondent announces the
"Russian test mobilisation."

In July President Poincare went to Petrograd. On
the 19th The Times Petrograd correspondent tele-
graphed : —

"Frequent discussion of European problems is a
necessity of the alliance — no less than naval and military
preparations. Naturally, it is the progress of the Russian
Army which most concerns France, but the naval renais-
sance indicated by the approaching entry into commission
of the first two of the eight large ships of the Russian
naval programme is by no means the least interesting
political event since President Poincare's last visit to
Russia."

On July 20 the Novoe Vremya, discussing the merits
of the Triple Entente, remarked that "its superiority

ON LAND AND SEA JUSTIFIES MORE ENERGETIC LANGUAGE
IN THE COUNCILS OF EUROPE. "

The British Ambassador at Vienna had ascertained on
July 15 what the character of the Austro-Hungarian Note
to Serbia would be.1 He advised the Foreign Office

1 The following foot-note appeared in the Labour Leader of
September 30, 1915 : — ■

A correspondent, who is a diligent student of the Continental
Press, draws my attention to a controversy in Die Neue Zeit between
two prominent "Socialists, David and Kautsky, over this statement.
As the point raised is of very considerable historic importance, it
may be well to throw light upon the matter. The passage alluded
to reads as under, and the italicised sentences are those which have
occasioned the controversy : —

The British Ambassador at Vienna had ascertained on

July 1$ what the character of the Austro-Hungarian Note to

Servia would be. He 'advised the Foreign Office on July 16.

RUSSIA'S MILITARY PREPARATIONS 147

on July 16. It is reasonable to assume that the Foreign
Office communicated its information to the British Ambas-
sador at Petrograd. On July 21 President Poincare and
tne French Premier and Foreign Minister were in Petro-
grad, and the decision of the Franco-Russian combination
was then, no doubt, arrived at.

I have made it clear, I think, why, from a military
point of view, Germany had reasons for anxiety for her
safety, and how the element of fear in her case cannot
be dismissed as idle fiction. I have written enough from
that standpoint — and quoted enough — to demonstrate the
untenability of the popular idea which ascribes sole
responsibility for this war to Germany.

It is reasonable to assume that the Foreign Office communicated
its information to the British Ambassador at Petrograd. On
July 21, President Poincare- and the French Premier and Foreign
Minister were in Petrograd, and the decision of the Franco-
Russian combination was then, no doubt, arrived at.
This passage is specially emphasised by David in reply to a
criticism by Kautsky on David's book on the war — a book, by the
way, which I have not seen.

In rejoinder, Kautsky impugns the accuracy of my statement
about the British Ambassador at Vienna. He points out that the
British White Book opens on July 20, with a despatch dated that
day from Sir E. Grey to the British Ambassador at Berlin, in which
Sir E. Grey stated that he told the German Ambassador in London
on that day (July 26) that he "had not heard anything recently" (i.e.,
anything about Vienna's intentions towards Serbia). Kautsky
naturally concludes — being insufficiently informed — that my state-
ment as to our Ambassador at Vienna having ascertained the
character of the impending Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia on
July 15, and having telegraphed his information to the Foreign Office
on July 16 is nothing but a "surmise."

But Kautsky is wrong. I made no surmise. I stated the facts.
Kautsky has evidently not read the later despatch from the British
Ambassador at Vienna dated September 1, and published by the
Foreign Office as a separate publication after the issue of the White
Book. This later despatch now forms No. 161 of the id. White
Book. If he will turn to that despatch Kautsky will find the follow.,
ing passage : —

As for myself, no indication was given me by Count
Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private
source that I received on 15th July the forecast of what was
about to happen, which I telegraphed to you the following day.
We have it, therefore, on Sir Maurice de Bunsen's own admis-
sion, that on July 15 he became aware of the impending Note to
Servia, and that he telegraphed his information to the Foreign
Office on Tub/ 16.

How this is to be reconciled with Sir Edward Grey's despatch to
our Ambassador at Berlin on July 20 it is not my business to inquire.
Diplomacy is a fearful and wonderful thing, and it is not surprising
if, in the maze of tergiversations, the parties responsible for editing
official despatches should sometimes inadvertently contrive to let out
the truth.

CHAPTER XVI.

Russia and the French Three Years' Military
Service Law

BEFORE I deal with the naval expenditure of the rival
European groups, it would seem advisable to refer in
greater detail to the statement in the previous chapter
relating to Russia's connection with the revival in 1913
of the French "Three Years' Law" for military service.

The situation in which France found herself in the
opening months of 191 2 was this. The entire nation was
militarised. By this I mean that every adult male not
physically unfit was compelled to serve two years in the
army at a stretch, and so many weeks or days in every
subsequent year until the age of 45. In this respect the
situation of France was unique among the Great Powers.
That is a very important point which is sometimes
forgotten.

Now a permanent situation of that kind constitutes a
terrific burden upon any nation. The fundamental cause
of it was the retention by the Republican Government of
la revanche as the foundation for all French foreign policy.
With the abandonment of that policy the burden would
fall, but so long as the Republican Government's fixed
resolution to regain Alsace-Lorraine governed the external
policy of France, the burden was there. Of late years it
had reached the intensity above described, owing to the
growth in the German population, so that while a numerous
section of German citizens escaped a prolonged term of
military service, Germany could still maintain an army
which, on its peace footing, was sufficiently large to compel
France — given her foreign policy — to levy this tribute on
all her sons, in order to keep pace with her Eastern
neighbour.

And even so, in a decade or two, France's capacity to
keep pace would automatically disappear through the mere
factor of population.

This cruel dilemma it was which had persuaded many

148

RUSSIA & FRENCH MILITARY SERVICE LAW 149

patriotic Frenchmen that the policy of la revanche must
in the national interest be given up. They were fortified
in their view by the marked change which had come over
public sentiment in the annexed provinces. Forty years
of increasing material prosperity and inter-marriages had
wrought a profound modification in popular feeling. But
for the blundering- brutality and stupidity displayed by the
German military on several occasions this sentiment would
have become even more generalised in a territory whose
inhabitants are, and have always been, mainly of German
stock. Except in certain localised areas, public opinion
was verging more and more towards full autonomy within
the German Empire.

It is, I think, no exaggeration to say that an actual
party had come into existence in France with the definite
purpose of working for a gradual acceptance of the
inevitable, and a burial of the hatchet. It was, in short,
a peace party ; but it had no exclusive political complexion.
Men bitterly opposed to one another on domestic affairs —
like Jaures and Caillaux — led it in their respective ways.
The books of Marcel Sembat,1 Georges Bourdon,2 and
others, ministered to it amongst the general public. The
movement was gaining steadily, despite the formidable
obstacles it had to contend against on both sides of the
frontier .... and elsewhere. It is idle, alas ! to deny that
the British Foreign Office view contemplated any genuine
accommodation between France and Germany with
alarm, and during the Morocco crisis of 1911 The Times,
the Spectator, and other organs which express that view,
went astonishing lengths in their covert threats to the
Caillaux Cabinet for its pacific tendencies, while The
Times' habitual sneers at Jaures — the only great political
figure whom the Republic has thrown up since Gambetta,
and unquestionably the most honest and far-seeing of
French politicians — took on a more acrid note. The
despatch to The Times, published from Paris on July 20th
of that year (191 1), and to which it gave editorial support,
reveals as no accessible contemporary document (except
the Belgian diplomatic despatches) reveals, the attitude of
the British diplomatic world towards the prospect of a
Franco-German reconciliation.3

1 Op. cit.

3 L'Enigme Allemand.

3 Vide "Ten Years' Secret Diplomacy" : op. cit., and "The Policy
of the Entente" : op. cit.

(iz)

iSo TRUTH AND THE WAR

Needless to say, such a consummation was as distaste-
ful to the Pan-Slavist elements in Russian foreign policy
as it was to The Times and to those whose views The Times
expressed.

Such, then, was the position of France when, in the
spring of 1913, the French Government brought forward
a proposal to increase the term of military service to three
years — i.e., to require every adult Frenchman to serve
three consecutive years in the army. This converted the
existing burden, already grievous, into an unbearable one,
and those who opposed it in France did so from the
intimate conviction that if this burden were imposed, war
or revolution must ensue.

How came the French Government to take this step?

The statement that Russia pressed the French Govern-
ment to adopt the Three Years' Law was repeatedly made
by the French Radicals and Socialists during the passionate
discussions which that measure provoked in France. The
struggle which raged around it became a trial of strength
between the peace party in France and the war party;
between those who were averse to a war with Germany
and those who were anxious for it; between those who
objected to France becoming the catspaw of Russia and
those who were willing to go to any lengths to meet
Russia's exigencies, in order to bring about an opportunity
for the revanche. I invite the reader to peruse the columns
of The Times in this connection. During the whole period
covered by this desperate struggle between opposing forces
in France The Times supported the Chauvinistic elements
in the French nation.

It not only supported them — that would have been
natural enough in view of the bitter detestation of Germany
and her Emperor which inspired those who directed the
foreign department of The Times. But it supported
them with a concentrated fury, with a frenzy of zeal, with
an invective against the other side so great, that the battle
which was being fought might have been one between
British political parties rather than French. As in 1905-6,
when the first Morocco crisis occurred, as in 191 1 during
the second crisis, so in 1912-13-14 over the Three Years'
Law, The Times was to all intents and purposes the organ
of the French extremists. It is absolutely impossible that
The Times should have steered this course without the

RUSSIA & FRENCH MILITARY SERVICE LAW 151

tacit — to put it no higher — approval of the Foreign Office,
not necessarily of the Foreign Minister, but assuredly of
the Department itself and of the British Embassy in Paris.
The charge made by the French Socialists received a
"sort of" denial by the French Premier (M. Barthou) in
the Chamber on July 16, 1913, whereupon several Deputies
shouted that the Finance Minister had himself admitted
the truth of it. A curious scene ensued. M. Dumont (the
Finance Minister) declared that what he had said was,
that he would accept the Three Years' Law rather than
expose the French Ambassador at Petrograd "to
humiliation." This ingenuous explanation evoked the
natural retort that if the project for the restoration of a
law which ensured a three years' instead of a two years'
service with the colours for all Frenchmen was a spon-
taneous act of the French Government, why should the
French Ambassador at Petrograd be "humiliated" if the
French Chamber rejected the project? The charge was
persisted in and, indeed, maintained after the Bill became
law, and on June 6, 1914, Le Temps — which plays the part
in French foreign politics that The Times plays with us —
found it necessary to insert a denial from its Petrograd
correspondent. The amusing sequel was, of course, con-
cealed from public opinion over here. Le Temps was
compelled to print a denial of the denial by stating in its
issue of June 8 that the French Ambassador at Petrograd
(M. Paleologue) had only accepted the post on the explicit
condition that the Three Years' Law should be maintained
in its integrity as "being accurately informed of the
sentiments of the Russian Court and Government, he was
in a position to inform the French Government that the
controversies raised in France by the Law were being
closely followed," and that "if the Law were in the least
impaired he (M. Paleologue) would be compelled to
resign."

Further evidence is not lacking. On August 4, 191 2,
the foreign affairs writer on the Paris paper, Le Gaulois,
stated that, "it was by no means impossible that new
military, as well as naval arrangements, between Russia
and France might be under consideration, although it was
unlikely that the public would learn anything about them
until they were ready for practical execution." This was
written on the eve of the President's departure for
Petrograd, and the anticipation proved, so far as the naval
arrangement was concerned, so remarkably accurate that

152 TRUTH AND THE WAR

the conclusion of a Franco-Russian naval convention was
announced immediately after the President's return. This
convention, as The Times' Paris correspondent was again
good enough to inform us, had been "preceded by an
exchange of views — perhaps I ought to say by arrange-
ments— between the British and French naval authorities."
In the case of the military arrangements, the writer in Le
Gaidois was equally accurate when he prophesied that the
public would know nothing about them until they were
ready for practical execution. For the French public was
allowed to know nothing about them until they became
embodied in the Three Years' Law.

When, finally, the Three Years' Law. was brought
forward, it was vigorously opposed by the redoubtable
M. Clemenceau, who, in the course of his meteoric career,
has overturned more French Governments than any other
living French politician. This was a serious matter, and
an interview between M. C16menceau and the President
(M. Poincar£) was, therefore, arranged. The confidential
conversation which took place leaked out. These things
invariably do in France. Several French papers
(L'Humanite and Gil Bias amongst them) published
detailed accounts of the President's arguments to
M. Clemenceau. The accounts concurred. Here is
L'Humanite" 's : —

"He, M. Poincare- (the President), reminded his visitor
of the visit he had made to St. Petersburg the preceding
summer, when he was still Minister for Foreign Affairs.
He apprised him of the very clear impressions he had
formed during his sojourn among our Allies. The
President gave him (M. Clemenceau) to understand that
grave events are about to take place, that sooner or later
the question of Austria will undoubtedly be raised and that
serious international complications woidd not fail to arise.
. . . Doubts had been expressed (in Petrograd) as to the
state of preparations in France, whose military situation
since the Two Years' Law had been far from favourable as
compared with the situation when the Alliance had been
concluded. He (the President) had been given to under-
stand in a friendly way that there was at St. Petersburg
a Germanophil party which constantly insinuated — not
without some show of reason — that there was no longer
any equality between the military strength of Germany
and France. That is why he (the President) and his
Ministry had decided to re-introduce the Three Years'

RUSSIA & FRENCH MILITARY SERVICE LAW 153

Law, whose object was to produce abroad the effect desired
by France's Allies. That was also why M. Delcasse had
been sent to Russia. In fact, the Franco-Russian Alliance
was threatened with disruption, because France was not
sufficiently strong, or, at least, did not appear to be so."

The accuracy of this account of the Clemenceau-
Poincare conversation, so pregnant of what lay ahead, was
never denied. Only five weeks before the war — June 23,
1914 — M. Justin de Godart, who afterwards became one
of the Under-Secretaries at the French War Office, wrote
a vehement article in Le Courrier Eur ope en (Paris), in the
course of which he said : "I am perfectly convinced that
we have abandoned our freedom, so far as our military
organisation is concerned." He went on to say that it
was an open secret that the President had brought back
with him from Petrograd two years before, an order, or
at least a suggestion, that France should re-enact the Three
Years' Law. We are no longer masters of our defence
strategy. . . . Our patriotism rebels when we are told
that the Three Years' service is France's only means of
protection. Has the Republic really become the slave of
Russia?"

This summary would be incomplete without a reference
to the striking despatches of the Belgian diplomatic repre-
sentative in Paris (Baron Guillaume)1 in connection with
the events summarised in the President's interview with
M. Clemenceau. Baron Guillaume reports from Paris
(February 21, 1913) that M. Delcasse's nomination to the
post of French Ambassador to Russia burst upon Paris
"like a bombshell." On April 17 the same diplomatist
reports the "increasingly bellicose and imprudent"
character of French public opinion. On June 12 he refers
as follows to the Three Years' Law: —

"It is, therefore, practically certain that French
legislation will adopt a measure that the country is unlikely
to be able to bear for long. The obligations of the new law
will be so heavy for the population, the expenses it will
involve will be so exorbitant that the country will soon
protest, and France will be confronted with this dilemma;
either an abdication which she could not bear, or speedy
war. The responsibility of those who have dragged the
nation into this situation will be heavy. . . . The propa-

1 Op. cit.

!54

TRUTH AND THE WAR

ganda in favour of the Three Years' Law, which was bound
to lead to a revival of Chauvinism, has been admirably
prepared and staged. It paved the way for M. Poincare's
election to the Presidency. It is being pursued to-day
without caring for the dangers to which it gives rise.
Uneasiness is general in the country."

As the months went on, Baron Guillaume's anxiety
increased. Writing on January 16, 1914, he reports : —

"I have already had the honour of informing you that
it is Messrs. Poincare, Delcasse, Millerand and their
friends who have invented and pursued the nationalist,
boastful and jingoistic policy, whose revival we have
witnessed. It is a danger for Europe — and for Belgium.
I see in it the greatest peril which threatens the peace of
Europe to-day. Not that I am entitled to suppose that
the Government of the Republic is disposed to trouble the
peace of Europe deliberately — I think rather the contrary
— but because the attitude which the Barthou party has
taken up is, in my judgment, the determining cause of the
increase of military tendencies in Germany. The bellicose
follies of the Turks and the Three Years' Law appear to me
to constitute the only dangers to be feared from the point
of view of European peace. I feel able to indicate the
perils which the present military legislation of France have
created. France, weakened by the decrease in her nativity,
cannot long support the three years' system of military
service. The effort is too considerable, financially, and
as regards personal burdens. France cannot sustain such
an effort, and what will she do to escape from the position
in which she will have placed herself?"

Writing on May 8, 19 14, he says : —

"It is incontestable that during the past few months
the French nation has become more Chauvinistic and more
confident in itself. The same men, instructed and com-
petent, who, two years ago, showed lively anxiety at the
mere mention of possible difficulties between France and
Germany, have changed their tone. They now say they
are certain of victory. They dwell largely on the progress,
which is truly very real, accomplished in the army of the
Republic, and contend that they could at least hold the
German army in check sufficiently long to enable Russia
to mobilise, to concentrate her troops and to fling herself
upon her Western neighbour. One of the most dangerous

RUSSIA & FRENCH MILITARY SERVICE LAW 155

elements in the situation is the re-enactment in France of
the Three Years' Law. It was imposed light-heartedly by
the militarist party, and the country cannot sustain it.
Two years from now it will either have to be abrogated or
war must ensue."

His final warning is conveyed on June 9 : —

"The Press campaign of the last few days in favour of
the Three Years' Law has been one of extreme violence.
Every possible means has been adopted to influence public
opinion, and it has even been sought to involve the
personality of General Joffre. We have witnessed, too,
the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg taking,
contrary to all usage, a somewhat dangerous initiative for
the future of France. Is it true that the St. Petersburg
Cabinet imposed the adoption, of the Three Years' Law
upon this country and is pressing to-day with all its weight
to secure the maintenance of that law? I have not
succeeded in obtaining light upon this delicate point, but
it would be the graver, seeing that those who direct the
destinies of the Empire of the Tsars cannot be ignorant of
the fact that the effort which is thus demanded of the
French nation is excessive and cannot long be sustained.
Is the attitude of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg based,
then, upon the conviction that events are so near that the
tool it proposes to place in the hands of its ally can be
used?"

As Mr. Lowes Dickinson remarks,1 "what a sinister
vista is opened up by this passage." He adds : "I have
no wish to insinuate that the suspicion here expressed was
justified. It is the suspicion itself that is the point. " Yes,
but when Mr. Lowes Dickinson wrote that, the French
evidence summarised above was not at his disposal. Can
any sane man doubt the real facts after perusing it?

Surely hypocrisy has reached its apotheosis when, in
face of this history, The Times, of all papers, remarks
in its leading article of May 15, 1916 : —

"Her (Germany's) onslaught upon her neighbours was
wanton. Nobody thought of attacking her; there was no
coalition against her; and she knew there was none.
Relying upon her preparedness and upon the unprepared-
ness of her neighbours, she suddenly assailed them."

1 "The European Anarchy" (op. cit.).

CHAPTER XVII.

European Navalism1

IN June, 1900, Germany issued her famous " Navy Act,"
providing for the reconstruction and a large increase,
of her naval armament which at that time, for a nation de-
pendent so greatly upon imported raw material for her in-
dustries, was relatively insignificant. What, at that
period, were Germany's potential foes, France and Russia,
spending on their navies compared with her own expendi-
ture? It is interesting to recall the figures because the
relative positions of the rival groups before the "Naval
Act" have been lost sight of in the increasing virulence
of the Anglo-German controversy as the execution of the
German programme proceeded.

TABLE I.

Naval Expenditure of France, Russia, and Germany
in the Five Years 1 897-1 901.

rears.

France.

Russia.

Germany.

£

£

£

1897 ..

10,444,000

■ 6,239,000 .

6,467,000

1898 ..

11,716,000

. 7,089,000 .

• 5.972,000

1899 ..

12,081,000 .

. 8,652,000

6,485,000

1900

12,511,000

. 9,962,000

. 7,472,000

1901

13,107,000 .

• 11,659,000

9,642,000

Germany's naval programme was deliberate and open.
It was adhered to with one exception. An amendment
publicly issued in 1908 provided that battleships and
cruisers were to be replaced after 20 years, instead of after
25 years, as stipulated in the Act. Various attempts were
made at various times in this country to establish that, side
by side with her open and avowed programme, Germany
was pursuing a secret programme of accelerated con-
struction. These attempts culminated in 1909 in one of
the most discreditable Parliamentary episodes of recent

1 The Labour Leader, July 15, 1915.
156

EUROPEAN NAVALISM 157

years; what Mr. Alan Burgoyne, M.P., editor of the Navy
League Annual, and in some measure the chief of the "Big
Navy" men (and, consequently, not suspect of pacifism,
"little Englandism," or any of the other "isms") described
as "one of the most portentous pieces of Parliamentarv
humbug ever practised upon the electorate." I shall nut
revive it here. Those who wish to re-familiarise them-
selves with its unsavoury features may be referred to Mr.
Hirst's volume.1 But when the history of Anglo-German
relations during the past decade is impartially written, the
part which this episode played in embittering those relations
will be adjudged as it deserves, and the historian will note
that the gross deception practised upon Parliament
remained uncensured. It is, however, well to recall these
words pronounced by Mr. Churchill after the great
"scare" : —

"That law (the Navy Act) as fixed by Parliament, has
not in any way been exceeded, and I gladly bear witness to
the fact that the statements of the German Ministers about
it have been strictly borne out by events."

Following the precedent employed in regard to military
expenditure, I will now give the figures of naval expenditure
for the ten years preceding the war on the part of
Germany and Austria, and of the Franco-Russian com-
bination respectively.

TABLE II.

Total Naval Expenditure in the Decade 1905-14 (15).

The Teutonic Powers —

Germany ^185,205, 164

Austro-Hungary ^50, 692 ,814

The Franco-Russian Combination —

France ^"161,72 1 ,387

Russia £1 44, 246, 5 13

Total expenditure by the Teutonic Powers ^235,897,978
Total expenditure by the Franco-Russian

Combination ^305>967,900

Thus we find that in these last ten years the naval
expenditure of France and Russia actually exceeded that
of Germany and Austria by ^70,069,922.

The Russian figures must naturally be read in con-
junction with the fact that the destruction of Russia's most
powerful ships in the war with Japan (1904-5) necessitated
fresh construction. No such argument applies, of course,

"The Six Panics" (Methuen).

1 <«'

158 TRUTH AND THE WAR.

to the French Navy, which, after a period of decline, began
to revive once more. It is surprising to note that in the
last ten years France alone has spent only ^24,383,777
less than Germany on her navy ; more than ever surprising
when one bears in mind that France's naval expenditure
showed an enormous increase in the second period of the
decade (i.e., 1910-14), or, in other words, since — as we
learned last year — British support was virtually assured
to her in the event of a general European conflagration.
Moreover, if we take into account the effect of the Japanese
war upon the Russian naval position, we must also take
into account the character of Russia's recent naval expendi-
ture and the interpretation consistently placed upon it by
the mouthpieces in the British press of the British govern-
ing class.

In June, 1912, eight years after the Japanese War, the
Duma voted a sum of ^43,000,000 for the navy, to be
spent over a period of five years, but the Russian Year
Book of 191 4 mentions that five years hence, and perhaps
"even sooner," a further demand would be made upon the
Duma for ^78,300,000 more. We must go to the Times
to get the ever-faithful reflection of the Russian official
mind and its interpretation by the British official mind. We
read in the issue of that journal for June 24, 1912 : —

"But however significant the attitude of the Govern-
ment on the Navy Bill may appear in respect of internal
policy, it is vastly more important in respect of foreign
policy. In his preamble to the Bill, Admiral Grogorovitch
repeatedly dwelt on the respective relations of Russia and
Germany as a fundamental reason for the revival of
Russia's naval power. . . . These statements in them-
selves suffice to indicate the course to which Russia's
foreign policy has been irrevocably committed, and for this
reason the Navy Bill should finally allay all suspicions and
remove any doubt which may arise, both in this country
and abroad as to the fidelity of Russia to her alliances and
agreements. The details of the shipbuilding programme
itself are, if anything, still more convincing. The type of
vessel selected for the future battle squadrons shows that
they are not exclusively intended for operations within the
narrow waters of the Baltic. All the Dreadnoughts,
whether building or projected, are to have a large coal
capacity, which would enable them to operate either in the
North Sea or in the Mediterranean. . . . Although the
programme approved by the Duma is to be carried out in

EUROPEAN NAVALISM 159

five years its effect cannot fail to make itself felt long before
that time and to stiffen the foreign policy of this country
in regard to neighbouring Powers."

There could hardly have been a more direct threat !

In estimating how far the element of fear has been the
most powerful factor in Germany's military and naval pre-
parations and in the series of events culminating in this
war (and my fundamental contention is that mutual fear
has been at the bottom of the whole tragedy), we are
bound — in this matter of naval expenditure — to take into
account the naval expenditure of Great Britain. Obviously,
Britain's naval preparations could not be left out of the
German reckoning, since not only the British official case,
but the British popular case for viewing Germany with
distrust, suspicion, and alarm, was Germany's determina-
tion to carry out the provisions of the Naval Act of 1900
— in other words, to have a strong navy. Moreover, the
close connection between Russia's increased naval expendi-
ture and Russian and British foreign policy was becoming
visible. to the naked eye, let alone to official sources of in-
formation. The arrangement between Messrs. Vickers,
Ltd., and the Russian Government was public property.
The Times announced (June 25, 1913) with visible satis-
faction that British shipbuilding knowledge and technical
advice had been secured for Russia's need. We were told
of special factories, large orders for new guns, and so
forth. Six months later The Times was again chronicling
a combination between Vickers, Ltd., and the leading
banks of St. Petersburg for the establishment of "exten-
sive gun works" in Russia — this was considered of "great
importance" to Anglo-Russian relations. A month before
the tragedy at Sarajevo, we find The Times' St. Petersburg
correspondent reporting Russia's Foreign Minister (M.
Sazonoff) as stating in the Duma : —

"The establishment of a sound friendship between
France and Great Britain and also between Great Britain
and Russia had brought Great Britain within the sphere of
political communion previously existing between Russia
and France. ..."

Referring to the discussions concerning the conversion of
the Triple Entente into a formal Alliance (mooted by Lord
Esher — a member of the Committee of Imperial Defence —
in The Times), M. Sazonoff went on to say : —

"It seems to me a somewhat exaggerated importance
has been attributed to a mere matter of form. There may

160 TRUTH AND THE WAR

be a formal alliance not based on real community of in-
terests and not supported by the reciprocal sentiments of
the peoples. On the other hand there may be political com-
binations of Powers imposed by unity of aims. In the
latter case friendly co-operation is assured, irrespective of
the form and scope of the written word. The important
thing is that we should not stand still."

What, then, was Britain's naval expenditure in the
decade 1905-14, the period under review?

TABLE III.

British naval expenditure, 1905-14... £^391, 916,47c1

We find, then, that in the event of a European war Ger-
many had to reckon upon meeting on the sea a combina-
tion of possible foemen — two of them certain, one prob-
lematical, but having- to be taken into account — who in
ten years had spent in preparations for a naval war a total
sum of ^697,884,370, against her own and her Ally's
expenditure on such preparations in the same period
amounting to ^235,897,978 : a combination, in other words,
which had spent' ^461,986,392 more than Germany and
Austria combined, and ^"512,697,206 more than Germany
alone on naval equipment — for war.2

Say anything you like about Germany and the Germans,
but can you, in the face of these naval figures and in the
face of the military figures precedently given and by none
challenged, continue to say, with due regard to truth and
honesty, that Germany's preparations for war, compared
with the preparations of her enemies, were such as to make
it unquestionable that she was hatching a vast conspiracy
to subjugate Europe?

1 Less some 40 millions under Pensioris, Coast-Guard, Reserves,
and Steamship subsidies, for which no corresponding provision exists
in the votes of foreign Powers, except France and Italy. (House of
Commons return, August, 1914.)

2 The Peace Society — 47 New Bond Street, E.C. — has issued this
year (1916) a detailed table entitled "The Armed Peace of Europe,
1914." In this table the "annual cost of the Army and Navy" of
the Russo-French Combination and the Austro-German combination
is given as follows : —

Russia .£105,955,980 Austro-Hungary... £24,992,000

France 81,065,967 Germany 59.°34.77°

Total £187,021,947 Total £84,026,770

According to the same table, Great Britain's expenditure was
£80,430,000.

CHAPTER XVIII.
The Spectre of Fear1

It is the universal reign of Fear which has caused the system of
alliances, believed to be a guarantee of peace, but now proved to be
the cause of world-wide disaster. . . . And this universal Fear has
at last produced a cataclysm far greater than any of those which it
was hoped to avert. — Hon. Bertrand Russell in " War the Offspring
of Fear" (Union of Democratic Control publications: September,
1914.)

WOULD suggest, then, that this charge of ' 'pro-
German be squarely faced. What was, and is,
the basis of that charge? It is that some of us decline to
juggle with our reasoning powers to the extent of accept-
ing as accurate the popular view attributing to Germany
sole responsibility for this war, undertaken by her with the
deliberate intention of " subjugating Europe." It is that
some of us realise how short-sighted is the view which bids
us keep silent on that issue, because not to keep silent is to
incur unpopularity. What does unpopularity matter when
everything that we hold dear, nationally and individually,
depends, in the ultimate resort, upon the nation seeing
straight on that issue?

At the present moment, if we are to judge by the utter-
ances of several members of the Government, of the Press,
and of publicists and literary men who have the public
ear, these charges against Germany are universally
accepted as axioms, axioms which must govern the national
war-policy and — never let it be forgotten for one instant —
the national war-policy is not only a military and naval
question but a political question. These axioms are held
to justify and make intelligible the policy, more and more
loudly proclaimed, that this war must be prosecuted until
Germany "surrenders unconditionally"; until she pro-
claims herself ready to submit to any and every humiliation
the Allies choose to inflict upon her in the hour of complete
victory. They are held to justify the denunciation of
"traitorous" applied to any suggestion for mediation by

1 The Labour Leader, July 22, 1915.
161

162 TRUTH AND THE WAR

neutral Powers to arrest this stupendous slaughter or to
the acceptance of any possible openings for reasonable dis-
cussion between the belligerents. From these axioms the
civilian spirit of hatred and revenge draws its inspiration.
These axioms are trumpeted on the housetops in order
to sweep aside all the professions made by our official
classes upon the outbreak of the war. While they stand
unchallenged, what really effective and practical counter-
vailing weapon remains for those who believe that these
axioms are erected upon false premises, and that the road
to which their acceptance tends is the road, not to national
and international salvation, but to national and inter-
national disaster?

My object is to shake these axioms from the hold they
have acquired over the national mind, and to do so not
by elaborating opinions or indulging in rhetoric, but by
recalling concrete facts. What are the facts I have en-
deavoured to recall? They may be classified under three
main heads :

I. — Germany's Position in the "Balance."

In the event of war arising out of Russo-Austrian
rivalry in the Balkans it was common knowledge that (a)
France would join Russia against Germany, choosing the
moment best suited to her interests — if she were allowed
to choose it; (b) Germany would thus be compelled to fight
on two fronts; (c) Germany would take the military offen-
sive against France at once, which her greater powers of
rapid mobilisation enabled her to do; (d) Germany would
probably seek to use Belgian territory for the purpose.

Conclusion: Germany's attack upon France was not
"wanton" nor "unprovoked," and was no proof in itself
of a desire to subjugate Europe. It was the inevitable
opening stage in a general European war waged on the
existing system of alliances and groups which divided
Europe into two hostile camps. It had been known and
proclaimed to be inevitable years before the war broke out.
Morally indefensible, the occupation of Belgium by the
German armies was a virtual certainty.

Belgium was the predestined victim of a general
European war which should find Britain entangled with
one or other of the two rival groups.

THE SPECTRE OF FEAR 163

II. — Germany's War Preparations.

(a) Militarism is not an exclusively German product,
(fo) With the single exception of a guerilla warfare against
a Hottentot tribe in S.W. Africa, Germany had kept her
sword in its scabbard for 45 years — with all her militarism ;
while all her present foes have within that period indulged
in the pastime of war, and acquired, or endeavoured to
acquire, extensive over-sea possessions in so doing, (c)
Germany prepared for war and carried her preparations to
the highest pitch of efficiency, which has been equally
characteristic of the industrial and scientific branches of
her national organisation. (d) On the assumption that
preparations for war are indicative of a desire and intention
to go to war, there is no case against Germany which will
not apply equally to her neighbours. For Germany's
potential foes had been spending even more — far more —
than she had in war preparations during the decade im-
mediately preceding the war — the decade marking the
gradually increasing tension in Europe, (e) In that period
the Russo-French combination spent ;£i 59, 798,931 more
on its armies than the Teutonic Powers spent on theirs,
and the military effectives of the former largely exceeded
the military effectives of the latter. (/) In the same period
the Franco-Russian combination spent ^"70,069,922 more
than the Teutonic Powers on its navies, while if it be con-
ceded— and it cannot well be denied — that the possible use
of the British Fleet against Germany in the event of a
general European war was envisaged by the rulers of Ger-
many, the naval expenditure of Germany's potential foes
exceeded her own expenditure and that of her ally in that
period by ^"461,986,392. (g) Taking military and naval
armament together, Germany's potential foes, Russia and
France, had between them spent on preparations for war,
in the decade 1905-14, ^229,868,853 more than Germany
and her ally, and if the factor of Britain's naval strength
were thrown in the scale, ^621,785,323 more than Ger-
many and her ally.

Conclusion: The argument that Germany's war pre-
parations were directed to the "subjugation" of Europe
will not bear examination. You do not undertake to "sub-
jugate" nations, vastly exceeding your own nation in
numbers, when those nations are spending hundreds of
millions more than you are spending on preparations for
war ! The German argument is that the war preparations

1 6.4 TRUTH AND THE WAR

of Germany's potential foes were directed to the subjuga-
tion of Germany. In the face of these figures it is at least
as plausible. The truth is that each "Group" was terrified
of the other "Group," and that, to quote an old declaration
of Sir E. Grey :

"If this tremendous expenditure on armaments goes on
it must, in the long run, break down civilisation. You are
having this great burden of force piled up in times of
peace, and if it goes on increasing by leaps and bounds as
it has done in the last generation, in time it will become
intolerable. There are those who think it will lead to war,
precisely because it is becoming intolerable. I think it is
much more likely the burden will be dissipated by internal
revolution — not by nations fighting against each other, but
by revolt of masses of men against taxation. . . . The
great nations of the world are in bondage to their armies
and navies at the present moment — increasing bondage."
Just so. But it is a little late in the day to tell us now —
now that, unfortunately, the above prediction has been
falsified — that the German expenditure has been the sole
cause of all the mischief, when the expenditure of the
Triple Entente has vastly exceeded the German.

III. — Germany's Fears.

(a) Germany's fears were genuine and natural, and
were admitted to be so by British and French statesmen
and military writers long before the outbreak of war. (b)
They increased proportionately with the relative decrease
in Germany's military power in relation to that of her
neighbours. (c) Had Germany's desire been to "sub-
jugate" Europe she would have struck at France and at
Russia when her superior armament ensured her the cer-
tainty of prompt success on several occasions within the
past twenty years. Had Germany's supreme aim been the
conquest of the British Empire, she would have disposed
of France with ease during the Boer War, or have joined
that Power and Russia in a hostile coalition against us,
which there is good reason to believe was urged upon her
at that time.

Conclusion : The charge against Germany that she has
been alone responsible for this war and has plunged the
world in strife to minister to detestable ambitions will be
ridiculed by the next generation. The war is fundamentally
the outcome of fears of one another entertained by the
governing classes in either "Group," fears produced by the

THE SPECTRE OF FEAR 165

vicious philosophy which lies at the root of European state-
craft. That these fears have been able to mature into fate-
ful consummation is due to the fact that the Governments
have been wholly uncontrolled by the democracy and have
carried out their secret rivalries and intrigues behind the
backs of the peoples, concealing the truth from their Par-
liaments and surrounding their obscure and unintelligible
aims in a network of secret manoeuvres. The peoples have
been helpless to save themselves, because they have been
lacking in combination, organisation, and effective co-
operation.

The question which confronts the democracies is to-day
a plain one. Are the causes which have produced this war
to be perpetuated ? If so, the course of the peoples is clear.
They must continue to take the advice of those who have
led them to this pass. It is quite easy and simple to do so.
It requires no mental exercise, no moral courage. It is
the line of least resistance. The British and French peoples
must continue to lend ear to those who tell them that Ger-
many must be "crushed," who demand Germany's "un-
conditional surrender." And the German people must
continue to hearken to those who tell them that Britain
must be "crushed." They must continue to regard those
who preach this doctrine, at a comfortable distance from
the bestialities to which it has given rise, as "patriots,"
and those who differ as "traitors." But they must not
deceive themselves. If they do follow this advice it is the
young children of to-day who will pay the price of the
fatuous arrogance and criminal vindictiveness of their
elders ; for the horror will begin all over again. The course
must be steered with eyes wide open — with the certainty
that the "crushing" policy will bleed us all whiter and
whiter and that the fruit of "victory" on those lines will
be putrid in the mouth. It is better to be called "pro-
German" and "traitor" than to bow the knee to that advice.

And we need not unless Ave will. For there is another
way ; another policy ; another creed.

(13

PART II

CHAPTER XIX.
The Union of Democratic Control1

I have never been more deeply convinced of anything than I am of
the urgent necessity of working, and working now, more especially
when so many are distracted by the turmoil of battle, to prevent my
fellow-countrymen from being misled, to strive for the attainment of
great ideals, and to keep my country's honour free from corruption
by the evil influences of debased and vicious doctrines. — Mr. Arthur
Ponsonby in a letter to his constituents.

URING the fatal opening days of last August, when
the hopes of a generation withered before our eyes
and civilisation plunged back into barbarism, a small group
of men met together in the house of one of them. For
years they had shared a common conviction that Europe's
statesmen were drifting to a catastrophe which, if it
eventuated, would overwhelm mankind. In their several
ways they had endeavoured to rouse public opinion to the
terrible gravity of the situation ; and they had failed. The
monster of militarism had mastered the diplomats whose
tortuous evolutions and mediaeval proceedings had done
so much to create it. The peoples, dominated by fear and
panic, neither informed nor consulted, had been whirled —
after a few short weeks of confused and secret negotiations
between their rulers — into a maelstrom of passions and
mutual slaughter. Was anything left for this small group
of men to do ? Should they confine themselves to the facile
and popular task of denouncing the enemy and giving such
assistance as it might be in their power to render to works
of charity or relief for the victims of the war? Or should
they attempt to evolve some constructive programme; to
indicate some definite line of thought, to provide some
rallying centre for future political action — national in its
inception, international in its ultimate aims — around which
men and women holding, it might be, divers and even
contradictory views as to the origins of the war, could,
nevertheless, gather, restore their shattered faiths, and
strive to lay the foundations of a more enduring edifice?
1 Published in the Contemporary Review, July, 191 5.
169

i7o TRUTH AND THE WAR

With no light heart, assuredly, could such a step be con-
templated. When discussion reached the point of decision,
just five individuals in the group felt that the effort must
be made. Fully conscious of their own deficiencies and
shortcomings, but confident alike in one another's integrity,
and in the righteousness of the cause they espoused, they
launched their frail barque upon the troubled seas.

Thus was conceived the Union of Democratic Control,
in circumstances of painful difficulty, without organisation,
without funds, without support. To-day, the Union is
solidly entrenched. Its rapid expansion has astonished
none more than its founders. Fifty1 branches, directed by
purely voluntary local endeavour, united to the parent body
as to policy and common action, and represented on its
councils, but otherwise conducting their propaganda in
accordance with local conditions and wholly self-support-
ing, are established throughout England, Scotland, Wales,
and Ireland. The individuals forming the Committees of
these auxiliary organisations are usually, and sometimes
prominently, associated with the social life of the com-
munity. Adherents daily swell the Union's ranks from
all sections of society. As its name implies, the Union
directs its appeal to the Democracy — to the people as a
whole — and Labour organisations in considerable numbers
have officially joined the Union, paying its affiliation fees
and receiving and distributing its literature. The Indepen-
dent Labour Party has virtually adopted the Union's four
cardinal points of policy, and supports them actively and
whole-heartedly. But the Independent Labour Party does
not stand alone in this respect. Trades and Labour Coun-
cils and Trade Unions are affiliating in increasing numbers,
and the literature of the Union is gradually permeating
the labour world. The public desire for information as to
the Union's objects may be gathered from the fact that
within the area of greater London alone between 300 and
400 addresses and lectures have been delivered by Union
speakers in the last five months to Adult Schools, Trade
Unions, Brotherhoods, Co-operative Societies and Guilds,
and various ethical societies.2 The demands upon the
Union are, moreover, continuously increasing, and the staff
of 45 lecturers attached to the London branch — all of whose
services are given free of charge — can with difficulty meet
the calls upon their activities. This process is being dupli-

1 Now eighty.

2 These figures have since been enormously increased.

THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 171

cated in many provincial cities where the Union has an
established branch. As for the Union's literature, it is
more and more in request, alike in this country and in
neutral States.

It must be evident that a movement of this kind, which
yesterday was not, and to-day is already becoming a power
in the land despite the efforts of the London Press to boy-
cott or misrepresent it; which is steadily forging- its way
into the public mind, not in this country alone, but in other
lands; which is already known in the five Continents, and
which is only in its infancy and has nothing ephemeral
about its programme and nothing secret about its methods
— it must, I say, be evident to all reasonable human beings
that this movement deserves at least to be understood. For
its growth is so remarkable that if it be wisely guided it
seems destined to become a factor in national politics and
in international relations with which the reactionary
elements in every Government will have to reckon, and
from which the democratic elements in every Government
may derive strength.

What then are the convictions which inspire the Union
of Democratic Control? What are its objects? By what
means and by what methods is the Union prosecuting those
objects ? We believe that the Ordeal by War as a method
of determining disputes between civilised States has become
an absurdity and a criminal absurdity, possessing even less
relevance to the removal of the causes of the dispute and
offering even less hope of obviating future disputes, than
the Ordeal by Poison, or the Ordeal by Fire, by which both
individuals and communities were wont, and in primitive
society are still accustomed, to adjust their immediate dif-
ferences. We believe that the Ordeal by War between
civilised States is a criminal absurdity because we do not
believe that it is able to provide a solution for any single
problem, or combination of problems, which may give rise
from time to time to international friction. The Union
seeks to permeate the public mind with that belief by every
means in its power — not as a theoretical proposition, but
with the force of a living and practical truth for which
humanity should labour, strive, and consent to sacrifice
its thought, its energy, and its means.

Concurrently with the presentation of the general
argument, the Union urges that public opinion^ in this land
primarily, and in so far as its example and teaching may
be followed and shared by similar movements of opinion

1 72 TRUTH AND THE WAR

in other lands, throughout the world, should concentrate
upon the main factors — mechanical, constitutional, tra-
ditional, and so on — which lead Governments to force their
peoples to have recourse to the Ordeal by War, and which
lead the peoples to support the Governments in their action.
It is of the essence of these aims that the Union's appeal
to national and international sanity should be uttered and
presented now, while the horrors of this desolating- war
absorb us all. For the Union contends that if the peoples
of the belligerent States are desirous — as we believe them
to be — that their successors, the younger children not yet
fit for cannon fodder, should not be immolated upon the
same altar; the peoples must not leave the Settlement to
be dictated by the rulers, the diplomatists, and the pro-
fessional men of war in the higher command, whose clash-
ing ambitions, incompatibilities of temper, incapacity of
judgment, ignorance of national needs and aspirations, and
whose secret manoeuvres have, in the opinion of the Union,
brought the world to the present pass. For the
peoples to give carte blanche to the diplomatists would be,
in our view, to place a premium upon an international
Settlement calculated to perpetuate the vicious errors of
the past and to sow the seeds of future wars.

To the extent in which it is possible to crystallise these
convictions and objects in a number of formulce — and it is,
of course, not possible to do so in a completely satisfactory
manner — the Union of Democratic Control has adopted as
the backbone of its constitution four cardinal points1 em-
bodying the policy which should inspire the future Settle-
ment, and Which should dominate the national and inter-
national situation after peace has been declared. I will deal
with these points seriatim. The first clause in the charter
— so to speak — of the Union reads as follows : — No pro-
vince shall be transferred from one Government to another
without the consent, by plebiscite or otherwise, of the
population of such province. ' '

In postulating that no province shall be transferred from
one Government to another without the inhabitants thereof
being consulted, we formulate a desire which is essentially
democratic and essentially just, but which, unfortunately,
has not guided the Governments in previous post-bellum

1 A fifth point has now been added, reading as follows : "The-
European conflict shall not be continued by economic war after the
military operations have ceased. British policy shall be directed
towards promoting free commercial intercourse between all nations
and the preservation and extension of the open door."

THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 173

Settlements. It has been wittily said that every war waged
in the past century has been made ridiculous by the next,
and the practice of diplomats to treat the peoples — in peace
and in war — as pawns in a game of chess is largely account-
able for the truism. Shortly after the present war broke
out, several Ministers of the Liberal Cabinet placed a very
different ideal before the public. I may cite, in particular,
Mr. Churchill's utterances in this regard : —

"Let us, whatever we do, fight for and work towards
great and sound principles for the European system. The
first of these principles which we should keep before us is
the principle of nationality — that is to say, not the conquest
or subjugation of any great community, or of any strong
race of men, but the setting free of those races which have
been subjugated and conquered. And if doubt arises about
disputed areas of country, we should try and settle their
ultimate destination in the reconstruction of Europe which
must follow from this war, with a fair regard to the wishes
and feelings of the people who live in them.1
And, again : —

"We want this war to settle the map of Europe on
national lines, and according to the true wishes of the
people who dwell in the disputed areas. After all the
blood that is being shed, we want a natural and harmonious
settlement, which liberates races, restores the integrity of
nations, subjugates no one, and permits a genuine and
lasting relief from the waste and tension of armaments
under which we have suffered so long."2

To enunciate such principles is one thing; to give prac-
tical effect to them is a very different thing. It is useless
disguising from ourselves that powerful influences are now
at work, and will be exerted when the belligerents have
severally laid down their arms, to settle the destinies of the
inhabitants of "disputed areas" in accordance with the
accidents of military conquest, and not in accordance with
the principles enunciated by Mr. Churchill and others of
his colleagues. The cases of Poland and Alsace-Lorraine
are classic examples of the diplomatist's art in this respect.
If the influence of Great Britain at the Settlement is to be
exerted in favour of the principles so warmly endorsed by

1 At the London Opera House, September 11. (Morning Post,
September 12.)

2 In the Giornale d'ltalia. — Text issued by the Official Press
Bureau. September 25.

174 TRUTH AND THE WAR

Mr. Churchill, the British people must face the facts in
advance, and understand them. The future destinies of
the Poles and of the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine must
be decided by themselves, and must not depend upon the
military results of war. Machinery must be evolved not
only by the belligerent States, but by the neutral States —
whose interests in securing a stable Settlement are obvious
— to ensure that the wishes of the people concerned shall
be honestly ascertained and honestly recorded, and that
their verdict, whatever it may be, shall be regarded as bind-
ing upon the Governments affected. By our national atti-
tude towards this problem will the professions, officially
and unofficially made on behalf of Great Britain at the out-
break of war, be tested. The restoration of Belgium to the
Belgians is but one aspect of it. A Settlement based upon
the recognition that the inhabitants of "disputed areas"
are not movable goods, but human beings with traditions,
aspirations, and economic interests of their own, is the
only Settlement which offers any prospects of permanence,
and it must be universally and impartially enforced.

It would, for instance, be a bitter satire upon the
generous impulses which have moved the people of Great
Britain in this war, and upon the professions of British
statesmen, if the struggle resulted in a Settlement under
which the opportunities for national development of any
section of the Polish population in Europe (which numbered
23 millions in the opening years of the present century)
fell short of those which, in increasing measure since 1866,
the Galician Poles have enjoyed under the much-abused
rule of the Dual Monarchy. This consideration applies
equally to the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) population of Eastern
Galicia, which, with the support of the Polish democracy
of the province, secured early last year many of the reforms
for which it had been agitating, if, to quote Mr. Asquith,
"room" is to be "found and kept for the independent
existence and free development of the smaller nationalities
— each with a corporate consciousness of its own. ' ' I will
not on this occasion attempt to discuss the problem of
Alsace-Lorraine in any detail. I will merely remark that
the principle set forth by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Asquith,
and embodied in Clause I. in the constitution of the Union
of Democratic Control, applies with equal force to the in-
habitants of those provinces, and can no more be honestly
or safely departed from in their case than in the case of

THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 175

the Belgians, the Serbians, the Poles, and, for that matter,
the Bulgars, the Finns, and the Persians.

The second and third clauses in the constitution of the
Union may be treated conjointly. They read as follows : —

"No treaty, arrangement, or undertaking shall be
entered into in the name of Great Britain without the
sanction of Parliament. Adequate machinery for ensuring
democratic control of foreign policy shall be created.

"The foreign policy of Great Britain shall not be aimed
at creating alliances for the purpose of maintaining the
balance of power, but shall be directed to concerted action
between the Powers, and the setting up of an International
Council, whose deliberations and decisions shall be public,
with such machinery for securing international agreement
as shall be the guarantee of an abiding peace. ' '

I suppose most people will concede that the present
condition of Europe provides a conclusive demonstration
that the machinery regulating the official intercourse
between States has broken down. At this moment passions
necessarily run high and judgment is obscured. But, even
so, no man who preserves any sense of perspective at all
but realises that the element of fear has been a powerful,
if not the predominating, element in producing at once
the moral atmosphere which has made this convulsion
possible, and the material factors thereof in the shape of
enormous and perfected armaments which are being used
by the belligerents for one another's destruction. The
last quarter of a century has witnessed an astonishing-
advance in the arts of peace. Great forces, some measur-
able, some intangible, have been operating to draw the
civilised peoples closer to one another, to accentuate the
mutuality of human needs, to reduce the significance of
political frontiers as an obstacle to community of effort.
The whole tendency of modern development emphasises
the interdependence of civilised peoples. But over this
natural and healthy growth a parasitic growth has flung
its tentacles, stunting normal expansion. Side by side
with the elements of co-operation have risen the elements
of potential destruction. The fairer the promise the more
over-shadowing the menace. While innumerable demon-
strations have testified to the spread of the idea
of human solidarity among the peoples, the Govern-
ments have been steadily increasing their armaments,

i76 TRUTH AND THE WAR

applying the triumphs of human science over
nature to preparations for the swift annihilation
of man, levying increased toll upon the communally-
earned wealth of the nations in order to perfect
and multiply engines for their extermination. Fear, and
a belief in the assurance of their governors that only by
such means could national safety be secured and peace
maintained, has induced the peoples to acquiesce; but,
while acquiescing, the manifestations in favour of inter-
national solidarity have multiplied, inspired by the pathetic
hope that in due course they would succeed in purging fears
and removing the burden of armaments which constituted
the material expressions of those fears. But the odds were
too heavy. The forces working for peace have lacked
cohesion, organisation, and concentration of purpose.

Now, the problem for humanity to-day and to-morrow
is this. Have the peoples the will, the determination, the
resolve to work constructively, each within its own
frontiers and as far as possible in co-operation with one
another, for the elimination of the fundamental causes
conducive to the creation of mutual fears ; for the removal
of the factors in the national life which occasion those
fears and which attain supremacy over the destinies of
countless millions as the outcome of those fears? If so,
the peoples must organise. We must organise against
war. We have been faced with a vast organisation for
the promotion of war, not in one country only, but in all
countries. If we imagine that the close of the present war
will automatically destroy that organisation, we are pre-
paring for ourselves the most bitter of delusions. The
possibilities — nay, the probabilities — are that it will be
stronger at the end of the war than it was at the beginning.
However that may be, it will assuredly exist, and those
who incarnate it will dominate the Governments. We must
evolve a vaster organisation to oppose it. We can do
so if we will, for the entire mechanism of war is of our
own tolerating. If we ceased to tolerate it, it would cease
to be. Our future is in our own hands.

To achieve this end we must revolutionise the proceed-
ings of diplomacy, and we must convert Mr. Asquith's
verbal expression into a positive policy, a policy which
shall substitute "for force, for the clash of competing am-
bitions, for groupings and a precarious equipoise," a "real
European partnership based on the recognition of equal
right and established and enforced by the common will."

THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 177

In other words, we must get rid of secret diplomacy and
the fetish of the "Balance of Power" which defies analysis
and means precisely what the diplomats desire that it shall
mean at a particular moment. And each people must
begin at home. If each waits for the other to move, all
will be equally helpless in the future, as they have been
in the past. And the key-note to action must be Organise,
still Organise, again Organise !

The Union of Democratic Control combines, in the
clauses quoted further back, both the national and the
international aim. Prominent personalities, differing so
widely in their political ideals, as Lord Bryce, Lord Rose-
bery, and Mr. Austen Chamberlain, have severally, within
recent years, drawn attention to the secrecy of our own
diplomacy, and to the almost unlimited powers of the
Cabinet in determining our foreign policy. The report of
the recent Royal Commission has partially lifted the veil
from the totally undemocratic character of our diplomatic
machinery. Some of the most respected names in French
political life — M. Ribot, Baron d'Estournelles de Constant,
Senator de Lamarzelle — protested in the French Legisla-
ture against the secrecy of Anglo-French diplomacy
in the Morocco affair. No one who has really studied the
evidence available will deny that the last decade has wit-
nessed a marked tendency towards increased secrecy in
the handling of our foreign policy, together with a steady
decrease in the facilities for Parliamentary and public dis-
cussion. The virtual withdrawal of foreign affairs from
national debate has, strangely enough, synchronised with
the spread of educational opportunities among the great
mass of the people. This state of affairs cannot continue
in a community such as ours without the gravest danger
to the British Commonwealth. A democracy upon whose
shoulders reposes in the ultimate resort the burden of
sustaining the greatest Empire the world has ever known,
cannot be kept in perpetual ignorance of its Government's
relations with foreign Powers — which we term foreign
policy. The conduct of our foreign policy involves the most
vital of all issues to the life of the nation, the issue of
peace and war, which is the issue of individual and national
life and death. The Union of Democratic Control labours
under the deepest conviction that one of the greatest needs
of the hour and of the future consists in a systematised effort
to drive this elementary truth into the minds of the masses

178 TRUTH AND THE WAR

in this country — to demonstrate the indissoluble connection
between the management of our foreign affairs and the
daily life, the welfare, the happiness of every individual
in the land.

If it be right and proper — and none will gainsay it —
that the self-governing Dominions should be consulted as
to the terms of Settlement which will eventuate from this
war, and should share in the counsels of the Mother
Country with regard to the direction of our foreign policy
in the future, a fortiori are the people of these islands
entitled to be taken into the confidence of the Government.
It is their right. They must be quickened in their apprecia-
tion of it, and when they are so quickened that right can
only be denied them at the risk of imperilling the safety
of the State.

But the necessity for fundamental reform goes far
deeper than that, and in opposing it the pedagogues are,
all unconsciously, playing with fire. For there is a new
spirit abroad, and those who affect contemptuous indiffer-
ence to it tread in dangerous paths. Tens of thousands of
young men have flung themselves into the field of battle
to-day, inspired by a double sentiment- — to help the weak
and to assist in bringing wars to an end. Is the nation
which accepts their sacrifice to treat them as unworthy of
consultation on the causes, the events, the rivalries which
lead to war? Again, do the politicians who during the
past five years have been engaged in familiarising the
masses with their just grievances, and bringing home to
their understanding that those grievances are not necessary
and ordained, but preventable — do they ever consider
whether they will not one day be asked : "Who made this
war What had we to do with it? Were we consulted?
Did you tell us this and that?" It is no use pretending
to believe that it will be for ever possible to persuade the
nation that he war is explainable by the events of the six
weeks which preceded it. More and more will it become
apparent that the war has been the inevitable outcome of
a universal system; that its true origins must be sought
in that system, and that one of the most potential factors
in that system is a Statecraft which, in all lands, in this
land as in others, carries on its evolutions behind the
peoples' backs and pursues ends remote from the "things
that really matter" to the lives of the mass of the people.
For those feelings a safety valve will have to be found,
and the only possible safety valve is to prove to the people

THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 179

that henceforth the foreign policy of this country shall be
a really national foreign policy; that the people shall be
fully acquainted with the nature of their liabilities, and
shall clearly perceive where they stand and whither they
are being led.

Among the organic reforms to ensure greater national
control of foreign policy which the Union of Democratic
Control advocates are these : The complete reform of our
diplomatic service, carrying with it the abolition of the
income test and the substitution of competition and merit
for nomination, privilege, and class distinction. No
Treaty, alliance, or understanding of any sort, contract,
obligation, or liability involving national responsibilities
to be entered upon without the consent of Parliament :
Parliament to have the additional opportunity of discussing
every treaty in detail before being asked formally to ratify
it. The Foreign Office vote to be discussed annually in
the House of Commons as a matter of regular procedure;
the vote to occupy two days, and to be treated like the
army and navy estimates. Periodical pronouncements on
foreign policy in the country to be the recognised duty of
a Foreign Secretary. A Foreign Affairs Committee of the
House to be formed for purposes of deliberation on points
of detail and with the object of further strengthening
Parliamentary control, knowledge and sense of responsi-
bility. All treaties to be periodically submitted to dis-
cussion with a view to amendment, confirmation, or can-
cellation. All these organic reforms can be secured without
drastic constitutional changes. Indeed, they would go far
to make of democratic government a reality, and not what
it is at present, so far as the conduct of the foreign policy
of the country is concerned, a sham. Taken in combina-
tion they would operate in the direction of diminishing the
autocratic position of the Foreign Secretary, who, to-day,
owing to the congestion of Parliamentary business, to the
enormous labours devolving upon Cabinet Ministers, the
curtailment of Parliamentary privileges, and the ensuing
decay of interest in the House on foreign affairs due to
increasing lack of responsibility, escapes in practice all
effective control, and is entirely dependent upon his per-
manent officials, selected from one particular class in the
State, and imbued with all the virtues, but also with all
the prejudices and narrowness of outlook inherent in that
class.

180 TRUTH AND THE WAR

But these organic reforms will not in themselves suffice
to secure real national control of foreign policy. They
will have to be accompanied and stimulated by an awaken-
ing of the nation as a whole, both to its interests and to
its rights. One will be the complement of the other. In
advocating these reforms and in making of them a con-
spicuous feature of its propaganda, the Union of Demo-
cratic Control is chiefly concerned with the interests of the
people of these Islands, as is natural. It maintains that
the democracy of the United Kingdom may fairly lay claim
to the sympathy and moral support of the democracies of
the Self-governing Dominions in its efforts to strengthen
the national control over foreign policy. But it would be
idle to suggest that the democracies of the Self-governing
Dominions are not also entitled to claim the sympathy and
assistance of the British democracy in any attempt they
may be led, severally or collectively, to put forward in
favour of the wider problem of Imperial control. It is
now clearly apparent that under the system obtaining it
is possible not only for the Cabinet, but for a section of
the Cabinet to contract obligations of honour towards
foreign Powers involving the potential use, not only of the
armed forces of these islands, but of the Empire. This
is the second occasion within a comparatively short period
that Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, and South
African blood has been shed as the result of policies in the
formation of which none of the Self-governing Dominions
have had a share. The situation is obviously an impossible
one. Upon a solution being found for it — and the case
of India is, in principle at least, analogous — depends the
preservation of the British Empire. Personally, I find it
difficult to apprehend how the national democratic claim
and the Imperial democratic claim can be satisfied by a
Legislature and a Government elected at the heart of the
Empire on purely domestic issues, but responsible in fact
for, and directing in practice, the conduct of foreign policy,
the administration of the fighting services, and the
administration of the vast tropical Dependencies of the
Crown whose social and economic problems are inextricably
interwoven with the destinies of European States.

"For groupings and alliances and a precarious equi-
poise"— a real European partnership." In those words is
embodied the policy of the Union of Democratic Control.
Mr. Asquith is not a sentimentalist. But that utterance
is his. Neither are we sentimentalists, and whatever steps

THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 181

Mr. Asquith and his colleagues, and their successors, who-
ever they may be, intend to take in that connection, the
Union of Democratic Control intends to work for the policy
which that utterance embodies. We are doing- so. And
in this case, again, the people of every State must con-
centrate primarily upon instructing and impregnating the
public mind within their particular State. Moreover,
initiative must come from somewhere. Great Britain has
led the world in so many reforms making for human
liberties that she may well take the lead in an effort to rid
humanity of a conception of Statecraft which no longer
responds to the needs of civilised men. The pursuit of the
"Balance of Power" is a diplomatic will-o'-the-wisp hover-
ing over the graves of innumerable victims. By the
statesmen of no country has it been erected into a cult to
a greater extent than by our own. This is an additional
reason 'why the attempt to substitute "a real European
partnership" should come from us. The vagaries of the
"Balance of Power" led us in 1854 to espouse the cause
of the Turk in a quarrel which was not of Russia's seek-
ing; in 1878 to regard national "honour" as compatible
with reinstating Ottoman despotism over Christian popula-
tions; in the 'seventies and 'eighties to see in what was
then currently described as the German "hegemony" in
Europe, a cause for eminent national satisfaction; in 1900
to contemplate war with France over some West African
jungle, Nilotic swamp, or Siamese river; in 1910 to regard
Germany as the potential foe. And if, as the outcome of
a complete victory of the Allies, it were considered desirable
to inflict upon Germany one tithe of the pains and penalties
recommended by the Morning Post school, by the dis-
tinguished gentlemen who write letters to The Times, and
by a notorious section of the press (which is able to com-
mand an enormous publicity), it is absolutely certain that
the Franco-Russian combination would be regarded on the
morrow of the war as the disturber of the "Balance" and
the future enemy. The pursuit of the "Balance" has now
reached the apotheosis of its monstrous imbecility. It
has conducted us to the most colossal failure of human
wisdom in the history of the world. Is Armageddon to be
followed by a renewal of the policy of the "Balance," or
by some new conception of international policy and state-
craft?

The Union of Democratic Control believes that in all
countries where public opinion is articulate there exists

1 82 TRUTH AND THE WAR

an intense desire for the creation of international machinery
supported by the collective will of Europe, which would
adjudicate upon disputes between States of a character not
susceptible of treatment by the Hague Court, and which
would be invested with the necessary power to enforce its
decisions in the ultimate resort. We believe that the
creation of such machinery is practicable and not Utopian
if public opinion in favour of it in every land is organised.

Among the vested interests concerned in keeping
Europe in a condition of fear and apprehension, none per-
haps are more insidious and more dangerous than the
interests bound up with the armament industry; and in
no country are they more powerful than in our own. The
Union of Democratic Control puts forward, therefore, as
its fourth desideratum that : "Great Britain shall propose
as a part of the Peace Settlement a plan for the drastic
reduction, by consent, of the armaments of all the belli-
gerent Powers, and to facilitate that policy shall attempt
to secure the nationalisation of the manufacture of arma-
ments and the control of the export of armaments by one
country to another."

It is a self-evident proposition that so long as the in-
fluence of militarist ideas within each State is buttressed
by the material factor, represented by gigantic armament,
the organised growth of the forces of Pacifism will be
faced with a formidable obstacle. The reduction of arma-
ments must accompany any real change in the relationship
between States, and that is why we ask that Great Britain
should take the lead in making proposals, whose effective
realisation, however, must depend upon the success of the
other proposals which have been discussed above. The
reduction of armaments involves, or should involve, the
abolition of the internationalised private interest in the
manufacture of armaments, which is, perhaps, the greatest
of all scandals of our time.

Such are the chief ends and aims of the Union of
Democratic Control. Each part of the programme we
put forward for the consideration of our fellow-country-
men is linked up with the others. By the steady prosecu-
tion of the whole we believe that a happier and a more
secure Britain will result, and that the mutual fears and
suspicions which have hung like a nightmare over the
civilised peoples of Europe, finally culminating in this
terrible catastrophe, can be removed and their repetition
avoided,

CHAPTER XX.
A Plea for Sanity of Thought1

Peace, say we, by crushing Germany, since she is the only disturber
of the peace. Peace, say the Germans, by crushing the Allies, since
they are the only disturbers of the peace. But how does this view
of the Germans look to us? Does it look like peace? Do we
imagine ourselves lying down for ever, beaten, humbled, and
repentant, under the protection of an armed Germany? Well, as we
feel about the .German idea, so, we may be sure, do they feel about
ours. That route does not and cannot lead to peace. . . . We can
no more crush her (Germany) than she can crush us. And the
attempt to do so can only lead to a new war. — Mr. G. Lowes
Dickinson ("After the War," A. C. Fifield. 6d.).

If you were to ask privately all those who do not provide
implements of war, or edit patriotic papers, or belong to the
intellectual victims of these papers, whether they would not gladly
undo this war if they could, you would find it easy to accommodate
in one single sanatorium the whole lot of those who would answer

in the negative An invisible army will arise from the souls

of the victims of this self-killing war, and with this army we shall
conquer all the others that have gone so far astray." — Mr. von
Tepper-Laski, President of the "New Fatherland League," in
"Das Freie Wort."

WHILE our gallant soldiers are laying down their lives
in the marshes of Flanders, in the Gallipoli Peninsula,
in the Persian Gulf, in the Cameroons, and in East Africa,
ideas are fermenting, policies are in the making, elements
are contending which will determine whether their collec-
tive sacrifice will have been vain or fruitful. I say collective
sacrifice, for sacrifice in the individual, whatever form it
may take, can never be fruitless. But the outcome of
collective sacrifice may be, and frequently has been, in
war. Just as the present war commands an unprecedented
collective sacrifice, so will its consequences be unpre-
cedented. Does it mark the final convulsions ushering in
the birth of a new era, setting free a new spirit which has
been striving for light and utterance ? Or will the fetters
that bind humanity be riveted but the tighter for it, the
struggling masses flung back, the artificial barriers which
separate the peoples from one another strengthened with
1 The Labour Leader, August 26, 1915.
183

1 84 TRUTH AND THE WAR

additional buttresses ? Are the peoples to mingle in peace-
ful intercourse, knitting- closer links of mutual compre-
hension; or will the frontiers still grin with countless
cannon ; the ocean highways still be cleft with monsters of
destruction above and beneath the depths; the sky still be
polluted by whirring engines of death ?

"Is it to be, hate?" as Mr. Harold Picton asks.1 The
people of this country have an enormous share in deter-
mining these questions, which for them have not merely
an ethical value, but a most practical and utilitarian signi-
ficance, considered nationally and individually. There are
some, it is true, to whom nationality makes but scant
appeal. The sentiment for land of birth, for the body of
history, custom, and tradition, which through the centuries
has moulded certain types in a certain setting and produced
broadly denned characteristics and ideals — that sentiment
awakens little echo in some breasts. To their owners
nationalism has had its day; for them the lamp of hope
shines in a wider sphere, a more catholic outlook. They
long for the time and anticipate it, when man shall have
but one cradle and one country — the universe; shall own
allegiance to none but Universal Law. In the internal
unification of States, laboriously achieved, they see but the
prelude to that comprehensive unification which shall
abolish political frontiers and weld humanity into one uni-
versal commonwealth. For them internationalism is the
goal, and they find no place for nationalism within it.
Theirs, intrinsically, the more splendid vision if the religion
we profess has any significance at all. But all its per-
spectives may not harmonise. Internationalism of a kind
which shall bring the world at least measurably nearer the
Christ philosophy may not of necessity involve the dis-
appearance of nationalism, except in its aggressive and
intolerant form. It is an obstacle to the growth of a great
ideal to make its acceptance dependent upon the abandon-
ment of an existing one, passionately clung to by the bulk
of humanity, and not proven incompatible with the former.
Moreover, the horizon open to the best of us is pitifully
limited, and dogmatism on such a theme is worse than
useless.

For my part, I write as one who believes that the
British commonwealth has evolved ideals in the art of

1 By Harold Picton. London : George Allen and Unwin, Ltd,
Price, 3d,

A PLEA FOR SANITY OF THOUGHT 185

Imperial Government which have generated a greater
measure of human liberty for a greater aggregate of the
human race than any system which the Continent of
Europe has created or could by any possibility have created,
given geographical conditions; as one who believes that
were the ideals of political freedom, which after much tra-
vail the British genius has crystallised into definite institu-
tions, to be overthrown, the world would be immeasurably
the poorer. But I write, too, as one who believes that
these achievements have been performed at the price of
weakening the nerve centre of the Imperial edifice. The
very virtues which have produced a race of Imperial states-
men with large ideas marked by political sagacity have
led here at home to an indifference towards and neglect
of social problems and to a blind and partly unconscious
selfishness which are undermining the whole structure,
and constitute the flaw in the foundations of a very splendid
edifice. That flaw the democracy, in my judgment, can
alone remove. We stand to-day at the parting of the ways.
We are in the grip of a conspiracy against truth in
this country. To speak truth is to be unpatriotic. To bid
the nation weigh carefully the outlook and think for itself
is to be "pro-German. " And the misfortune is that a great
many — a vast mass — of reasonable people, belonging to
all classes, are allowing themselves to be hypnotised, do
not realise the profound modifications of thought which
this war is creating, and are, by their blindness, bringing
down upon the British commonwealth those very dangers
which they dread. Take, for instance, this vision of an
internationalism which shall replace nationalism. The
people who most declaim against it are doing most to
spread it. Why? Because they see in it nought but the
mutterings of a soulless proletariat. Do they ever ask
themselves what the governing classes have done for the
masses that the latter should be led to regard death and
mutilation on the field of battle as the sublimest manifesta-
tion of human worth, the supreme achievement of human
duty ? Do they, ready as they have ever proved themselves
to be to consent to such sacrifice when called upon — and
none can justly dispute that claim — ever take the trouble
to inquire why incentives to similar action may be lacking
in the lives of millions of their countrymen? For them,
"patriotism" has but one meaning. But for them country,
home, history are tangible realities, fibres which permeate
their being, cords responding instantly to the touch — and

r86 TRUTH AND THE WAR

with reason. But what are country, home, history to num-
bers in those crowds they all uncomprehending^ jostle in
the busy thoroughfares of life ? For them prowess in arms
means a social halo; and often more material gains. But
for those others — what ? In one case substance worth the
risk; the risk itself framed in irridescent hues of excite-
ment and glory. In the other sterility, the goal of risk;
beyond the goal, submergence in the drudgery and pre-
cariousness of the heretofore. What reward was meted out
to the conquerors of Waterloo? The rulers whom they
served completed the process of reducing them to the most
pitiable of all situations to which a people can be reduced
— the situation of a landless proletariat. The conquerors
of Waterloo became the serfs of the aristocracy and landed
gentry. The termination of a protracted struggle "for the
liberties of Europe" found the mass of the people of Eng-
land irremediably divorced from their land, degraded and
poverty stricken. The degradation still subsists in our
Poor Laws. Where in Europe will you see the like ? What
benefit did the British people derive from the two and a
half millions which Pitt presented to the King of Prussia,
or from the million expended annually on the German
legion in order to keep order in England ? What was
given them in return for fertilising the mountains of Spain
and Portugal with their blood? Did that particular war
of liberation liberate them? It did usher in a notable era
of improvement for the French and Prussian peasants.
But the conquerors of Waterloo were bereft of all. Since
then their descendants have been struggling hard and are
still struggling to obtain a measure of justice under changed
economic conditions.

But they have never won back their heritage — the land.
Our Junkers have clung fast to it. It can be legitimately
said of the classes whose power is so largely based to-day
upon that dispossession that if they are brave and fearless,
as they have always been, their patriotism has, neverthe-
less, a silver lining. To-day these same classes, slavishly
adulated and emulated by a new-sprung hybrid type
deficient in the virtues which characterised and still in some
measure characterise those they ape and are, in part, sup-
planting, but opulent and commanding publicity; take little
trouble to conceal their hopes that the aftermath of this
war of liberation will be conscription, Protection, and the
final burial for this generation of urgent social reforms.
And it is from them that emanate the counsel of a war of

A PLEA FOR SANITY OF THOUGHT 187

extermination and strangulation towards our present
enemies — even though it last a decade and sweeps the very
breath of liberty from our land. It is from them that came
the arrogant "Thou shalt not grow," which is one of the
root causes of this war. It is from their organs that come
the epithets of "traitorous," levelled at those who bid the
people think out the aftermath of such a policy in the light
of what has gone before. Among' the vice-presidents of
the Anti-German Union are a marquis and two belted earls,
who between them own 300,000 acres of British soil, to
say nothing of the proprietor of a certain London news-
paper which is frankly Militarist, Conscriptionist, and
Protectionist.

When we are faced, as we are to-day, by the clatter
of certain politicians and by the Tory Press (supported by
a number of "intellectuals," who seem to have exchanged a
certificate of lunacy with their German colleagues) in favour
of a "war of attrition" which is to last three, five, ten
years if need be; when we are faced with this, and when
we realise the immense powers behind the appeal, it
appears to me that some of us are bound to put the other
side of the picture. And for this reason : that persistent
neglect of the other side of the picture, the neglect involved
in this proclaimed policy, will in the ultimate resort destroy
the British Commonwealth.

A few months before the war, statistics were placed
before us. They apprised us, did these statistics, that in
the majority of English counties our agricultural popula-
tion was permanently underfed, and that 60 per cent, of
our agricultural labourers between the ages of 20 and 65
were receiving wages below the standard required to main-
tain health. They told us that the housing conditions of
our working classes in most of our great cities and in very
many parts of rural England were a disgrace to a State
calling itself enlightened ; that the slum areas of our cities
alone sheltered between two and three million citizens of
this proud Empire. They told us that here in wealthy
England half a million people were dying yearly from pre-
ventable disease; that infantile mortality in our manu-
facturing centres marked a higher percentage than pre-
vails among the primitive races we are so anxious to prose-
lytise; that a vast host was living, through no fault of the
units composing it, just on the poverty line, in the midst
of the ostentatiously displayed wealth of the richest State
in Christendom ; that the mass of the people were enjoying-

1 88 TRUTH AND THE WAR

but a fractional part of the national income — built up by
their muscles and their sweat — and that half the acreage
of the United Kingdom is held by 10,000 persons out of
a population of 45 millions.

Do those who have spread these facts before us in
official documents; do the prelates, and the well-fed and
comfortable (the battalions that possess reserves to stave
off the pinch of economic stress), who fling up their hands
in horror at the conception of political internationalism —
do they ever contemplate, one wonders, that some day they
may be faced, not merely by the sullen mutterings of the
cowed and starved, but by questions clamoured from the
throats of multitudes ? Questions they would find it hard
to answer and to meet. Questions such as these :"What
is the 'security' you offer me in exchange for my blood
and that of my sons?" "What is the 'home' I am asked
to defend?" "Where is my 'land' which you tell me is
in peril?"

CHAPTER XXI.
The Interests of Belgium1

The a •priori refusal of the Allies to negotiate a general European
settlement permitting a peaceful evacuation of Belgium would be for
my country the equivalent of a death warrant. Such a refusal
would also constitute a great crime — the greatest crime indeed which
human history has ever known. — M. Henri Lambert (ex-Member of
the Commission for the reform of the Belgian electoral laws, Member
of the Societe d'economic politique, etc.), in the "U.D.C." for
December, J915.

BROADLY speaking, there are two alternate lines of
policy upon which the people of this country have to
make up their minds. If, and when, the opportunity pre-
sents itself to discuss a termination of the war, either
through the good offices of Neutral Powers, or in some
other fashion, will they insist that it shall be taken? Or
if that opportunity occurs will they actively approve of, or
tacitly acquiesce in, its rejection? In other words, will
they be disposed to consider a settlement not dishonour-
able to them ; or will they decline, and if they decline, why
will they decline? The answer to the question, one
assumes, depends upon what the British people, not merely
the British Government, not merely the British governing
classes, but the British people, really want.

Do they want to "crush" Germany, or do they want
what Mr. Churchill said the Government wanted last Sep-
tember?2

"We want a natural and harmonious settlement which
liberates races, restores the integrity of nations, subjugates
no one, and permits a genuine and lasting relief from the
waste and tension of armaments under which we have suf-
fered so long."

That is what the British people have got to decide, and
the sooner they set about making up their minds the better.

It is true that Mr. Churchill has talked since about the
"unconditional surrender" of Germany. It is for the Bri-
tish people to choose whether the first or the second edition

1 The Labour Leader, September 9, 1915.

2 1914-

189

:9o TRUTH AND THE WAR

of Mr. Churchill suits them best. There is an ethical side
and a strictly utilitarian side. When we consider the
ethical side, Belgium is naturally the chief figure in the
picture. Let us, then, look at the ethical side a moment.
No one will gainsay that what stirred the generous
emotions of the mass of the British people was the in-
famous invasion of Belgium, and her treatment by the in-
vaders. If the invasion of Belgium had not occurred and
the Government had decided to go to war with Germany
because a state of war existed between Germany, France,
and Russia, there would have been a complete split in the
Cabinet, and an immediate "stop-the-war" movement
would have been the outcome. It was Belgium that made
the appeal to British hearts. It is of our duty towards
Belgium that the British Government has continually
spoken. "Remember Belgium" has been the main
theme in recruiting propaganda. It is true that The Times
and other papers, annoyed when Mr. Lloyd George recently
declared that but for Belgium he would not have supported
the war (or words to that effect), hastened to state that
while Belgium's case was a sad one, we were really at
war to maintain the "balance of power"; and it is true
that The Times spoke the truth when it made that declara-
tion. It spoke for the Tory Party as a whole, for the
most influential section of the governing class, for the
militarists and Jingoes; and it said quite accurately, so
far as those forces in the nation are concerned, that we
are at war for the "balance of power."

To do it justice, The Times revealed the inner mind of
the classes who have hitherto directed the foreign policy
of this country quite early in the day, for on December
41 it wrote : "We have always fought for the balance of
power. We are fighting for it to-day." The then exist-
ing interpretation of the "balance of power" by those
classes was specified with blunt emphasis by the Spectator
a few days afterwards, when it remarked :

"If Germany had tried to invade France by the direct
route instead of by way of "Belgium, we should still have
been under a profound obligation to help France and
Russia. It is useless to tell us that we were free to act
as we pleased. . . All our dealings with France — our
sanction of her line of policy, our military conversations
with her Staff, our definite association with her acts abroad
— had committed us to her cause as plainly as though we

1 1914.

THE INTERESTS OF BELGIUM 191

had entered into a binding alliance with her. And what is
true of our understanding with France is true in a scarcely
less degree of our understanding with Russia. ' '

But the British people did not support the war, the
bulk of the Cabinet did not support the war, and would
not have supported the war, to fight the battle of France
and Russia alone; in other words, for the "balance of
power." The British people supported the war out of pity
and indignation for Belgium.

If the British people still feel pity and indignation for
Belgium, then it is time they faced honestly what the effect
upon Belgium would be of a refusal on our part to consider
a settlement which would restore her territorial integrity
and compensate her (so far as it is possible to compensate
her) for the material damage she has suffered. I am assum-
ing, for the purposes of the argument, that such a settle-
ment may be, or may become, within the bounds of prac-
tical politics. I will deal further with that assumption later
on. What, then, would be the result for Belgium of a
refusal on our part to discuss terms of peace of which the
evacuation of Belgium would be an integral part? Well,
the first and palpable result would be a prolongation of
the German occupation of Belgium; a postponement of
Belgium's liberation. What would ensue? Obviously, an
intensified renewal of (a) the German attempt to break
our line, (b) our attempt to break the German line. If the
Germans succeeded in breaking our line, Belgium would
cease to occupy much place in our thoughts, for obvious
reasons. Simultaneously with a changed perspective of
Belgium in our thoughts, the "annexation" party in Ger-
many would be immensely strengthened. Belgium's
future would be one of exceeding blackness from whatever
standpoint examined. If we succeeded in breaking the
German line, the Anglo-French armies would dispute with
the German for every square yard of Belgian soil, destroy-
ing with shell-fire, as they would be compelled to do for
military reasons, every town, village, homestead, and
public building which sheltered the German troops. What
would remain of Belgium at the end?

The man who does not face these questions is not being
honest with himself; nor is he being honest towards Bel-
gium. So far as Belgium's interests are concerned, her
most vital interest is a settlement which shall, as speedily
as may be, restore her integrity, enable her, with help, to
build up once more her industrial and agricultural life,

i92 TRUTH AND THE WAR

and give her a greater measure of security for the future
than she has had in the past. The latter can only come as
the result of the destruction of the theory of the "balance
of power," and with it the abandonment by the Govern-
ments of the group system of international relationships.
And that can only be achieved by a process of international
reconstruction which it will be the task of every true demo-
crat in every country to labour for unceasingly after the
war. If we are to consider Belgium's interest, Belgium's
interest clearly does not lie in having the whole of her
territory converted into one vast ruin.

But it may be said, "If Belgium's interest is as you
set it forth, why does not the Belgian Government make
some sort of statement in that sense?" A moment's con-
sideration will show that it would be impossible for the
Belgian Government to make any such statement. Bel-
gium is, virtually, one of the Allies. She is the last of
them that could put forth an independent wish at this
moment. Her Government is enjoying the hospitality of
French soil; hundreds of thousands of Belgian refugees
are established in France and England. Well, if not the
Belgian Government, then, at least, some Belgian news-
paper or public man? How? I believe there are still
papers published in Belgium. What they are saying I do
not know, but we cannot accept as genuine Belgian opinion
any printed expression of opinion in a Belgian newspaper
which passes the German censors. Le Vingtieme Steele
is printed at Havre, and the Independance Beige, I believe,
in London. But these are merely Government organs so
far as any expression of public policy is concerned. As for
individuals — other than members of the Belgian Govern-
ment— the only statements I have seen are those of M.
Henri Lambert and M. Paul Otlet, and there is certainly
nothing in what they have written which suggests that my
view of Belgium's interests is not the right view. Both
these distinguished Belgians have written with sound sense
and a practical appreciation of the underlying issues of
the war and of the fate of their country. M. Henri Lam-
bert owns a big industrial establishment at Charleroi, and
is an honorary member of the Society of Political Economy
of Paris. He is an Economist of repute, a man of wide
reading and much experience, of sterling honesty and strong
character. His letter in the Nation the other day, his
letters in the Westminster Gazette, and two remarkable

THE INTERESTS OF BELGIUM 193

pamphlets, one of which has been translated into English,1
are familiar, I dare say, to some of my readers. As a
Belgian he might be excused for taking a view of the war
which excludes sanity of judgment. I do not know, but I
suppose he must be a great material loser from it, apart
from his feelings of belonging to a small nationality shame-
fully used. But he does not think, apparently, that true
patriotism for a Belgian civilian consists in adding his
voice to the sterile declamations against the enemy. He
realises that the Germans are not naturally endowed with
a double dose of original sin, and that the origin of the
war did not start with the bombardment of Liege.

"The international situation to-day — he writes — is due
to a series of special circumstances affecting the interests
of nationalities. National psychology is a factor which
has played in it a part, the importance of which neither
is, nor can be, contested. But the real 'causes,' the
original and deep-seated causes, were of a far more
general character, connected with the very nature and
necessity of things. . . .

"The war will of necessity be followed by a peace, but
the universal and permanent peace that each of the belli-
gerents declares to be the supreme result to be attained
by this war will not be the achievement of superiority of
arms, nor of skilful strategy, nor, alas ! of the bravery of
soldiers : these forces will only be capable of imposing a
temporary peace, consisting in the subjection and
oppression of the conquered. A peace worthy of the name
and worthy of true civilisation will be the achievement of
the thought of those who shall succeed in furnishing a
conception of the mutual rights of nations, in accordance
with true justice."

And for Henri Lambert — and I very largely agree with
him — one of the fundamental "causes" of this war is the
protectionist and monopolistic policy adopted in economic
matters by many of the Governments; by all, in a certain
measure, though by Britain herself, hitherto, least of all
— since Bright and Cobden's great achievement. Free-
dom of trade is for Henri Lambert the true road to a per-
manent peace among the nations. He does not discard
other avenues of approach, but he says, in effect, "Neglect

1 "The Ethics of International Trade" (Oxford University Press,
Price, 2d., June),

i94 TRUTH AMD THE WAR

this one, and your efforts are vain." And here I am in
complete accord with him.

Here, then, is a well-known citizen of a country which
has suffered much and grievously at German hands. You
do not, however, find him demanding that Germany shall
be crushed. He implores the European Governments to
remove one of the most potent causes of international dis-
putes, from which small countries like his own become, in
the ultimate resort of war arising from those disputes, the
victims, and freely admitting the "precarious position" of
Germany, economically speaking, before the war.

M. Paul Otlet is the director of the Bibliographical In-
stitute of Brussels, and Secretary of the Union of Inter-
national Associations. In his thoughtful paper published
last month, "Les conditions de la paix et de la sauvegarde
de l'humanite" (Les documents du Progres, Lausanne), he
strikes the same note substantially as M. Henri Lambert.
He does not see in this war Teutonic demonology triumph-
ing over an international company of angels. He, too,
goes to the root of things.

"The present war — he writes — if not in its origin, at
least in the actual condition of its development and in its
continuation is due not to one cause alone, but to a number
of causes, which can be classified in the following manner. ' '

He classifies his "causes" under seven heads, and to
the economic cause he attributes primary importance. He
thus defines it :

"Obstacles to expansion owing to the lack of colonies,
the closing of markets as the result of protectionist or pro-
hibitionist measures, unfair competition, export rebates,
and 'dumping,' brought about by trusts sheltered by
customs tariffs. ' '

I do not propose to go into the arguments of these two
Belgian gentlemen at any length at this moment. I shall,
indeed, have myself to deal here with the enormously im-
portant problem of which they treat. What it behoved to
place on record was their opinion as Belgians considering
first the welfare of their country and not their own in-
dividual feelings of anger against its invaders. They see
in a peace resulting from military victory on either side
no future security for Belgium. They see in a negotiated
settlement which shall take into account the national neces-
sities of the various belligerents the only avenue through

THE INTERESTS OF BELGIUM 195

which security for Belgium can come. And that, needless
to say, is the view of the Union of Democratic Control,
of the Independent Labour Party, of all men who decline to
let themselves be driven like cattle by newspaper bullies
into approval of courses which would be fatal, not for
Belgium only, but for Britain and for Europe as a whole.

CHAPTER XXII.
What is the War's Object?1

They (the people of England) might be misled for a time by passion,
or duped by political intrigue ; but ere long the sound practical good
sense of the nation re-asserted itself ; and he believed that a year
would not pass before the country would ask with one voice : "Tell
us for what we are fighting ; tell us, if we are victorious, what will
be the results of victory ; tell us what recompense we may expect,
except barren wreaths of glory, for a sacrifice of uncounted treasure
and for mourning and misery in a hundred thousand English homes."
— Lord Stanley on the Crimean War (Annual Register, 1855).

PERHAPS the determined efforts of certain individuals
and certain influences to establish a Caesarism in our
midst and, as a short cut to this g"oal, to force Conscrip-
tion upon us (not on the merits of the case, but as the result
of an intrigue in which political and personal ambitions
and great vested interests are leagued) ; perhaps this
menace, which threatens dire consequences to our national
efficiency, will prove to be a blessing in disguise. For it
seems that only a momentous event will wrench the nation
out of its mental lethargy, compel it to mobilise its brains,
to think out clearly whither it is being led. In many
respects the nation is living in a fool's paradise : in no
respect more completely than in the surrender of its powers
of constructive thought, in allowing its faculty of critical
judgment to be atrophied, and in becoming the slave of
phrases without inquiry as to their purport and significance.
For what objects is the nation striving? What results
does it hope to obtain from the "utter and complete defeat"
of Germany? Is "utter and complete defeat" a realisable
achievement in terms of modern warfare? Is a "war of
attrition," upon which the nation is invited to pin its hopes,
other than a mere collection of words devoid of practicable
import?

The people are not thinking out these questions for
themselves. They are allowing the "Government" to do
their thinking for them, and publicists, every one of whose

1 The Labour Leader, September 23, 1915,
196

WHAT IS THE WAR'S OBJECT? 197

predictions have been falsified in the last twelve months.

So long as the Government presented to the world a
united front, "trust the Government" was at least an in-
vocation which could reasonably be uttered. But what is
there in the spectacle which the Government presents to-
day to justify a demand for the continued paralysis of con-
structive criticism, not only as regards the conduct of the
war — and here criticism has not lacked — but as regards the
infinitely graver problem of the ultimate objects with which
the war is being waged? Is the surrender of the national
judgment with regard to the Government's policy, or lack
of policy, concerning that supreme issue wise or even safe,
when the very Ministers who demand it are engaged in
washing the national dirty linen in public for the enemy's
edification, and by their intrigues and plots against one
another are convulsing the nation in the face of the enemy ?
Can the nation suffer itself to be led blindfold in respect of
the war by Ministers who proclaim the profound ani-
mosities and divergencies which separate them as to the
methods of prosecuting the war, and who summon to the
support of their contending ambitions the most powerful
organs of the public Press?

The time has come for asking some plain questions.
The agitation for Conscription, violently thrust upon the
country, raises the entire question of the ends for which
the war, now thirteen months old, is being waged. For
what ultimate purpose does an important section of the
Government agitate for Conscription ? What is the goal at
which Ministers — Conscriptionist and anti-Conscriptionist
— are aiming? Do they aim at securing an honourable
peace ; a peace which would liberate Belgium and Northern
France from the invader; lead to the adjustment of the
Alsace-Lorraine trouble on the basis of a plebiscite or of
racial affinity; to the reconstitution of an independent
Polish kingdom ; to a federated Austria ; to a Balkan settle-
ment conceived as far as possible on the lines of nationality
and a common tariff from which could evolve in the fulness
of time a true Balkan Federation containing within itse(f
sufficient vitality and coherence to make it independent of
Austrian and Russian intrigue; to the "open door" for
trade in over-sea possessions; to the abolition of the right
of capture of private property at sea, and the recognition,
by territorial readjustments in Africa and economic facili-
ties in the near East, that the energies of a great nation
of 65 millions, increasing at the rate of three-quarters of

(i,5)

198 TRUTH AND THE WAR

a million per annum, represents an element in the world
Avhich cannot be denied its fair share of opportunities in
the development of the universe. Is it, as we were assured
when it broke out, a war which, in the conscious purpose
of those who direct our national policy, shall, out of the
wreckage of human hopes and the desolation of human
homes, give birth to international machinery for the future
settlement of disputes between States, thus registering- this
war as the final spasm of a perverted statecraft?

Or is it a war of destruction and extermination that we
are now waging ? A war to which those in authority refuse
to contemplate any conceivable limit of time in the en-
deavour to reduce the enemy to absolute impotence? A
war in which those in authority decline to consider any
negotiations for a settlement not preceded by an uncon-
ditional surrender of the enemy? If it is not such a war
as this, why does not the Government indicate in other
than rhetorical language capable of sinister interpretation
the policy it is in reality pursuing, and the national aims
it has in view? If it is not a war of destruction and ex-
termination, why does not the Government dissociate itself
from the utterances which emanate day by day from
organisations and individuals claiming to speak for the
nation; utterances which thereby strengthen the
reactionary elements in the enemy countries, proportion-
ately weaken the elements favouring an honourable peace,
and prolong the holocaust?

"Some honourable gentlemen," Bright once remarked
in a famous House of Commons speech, "talk as if Russia
were a Power which you could take to Bow Street and
bind over before some stipendiary magistrate to keep the
peace for six months." Are we fighting to-day under the
same delusion with regard to Germany? Are we fighting
that British troops may march along the Unter den Linden
in Berlin? If not, why cannot the Government say so?
Are we fighting to seize and to retain all the German
Colonies and to prevent Germany from ever holding over-
sea possessions in the future? If not, why cannot the
Government say so? Are we fighting to shatter the poli-
tical unity of Germany and violently to split up the Ger-
manic Federation? If not, why cannot the Government
say so ? Are we fighting to dismember Germany, to reduce
her territory in Europe by an extension of the Russian terri-
torial area westwards, and the French and Belgian

WHAT IS THE WAR'S OBJECT? 199

territorial area eastwards ? If not, why cannot the Govern-
ment say so? Are we fighting to build up an economic
fence round Germany in the future, to differentiate against
her trade throughout one-fifth of the habitable globe over
which flies our flag, and to induce our Allies to act
similarly; permanently to cripple her industrial activities,
her foreign trade and shipping; to make deserts of her
ports? Is the blood of the most virile in our land being
spilled for these purposes ? If not, why cannot the
Government say so?

For one and all of these objects are constantly pro-
claimed by pen and voice in this country to be the firm
purpose of the nation to achieve. And these statements
are believed in Germany. Just as the British newspapers
publish the ravings against England of incendiary
publicists and tub-thumping politicians in Germany; just
as those British newspapers who advocate the crushing
policy towards Germany lay stress upon these ravings and
conceal from us the counsels of moderation which are also
printed on the other side of the North Sea; so do the
German newspapers reproduce the alleged designs of the
British Government and people, conveyed in the
intentions advertised here, and not repudiated by the
British Government. And as these utterances with us are
numerous and incessant, so are the German people, from
the bottom to the top, persuaded that the fixed and unalter-
able purpose of the British nation is to shatter the German
Empire, destroy the national integrity of Germany and
reduce the German nation to political and economic
paralysis.

They are wrong, of course. The British nation wants
none of these things. The British people, like the German
people, like all the belligerent peoples, want security ; and
it is only in the measure in which they refuse to think for
themselves and listen to the voices of false prophets that
they can be led to believe that security is obtainable by an
"utter and complete" military defeat of the foe. Nor can
any elements of sanity contained in the British Govern-
ment desire these things. Such elements will intellectually
reject them, not out of consideration for the German
Government — the German methods of warfare are not
conducive to rouse such sentiments — but from considera-
tions of national self-interest. But no single member of
the British Cabinet has publicly repudiated any of these
proclaimed intentions. Why not? What could Britain

2oo TRUTH AND THE WAR

lose in power and prestige by an official repudiation of
purposes attributed to her by irresponsible speakers and
writers, whose utterances fan the flames of hate and fear,
and assist to perpetuate the massacre of the innocent?

For let us realise the truth. This war in its dominating
and precipitating origin was a struggle for mastery
between the Russian and Teutonic autocracies. To-day it
has become an Anglo-German war. Mr. A. G. Gardiner
is right when he says that without us the war would have
been over long ago, in the sense, of course, that British
gold and the command of the sea by the British fleet
jointly enable our Allies to receive the cash sinews of war
and an uninterrupted flow of American ammunition. It
is equally true to say that if the ruling classes of Britain
and of Germany would consent to negotiate, ten millions of
men would escape the horrors of another winter campaign.
I can fancy the Pan-German editor and the Tory Conscrip-
tionist exclaiming as they read that sentence : "The people
would not allow them to negotiate. " The people! What
people? Who are they who talk so glibly of "the people" ?
Do they mean the soldiers? Do they mean that the
soldiers, the men living and dying daily in the Hell which
the Statecraft of the great has brought upon them — that
these men, involved in a common suffering, would prevent
the Governments from negotiating? Do they mean that
the workers in Germany and Britain would besiege the
Reichstag and Westminster ... to prevent the Govern-
ments from negotiating? Are they quite sure that tEe
day may not come when, if the Governments will not
negotiate, the democracies will compel them to do so?

The peoples in every land may be as persuaded to-day
as they were thirteen months ago that the cause of their
respective countries is the just cause and the only just
cause. How could they believe otherwise, seeing that the
entire mechanism of the Governments has been working
full time to persuade them in those beliefs, and when the
stress of cruel bereavements and the tremors of
apprehension for beloved ones in daily danger of death
provide an unlimited supply of lubricant for that
mechanism? Nevertheless, the peoples want peace. In
millions of hearts throughout Europe to-day there beats
a passionate desire for a cessation of this senseless
slaughter. Millions of lips in Europe are framing to-day
prayers for the deliverance of humanity from the fiend of
war, from another winter campaign. Is there a home in

WHAT IS THE WAR'S OBJECT? 201

France, in Germany, in Belgium, in Russia, across whose
threshold the angel of death has not passed ?

When will the Parliaments come to the rescue of the
peoples and force the Governments to negotiate?

This war has become an Anglo-German war. The
nature of the settlement which shall terminate the war will
depend primarily upon the temper of Berlin and London.
The delay within which the beginning of a settlement may
be discussed depends primarily upon the temper of Berlin
and London. Those who revile us for preaching the gospel
of reason as opposed to the gospel of hate, point to France.
"Go and preach it there," they sneer, "and see where you
will find yourself." Little do they know of the French
mind and soul outside Paris ! France is supporting with a
heroism and a dignity beyond compare the adverse decrees
of Fate. But France is slowly bleeding to death. For
France, even more, perhaps, than for Belgium herself,
peace, and an early peace, is essential — even from the
point of view of those who believe in the future main-
tenance of the policy of the "balance of power. "

This war has become an Anglo-German war. In the
Reichstag voices have been raised to protest against the
policy of plunder and annexation on the Continent; to
reject the doctrine of hate; to proclaim the true interests
of Germany to lie in an honourable and just settlement.

But in the British Parliament no voice has yet been
raised in similar strains; no utterance has yet been heard
in repudiation of the doctrine of destruction, colonial
annexation, and economic strangulation.

At a moment when a section of the Government is
endeavouring to stampede the country into Conscription,
there is the more urgent need for the note of statesmanship
on the wider and fundamental issue — the policy and
ultimate objects of the war — to be sounded.

CHAPTER XXIII.
Reactionaries in Germany and Britain1

The idea of conquering foreign lands must be discarded, since
nowadays the incorporation of an entire people, or the mutilation of
an ancient State, which is a pillar of cultural power, can only be
undertaken if there be a firm intention in the near future to risk
another general war to maintain such a conquest. . . .The
independence and freedom of the European nations, the German as
well as the others, is the -.indispensable condition, without which
there can be no peace and no peaceful work. — Extract from pamphlet
issued by the "Bund des Neues Vaterland" ("Society of the New
Fatherland").

Even, therefore, if we assign to Germany a monopoly of the
spirit of aggressive militarism, European peace is not secured by
crushing Germany. — Mr. J. A. Hobson in "Towards International
Government." (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.)

IT is clear that a bitter struggle is now raging- in
Germany, between the forces of reaction and of reason,
on the subject of Belgium and the invaded portion of
Northern France. With a brutal cynicism, the German
militarists and Chauvinists are clamouring for the annexa-
tion, absorption, and assimilation of these European areas.
Their attitude is on all fours with the utterances of Russian
reactionaries in connection with Galicia before the war and
with their acts during the occupation of that country — as
to which the British public is allowed to know nothing.
These gentle Teutons proclaim their ideal of a predatory
empire and seek to lure their countrymen to fatal courses
in the name of national safety; in reality, on behalf of
national vanity in its most detestable form, and on behalf
of material interests of class, naked and unashamed. But
they are confronted by powerful influences working against
them; influences which include personalities in the closest
touch with the throne (and, it is stated, by the Kaiser
himself) and with the official world, as well as the Social-
Democrats. In this struggle the future destinies not of
Belgium only, but of Germany herself and of Civilisation
are involved.

1 The Labour Leader, September 30, 191 5.
202

REACTIONARIES IN GERMANY & BRITAIN 203

A variety of circumstances will, no doubt, combine to
determine which side shall eventually triumph. But
among- those circumstances the attitude of Great Britain
will count as one of great, and, perhaps, capital
importance. We can assist the German party of reaction
and embarrass the party of reason — in effect, the party
which aims at an honourable settlement of the war — in two
ways. We can refuse to entertain the very idea of peace
negotiations until the Germans have been driven from
French and Belgian soil manu militari. We can
characterise all German feelers towards peace negotiations
thrown out from German sources as "intrigues";
describing them at one moment as an acknowledgment of
approaching collapse and calling, therefore, for scornful
rejection, and the next moment as impossible of considera-
tion, on the ground that consideration would be tantamount
to an admission that Germany had not been and could not
be "crushed." That is one method, and the policy which
underlies it is, of course, the "crushing" policy, advocated
by some in the genuine belief that the national safety
demands a Germany crushed and dismembered, by others
from much the same motives as animate the German
reactionaries in their proposals with regard to Belgium
and Northern France. The latter point needs emphasising.

What are the elements in Germany which demand the
subjugation and spoliation of Belgium and France?
Possibly some of the Generals, although on that point we
have no information; while from neutral sources it is
rumoured that Von Moltke and Von Hindenburg (whose
collective influence at this moment must be enormous) are
averse to the annexationist policy. Setting the Generals
on one side, we find in the annexationist camp the
agrarians — i.e., the ultra-protectionists, the enemies of
democracy and freedom not only beyond but, and
especially, within the borders of their own country ; certain
big industrial interests; certain "intellectuals" bemused
with arrogance and suffering from that lack of a sense of
modern perspective which appears to be an effect of a
surfeit of historical reading; the type best described as
the "civilian-militarists," of all types floating on the war-
scum the most odious, "lip-heroes" as Professor Foerster1
dubs them; the colonial Chauvinists — i.e., the men who
covet a large colonial empire by fair means or by foul ; the

1 In the Forum of Munich.

204 TRUTH AND THE WAR

Jingo journalist and, we may be sure, working in the back-
ground, the armament interest.

And what are the elements here at home corresponding
to the above, our ' 'Prussians," so to speak (although,
really it is becoming a little ridiculous to talk about
"Prussian militarism," seeing that the King of Bavaria
is the greatest Jingo of them all; "Bavarian militarism"
would be a welcome change) ; the people who seek in every
conceivable manner to assure the British public that the
true voice of Germany is the voice of the German
annexationist, tear a passion to tatters in their denuncia-
tion of it and then go on to urge that precisely the same
policy they condemn as "German" should be adopted
towards Germany by the victorious Allies ! What our
Generals are thinking the "man in the street" has no
means of ascertaining. But in my experience, and in the
experience of every one of my friends without exception,
not a solitary military man of any standing at all, supports
in private conversation the "crushing" of Germany — in
the sense intended by our reactionaries — as either feasible
or desirable. Setting, then, as in the case of Germany,
military opinion aside, we find in the British reactionary
camp the industrial and agrarian protectionists, many of
the great landowners and monopolists, and the Conscrip-
tionists, whom the Globe appropriately enough divides into
two camps : —

"Those who wish to use the war to secure military
conscription; those who hope to secure compulsory labour
by obtaining national military service."1

And, again, as in Germany, the intellectuals afflicted
with historical gangrene, the "lip-heroes," the Jingo-
journalist (much more powerful here), and the aggressive
Imperialists corresponding to the German colonial
Chauvinists, but differing somewhat from their Teutonic
prototypes insomuch as they do not avow their intentions
on the trombone, but utilise the more subtle strains of the
harmonium to convey their sentiments. Their sentiments
are that Germany's sins are such that we can only punish
her adequately by adding her colonial domains to our own
Imperial heritage; naturally in a spirit of pure altruism,
as a duty laid upon our shoulders by Providence, accepted
with patient humility and resignation. Lastly, the arma-
ment interest keeping, for the nonce, discreetly in the
background.

1 Issue of August 30^

REACTIONARIES IN GERMANY & BRITAIN 205

Such, then, is one method whereby Public Opinion is
this country can play into the hands of the reactionaries in
Germany, by playing the game of the reactionaries at
home, between whom there is little to choose, save that the
former are less cultured (for all their appeals to "Kultur")
than the latter in the art of cloaking reaction in the garb
of respectability; and who are, in both cases, working
for ends identical in principle, antagonistic to the interests
and rights of the mass of their countrymen respectively.

The other method would consist in allowing the
German reactionaries to imagine that those Englishmen
and Scotsmen who are incurring the wrath of their own
Jingoes by appealing to the national sense of judgment,
fairness and reason, are imbued with anything but detesta-
tion for their German prototypes, or are in the least degree
less opposed to the predatory policy which the latter
proclaim. No terms of settlement which included a
German annexation of Belgium and of the invaded districts
of France would find backers in this country.
No section in Britain would acquiesce in a peace
on those lines. Only a Britain utterly defeated, extenuated,
and compelled to an unconditional abandonment of the
struggle would consent to such a peace as that. And this
calamity it is not within the power of Germany to inflict.
Moreover, did it lie within her power, she would not secure
peace thereby; but only a temporary cessation of hostilities.
Those who are opposed to a policy which urges the
prosecution of the war to the point of a German "uncon-
ditional surrender" (I am not concerned with discussing
the practicability of the idea) because they think it insane
from the standpoint of the British national interest,
morally wrong and fatal to all hopes of international
reconstruction, would be among the first to declare that
the adoption by official Germany of the policy of the
"Plunder-Party" would blend every shade and section of
British thought into a unity of uncompromising resistance.

But at present there is no proof that the "Plunder-
Party" has captured the German official machine, still less
the majority of Public Opinion. There is good reason to
suppose that it has done neither, and will do neither unless
our reactionaries here persist in giving their German
prototypes the chance of advancing the one and only card
which might enable them, after all, to win the day — the
card of a Germany whom the ruling class in Great Britain
was implacably resolved to crush, despoil, pulverise

206 TRUTH AND THE WAR

economically, and reduce to a position of permanent
inferiority in the councils of the nations. That, in effect,
is what the British reactionaries are preaching-. Let us
see to it that they do not capture our official machine. For
if the reactionaries on the other side were able to show
that their card was not a marked one, they would proceed
to argue that a Germany thus threatened must in self-
preservation disable at least one of her foes for genera-
tions, and buttress her defences and powers of material
recuperation by the annexation of territory, and the seizure
of ports and coal and iron fields, evoking the spectre of
fear by way of justification, which, in nations as in
individuals, beckons along the road of savagery and
stupidity.

The question, then for the British and for the German
people alike is whether their collective sacrifices and
sufferings are to be exploited by the selfish ambitions or
stupidity of certain classes; whether their collective
sacrifices and sufferings are to lead them, not up the slopes
of the mountain of hope, but into the marshes of the valley
of despair; whether the end of this infernal slaughter is to
be, not mutual security and opportunity to build up their
shattered lives afresh and prepare a brighter heritage for
their children, but a perpetuation of unrest and an
immeasurable aggravation of economic and social evils,
cursing the rising generation and generations yet unborn.

CHAPTER XXIV.
The Penal Policy1

"Before peace can come Germany must accept complete and utter
destruction of her whole racial ideal and submit to be put into the
tightest of leading strings. "—Mr. John Buchan, at the Bechstein
Hall (Mr. Balfour in the chair). "The Times," April 27, IQ15.

"From this consideration there follows the conclusion which
many people, including ourselves, have been extremely reluctant to
adopt, but which seems to be irresistible — namely, at the end of
the war Germany must cease to exist. ... It is the State that must

be destroyed Not only can we not grant ..such a State an

honourable peace, we cannot grant it peace at all." — "New States-
man, May 15, 1Q15.

"The German must be broken to pieces before there can ever be
peace or safety." — "Morning Post," May 12, 1915.

"The Kaiser, his system, his sham culture, and the nation
which follows him in reckless cruelties, must be crushed : the dynasty
must be blotted out. — Sir W. B. Richmond, "Daily Mail,"
September 75, 1914.

"Sweep away the whole of the over-sea possessions of Germany,
and whatever the cost of this war may be to us in men and money
we shall breathe freely for generations to come." — Sir R.
Edgcumbe, "Daily News," August 25, 1914.

"Territory must be taken from Germany to weaken her power."
— Mr. J. M. Robertson, the then Parliamentary Secretary to Board of
Trade. "Manchester Guardian," October 23, 1914.

"It is necessary to humble and humiliate the German Empire."
— Lord Charles Beresford, "Morning Post," November 5, 1914.

"A steady war of attrition must be waged against German
commerce, finance, credit and means of livelihood." — "Times"
Military Correspondent, December 13, 1914.

"But, however the world pretends to divide itself there are only
two divisions in the world to-day — human beings and Germans. —
Mr. Rudyard Kipling, "Morning Post," June 22, 1915.

"Germany must be got out of France and Belgium by direct
force of arms. Austria and the Balkans should be permanently with-

1 The Labour Leader, October 14, 1915.
207

208 TRUTH AND THE WAR

drawn from German influence and German soil must be occupied,
and we must refuse to re-open the sea to German purposes until we
have made the future secure." — Mr. J. L. Garvin, National Liberal
Club: "Westminster Gazette," October 12, 1915.

THE overpowering need of the moment is that the
belligerent Governments should, in some form or
another, become acquainted with the views entertained by
each as to the terms upon which they would negotiate;
that, in short, the first stage in the bargaining bout should
begin. It matters little how the initiatory steps are taken.
The most practicable method would consist in a declaration
conveyed to mediatory Powers. [It is known that several
of the neutral Powers are ready and anxious to mediate.]
But it does matter that the peoples in each of the belligerent
States should be taken into the confidence of the Govern-
ments; that the Parliaments should be informed, at any
rate of the broad lines of the settlement envisaged by the
Governments as honourable and reasonable. For if in one
sense this war is not, and never has been, the "Peoples'
war" it is described as being hv. the apologists of
diplomatic incompetence, in another, and a very grim
sense, it is a Peoples' war, and the Peoples have the right
to see that it shall be a Peoples' peace and not a
diplomatists' juggle concluded behind the Peoples' backs.
In that sense the war is for us particularly a Peoples' war,
and the People are entitled to know the real and ultimate
aims of their Government. These the people do not at
present know. That is why I appealed the other day to
those members of Parliament who have retained their civic
courage, their independence of judgment, and their sense
of perspective, to press, in effect, for a Ministerial
declaration and a Ministerial repudiation of the "crush-
ing" policy, pointing out that the party of reaction and
conquest in Germany was proportionately strengthened,
and the party favouring reasonable terms of settlement
proportionately weakened, by the conviction — which the
German papers of all shades reflect — that the British
Government and nation are intent upon reducing Germany
to political and economic impotence.

No doubt it is legitimate to argue that Ministers have
never said, in so many words, that their desire is to crush
Germany; but only to crush "Prussian militarism," or to
"destroy the military domination of Prussia." But these
expressions, which Ministers have used, are either mere
rhetoric — and rhetoric in such a case is a dangerous thing

THE PENAL POLICY 209

— or it is something even more mischievous. We cannot,
therefore, understand too clearly that the rest of Germany
stands or falls with Prussia. Many liberal-minded men in
Britain think differently because they establish a correla-
tion between "Prussianism" as a force in German normal
political life, and "Prussianism" as a factor in a Germany
struggling" against a world in arms. They are thinking all
the time in terms of franchise and "bureaucracies," and
such like. They, or many of them, are so temperamentally
predisposed to crusades against reactionaries of the hearth
that they are intellectually incapable at this moment of
realising the profound abyss which separates the feelings
of non-Prussian Germany towards Prussia in peace, and
those feelings to-day. Apart from the fact that the
domestic side of "Prussianism" is an issue which the
German people themselves can alone work out, "Prussia"
to-day, considered in terms of the war. now raging, is
indistinguishable from the other States of the Germanic
Federation; indeed, one might say, indistinguishable from
the Teutonic race as a whole — the Bavarian, for example,
being ethically and spiritually far more drawn towards
Austria than towards Prussia, but just as great a
"Prussian" (in the sense used by our coiners of catch-
phrases) for the needs of this war as the most Prussian
of Prussians. The vast amount of nonsense which centres
round the phrase "Prussian militarism" is reinforced by
quotations from the effusions lauding force as a sort of
national cult, obligingly provided by certain German
intellectuals and philosophers and even military men. I
say "even" military men, for while we can argue with
justice that the philosophers , so-called, are atrocious; we
can only denounce the militarist as montrous by the
exercise of an hypocrisy which, if it be unconscious, is a
reflection upon our intelligence. Militarism per se IS the
cult of force in human affairs, and the professional
militarist must be a believer in that cult. That he should
rush into print to proclaim the fact adds nothing to our
knowledge. Allowing for crudity of expression and
brutality of diction, which the stern physiography of
Prussia and its sinister experiences at the hands of more
favoured peoples have evolved, there is little substantial
difference between the philosophy of Cramb or even of
Carlyle (in some moods) and Kipling (in others) and the
particular brand of Teutonic philosophy now held to single
out the Germans as pertaining to a lower strata of

aio TRUTH AND THE WAR

humanity. As to the German professional militarists, the
Keims, the Bernhardis, and the rest, if you read their pre-
war writings otherwise than superficially and with the
fixed determination to discover therein the "mark of the
beast," you will not only find in them that glorification of
war which — unless you are very simple — you would expect
to find. You will also find running through them the
conviction that sooner or later, and sooner rather than
later, Germany would be called upon to fight for her life
against a host of enemies. And when you bear in mind
even the very limited selection of utterances from the lips
and pens of British, French, and Russian politicians,
military men, and journalists during the past ten years,
which I have quoted in this volume, you cannot but
recognise that these German "political Generals," as Dr.
Nippold1 calls them, had no difficulty whatever in making
out a case for the consumption of the German public, what-
ever their own motives may have been in doing so; and
they were probably mixed, like the motives of most human
beings.

To call attention to these things is not to minimise the
share of responsibility borne by these elements in the life
of Germany in building the European powder magazine,
and in helping to explode it; still less to palliate the German
treatment of Belgium, which will ring down the ages to
the detriment of the German name. But it is only by
bringing to a proper focus this whole field of considera-
tions, and keeping the focus, that such phrases as
"crushing Prussian militarism" can be adjudged at their
true worth.

Neither must it be overlooked that since the war broke
out events have been conspiring to fuse all sections from
the Emperor to the working man.

It is not merely the shedding of torrents of German
blood and the plunge into mourning of all classes in
Germany which is accountable for the fusing process. It
is the belief which events arising out of the war have
caused to become universal in Germany, that the German
people were the predestined objects of coalesced attack;
and that the motive thereof was their destruction. And
this, not because they were more bellicose than their neigh-
bours— that in the past forty-five years they had proved

1 Op. cit.

THE PENAL POLICY in

themselves less bellicose in action than any of their great
neighbours is a material tact absolutely conclusive on the
point to any German — but because they were becoming
steadily greater and more prosperous, more dreaded as
competitors in art and crafts. What has occasioned that
belief which we may deem erroneous, but which to-day is
one of the dominating elements in the international
situation ? It has been determined in chief by : (a) The
British "blockade" policy; (b) the loudly-advertised
intentions of powerful sections of the community here, in
regard to Germany's economic and political future; (c) the
reports of Belgian Ministers abroad to their Government,
discovered in the archives of the Belgian Foreign Office
and distributed broadcast throughout Germany by the
Government. On the "blockade" policy, viewed from the
standpoint of strategic necessity, or in relation to
Germany's submarine policy, or as a legitimate act of war,
I am not competent to pass an opinion. Moreover, I am
concerned now only with its psychological effect upon the
German mind. What that effect is may be judged, not
from extraneous sources, but simply from what the Press
here has published as to the confidently anticipated results
which would ensue from the policy, viz., the restriction of
a substantial portion of the necessary food supply of the
German population. The anticipation may correspond
with fact, or it may not — I do not know — but the
psychological effect is bound up with the advertised
intention. "England wants to starve us out; to strike at
us through our women and children," could hardly be
surpassed as a battle-cry creative of the cement of national
unity. As to (b), it will be recalled that steel had hardly
clashed when the most powerful newspaper Trust in this
country started, with the warm approval of certain com-
mercial and politico-commercial bodies, its "War on
• German trade. ' ' While our soldiers were dying for a
great ideal, these civilian patriots were manufacturing
schemes for increasing their business profits. The
agitation in. due course died down — in the particular
form in which it was first manifested. But it has
been revived and, as I shall show in my next
article, exists among us now as an organised move-
ment, with powerful financial and "high society" support.
It is accompanied by incessant pronouncements by men
prominent in the life of the nation, as to the "punishment"
we purpose inflicting upon Germany when we have brought

2id TRUTH AND THE WAR

her to that "unconditional surrender," which the Govern-
ment indirectly (except in the case of Mr. Churchill, who
used the actual words) allows it to be assumed is the
Government's penultimate object. The '"punishment"
takes many forms, varying from territorial mutilation in
Europe to economic strangulation, from political disinteg-
ration to a permanent veto upon the holding of over-sea
possessions. The last-named "punishment," which a
completely victorious alliance could impose with greater
facility than it could the other items in the programme, is
now being endorsed by no less an authority than Sir Harry
Johnston, whose name carries weight in Germany, and
who pleads for it with almost fanatical passion in the
columns of the New Statesman.

As to (c), it would need a special study adequately to
convey the impression which the reports from Belgian
Ministers alluded to above must be making upon the
psychology of the German people. The authenticity of
these documents is not questioned. The time will come
when they will be regarded as, perhaps the most important
contribution to our knowledge of pre-war conditions, and
a complete vindication of those who have condemned the
secrecy of British diplomacy. A brief indication of the
character and scope of these documents has already been
given. They show, with a unanimity whose cumulative
effect is staggering, that, in the eyes of all these
Belgian diplomats stationed in the various capitals
and charged with the duty of conveying to their
Government the impressions the*- formed of the
character and objects of the foreign policy pursued by
the various Governments to which they were accredited,
the policy pursued by the diplomacy of England and
France, sustained by influential Press agitations, had every
appearance of being directed to the isolation and discom-
fiture of Germany; that it was, in short, aggressively and
deliberately anti-German. It may not have been — all this
will have to be threshed out later on. But that is what
seemed to be its character to these trained observers [who,
being neutral, may be assumed to have been impartial]
noting its evolution from those inner sanctuaries where the
fate of peoples is lightly decided in darkness and in
secrecy. And if Anglo-French diplomacy seemed thus
inspired to these neutral observers, what must it have
seemed to the diplomatic representatives of Germany in

THE PENAL POLICY 213

foreign capitals and, consequently, to the German
Government ?

Possess yourself, then, of the mind of the average
intelligent German citizen and you will find that, under
the influence of these events, it must work like this : —

"We are to be starved into surrender. After our
surrender, which is to be unconditional, our trade is to be
throttled by combinations and differentiations. That was
the object of our enemies all along. They proclaimed it
almost as soon as the war started. Our commercial access
to foreign markets over-seas is to be hampered and
restricted. Territorial areas over-seas are to be wrenched
from us. We are not to be allowed to possess colonies or
dependencies. As our industrial population must have raw
material to be kept in employment, these concerted
measures will mean for us economic paralysis. Britain
means to stifle us and to use the French and Russian
armies for the achievement of her purpose. That it has
been her fixed intention is now made evident by this long
series of Belgian diplomatic reports which our Govern-
ment has found. We are the victims of a diabolical con-
spiracy."

I am not asserting that this frame of mind reflects the
true facts of the case. But I do assert that the principal
events I have examined must appear to the German mind
to embody the true facts of the case. And I do assert that
to talk of "Prussian militarism"and"Prussian domination"
as factors which can be isolated and "destroyed," in
connection with the ultimate aims of our policy towards
Germany, is to display a superficial and even a frivolous
mentality unworthy of the name of statesmanship, and
calculated to lead the nation into a quagmire of political
error — the same sort of intellectual mistake which lost us
the American Colonies. To tell the average German that
you intend to "crush Prussian militarism" is to tell him
that you intend to crush Germany : her commerce, her
shipping, her prosperity, her competition in the markets
of the world, her colonial enterprise.

I have said before that I am persuaded the British
people have not this end in view, and that I do not believe
the sane elements in the British Government have this end
in view. But that powerful, organised forces in this
country have this end in view, are endeavouring to super-

(16)

2i4 TRUTH AND THE WAR

impose it upon the national mind and, by the advertisement
which is given to them in the Press, are strengthening the
Germans in their conviction that this is, indeed, the fixed
purpose of the British Government and nation, therebv
prolonging the war, I shall now show.

CHAPTER XXV.
Hate as a Creed1

From henceforward the Germans are to the English an accursed race.
We will not buy from them, sell to them, eat with them, drink with
them, nor pray with them. — The Globe, October 7, 1915.

"Everything German taboo." — Motto of the Anti-German
League.

"No German labour, no German goods, no German influence ;
Britain for the British." — Motto of the Anti-German Union.

"Germany under all." — Motto of the Imperial Maritime League.

THE two most prominent organisations which devote
their energies to the propagation of the policy which
may be described as "crushing Germany" and which
advocate it, in effect, as desirable in the national interest
and as the supreme end and aim of the war, are the anti-
German League and the Anti-German Union. The
significance of such organisations is that they crystallise,
as it were, all the looseness of thought which has gathered
round the phrase "Prussian militarism," all the passions
incidental to a state of war, all the natural bitterness, the
unreason, the intolerance and unfairness which curse
humanity in war time, into a perfectly definite and deliberate
purpose. They seek to direct the piteous aberrations from
which an afflicted humanity suffers in a period of war, for
the pursuance of aims which in themselves are ignoble and
sordid. They take advantage of the mental dislocation
which war brings and, coldly, with calculation, trade upon
hate and fear, orienting these elements towards-ends frankly
material. They are the exploiters of hate, analogous to
the ghouls of the battlefield. We shall see as we dissect
their manifestoes that were this attempt to impregnate
the national policy with the virus of an enduring hatred;
were this appeal to the lowest human instincts to succeed
in its objects, the nation in whose interest they are said
to be put forward would lose by every test — ethical,
economic, or political — which can be applied. Certain
classes, certain, vested interests, would, however, gain,

1 The Labour Leader, October 21, 1915.
215

2i6 TRUTH AND THE WAR

and gain largely — for a time at all events. The preposals
set out by these organisations would hit the consumer all
round — the poor especially — but they would put money
into the pockets of certain kinds of producers. They would
raise the value of his lands to the great landlord. They
would impoverish the needy man still further and increase
the revenues of the rich. Such is the species of spurious
patriotism which flaunts itself in war time and seeks to
identify itself with the spirit of self-sacrifice. All wars
have produced it, and sometimes Governments and peoples
have been led grievously astray by it.

Both the Anti-German League and the Anti-German
Union appear particularly desirous of capturing the
working man. Curiously enough, they have neglected to
include representatives of the working class among their
patrons and committees. More curious still, these are
exclusively drawn from a class which — as a class —
abominates the claims of Labour, and in peace time,
utilises the whole machinery at its disposal to counteract
them. "Everything German taboo." That is the motto
of the Anti-German League, whose committee is headed
by the Marquis of Hertford (whom "Who's Who"
indicates as former Captain in the Grenadier
Guards and the proud possessor of 12,300 acres
of British soil), and is under "the distinguished
patronage" of Lord Frederick Fitzroy (also late
of the Grenadier Guards) ; a number of ladies of
title and a number of military and naval officers —
presumably retired. The League desires, above all things,
to "Smash the Germans commercially." Mark that.
That amiable intention is in the forefront of the League's
programme. Fighting for the "liberties of Europe"?
Ah ! that is well enough for the men who are laying down
their lives in Flanders, in the Gallipoli Peninsula, in the
burning sands of Mesopotamia, in the jungles of West
Africa. But your aristocratic patriot of the Anti-German
League brand is much more utilitarian. It is the trade of
the Teuton he is after, not the Teuton's blood. For this
purpose — the purpose of smashing the Germans com-
mercially— the League invites its adherents to take the
pledge — I mean, of course, the Anti-German pledge. The
Anti-German League promises, amongst other things : —

"Not to purchase, use, or consume German or Austrian
goods whatsoever. Not to employ a German for either
domestic or commercial purposes. Not to place contracts

HATE AS A CREED 217

with any German-owned or controlled Company, Trust,
or Corporation, or to send goods by, or travel in, German
ships."

No doubt German armament trusts are included in this
interdict, but there is no special reference to them — a
regrettable omission. Among the far-seeing objects the
League has in view is to "legislate for a protective and,
if necessary, a prohibitive tariff on all German and Austrian
made goods." (One seems to detect here a far-off echo of
the familiar Pipes of Pan !) In the document which
accompanies its pledge form, and which is described as an
"Introduction by the Founder," one reads such Tariff
Reform, new style, as this : —

"Thirty years ago we were miles ahead of all our
competitors in manufacturing, in trade, in finance, and in
labour, but what have we done to maintain that premier
position among the great nations? We have, alas,
permitted foreigners, particularly Germans, to dump their
goods at the very gates of our great works, while our own
men have starved or emigrated. We have to our own
lasting disgrace readily purchased German produce to the
detriment of our industries."

And so on. It seems that the Germans have had the
astounding impudence, without even a "By your leave,"
to increase their merchant shipping "from 500,000 tons
to 5,000,000 tons" in the last thirty years. Clearly a
nation that can act thus is past reforming. There is much
talk about "Made in Germany, the mark of the Beast,"
the "Butcher of Berlin," and so forth. In short, the
programme of the League is a repulsive and vulgar appeal
to national cupidity. This precious society asks for a
million subscribers at one shilling a head; in other words,
for an income of ^50,000 a year, "not a large income
certainly to exploit the aims we have in view."

At first sight it may seem queer that there should be
necessity for an Anti-German Union as well as an Anti-
German League. Perhaps it is an illustration of the
Quaker saying : "All the world is queer but thee and me,
dear; and thou art a little bit queer." Anyway, "you
pays your money and you takes your choice. " The Union
is specially favoured by the Daily Express and the Morning
Post. The Editor of the Daily Express is a celebrity who
once wrote a book entitled "Exiled in England." His

2i8 TRUTH AND THE WAR

name is Blumenfeld. It is a very patriotic paper, the
Daily Express. That is why it thinks so highly of the
Anti-German Union. As for the Morning Post, so
attached is it to the Union that its proprietor figures among
the Union's vice-presidents. The Morning Post preaches
the Union's policy in its leading articles with punctilious
regularity. It also makes a speciality of insinuating that
those who combat its doctrines are rewarded for so doing
with German gold. It opens its columns to the Secretary
of the Union for the diffusion of similar insinuations, and
declines to insert replies on the ground of insufficiency of
space. I used to be a little puzzled as to why the directing
minds of the Morning Post seemed so bent upon this
particular style of public controversy. But I now under-
stand that it must be a case of inherited mentality, on the
"judge others by what you once were" attitude. I am
indebted to a correspondent for the revelation. The
correspondent obligingly forwarded me a copy of Lord
Malmesbury's memoirs1 the other day, and suggested that
I should therein find the key to the Morning Post's men-
tality. Now, Lord Malmesbury, you will remember —
and if you don't remember you may be forgiven — was
Foreign Minister in the Derby Cabinet (1852), and I very
much regret to say that in those days the Morning Post
was in the pay of a foreign Government — a Government
with which we were on the worst of terms. That is
vouched for by Britain's Foreign Minister of the day. Here
is the passage : —

"November 4. An article in the Morning Post from
its correspondent in. Paris on the title of Napoleon III.,
retailing nearly every word of my last conversation with
Walewski (the French Ambassador)."

"November 5. Sent for Walewski. He confirms that
the French Government paid the Morning Post, and that
he saw Borthwick, the editor, every day."2

Very sad !

With these distinguished backers in the Press, the
Anti-German Union fills the atmosphere with its patriotic

1 "Memoirs of an Ex-Minister. " By the Earl of Malmesbury.
(Longmans, Green and Co., 1884.) Vol. I., p. 362.

2 See, too, passages in Vol. II., p. 107, as to the Post, which
"obeys the orders of the Emperor to write one down." And (p. 151) :
"The Morning Post has received orders from the French Emperor to
attack me on every possible occasion. Mr. Borthwick, the editor,
saw him at Paris and got his orders from himself."

HATE AS A CREED 219

vibrations. Its personnel, you will concede, is well fitt«d
to make a special appeal to the intelligence of the working1
man, being so eminently qualified, by sympathy with the
latter's aspirations, knowledge of his needs, and under-
standing of his claims, to be his guide, counsellor, and
familiar friend in these dark and troublous days. For
is not its president the Earl of Euston, and do not its
seventeen vice-presidents include the Marquis of Sligo,
the Earls of Egmont, Kenmore, Kilmory, and Oxford,
Lord Headley, Lord Leith of Fyvie, and a bevy of
Peeresses? In fact, but for Mr. Ronald McNeill, M.P.,
and the Right Hon. Sir F. Milner, Bart, (at one time —
horresco referens ! — on the General Council of the Anglo-
German Friendship Society1), the whole of the Union's
seventeen vice-presidents are ornaments of the Peerage.
The Union's motto is more ornate than the League's : —

"No German labour, no German goods, no German
influence. Britain for the British."

In short, the Chinese wall within which the British
people shall in future be cribbed, crabbed, and confined
for the greater benefit of Tariff Reform manufacturers
and rural landlords.

From the Union's "Aims and Objects " and from its
"Policy" I extract the following items : —

"To defend British industry and British labour against
German competition. To fight against German influence
in our social, financial, industrial, and political life. To
expel Germans from our industries and commerce. 'To
explain the folly of granting peace on terms so easy as to
make it possible for the Germans again to disturb the peace
of Europe and the world.' "

The world has, you observe, ever been a peaceful one
until the wicked Teuton disturbed its blissful repose. The
Union proposes to discourage the use of German shipping
lines by English passengers and merchandise; to form a
register of traders who will undertake not to buy or to sell
German goods, and to take sundry other steps of a similar
character. The Union, as I have remarked before, is
being well boomed in the Press. But it is being advertised
in other and more subtle ways. Its leaflets and subscrip-
tion forms may be seen displayed on the counter of one
at least of the best known of London Banks.

1 Vide "Report of the Inaugural Meeting held at the Mansion
House, May i, 1911."

22o TRUTH AND THE WAR

This glance at the chief hate-mongers and their ideals
and methods would be incomplete without a passing refer-
ence to the Imperial Maritime League, whose motto (these
people cannot get along without mottoes) is, "Germany
under all." It seems, according to the Imperial Maritime
League that "we have got to smash them (the Germans)
now once and for ever that they rise not again." The
League has a partiality for the word "smash." It has
issued a "Smashing the enemy declaration," which
demands — after Mr. Churchill's and the New Statesman's
own hearts — the "unconditional surrender" of the enemy :

"Germany must be left at the close of this titanic
struggle — so firmly fettered that she may never rise again
in the panoply of war."

All the other belligerents, apparently, may retain that
panoply. But Germany, it appears, must not even wear
the panoply of trade :

"The sun. has got to set now, once and for all, either
on the British or German Empires."

Such is the articulated policy the working classes are
asked to endorse by the "Prussians in our midst." These
organisations and their organs in the Press are typical of
the influences and forces in our social system which are
fatally, necessarily, inevitably inimical to the interests of
the workers — so long as our social system reposes upon
its present bases. Yet they appeal to the working men
of Britain to support them. They incarnate, do these
elements, all that is intolerable and intolerant, selfish, and
short-sighted in our national life. It is these elements
which have controlled hitherto the entire course of our
foreign policy; which compose to-day our diplomatic
service, and which will go on doing both if we allow them.
Do not, I beg of you, minimise their power for mischief.
It is not for nothing that a man in this country sports a
i coronet and flaunts armorial bearings. They can organise.
They can lead. They have the governing instinct. They
are wealthy. They are provided with keys which unlock
the council chambers of the State. Through their power
over the Press they can play a ponderating part in
"national" decisions. They do not monopolise the spirit
of hatred and revenge among us to-day, but they organise
it. The more the workers fall under the spell of their
doctrines, the bigger the price the latter will have to pay

HATE AS A CREED 221

in the end. For the policy they preach is — Death;
physical death for multitudes, for it prolongs the war;
social and economic death for multitudes, because the
longer the war lasts the greater the social misery and
suffering which will follow it.

I now propose to examine some of the specific proposals
which the policy of hate contains. The purpose which will
inspire me in so doing will be the dual one of (a), demon-
strating their ineptitude from the point of view of practical
politics; (&), setting forth what I conceive to be the true
national necessities of Britain, and Germany, from the
standpoint of the future of Anglo-German relations. In
this examination I shall be guided by the conviction that
an understanding of their mutual needs by the British and
German peoples is the keynote to any possible reconstruc-
tion of Europe, of escape from a repetition of the armed
peace of the last twenty years, and from a repetition of its
inevitable sequel, attended by consequences even more
cataclysmic for humanity. My conviction is based upon
the incontestable fact that the British and German peoples
have got to go on living on the same planet; that they
cannot do so as permanent foes ; that they cannot suffer an
indefinite prolongation of mutual hatred without mutual
disaster, and hence that they must discover the way out,
and, having discovered it, pursue it to their mutual
salvation.

CHAPTER XXVI.
The "Trade War"1

It is no exaggeration to say that if this conflict goes on indefinitely,
revolution and anarchy may well follow; and unless the collective
common-sense of mankind prevents it before the worst comes, great
portions of the Continent of Europe will be little better than a
wilderness, peopled by old men, women, and children. — Lord
Loreburn, in the House of Lords, November 8, 1915.

I only wish to draw you to this conclusion, that the war has
resulted in something like a deadlock of force and has operated to
diminish the standard of our civilisation, to take away the guarantees
of liberty, to diminish the trustworthiness of law, and to endanger
the situation amongst nations, neutrals as well as combatants. If
that is so, surely it is not surprising that one should begin to ask,
Is any escape possible from this rake's progress upon which we have
entered? Must we go on to witness a continually extending
panorama of war? Is there no alternative? I believe there is. The
passion of national independence is glorious and well worthy of any
sacrifice. I recognise all its claims. But the passion of national
independence must in some way be reconciled, if civilisation is to
continue, with the possibility of international friendship, and unless
you can see out of this war something which will lead to international
friendship, coming into alliance with, and being supported by,
national independence, you have nothing before you but a continued
series of wars, hate after hate, extermination after extermination,
from which, indeed, you may well recoil. — Lord Courtney of
Penwith, in the House of Lords, November 8, 1915.

We are told we are fighting for liberty and democracy against
tyranny, but gradually we have seen the very system we abominate,
whose very existence we detest, instituted in our midst, and in setting
out to destroy it in the enemy, we are creating it at home. — Mr.
Arthur Ponsonby, in the House of Commons, November 11, 191 5.

I have been violently abused for using the word "peace." I
am not going to allow myself to be charged with saying out of
this House what I dare not say inside it. I have never, nor, so
far as I know, have any of the friends who are associated with me,
spoken of "peace at an)' price" or of "peace at any time." For my
part, I have always said precisely and absolutely the opposite. I
have said that I thought there were certain things that we ought
to want and without which this war could not end. . . . But
I have said . . . that there is nothing inherently disgraceful or
humiliating in attaining these things by negotiation, and not by
fighting. It is just as honourable, and it is less disastrous. It
avoids incalculable human suffering, and it is more effective if what
you want is a permanent peace. . . . — Mr. Charles Trevelyan, in
the House of Commons, November n, 1915.

1 The Labour Leader, October 28, 1915.

222

THE "TRADE WAR" 223

UR national capacity to judge sanely of the present
situation must be guided, as I have sought to
emphasise throughout, by some clear conception of the
ultimate aims we are pursuing in this war. At present we
possess no such clear conception. The terrible events which
are convulsing Europe and the confusion which reigns in
our own national Councils alike militate against it, and
there appears no constructive force, articulate in the nation
at this moment, to visualise beyond the present and to
detach the national mind from the mirage provoked by
catch-phrases, such as come glibly to the lips of those who
have spent most of their lives in talk.

A monster styled "Prussian militarism" is enthroned
before the national imagination; and that its overthrow
alone is needed to re-establish peace and good-will on earth
is so persistently taught, that to question it is denounced
as virtual treason. That the German military machine is
utterly ruthless and that some of its operators are deaf
both to pity and to policy, is true enough — the odious
tragedy perpetrated last week in Brussels is but an addi-
tional proof.1 But the myth which, because of this,
portrays "Prussian militarism" as a sort of entity in itself,
a something wholly exceptional and peculiar, is not less
fabulous, or less calculated to distort the national sense
of perspective in regard to the character of the European
struggle, or to blind the national judgment to the nature of
the elements which have been let loose by the rulers of the
world. Those who reiterate incessantly that we are
fignting "Prussian militarism" delude the nation. We
are fighting a people of 65 millions, or, if you reckon in
the Austro-Hungarians, of over 100 millions, who believe
that we seek their destruction as a people. And it is the
daily statements made by those who command the avenues
of publicity among their foes, and who claim to represent
the intentions of their foes; it is these, far more than any
statements of their own Governors, which continually
strengthen these people in that belief. That is the truth.

The noblest utterance which this war has yet elicited
has been given to the world by Miss Cavell herself : — "But
this I would say, standing as I do before God and eternity,
I realise that patriotism is not enough. I must have no
hatred or bitterness towards anyone." To her, indeed,
in that supreme hour there seems to have come a Divine
message. Herself a victim to the barbarous insensibility

1 The Execution of Miss Cavell.

224 TRUTH AND THE WAR

that war engenders, her dying words were not an incite-
ment to hate and revenge, but an appeal to the Christ ideal
which the statesmen of Europe are trampling in the blood
of the peoples, calling the while upon some Pagan deitv to
justify their hideous work.

I have said that the Parliaments are guilty, although
in a lesser degree. Parliament here is ready to debate the
details of a Budget, to listen to platitudes about the
Balkans, to wrangle fiercely over conscription, to make
unkind remarks about the censorship. It is capable of
becoming annoyed over a variety of matters connected
with the management of the war. But so far it has shown
no sign of grappling with the fundamental issue — the
object and purpose with which the war is now being waged.
From Parliament has come hitherto no lead, no guidance,
no ray of light sweeping aside the comparative unessentials
and throwing the essentials into bold relief. Some organs
of the Press are beginning to clamour for the "truth."
But the truths for which thev agitate are the lesser truths,
and when Ministers have been driven to speak more openly
of the military outlook in the various theatres of war;
when, perchance, this or that Minister has paid the penalty
attaching to a foolish boast, or has succumbed to the
personal animosities which this demand for "truth," in
part at least, conceals; or when some strategical success
comes to relieve the monotony of gloom, all this insistence
upon the "truth" will fade away, to be presently renewed
when, and if, a further period of military ill-success sets in.

For those who would say to the nation : — "The truth
which you- need to apprehend lies not there, but in the
interminable march of your youth to the shambles, in the
mortgaging of your children's patrimony, in the growing
irritation of neutral Powers at your maritime policy,
casting, as it does, new and sinister shadows upon the
international screen, in the increasingly alarming inroads
upon your financial stability, in the fearful future preparing
for your posterity; it is in these portents, whose cumula-
tive significance escapes you, that reside the truths you
must realise; it is that you incur these ills with no distinct
conception of the goal you seek, without measuring the
consequences by a conscious effort of the will" : for those
who would say this to the nation, the Legislature has,
apparently, no liking. So, in the absence of Governmental
and Parliamentary leadership and in the functional abdi-
cation of the Press, are we reduced to pursue the search

THE "TRADE WAR" 225

for truth by such lights as we individually possess, and to
proclaim it in. the measure of our understanding- and our
opportunities.

And our vision, I think, will be contained within the
boundary of the verities if it be inspired by the conviction
that the essential problems peculiar to the belligerent States
before the war, and which affected their mutual relations,
will survive the war. The working out of these problems
may be modified by the war, but their constituent factors
will remain unaltered. Fundamentally the war is an
attempt to solve these problems by the stupidest and most
inconclusive of all means. But they will not and cannot
yield to that treatment, because that treatment ignores
growth, and growth is indestructible. The essential
problems, then, which confronted the nations in their
international relationships before the war will confront
them at the settlement, and after the settlement. The war
will not solve them, and the antiquated mechanism in vogue
before the war will not solve them. A new mechanism
must be created, and the peoples themselves must create
it. The lubricant of that mechanism must be mutual com-
prehension. There must be, on the part of each belligerent
people, a conscious and sustained effort of the will to
understand the nature of these problems as they affect its
own destinies, and as they affect the destinies of its neigh-
bours. And the starting point of that intellectual process
must be a firm grasp of the first principle in the life of
the modern State, viz., the common interests which unite
the people of each belligerent State to its neighbours.
When that principle is clearly apprehended war is seen in
its true perspective — an outrage perpetrated upon the
community by a restricted section thereof, an outrage
rendered possible only through the intellectual failure of
the community as a whole to appreciate the truth of that
first principle.

Let us apply this first principle to the problem of Anglo-
German relations, upon whose future adjustment on a
basis of mutual comprehension depends the realisation of
that "New Europe" for which the belligerent peoples are
told by their Governments they are striving, and for
which the mass of them believe, more or less
vaguely, themselves to be so striving. And let us
apply it first to the problem of commercial intercourse,
which is at once the most visible test of those common
interests of which I have spoken and the most powerful

22* TRUTH AND THE WAR

medium to heal the wounds and bitterness engendered by
war. And here we are faced immediately with the
trail of the exploiters of war. To follow that trail, to
expose the exploiter in his haunts, must be our purpose.
He calls himself a German, a Briton, an Italian, a French-
man, a Russian, according- to the community to which
he belongs. In reality he is neither one nor the other
and he is all in one. He is just an exploiter. His
purposes are selfish, and his selfishness is cosmopolitan.
To him the buying- and selling of commodities between
peoples is beneficial to the extent in which he profits by it.
If his competitors in other lands, by better organisation
or ingenuity reduce his profits, trade to him becomes a
"war," his competitors become enemies, and as he is
extremely noisy, and often, influential, bitterness arises
through his laments between the mass of consumers and
producers in the country in which he lives, and in the
country whence proceeds the competition to which he
objects. We have seen that the proclaimed object of the
organisations for the stereotyping of Anglo-German hatred
and the newspapers which support them is to destroy
German trade. The Morning Post puts the matter quite
baldly :—

"Our aims should be to destroy German trade because
by trade a nation lives."

This scheme to destroy German trade is to be all-
embracing'. Sixty-five millions of Germans are, hence-
forth, to be artificially forbidden to sell goods to the British
Empire, the French and Russian Empires, and Japan, with
Italy and the smaller fry thrown in. This is the "trade
war" for which the Morning Post and other papers and
numerous influential bodies here are preparing, and which
they are urging shall follow the holocaust of human life.
Hatred must survive in. the counting-house.

Now a "trade war" is, intrinsically, as great an outrage
upon the peoples as a war of armaments and a war of men,
of which latter it is, indeed, often the forerunner and
contributor, as Mr. Brailsford has so powerfully portrayed
in his "War of Steel and Gold."1 It is an outrage
upon the peoples on that account ; and also because it seeks
to interfere violently with the first principle of international
relationship, the common interest between peoples. The
influences which would impose this new form of warfare

1 G. Bell and Son.

THE "TRADE WAR" 227

upon humanity at the close of a desolating- war are the
most dangerous enemies of the peoples among whom they
are established. To prevent the Germans from selling to
us by the erection of "penal tariffs" is to lay plans for the
further impoverishment of the British people when the
latter, after the war, are struggling with unemployment,
lowered wages, immense rise in the cost of living, depre-
ciation, of monetary values, and the hundred vicissitudes
war brings in its train. It involves and necessitates its com-
plement. If the Germans cannot sell to us neither can they
buy from us, and the exclusion of 65 millions of people
from active commercial intercourse with their neighbours
means a penalisation, not of them alone, but of their
neighbours too. This advertised war upon the German
producer and consumer is, therefore, the intimation of a
coming war upon all British consumers, and upon a very
considerable proportion of British producers; and,
obviously, the section of the community which will be
hardest hit by that war is the British working class. The
employment, and, therefore, the means of livelihood which
the British workers enjoyed through the labours of German
workers will disappear : by restricting competition in the
production of manufactured goods, and by narrowing the
market, the British working man will be called upon to
pay more for what he uses. Every restriction placed upon
the free circulation of produce and manufactures, even in
normal times, is really an invasion of the rights of mankind
in the interests of private individuals connected with some
particular branch of production or manufacture. The
interest of the overwhelming mass of peoples in the
freedom of commercial intercourse is common and
universal. It holds good in the case of the relationship
between civilised (so-called) peoples and between civilised
peoples and uncivilised (so-called). Deliberately under
cover of the passions of war, to prepare a future in which
65 millions of people in Central Europe are to be debarred
from trading with their neighbours is in itself a crime.
It is doubly a crime, because it is also to prepare the way
for future wars, of the sort we are experiencing to-day.
The British Empire, grandiloquently exclaims the Morning
Post, Can do without Germany, but Germany cannot do
without the British Empire.
Let us see.

CHAPTER XXVII.
German Competition1

"Here is a low political economy, plotting to cut the throat of foreign
competition, and establish our own ; excluding others by force or
making war on them ; or, by cunning tariffs, giving preference to
worse wares of ours. But the real and lasting victories are those
of peace and not of war. The way to conquer the foreign artisan
is not to kill him, but to beat his work." — Emerson.

"The trade which we can only capture by throttling Germany
with the aid of the British Fleet will not long be ours when normal
conditions recur ; and then what will become of the capital which
we are adjured to put into it? How did Germany originally secure
this trade? She won it fairly by science, intelligence, hard work,
and adaptability. Only by those qualities can we recover and keep
it." — The Times (September 24, 1914).

STATISTICS are never stimulating-. But it is
only by a reference to statistics that we can
appreciate the importance to the British people
of the labour and enterprise of the people of
Germany and vice-versa. In 191 1 the total value
of the direct trade between the British Empire and
Germany amounted to ^16^0,640,000. In the list of
foreign countries and British possessions from which we
imported and retained merchandise in 1912, Germany
figures second. The net value of that merchandise
amounted in that year to ^65,841,000. We bought
^25,000,000 more from Germany than from France,
^27,000,000 more from Germany than from Russia, and
^25,000,000 more from Germany than from India. We
sold Germany ^"40,362,000 of produce and manufactures;
^10,000,000 more than we sold to the United States,
;£i 5,000,000 more than we sold to France, and
^27,000,000 more than we sold to Russia. Germany
supplied us with 10.4 per cent, of our total imports, and
she absorbed a greater proportion of our total exports
(8.2 per cent.) than any country in the world except India.
How can an attempt to "destroy" a commercial connec-

1 The Labour Leader, November 4, 1915.
228

GERMAN COMPETITION 229

tion of that kind be undertaken without causing- an
immense amount of distress to the people of these Islands ?

From whatever aspect this problem of Anglo-German
commercial relationship is examined, the more inimical to
the interests of the masses of the British people, and the
more inherently fallacious does the policy propounded by
the Anti-German organisations and the so-called Imperial
newspapers appear. To read their outpourings you would
imagine that all we have to do is to replace the
^70,000,000 of goods which Germany and Austria sent
us anually before the war, by producing the articles at
home, and that in so doing we should not only be as well
off, but even better off. This calculation, of course, over-
looks the fact that even if we could perform this miracle
we should not be as well off or better off, for the very
simple reason that the disappearance of that import trade
would involve the corresponding disappearance of an
export of British produce, manufactures, and services to
pay for it. Again, to close our markets to German trade
after the war would not merely involve the direct loss of
the national transactions with Germany; for the policy, it
seems, is to be a sort of joint combination on the part of
the Allies. It would, thus, involve a further loss for the
British people in the decreased purchasing power of the
Allied States, consequent upon the self-inflicted loss
imposed upon them by their rulers arising out of the disap-
pearance of the volume of trade carried on between those
States and Germany before the war. No State can shut
out its people from so immense a market as that Avhich
the Central European Powers provide without inflicting
grievous disabilities upon its own people. No commercial
firm can suddenly strike off a large proportion of its
clientele without heavy loss resulting from the inevitably
ensuing restriction of transactions. And the same thing
holds good with nations. The people of each State are
the clients of their neighbours. These, if you like, are
commonplace truisms. But when we see how they are
overlooked in the collapse of the reasoning faculty which
is to be observed all around us, it may not be inappropriate
to call attention to them.

The same absence of rudimentary common-sense can
be noted in other branches of the professional hate-
monger's business. Germany, as we have seen, is to be
faced at the close of the war with a trade boycott extending
ibrough five-sixths of Europe, the whole of Africa, and

(17)

230 TRUTH AND THE WAR

virtually the whole of Asia if, as is firmly hoped, Japanese
political pressure can forcibly close the Chinese market
to her1 : in any case, a good half of Asia. And this same
Germany, paralysed in her foreign trade and in her indus-
trial development, is to pay a huge war indemnity to
her conquerors ! But how? She could do so only by
manufacturing and selling goods, and those who purpose
imposing the war indemnity also purpose to withhold from
her as much of the raw material with which to manufacture
as they can manage, and to do all in their power to prevent
her selling such goods as she may, nevertheless, succeed
in manufacturing ! Then, where is she to get the money
from wherewith to pay the war indemnity?

Another thing which seems to be equally lost sight of,
although not quite on the same plane of thought, is this :
The woes of the world to-day are held, and rightly if we
consider visible effects and ignore profound causes, which
seems the popular procedure just now, to be in large
measure attributable to the existence of huge conscript
armies, which means huge armaments . . . and the rest.
And Germany is regarded, erroneously from the historical
standpoint, as the initiatory culprit. Well, were we to
succeed, as the result of this war, in forcing Germany to
abolish her conscript army without a corresponding
measure on the part of the Continental States now
opposed to Germany, what would be the upshot? We
should be thereby releasing for commercial and industrial
pursuits the whole of the able-bodied population of
Germany for the whole period of the year. Having done
so, should we impose a veto upon that population carrying
on those pursuits? One might imagine that the
ludicrousness of the impasse would appeal even to the
titled patrons of the Anti-German Union.

Hardly less absurd is the policy of dismembering
Germany in order to remove Germany's trade competition.
I say, in order to remove Germany's trade competition.

1 Unexpected results sometimes ensue from clumsy attempts to
dam up a river. Jf Germany is forcibly excluded from Africa her
obvious policy will be to support Japan in the inevitable conflict which
would arise between that Power and Great Britain and the United
States should Japan seek special privileges on a large scale in the
Chinese markets. Naturally, she would exact her price. But it
would be a price which Japan might, under quite conceivable circum-
stances, be prepared to pay. Of all the follies of which those who
direct the policy of this country could be guilty, none could have
more enduring and fatal results, than the policy of attempting to
stifle the industrial development of Germany in the neutral markets.

GERMAN COMPETITION 23 r

because the political disruption of Germany is recom-
mended by the same parties that want to "smash"
German trade, although it does not usually figure on their
printed programmes. Germany, as we now know her,
is to be mutilated by large accessions of territory to France
and to Belgium (which does not want them) on the West,
to Russia on the East. This, of course, would involve the
transference of millions of Germans to the French,
Russian, and Belgian States. What would be the
consequence from the point of view of human production ?
It would be that these millions of transferred Germans
would continue to produce just the same, the only
difference being that the merchandise they produced to
compete with ours in the world's markets would be made
in France, Russia, and Belgium respectively, instead of in
Germany. And what difference would that make to the
competition? Absolutely none. We should merely have
shifted a political frontier, which, incidentally, is becoming
a factor of steadily dwindling importance in the life of
peoples. We should not, in so doing, have affected trade
competition one iota. And in arbitrarily shifting that
frontier, thereby violating in flagrant fashion one of the
main principles for the upholding of which we are officially
stated to be at war, we should, without gaining any
compensating advantage, have planted in the breasts of
these millions of transferred Germans the determination
to strain every nerve to become politically reunited to the
bulk of their countrymen. Ag-ain, what sort of Europe
is this which our hatemongers would create? The sort
of Europe that would saddle the British working classes
with a permanent war expenditure in peace, from which
emigration en masse or revolution would be the only
means of escape.

Moreover, these short-sighted persons have not
seemingly grasped the rudiments of what would be
involved, in all sorts of ways, by a policy aiming at the
penalisation of one of the most numerous and industrious
peoples on the face of the globe. They talk and write as
though the Teutonic race were confined to Central Europe,
or could be confined thereto to-morrow ; increasing as it is
far more rapidly than the British and, of course, than the
French, which was actually decreasing before the war.
Have they ever taken into account the millions of Germans
scattered throughout our Empire ; in the neutral States ;
in America? What kind of ferment should we be setting

232 TRUTH AND THE WAR

up against us throughout the world by such a policy of
permanent repression? What interminable intrigues we
should be inviting, a constant source of disquietude and
embarrassment; intrigues ready to mature when, later on,
the era of mutual recrimination begins between the Powers
now allied, a process which has invariably succeeded
alliances between Governments for the purpose of waging
war, and which is even more certain and will be even more
than usually rapid in this particular case, owing to the
secret diplomatic manoeuvres which involved potential
belligerency without the knowledge of some of the peoples
engaged.

And the mention of America induces me to touch
upon one more aspect of the creed of hate. We
are not, it appears, to ship goods or passengers
in German vessels. We are even to cut off German
ships from British ports — in order to kill German
shipping, which is a branch of German trade competition.
Very well. Now those who at this moment can see
further than the distinguished personages presiding over
the Anti-German Union and its contemporaries must be
fully aware of two factors in this connection. First, that
whatever we may do, or may induce our Allies to do in
the direction of penalising Germany, America is not going
to follow us one step in that direction. This war has
taught America many things, and although consanguinity,
some similar ideals, and detestation of German methods
of warfare have powerfully influenced American opinion
on our side, we have struck a heavy blow at American
trade interests, and we have raised, in a form which here-
after will become acute, that problem of the future of
international commerce as it affects the greatest White
community in the world, which the Germans loosely call
the "freedom of the seas." America will not forget this,
and is, indeed, already taking out insurances for the
future. The other factor is this. Anyone who knows
anything at all about the world's shipping problems knows
that the backbone of German shipping is the North
Atlantic trade, and that this, far and away the most
important section of German shipping, has never received,
because it has never needed, Government assistance.
The traffic between Continental Europe and the United
States has increased enormously during the past twenty
years. The ostracising of German shipping by Britain
would but intensify its activities with American trade, and

,

GERMAN COMPETITION 233

one can imagine the tempting" offers Germany, if she were
excluded from British ports, would make to America,
which is ready to move heaven and earth to create a
mercantile marine of some consequence, of her own.

This survey, inadequate as it is, shows how essentially
antagonistic to the interests of the British people, and
especially to the British working classes, any "trade-war"
against Germany would be. It has also contributed, I
hope, to prove the impracticability and suicidal tendency
of such a policy. A great deal might be said as to the
causes of Germany's extraordinarily rapid commercial
development, and as to our failure to maintain our former,
lead in certain markets. A profitable field of inquiry also
lies open in the direction of demonstrating that com-
munities do not buy from other communities for love, but
because they desire the goods those other communities
produce. This element in international intercourse must
survive the war as it has survived other wars, and must
render nugatory any artificial efforts to restrain its
influence. Enough has been said to show that in so far
as the destruction of German commerce, for the greater
benefit of the British people, may be represented to the
British nation as an argument in favour of prosecuting
the war to the "bitter end"; the destruction of German
commerce is, in fact, impossible, and the attempt to ensure
its destruction would redound, not to the benefit, but to the
disadvantage of the British people.

In the domain of trade interests ^ritain stands to gain
nothing from a prolongation of the war ; and a parade of
the Allied troops in the Unter den Linden would not lighten
by one groat the bill which the prolongation of the war to
that point — assuming the feasibility — would create, and
which the British people would in the largest measure
(they are paying to-day for the maintenance of some three
million British troops and some three million Allied troops
in the field !) be called upon to foot. The plea for a
prolongation of the war on the ground that Germany must
be punished by the destruction of her trade, and because,
unless she is reduced to "unconditional surrender," and
to the acceptance of any terms the Allies choose to impose,
British trade would suffer from a renewed period of
German trade competition is, therefore, both dishonest
and fallacious.

German trade competition is inevitable. There is only
one means of removing it : to kill off the German people.

234 TRUTH AND THE WAR

German trade competition is not in itself an evil, because
the greater the purchasing powers of the German people,
the greater the volume of business our people can transact
with them. The mass of the people in both countries are
partners in one another's prosperity and in one another's
misfortunes. Where German competition hits particular
British manufacturers, the remedy is to be sought, not in
the elimination of the competitor, but in an increase in
efficiency ; in maintaining a higher and more universal
standard of technical knowledge, in perfecting educa-
tionary systems, in revising methods, in cultivating foreig'n
markets with greater assiduity, in creating machinery
for the co-ordination and classification of effort, in
converting consular functions into intelligence bureaux.

In all these branches of the commercial art we lag far
behind because a long undisputed supremacy in every
market (which in the nature of things could not, and
cannot, be eternalised) has made us careless, and because
we suffer from the incompetence of a diplomatic service
wholly composed of men of aristocratic connections and
wealth, whose upbringing and traditions cause them to
look upon the national requirements of trade and
commerce as vulgar unessentials, except when some
particular commercial or financial combination can be
used as a pawn in the diplomatic game of "checking the
other fellow. ' '

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Our National and Imperial Problem1

What the open door is for trade, the open window is for politics,
and a people is wise if it distrusts men who tell them that they can
only conduct the public business in the dark. The first requirement
of popular control of foreign policy, therefore, is a reasonable
publicity. The people must have full opportunity of knowing what is
being done and why it is being dene, before it has actually been done.
Without this provision there is no safety. For a people to grant an
unlimited control of their lives and their money to little knots of
unrepresentative supermen, who tell them that the arts they practise
are too important and too delicate for disclosure, is a monumental
act of folly. — "Towards International Government." By J. A.
Hobson (George Allen and Unwin.)

"At present the control of foreign affairs is centralised in the
British Isles. There is in London a group of men who do in fact
determine the issues of peace and war for upwards of four hundred
and thirty millions of human beings." — X.

N considering the great task of national and inter-
national reconstruction which is laid upon other peoples
and upon ourselves, what is the fact which stands out above
all the rest?

It is surely this : —

The ignorance in which the population is left as to the
policy which its rulers are pursuing, in .its name, towards
other States.

I propose very briefly to examine our own case, and
to give some specific illustrations. Our case is not excep-
tional. It is typical, although more striking than some
others, because we entertain in peculiar degree the illusion
that we enjoy a truly democratic constitution. Fifty-
seven years ago, speaking in. this city of Glasgow, one of
the most able, the most honest, and, in the real sense of
the word, one of the greatest statesmen Britain has
produced — John Bright — said this : —

"When you come to our foreign policy, you are no
longer Englishmen, you are no longer free; you are
recommended not to inquire. You are told you cannot

1 A speech to the Glasgow Branch of the Union of Democratic
Control, at Glasgow, November 23, 1915.

235

236 TRUTH AND THE WAR

understand; you are snubbed; you are hustled aside. We
are told that the matter is too deep for common under-
standings like ours."

That was the situation obtaining at the time we fought
our last great war upon the Continent of Europe. That
was the situation obtaining in the years which immediately
preceded the present war. That is the situation obtaining
to-day. Now, as then, when it comes to matters of
foreign policy we are not free men. We are, indeed, less
free, if possible, than we were in 1858, because of late
years — during the past twelve years especially — the strings
of secrecy have been drawn tighter and tighter round the
operations of our foreign policy, with the natural result
that Parliamentary sense of responsibility for foreign
policy has weakened and public interest in foreign policy
has waned.

And yet what are the issues which our foreign policy
decides? They are issues which affect every one of us
more nearly than any national issue can conceivable do.
They are the issues of life and death hanging in the scale
for multitudes.

Those issues, nevertheless, are determined without our
cognisance and without our control. When we inquire
into them, we are snubbed, we are hustled aside.

I enumerate the following facts by way of illustrating
the applicability of John Bright's words to existing condi-
tions, and when I say existing conditions I mean the
conditions which preceded the war and the conditions of
to-day. I make no charges against individuals. I shall
offer no opinion on the merits of the policy itself which the
facts affect. I shall merely give the facts themselves, and
follow them by the briefest of comments.

My first illustration is this. It will be well within your
recollection that in 1905, and again in 191 1, this nation
stood on the brink of war in connection with the contro-
versy over Morocco.

Now, for seven years — from 1904 to 191 1 — the people
of this country were kept in ignorance of the fact that
attached to the published Anglo-French Treaty over
Morocco in. 1904 there were secret clauses and a secret
Treaty — the complement of those secret clauses ; that these
secret arrangement provided (when the Powers benefiting

OUR NATIONAL & IMPERIAL PROBLEM 237

under them 1 considered the time was ripe) for the political
and economic partition in their favour of Morocco, in which
country another European Power2 had interests formally
recognised in one3, and subsequently in two4 international
conventions, to both of which the British Government was
signatory, and the second of which solemnly pledged the
signatories to uphold the independence and integrity of
Morocco.

Of these secret arrangements it can be said with incon-
trovertible accuracy, and without raising points of
controversy : First, that they weighed upon, and affected
in constant fashion, the whole direction of our foreign
policy in the ensuing years. Secondly, that the ignorance
in which the nation was kept of their existence affected
fundamentally the national judgment in regard to the
friction, almost resulting in war, to which the Morocco
controversy gave rise.

My second illustration is this : For eight years — from
1906 to 1 91 4 — the people of this country were kept in
ignorance of the fact that the Cabinet, or a section of it,
had authorised periodic consultations and preparations for
combined action upon the Continent between the nation's
military advisers and the military advisers of the French
Republic; and that, arising out of these consultations, this
nation was held to have contracted obligations of honour
towards that Continental Power.

My third illustration is this : —

For three years — 1912 to 1915 — the people of this
country were kept in ignorance of the fact that, after a
protracted effort to find a formula of words which should
define with nice exactitude what they conceived their
official relations towards one another to be, our Govern-
ment and the Government of Germany had failed to find
that formula — a failure which, in the circumstances of the
case, was invested with the utmost gravity for the future
of the peoples for whom these Governments were trustees.

Of the two sets of facts which provide my second and
third illustrations, it may be said with truth, without
entering upon a discussion of events not yet ripe for
discussion : — First, that the ignorance in which the nation
was kept of them prevented a due appreciation of the

1 France and Spain.
3 Germany.

3 The Madrid Convention, 1880.

4 The Algeciras Act, 1906.

238 TRUTH AND THE WAR

perils which lay ahead of it; secondly, that these facts
necessitated, and must have occasioned, had the nation
been made aware of them, either a cpmplete and timely
alteration in the accepted conception of national strategy
(which would admittedly have avoided many of the diffi-
culties and dangers with which we are now confronted),
or such a full Parliamentary and national discussion of the
international situation affecting the national policy and
the national interests as might quite conceivably have
averted these threatened perils.

Finally — and this is my last illustration — the nation is
entirely ignorant to-day of the ultimate purposes which
the States with which it is allied — the personnel of whose
Governments has been largely changed since the war broke
out — are pursuing in this war.1 The nation knows that
there is a quadruple arrangement between its Government
and the Governments of three of its Allies not to conclude
a separate peace. But it has no clear notion of the ideas
entertained by any one of those Governments as to the sort
of settlement it would be prepared to accept, or whether
those views, whatever they may be, are considered by this
Government to be binding upon this nation. Meantime
this 1 nation has already advanced sums to those Govern-
ments, sufficient, so we are officially informed, to maintain
three millions of their soldiers in the field, and is pledged,
apparently, to further advances before the end of the
financial year.

I know that I am expressing the conviction of a rapidly
increasing number of thoughtful men, not confined to any
particular school of domestic politics, when I say that to
conduct foreign policy behind the back of the nation in this
way constitutes one of the greatest possible dangers to the
security of the State.

And I know I am expressing the views of a very much
greater number of citizens, who are beginning to realise
that every detail of their lives — the condition of their
homes, the well-being of their families, their employment,
their wages, their food — are intimately connected with the

1 It has been affirmed since this speech was delivered, by such
high authorities on Balkan affairs as Mr. Seton Watson and Sir
Arthur Evans, that a secret understanding has been arrived at
between the Allies whereby the Slav population of Dalmatia is made
over to Italy as part of Italy's price for entering the war. It has
also been affirmed by M. Miluikoff and Dr. Dillon that.Great Britain
has agreed to a Russian possession of Constantinople. Neither of
these affirmations has been denied.

OUR NATIONAL & IMPERIAL PROBLEM 239

conduct and direction of their foreign policy : when I say
that the present methods constitute a flagrant injustice to
the people at large, and must be abandoned.

The U.D.C. has formulated a series of urgently needed
reforms, and there can be no doubt that were these reforms
to be loyally and integrally applied they would go a very
long way indeed to remove the present anomalies, injustice,
and dangers. They would undoubtedly abolish that
secrecy, which is the greatest danger— and which should
be the chief object of reform.

But I feel personally convinced that we shall have to
accustom ourselves to the idea of contemplating far more
drastic changes than any of these, which, in the main,
are changes merely of custom and procedure.

When we talk of democracy and democratic control
of British foreign policy we have to remember that, while
the claim of the democracy of this country to control the
issues of national life and death must come first, because
they are incomparably greater and because the burden laid
upon the democracy of this country is incomparably
heavier, there are four other democracies sharing that
burden with this democracy, and that the claims of these
other democracies cannot be ignored.

It appears to me that it will be quite impossible when
the war is over to stave off any longer the demand of our
self-governing Dominions, which they have so clearly
earned the right to press, for a share, and a full share, in
the formation and in the character, control, and discussion
of foreign policy.

With the conclusion of peace, and probably before it,
we shall find ourselves confronted with this problem.

Even before the war, when the Canadian contribution
to the Fleet was carried through the Dominion Parliament,
Sir Robert Borden — then, as now, Canadian Premier —
was emphatic on the point. Speaking on December 15,
1912, he said :—

When Great Britain no longer assumes sole responsibility for
defence upon the high seas she can no longer undertake to assume
responsibility for, and sole control of, foreign policy, which is closely,
vitally, and constantly associated with that defence in which the
Doninious participate. It has been declared in the past, and even
during recent years, that responsibility for foreign policy would not
be shared by Great Britain with the Dominions. In my humble
opinion, adherence to such a position would have but one, and that
a most disastrous, result.

240 TRUTH AND THE WAR

Since the war another of Canada's leading men, who
enjoys peculiar authority, has used much the same
language. Sir Clifford Sifton, at the Canadian Club,
Montreal, delivered himself of the following unanswerable
proposition last January : —

Bound by no constitution, bound by no rule or law, equity, or
obligation, Canada has decided as a nation to make war. We have
levied an army ; we have sent the greatest army to England that has
ever crossed the Atlantic to take part in the battles of England. We
have placed ourselves in opposition to great world Powers. We are
now training and equipping an army greater than the combined
forces of Wellington and Napoleon at the Battle of Waterloo, and
so I say to you that Canada must now stand as a nation. It will
no longer do for Canada to play the part of a minor. The nations
will say : "If you can levy armies to make war you can attend to
your own business, and we will not be referred to the head of the
Empire; we want you to answer our questions directly."

What holds good for Canada holds good for Australia
and New Zealand — whose sons have earned imperishable
fame in Gallipoli — and for the Union of South Africa,
which is even now engaged, at our Government's request,
in raising a large force for operations against the Germans
in German East Africa.

We cannot evade the problem. But its solution will
necessitate profound and far-reaching changes in our
Constitution, changes which, imperfectly understood by
the public and badly handled by a Government distrustful
of public opinion, might well shake the British Common-
wealth to its foundations.

There is only one way by which the ship of State can
be steered through the many shoals and rapids with which
the chart of our future is marked — for our own people, for
the institutions they have built up, for the principles for
which we have long stood, for the faiths which we hold —
and that way is for the Government of this realm to take
the people into its confidence, fully and completely.

Hitherto the nation in all these matters has been
treated — the nation has allowed itself to be treated — as an
infant in swaddling clothes. Its rulers have committed it,
have been allowed to commit it, to unknown courses for
ends obscure, even to themselves. They have whittled
away the prerogatives of Parliament until that once proud
assembly is in danger of sinking to the level of a second-
class debating academy as regards these vital issues.
They have tried, and they have been permitted to try, to
govern without the nation, relying more and more upon

OUR NATIONAL & IMPERIAL PROBLEM 241

cheap and nasty newspaper associations to give the lead
they desired the nation to follow, with the not unnatural
result that the chosen instruments now call the tune to
which Ministers are fain reluctantly to dance.

All this is bad, unwholesome, perilous.

The key to its explanation and the key to its remedy
lies here.

Something may be said in favour of a despotic form of
government. A good deal, we think, can be said in
favour of a democratic form of government. But no
State can manage its affairs for long upon a mixture of
both without inviting consequences fatal to its stability.

And that is what this State is trying to do, and has
been trying to do, in all matters which affect the issues
of national life and death.

CHAPTER XXIX.

The Alleged "Conflict of Ideals"1

HAVE said that the essential problems which confront
the nations in their international relationship before the
war will not be changed by the war, but will confront the
negotiators at the settlement and the peoples after the
settlement; and that there must be on the part of each
belligerent people a conscious and sustained effort of the
will to understand the nature of these problems as their
own destinies and the destinies of their neighbours are
affected by them. This effort is particularly incumbent
upon the people of Great Britain, since, as I have already
remarked, the war to-day is to all intents and purposes
an Anglo-German war, and Anglo-German enmity alone
prevents its collapse. If, therefore, the war is not to be
prolonged to the stage when ordered government itself
becomes impossible, and if the war is not to be followed
by a renewed period of armed peace, with a series of fresh
wars in prospect, a real intellectual effort is needed here
at home to understand what is the paramount necessity
laid upon Germany by the factor of growth. And when I
use that word, I mean it as applying to Germany's own
growth in population and in industry, and also to the all-
round growth in the demands of modern industry for the
raw materials of the tropics and subtropics on the one hand
and the all-round growth in the cost of foodstuffs on the
other — both outstanding phenomena of the past two
decades.

Among the tragic failures — of prescience, temper,
common sense — which have led Europe to its present pass,
there is none, after making every allowance for German
mistakes and the arrogance peculiar to the nouveau riche
(in individuals as in nations), more tragic, and none which
has been more intimately responsible for this world-war
than the unwillingness or the incapacity — probably, in
major degree, the incapacity — of the British ruling class

1 The Labour Leader, November 25, 1915.
242

THE ALLEGED "CONFLICT OF IDEALS" 243

to grasp Germany's economic problem, which during the
past quarter of a century has, in increasing measure,
governed and determined the character of her international
relationships. The blunders of German diplomacy, the
crass ignorance of British psychology and British institu-
tions exhibited by the ordinary German official, the appre-
hensions excited over here by the development of the
German Navy, and the unbridled licence of the mischief-
making Press in both countries — these have had their full
share in obscuring the vital issues beneath a fog of miscon-
ception. But the absence in British governing circles of
a broad-minded and comprehending grip of Germany's
economic situation arising from her automatic growth
and the ineAritable effect of that situation in creating and
justifying her Weltpolitik; the absence, in short, of that
political insight and discrimination which goes under the
name of statesmanship, among those who have directed
our foreign policy in recent years, has been (combined with
the general secrecy of diplomatic methods everywhere)
one of the chief elements in producing that state of tension
in Anglo-German relations, thanks to which, and thanks
to which alone, an Austro-Russian squabble in the Balkans
has lit a European conflagration where seven millions of
the flower of European manhood have already been
consumed.

The attempt to throw the bridge of reason across the
) torrent of human passion which is hurrying the British and
I German peoples along the road to bankruptcy is the more
difficult to-day, when even those who take the sanest view
of our own grave national and Imperial problems endorse
the postulate that this war is fundamentally a war between
two ideals, the ideal of liberty incarnated in the British
Constitution, and the ideal of tyrannous reaction incar-
nated in the German Confederation. We have advanced
so far in that error that the public accepts without a
murmur the open threats of violence to Greece indulged
in by powerful London newspapers in the event of Greece
not doing our bidding; so far, that organs of the Press
which used to be "Liberal" complacently envisage, in the
name of liberty, a future Europe in which the present
Allies, armed to the teeth, shall "permanently hold down"
a forcibly disarmed Germany !

What, then, is the nature and significance of Germany's
economic problem, arising inexorably from her own growth
and the growth of world phenomena affecting her national

244 TRUTH AND THE WAR

future ? I denned it myself in the last chapter of "Morocco
in Diplomacy," published in the spring of 1912, as
follows : —

"The guiding motive of German foreign policy to-day
is to secure for the German people unfettered access to
markets over-seas, as large a share as possible in the
development of these markets, and a voice in the acquisi-
tion of over-sea territories which may pass, through the
course of events, into the International melting pot. It
is not land hunger, but trade hunger, which inspires her,
and trade hunger responds to the fundamental demand of
her national existence."

To every word then written I adhere, and if you
want the statistical proof of their truth, you will find it in
the fact that more than half of Germany's imports is
composed of raw material for manufacture. German
"World-policy," that Weltpolitik which the political mind
has associated with aggression, because the political mind
has regarded it exclusively from a political point of view,
and which the Jingo Press has dinned into our ears
morning and evening, must be aggressive from its very
title (although Weltpolitik has been the breath of our own
national nostrils since Elisabeth), is the product, not of
political design, but of sheer economic necessity, outcome
of growth. No doubt it has been expressed, often enough,
in a manner calculated to offend susceptibilities, although
I hardly think that any German utterance has exceeded
the erstwhile performances of Mr. Grover Cleveland. But
it is the business of statesmen to discover and appreciate
the motive forces lying beneath the surface of diplomatic
or royal demonstrations.

Let us consider this economic problem of Germany,
whence it springs, and how it has revolutionised the condi-
tions of her national existence — for the problem is not a
thing of yesterday, but of to-day and to-morrow. It
governs the future as well as the present. In the last
forty-five years the population of Germany has more than
half doubled itself. It has risen from 40,000,000 to
65,000,000, and before the war it was increasing from
three-quarters of a million to a million per annum. To
find food and work for an immense natural growth of this
kind must ever be the primary obligation laid upon the
Government of a community so prolific. As Mr. Dawson
pointed out with irrefutable truth some years ago : —

THE ALLEGED "CONFLICT OF IDEALS" 245

"The position of Germany is that of a prolific nation
which is growing beyond the physical conditions of its
surroundings."

And Germany alone among the nations of Europe has
been faced with the tremendous perplexities incidental to
a problem of this kind. Her Government had either to
sustain this population at home, or encourage its emigra-
tion to foreign countries. Now, so long as the spirit
of national entity exists, no Government and no national
organism will be satisfied that foreign countries should
benefit exclusively from the surplusage of its population.
Germany possessed no over-sea territories affording the
necessary climatic requirements for the expansion of a
White people. The policy of her statesmen was, there-
fore, bound to be centripetal and not centrifugal. In
other words, they had to meet their problem by centralisa-
tion and not by decentralisation. They had to concentrate
and not disseminate their human material.

Two points have to be noted, first, the necessity ;
secondly, the decision. The centrifugal policy, the policy
of radiation from the centre, was impracticable, because
the means were not available : no temperate zones were
in the market. The centripetal policy, the policy of con-
centration of national effort within the boundaries of the
State, was, therefore, deliberately adopted, and has been
deliberately and scientifically pursued and systematised.
Both food and work were found for the population at home. /
Emigration dwindled, virtually to vanishing point. An
immense industrial system was built up. While other
Powers — the lambs of the international picture as painted
to-day — were waging war here, there, and everywhere,
in Manchuria, South Africa, Tripoli, Abyssinia, Morocco,
the Sudan ; Germany, while fully prepared for war, did not
wage it, but devoted the national energy to consolidating,
perfecting, and training her population in industrial
pursuits, calling upon all the inventive genius and
laborious, painstaking, hardworking qualities of the race ;
improving her hygienic and municipal undertakings to a
degree which caused other nations to seek her counsels;
penetrating every foreign market accessible, rivalling and
outpacing old-established competitors by sheer application
of intellect and system to commercial and industrial
development. Two years before the war broke out
Germany's foreign trade stood at ^"982,615,000; in 1888
(18)

H6 TRUTH AND THE WAR

her foreign trade only amounted to ^323,585,000. In
24 years it had trebled itself, showing an annual average
rate of increase of 8.5 per cent., compared with Great
Britain's 4.1 per cent.

And it is precisely when we contemplate these facts
that the fallacy of so much that is now being written about
the divergence between British "Imperial" ideals and
German "Imperial" ideals becomes so apparent. German
professors and publicists may rave to-day about "destroy-
ing" the British Empire, just as British professors and
publicists rave about "destroying" Germany and
' 'grinding her to powder. ' ' But the policy actually followed
by Germany's rulers — imposed upon Germany's rulers by
accomplished facts — during the past quarter of a century,
has been a policy moving in a direction absolutely con-
trary to the forcible wresting of temperate zones over-seas
from the peoples which inhabit those zones . in order to
create therein German-speaking communities. The belief
which attributes to the rulers of Germany a deep-laid plot,
hatched for years past, to acquire Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, South Africa ("destroy the British Empire," in
other words), is a belief founded in ignorance of the whole
trend of German policy and of the economic necessities
dictating it, and also upon a radically faulty concept of the
relationship existing between Great Britain and her self-
governing Dominions. The British self-governing
Dominions are inhabited by a white population of 14
millions invested with complete control over their own
affairs, except (and it is a big exception which cannot
be perpetuated without wrecking the Empire), in so far
as their own affairs are affected by the foreign policy of
Downing Street. The Germans would not "possess"
these countries even if they could conquer them, any more
than we possess them ; and, in practice, Germany, having
conquered these countries, would be no more able to coerce
and control them than we are, without coming to grief,
even as we came to grief when we tried that procedure in
the case of the American Colonies.

And when we are gravely told, as we are to-day, that
this war is a struggle between irreconcilable British and
German "Imperial" ideals, between two "opposing
systems," and so forth, meaning thereby the fundamental
divergence between the British and German notions of the
relationship which should exist between the Central
Authority and over-sea communities of the same stock on

THE ALLEGED "CONFLICT OF IDEALS" 247

the one hand, and between the Central Authority and
communities of alien stock, but incorporated within the
boundaries of the Central State, on the other hand; when
we are told these things, what is our reply ? Our reply
is this. The similitude implied, in order to point a moral
from the divergence, is non-existent. There is no material
for comparison, for the simple reason that Germany has
never had to face an Imperial problem involving the
creation of any kind of relationship between the Mother
Country and over-sea communities of German stock ; and,
secondly, because we have never had to face the German
Imperial problem of determining the character of the
relationship which should prevail between the
Central Authority and alien communities within the
territorial boundaries of the State subject to that
Central Authority. Our nearest approach to the
German Imperial problem is the case of Ireland, and our
record in Ireland should make us chary of using the sort of
arguments current to-day, because the very faults com-
mitted by Germany in Poland and Alsace-Lorraine,
covering a few decades in the matter of time, have been
committed by us in Ireland for centuries, and an influential
Party in the State is still bitterly opposed to our correcting
them.

All this talk about a conflict of ideals being the rock
bottom of the war, a conflict so deep-seated and racial that
it can only be settled by the "complete overthrow" of
either Britain or Germany, is, therefore, as applied to the
domain of actual facts, an extraordinary hallucination,
typical of that looseness of thought which catch-phrases
engender. There is no such conflict, because Germany
has never had the opportunity of demonstrating whether
she possesses or does not possess the political sagacity
to treat great white communities of her own stock over-
seas as we have learned by bitter experience is the right
way to treat them. There is no such conflict, because we
have not been called upon to handle the problem of the
government of vast agglomerations of alien peoples within
our territorial boundaries, the case of the Irish —
separated from us by sea, but at our doors — approximating
most nearly to the German problem, and our dealings with
the Irish not having been of a character such as to entitle
us to declare that our regard for alien communities sub-
jected to our immediate control places us upon a moral
pedestal compared with the Germans. There is no such

248 TRUTH AND THE WAR

conflict, because the part Britain and Germany have had
to play in the world has been utterly different; permitting
of no possible political analogy.

If the war is indefinitely prolonged, a direct or subsi-
dised attack upon any portion of the British Empire,
territorially accessible to Germany or her Allies, is probable
enough. But that will be part of the strategy of war,
and not of any supposed conflict of political ideals respon-
sible for the war itself.

CHAPTER XXX.
Germany's Human and Economic Problem1

A people which increases fifty per cent, in a generation must be a
colonising people, must have a great over-seas commerce, must, there-
fore, have a great navy. — /. Holland Rose, in "Germany in the
Nineteenth Century."

Germany has a population to-day of over 65,000,000 of people,
who are confronted with problems at home as well as abroad. They
are the best clients of the United Kingdom ; they also do a very large
trade with France (buying more from her than they sell), and an
enormous trade — an average of ^90,000,000 annually — with Russia.
Therefore, if the Governments of the Powers who form the Triple
Understanding are business men, they will desire that Germany may
solve not only her foreign difficulties, but her anomalies in home
administration, as well as the social and fiscal questions in dispute,
so that her toiling millions may increase in numbers and in wealth,
and require larger and larger supplies of foreign products for their
manufactures and their bodily consumption. — Sir Harry Johnston, in
"Views and Reviews." (Williams and Nor gate. 19 12.)

F I return to Germany's economic problem, resulting
.from the growth in her population, it is because there can
be no "New Europe" if that problem, and its effect upon
international relations, is not understood; and, above all,
by the people of this country. It is one of the capital
issues underlying the condition of Europe to-day, and it is
one of the capital issues inseparably bound up with the
sort of future which is reserved for Europe after the war.
The problem will subsist substantially unimpaired in its
essentials by the war. If the settlement does not take
it into account, the settlement cannot in the nature of
things be a permanent one. A few years, at the most a
decade or two, and the problem re-asserts itself automati-
cally. Its solution can be sought, however, by action
which would not only relieve the arterial pressure in Ger-
many, but at one and the same time confer lasting benefit
upon humanity at large. That action would consist in the
establishment, by common consent, of freedom of com-
merce and the "open door" for all commercial transactions
(i.e., unrestricted by differential tariffs and exclusive privi-

1 The Labour Leader, December 2, 1915.
249

250 TRUTH AND THE WAR

leges) by the nationals of every European State in the
dependencies which have been, or may be, acquired
by those States outside Europe. It would mean
ridding Africa and Asia of the curse of the
monopolist, the protectionist, and the concessionaire,
whose selfish interests provide the Chancelleries of
Europe with most of their recriminating matter and with
the raw material of their intrigues. It would make for
peace in Europe, in Asia,1 and in Africa. It would make
for commercial and political honesty and international
decency. It would not benefit Germany at the expense of
other nations. It would ensure a fair field and no favour
for all nations, and prove an inestimable boon to the
"coloured" subjects of colonising States.

So far as Germany is concerned, let us glance at her
problem once more. We have seen that her rulers were
compelled, in the absence of colonisable areas suitable for
white settlement, to concentrate the tremendous elemental
force with which Nature was endowing their country, within
the boundaries of the State, which necessitated providing
that force with sustenance and with labour. Now, despite
artificial fiscal efforts the agricultural resources of the State
were insufficient to supply foodstuffs in adequate quantity
for the increased population. Germany's position has been
steadily approximating to our own. She has become more
and more dependent upon imported food. But to buy food
from abroad you must pay for it, and, in the ultimate
resort, you can only pay for it in goods. Put otherwise,
a population unable to sustain itself with the necessaries
of life from its own territory must be in a position to
purchase its requirements by producing articles to sell to
foreign food-producers in exchange. Similarly, a popula-
tion increasing prodigiously, but concentrated at home by
force of circumstances, must be kept employed. To
furnish these articles and to provide this employment the
raw material from which goods can be manufactured must
be available in abundance. To sell these articles to the
best advantage in the face of a universal competition
entails not only access to existing markets in Europe,
where in most cases discriminating tariffs have to be
reckoned with; it entails unhampered access to new
markets overseas of vast potentiality in raw material,

1 I am assuming that the "open-door" in China is not closed by
Japan as the outcome of an attempt on the latter's part to exercise
complete control over China's internal and external policy.

GERMANY'S ECONOMIC PROBLEM 251

both for trade and for the employment of capital designed
to intensify the flow of that raw material towards the
centres of home manufacture. In the measure in which
access to these new markets is hampered by discriminating
tariffs, set up by those who control these new markets
and by other restrictive measures, the problem confronting
a Power in Germany's unique position must be rendered
more complex and more difficult to solve. Free and
expanding markets have become for Germany an indis-
pensable necessity of her people's livelihood. As Mr.
Dawson, writing at a time when men's judgments were
not obscured by the passions of war, has put it : "To the
nation collectively extended markets are a condition of
life."

Dr. Paul Rohrbach, the well-known German economist,
quoted by the same writer, states the case with admirable
lucidity : —

"The number of those who must live on foreign corn
increase, and the increases will soon be a million a year.
Whoever cannot get rid of this million is bound to answer
the question how otherwise he will feed them than by the
produce of our industry — in the manufacture of raw
material brought from abroad and the sale of our products
to foreign nations, or the produce of the capital created
here and invested abroad. If that is so, then for Germany
all questions of foreign politics1 must be viewed from
the standpoint of the creation and maintenance of markets
abroad, and especially in trans-oceanic countries. For
good or ill, we must accustom ourselves in our political
thinking to the application of the same principles as the
English. In England the determination of foreign policy
according to the requirements of trade, and, therefore,
of industry, is an axiom of the national consciousness
which no one any longer disputes. If the possibility of
disposing of its industrial products abroad were one day to
cease or to be limited for England, the immediate result
would be, not merely the economic ruin of millions of
industrial existences on both sides of the ocean, but the
political collapse of Britain as a Great Power. Yet the
position is not materially different for ourselves."

Now, if we can lay hold of this pivotal fact and get it
firmly fixed in our minds, we shall be able not only to
understand how utterly impossible it is to expect that a
durable peace in Europe can be secured by any of the

<2$z TRUTH AND THE WAR

nostrums for penalising Germany which are being dangled
before the national vision, but how impossible it is to
suppose that a permanent cure for Europe's ills is to be
found if enormous regions in Africa and Asia continue to
be treated by the States which administer them as privi-
leged preserves for their own. nationals, especially when
the States which so administer them are free from the
internal problems which press upon Germany; and, too,
if an area of the world's surface one quarter larger than
Europe, inhabited by a population only 33 millions less
than that of Europe, is liable to become a privileged area
for British nationals by the accident of a British General
Election.

The three great Imperial colonising Powers (excluding
Germany), are Britain, France, and Russia. Excluding
the self-governing Dominions of the Empire, which are,
of course, in all fiscal matters independent States, the
British Government can determine the fiscal policy of an
area covering one-tenth of the world's surface and
inhabited by a little more than one-fourth of the world's
total inhabitants.1 Britain has hitherto discriminated
against none of her commercial rivals throughout this
gigantic area, and that is one of the reasons why, as
Britons, we are justified in asserting that the British
administration of those vast tracts is unselfishly exercised
so far as other European nations are concerned. Were a
strong Protectionist Party, however, to come into power
at the end of this war and carry out its long threatened
programme, the whole world, and especially the nation
which comes next to our own in productive capacity, would
suffer, and international relations would again become
poisoned in consequence. For us, the result would be
that we should have to build against the whole world, and
maintain a permanent army on a large scale to prepare for
the Continental coalition which would infallibly come about
sooner or later.

The case of France and Russia is different. France
now owns very nearly half Africa and over 300,000 miles
in Asia. In Asia the Russian Empire extends over just
under one-third of that continent; and both France and
Russia discriminate to the uttermost practicable extent
against foreign merchandise and foreign enterprise, except
where restricted from doing so — and the restrictions are

1 The area of the British dependencies is 5,091,000 square miles,
and the population is 369,000,000.

GERMANY'S ECONOMIC PROBLEM 253

confined to a few areas in French West Africa, and these
only for a term of years which has nearly expired — by inter-
national agreement.1

The case of France and Germany respectively may be
taken, by way of illustration of the impossible situation
which is created in the world so long- as great colonial
Powers use their privileges to create for themselves and
their nationals exclusive advantages, to the detriment of
other Powers, for whom the need of free markets over-
seas is a national necessity. This can best be shown in
a table : —

Population :---

France " 39,601,509

Germany 64,925,993

Excess of deaths over births : —

France 34,869

Excess of births over deaths : —

Germany 740,431

Foreign trade (1912) : —

France ^"583,488,000

Germany ^"982,615,000

That was the situation before the war.2 It is, it would
seem, to be further aggravated after the war. France and
England are to drive Germany from the African Continent
altogether. They are to seize and retain her dependencies
therein, and they are to combine for the purpose of
"smashing" her over-seas trade. Yet Germany is driven
by the immutable laws which govern the existence of
States either to secure free markets over-seas or to secure
over-sea territory which she can develop free from the
unfair competition of hostile tariffs, or perish ! Of course,
if you can really "destroy" Germany the problem is solved.
Personally, I do not regard that operation as within the
range of possibility.

The Government of every nation engaged in this war
has repeatedly declared that it is waging war in order to
secure a durable peace at the end of it. A durable peace
cannot be secured from the military results of the war. It
can only be secured by a joint effort to recognise the

1 I assume, of course, that the Franco-German Convention in
Morocco has gone by the board.

3 In the decade preceding the last census, which in France was
taken in 1911, and in Germany in 1912, the population of Germany
increased by 8| millions, and the population of France by 639,564.

254 TRUTH AND THE WAR

peculiar needs of each nation, and by the admission,
expressed in political acts, that natural growth must find
an outlet and cannot be artificially stifled. The following
table illustrates a further aspect of the problem we have
been, here considering, and, like the preceding one, crystal-
lises a series of facts which can only be disregarded by
the expedient the ostrich is said to adopt when pursued.
The States of Europe are being pursued to-day by the
nemesis of their own past follies, and they cannot find
salvation by imitating the ostrich.

Population : —

United Kingdom 45,369,090

Germany °4>925>993

Increase in last decade : —

United Kingdom 3,392,263

Germany 8,558,815

Foreign trade : —

United Kingdom ^"1,344,168,421

Germany ^943,050,000

Growth of foreign trade in last 25 years : —

United Kingdom 100.7 Per cent.

Germany 204 per cent.

Actual increase in. aggregate value of foreign trade in
last 25 years : —

United Kingdom ^562,025,000

Germany ^659,030,000

I shall now show that the enormous importance which
attaches to the future colonial policy of European States in
determining what the future of Europe is to be, is fully
apprehended by representative men belonging to neutral
and even to belligerent States.

CHAPTER XXXI.
The Eternal International Irritant1

If you think that, not being able to sell freely, we should mend
ourselves by giving up the power to buy freely, I must leave you to
that opinion, only expressing my wonder at it. But you will perhaps
say that we can force other nations to reduce their tariffs if we impose
a tariff against them. You forget, probably, that we have tried
that in past times, and that it has wholly failed. — John Bright.

THE war of to-morrow will be a war, not between
nations, but between influences and forces within
nations divided into two opposing camps, those upholding
the conception that force must be the ultimate Court of
Appeal for conflicts between nations, and those determined
that other means must be found. If we are to equip our-
selves efficiently for this struggle we must look out upon
the world as it is and frame our action in conformity there-
with. We must not act and argue as though the world
were what we wished it to be, and what, no doubt, it
ought to be. Nor shall we achieve our ends by supposing |
that it is within our power to start right away fashioning
a new world. The new world will grow out of the reformed I
world. But first the existing world has to be reformed. \|
The struggle for the internal reform of nations, i.e.^ fairer
adjustment of nationally earned wealth, equality of oppor-
tunity, the obligation upon the State to find work for all
and to exact work from all, and so forth, can proceed side
by side with the struggle for the reform of international
relationships. But so long as the latter problem is not
solved, the former proceeds under a perpetual menace. For
what measure, not merely of finality, but even of assured
and cumulative progress, can be achieved within a State
when the whole internal economy of that State is open to
violent dislocation at any moment by war — by war which
diverts the national resources from the amelioration of
internal conditions to the destruction of the nation's clients
in neighbouring States, thus in a double sense hampering
the nation's advance? The utmost precariousness and
1 The Labour Leader, December 23, 1915.
255

256 TRUTH AND THE WAR

perennial delay must of necessity characterise the internal
improvement of States until the wider problem is solved.

And when we look out upon the world as it is, what
is the irritant we observe everywhere at work poisoning
the relationship between nations? The tariff. And it is
a poison which increases in virulence with the growth of
population. The closer the intercommunication between
peoples, the greater the facilities for the exchange of com-
modities, the nearer the peoples are drawn to one another
by mutual needs. How singular is it to reflect that while
the operation of natural forces tends more and more to the
abolition of frontiers as obstacles to human intercourse
and to a fusing and commingring of human interests, a
restricted section of every community is permitted by the
Governments to interpose artificial barriers thereto, and
how grimly ironic that the very influences which ought to
make for increasingly harmonious relations become
charged, owing to these artificial barriers, with matter
making for bitterness, jealousy, and discord. Tariffs pro-
duced the tension which in the middle of last century
almost determined war between France and England.
Within the present generation France and Italy have nearly
come to blows over tariffs. In the last twenty-five years
tariffs have over and again embittered the relations of
Britain and France, and France and Germany. The Tariff
Reform campaign, here gathered copious harvests of inter-
national ill-will from the home tariffs of Germany, and the
threat of constructing a tariff wall round the British Empire
provoked German anger and alarm. The decision of
the Russian Government in March of last year to impose
heavy tariffs upon German rye and flour helped to precipi-
tate the events of August. And to-day our tariff
worshippers are busy laying plans to sow the seeds of
future hatreds when this war is over.

The opening up of new vast markets over-seas,
primarily due to the rapid development of European indus-
tries and consequent demand for increased quantities of
raw material, has intensified the friction and quadrupled
the dangers arising out of it. For to tariffs pure and
simple have been added special forms of monopolies and
privileges of an exclusive character. True, neither Britain
nor Germany has been guilty in this respect. Germany
has not imported her home tariffs into her colonial posses-
sions. She has preserved therein the open door. Britain
has maintained her home traditions in all her dependencies,

THE INTERNATIONAL IRRITANT 257

although she has accepted preferential treatment from the
Dominions. But while British fiscal policy has remained
sound, British foreign policy has for the past twelve years
been identified with the political interests of Colonial
Protectionist Powers, and against the interest of the only
other Colonial Free Trade Power1 except Britain. This
association has led on the one hand to the present topsy
turvydom — Free-Trade Britain helping Protectionist France
and Russia in their extra-European interests against Free-
Trade Germany — and, on the other, has undoubtedly
strengthened the tariff elements in Britain in their agitation
for Imperial Protection, an agitation promoted by the
immense increase in. German trade, and assisted, in its
popular appeal, by the Protectionism of Germany at home.
The part this fatal economic policy has played in shaping
the events which led to the war is beyond question, and
here lies, perhaps, the most vital of all the reforms which
clamour for broad and far-seeing international statesman-
ship, if the "New Europe" of the future is to emerge from
the region of hope to the region of fact. Cobden's vision
not only went to the root of the actual, it pierced the future.
We read his utterances with reverence, for if they embodied
the truth in his time, they apply with tenfold significance
to the world of to-day. Unhampered commercial inter-
course, the right of all peoples to exchange their produce
and their merchandise on a basis of mutual equality — this
still remains the greatest of all reforms to be accom-
plished in the relationship of States. The evil needs
attacking all along the line, both in. its actual manifesta-
tions and in its potential threats. It can be attacked more
effectively where its establishment is recent and where,
for a multiplicity of reasons, it is more easily approached —
i.e., in the Colonial field.

This is realised by the able and distinguished men who
have drawn, up the "Minimum Programme for a Durable
Peace," and who before many months — perhaps weeks —
will assemble at Berne to discuss it. Twenty-six countries
are represented upon the Council of the coming conference,
including the United States, the Argentine, Austria-
Hungary, Belgium, Britain, Brazil, Canada, Denmark,
France, Greece, Holland, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden,
Italy, Spain, and Roumania. One of the resolutions reads
as follows : —

1 I.e., among the Great Powers. Holland pursues a Free Trade
Colonial policy.

258 TRUTH AND THE WAR

"The Powers shall agree to introduce freedom of trade,
or, at least, equality of treatment for all nations, into their
colonies, protectorates, and spheres of influence."

Here are some notable passages from the statement
issued in support of the resolution : —

"The opinion is universally entertained that economic
rivalry has contributed more than has any other motive
to the present war; it is evident in any case that the
commercial competition between Germany and Great
Britain profoundly troubled the relations of the two
countries; thus a conflict was created which became one
of the principal causes of the world war."

Were the friends of peace of the last century mistaken,
then, the document asks, when in urging freedom of trade,
which implies the most widespread competition, they
argued that the unrestricted exchange of goods between
peoples was symbolic of human solidarity? Obviously
not. For it is not international competition in the
purchase and sale of merchandise which leads to armed
conflict between States. What does so is the action of
Governments in seeking to create, in specific cases, privi-
leged conditions for their nationals at the expense of other
nations.

"German, trade" and "British trade" are often spoken
of as though these two Empires were joint-stock
companies, one and indivisible in their interests and
pursuing commercial enterprises under the direction of
their Governments. Everyone knows that nothing of the
kind exists, and that, in point of fact, commercial competi-
tion in regular trade and in the exchange of ordinary goods
is much more intense between two British merchants or
between two German merchants than between English and
German merchants; and, on the other hand, that the
majority of the citizens of both countries have common
and identical interests."

After pointing out that the Protectionism adopted by
many States at home will only perish by degrees as a
democracy, growing in enlightenment and in power, is
able more and more to impose its will upon selfish interests,
the document contends that collective international action
in regard to Colonial Dependencies is perfectly feasible
and urgently necessary, and is the only policy compatible

THE INTERNATIONAL IRRITANT 259

with the duties of civilised nations towards races in a more
backward state. The document lays stress upon the fact
that : —

"Exclusivism in the Colonial field has become more
and more a fertile source of conflicts between States. It
is in the Colonial field that commercial competition tends
to assume a political complexion, and, consequently, to be
provocative of war. ' '

Britain, Germany, and Holland have adopted the policy
of the "open-door" in their Colonial Dependencies. Why
should not other countries ? The remedy is simple, and
would consist "in an undertaking between all colonising
States to put an end to a system of Colonial privilege,
preference, and favouritism." The compilers of the
Minimum Programme rightly insist that "freedom of
commerce" must mean more than mere "freedom of
exchange." Freedom of navigation, of employment of
capital, of the location of commercial undertakings, of
mineral enterprises — these must be free for all nations in
all Colonial Dependencies, i.e., the enterprise of all nations
must be on a footing of equality. If Customs dues are
imposed for revenue purposes, they must not be differential
dues, but applied to all goods, whatever their origin.

The document stigmatises as an illusion the idea that
national interests are really concerned in the international
friction to which the policy of the "shut door" in Colonial
Dependencies gives rise. It is individual interests which
are at stake, and these, by the influence they are able to
bring to bear upon Governments and in the Press, create
among the masses the illusion that national interests are
at stake.

It is cheering to read so lucid and truthful a statement
drawn up by well-known men from so many different
countries, and to find distinguished Belgians like M. Henri
Lambert and M. Paul Otlet devoting themselves, the
former especially,1 to the spread of the truth. It
encourages the hope that the immense movement which
will everywhere arise after the war against war as a
medium for the solution of international disputes, will

1 I would earnestly commend to those who may not have read it,
Lambert's "The Ethics of International Trade," published by
Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press (London, Edinburgh,
and Glasgow), and printed at the price of 2d. by Frederick Hall,
Oxford.

260 TRUTH AND THE WAR

concentrate upon the removal of positive factors in inter-
national relations which, so long as they exist, render a
durable peace utterly impossible.

It must come as a shock to those evil or ignorant
advisers of the British nation, who go on dinning into our
ears that the inherent wickedness and vile ambitions of
Germany were alone responsible for this war, and that a
durable peace can only come as the result of her destruction
as a first-class Power ; it must come as a shock to them to
find, after fifteen months of declamation, that they can
impose less and less upon international intelligence, and
to find that men of eminence, belonging to neutral, and
even Allied nations, are preparing for a rational solution.
But let us face the truth quite frankly. The stumbling
block to a Colonial understanding between the three great
Colonial Powers which are articulate — Britain, France,
and Germany — is the Colonial policy hitherto pursued by
France. Let us see whether, by the exercise of states-
manship in all three countries, that stumbling block cannot
be removed, and whether its removal, if practicable, might
not be the first step to the breaking down of the tariff
barriers which play such havoc with the interests of
European peoples.

CHAPTER XXXII.
The Way Out1

AN arrangement for the internationalisation of
commercial activity in the extra-European
Dependencies3 of the Colonial Powers and for the
neutralisation of the Dependencies themselves would
remove three-fifths, possibly four-fifths, of the cause of
potential conflicts between States. It would be a self-
denying ordinance on the part of the Governments, but
the peoples would be the material gainers thereby, apart
altogether from the immense gain derivable by them from
the elimination of the chief irritant in international
relations. And if the European Governments could be
induced to go thus far, it would be comparatively easy to
extend the principle to China, Persia, and other parts of
Asia and Africa ruled over by indigenous Governments
free from direct European tutelage, but necessarily
accessible to and swayed by European influence. In other
words, if agreement were possible in regard to the
Dependencies, there could be agreement to refrain from
pursuing exclusive commercial or political advantages
(which are usually the cloak to cover the former) in
independent Asiatic and African territories. There is
nothing Utopian or visionary in these suggestions. They
are eminently practicable. Their execution would involve
no diminution of commercial activity and business enter-
prise on the part of the nationals of any European State.

1 Written on December 24, 1915, i.e., before Mr. Runciman's
pronouncement in the House of Commons (January 10, 1916) :
published in the Labour Leader, January 20, 1916.

2 In using the term "Dependencies," instead of "Colonies," I
desire to avoid that confusion in ideas which leads to so much
muddled thinking on this subject. The term "Colony" is not
applicable to the vast tropical and sub-tropical areas which have been
drawn into the vortex of European political ambitions owing to
Europe's economic need for the raw material these areas produce.
They are not colonisable by white peoples. At the present time these
non-colonisable areas and the self-governing Dominions of the British
Empire are all lumped together as "Colonies."

261
(19)

262 TRUTH AND THE WAR.

But all would compete on equal terms. Acumen,
applicability to local conditions, up-to-date methods, hard
work — these would be the criterions of success.

I mean by the expression, "internationalisation of
commercial activities" in the Dependencies of the Powers,
tnat the nationals of all European States shall compete
on an equal footing in the Colonial Dependencies of each,
whether in commerce, industry, banking, mining, shipping,
or any other form of legitimate enterprise. I mean that a
Frenchman, an Italian, a Russian, a Dutchman, a
German, a Belgian, an Englishman, shall carry on his
business on equal terms in a French, British, German,
Italian, Russian, Dutch, or Belgian Dependency as the
case may be. I mean that representatives of all
nationalities that care to do so shall have equal rights of
tendering for the construction of public works, and a share,
if they desire it, in enterprises necessitating large capital
outlay, in the Dependencies of the various Powers. I do
not mean that the local administration of a Dependency
should not impose taxes on European enterprises in order
to raise revenue, but that such taxes, whatever form they
take, should be imposed without differentiation. Neither
do I suggest that the administration itself should be
internationalised, although the creation of international
Boards for the discussion and adjustment of local
difficulties, upon which commercial representatives of the
nations interested would sit, might suggest itself as a
feasible development in course of time.

The subject has another side to it, superficially
irrelevant, but to those who look beneath the surface
indissolubly connected, viz., the treatment of the native
races. If economic rivalry between the colonising Powers
in the undeveloped or partly developed areas of the world's
surface could be done away with, the rights and the wrongs
of the native races would receive closer and more
sympathetic consideration by the Governments. At
present the native races are callously sacrificed to rivalries
between the Governments — perfectly futile rivalries for the
most part; and the Governments have not yet realised
that the perpetration of, or the acquiescence in, moral
wrongs inflicted upon the natives, affect in the most
detrimental fashion those very economic interests for which
these Governments intrigue and agitate. So long as the
European Governments look upon these vast African and
Asiatic territories as areas for the pursuit of privileges

THE WAY OUT. 263

and monopolies, carried on behind closed doors, in favour
of a microscopic fraction of their respective nationals, so
long will these territories continue to be one of the prime
causes of European unrest and European armaments, and
so long will their inhabitants be sacrificed — and sacrificed
not only immorally but stupidly, without the slightest
advantage to the European peoples, and for the sake of
purely ephemeral and exclusively selfish interests.

By the "neutralisation" of the Dependencies them-
selves, the writer means the removal of these over-
over-sea areas from the operations of European war.
This was intended by the Berlin and Brussels Acts
to apply to a considerable part of the African
Continent. But that provision, like everything else,
has gone by the board. What chance, then, the
sceptic will exclaim, of extending that principle on a
vaster and, indeed, universal scale after the war, or by the
terms of settlement? Every chance, if public opinion will
but apply itself to the problem in the meantime; and,
intrinsically, a very good chance, for a multiplicity of
reasons. The Berlin and Brussels Acts laying down the
neutralisation of the Congo Basin had been so frequently
violated both in the letter and spirit before the war, that it
may have been said to have been a dead letter from the
start. The war itself has produced many weighty
arguments in favour of the neutralisation of African and
Asiatic Dependencies. When passions have cooled down
and a sense of perspective reasserts itself, I do not
suppose the British or French Governments will feel
particularly proud, or particularly easy in their minds as
to the ultimate effects of their action — at having imported
Asiatics1 and Africans to fight their battles upon the plains
of Europe. Experience will suggest to them the doubtful
wisdom of consecrating that policy.

It would be idle to deny that the neutralisation of the
European Dependencies over-seas would entail a sacrifice
on Britain's part; while, on the other hand, the inter-
nationalisation of commercial activities within them would
be to her advantage, because of her commercial experience.
For it is evident, of course, that in time of war the
Dependencies of every European State are at the mercy,

1 The tribute to the general character of our Indian administra-
tion involved in the generous support Indian potentates have given us
is gratifying and deserved. It is the wisdom of having profited by it
that is doubtful.

264 TRUTH AND THE WAR

virtually speaking, of the Power which commands the seas.
Their neutralisation would, therefore, involve on the part
of Britain the loss of an advantage which her sea power
gives to her. Let us face the fact frankly. But let us
also ask ourselves, with an equal desire to deal honestly
with ourselves, whether the voluntary surrender of that
advantage would really injure the vital interests of the
British people; and, too, whether, in the long run, the
Powers of Europe can be expected to acquiesce in a
situation which makes all their over-seas enterprise subject
to British sufferance in time of war. To-day, no doubt,
this is a German grievance. But yesterday it was a French
grievance. To-morrow it may be a grievance collectively
urged. The way to envisage the problem is not in terms
of the grievance of this or that particular State at a
particular moment; but in terms of the future of Europe,
humanity, and of Britain herself. Continental Powers
can. never be expected to disarm on land, even approxi-
mately, still less to abandon the idea of challenging us on
the seas, so long as their policy over-seas is carried out
subject to our good will and pleasure. The safety of an
island-Empire whose nerve-centres depend upon sustenance
from abroad can never be jeopardised without a radical
elimination of the causes which might place that safety in
jeopardy. But neither can an island-Empire in a future
world of man's increasing mastery over air arrogate with
safety to itself the right to maintain a perpetual mortgage
over the extra-European activities — the Imperial policy —
of Europe. But that has been, and is, the attitude of
British statesmanship. We say, in effect, to the Powers
of Europe : "You can have an over-seas policy if you wish.
You can acquire Dependencies, spend money on them,
build up a big trade with them. But if you are so foolish
as to fall foul of us, understand that we shall promptly seize
them." Most Englishmen believe to-day that this war
was caused by the German Government's desire to dictate
to Europe, in Europe. Assuredly some Germans have put
forward views which, logically interpreted, mean nothing
else. But in our own case we quite deliberately, and as
the most natural thing in the world, claim to dictate, by
virtue of our overwhelming sea power, the policy of
European Powers outside Europe. To me it appears
utterly impossible, either that a better Europe can arise
from the ashes of the old while that claim remains the
bed-rock of our foreign policy, or that we can continue

THE WAY OUT 265

indefinitely to exercise it with safety to our own country
or Empire. The neutralisation of the overseas
Dependencies of all Powers offers a just and feasible way
of escape from the accumulation of fresh hatreds and of
fresh rivalries ; and from a position, which, ultimately, must
in the very nature of things become impracticable to
sustain.

Britain is in a position to take the lead in the matter of
the neutralisation of the Dependencies ; quite obviously
this great reform could not be consummated without,
her consent. In the matter of the internationalisation
of commercial activities in the Dependencies, on
the lines here laid down, the word rests primarily
with France, which, after Britain, possesses the
largest over-seas Empire and treats it as a protectionist
reserve. But Germany, too, would have to consent to
make sacrifices, for there must be a German quid pro quo.
The internationalisation of "colonial" trade would be the
first step towards undermining the tariff in Europe itself.
Both in her over-seas policy and in her home policy Europe
must gravitate towards freedom of trade, or continue to
nurse within her bosom the asp of international strife. At
present her ruling classes, pushed forward by vested
interests and at their wits' ends to conciliate the most
superficially powerful elements in their public opinion for
the horrors and losses of the war, would seem to be busily
preparing for renewed economic conflicts, rendered the
more bitter by pumping into them the passions of the time;
and hence preparing for fresh political conflicts and
increased armaments. For let this incontestable truth
sink into the minds of all the peoples. If, when the
cannon cease to boom, the blight of the tariff war ensues,
the hopes of humanity, which centre in this frightful
catastrophe being the last of its kind, are blasted. Were
European frontiers remodelled, as the result of this war,
upon the most approved lines of national boundaries and
political consciousness, and the tariff and the colonial
monopoly not only remained in being but were aggravated
by a further strengthening of the artificial barriers between
peoples, the most fundamental of all causes of international
friction would subsist. When, one reads about this
plotting and counter-plotting on the part of the British,
German, French, Austrian, Russian, and Italian Govern-
ments to hamper Britons, Germans, Frenchmen, Austrians,
Russians, and Italians in the exchange of commodities,

266 TRUTH AND THE WAR

one is tempted to ask whether statesmanship has not
become utterly bankrupt in ideas. While its spokesmen
declare that a durable peace is their one end and aim, they
are deliberately engineering war under the spur of a
spurious patriotism. They are arranging to plunge
Europe back into the morass.

Imagine a draught of pure, wholesome air sweeping
through the musty atmosphere of the Chancelleries, and
you might picture to yourself these men, appalled at the
consequences of their own past incompetence, concocting
no more poisonous brews, but some healing balsam to
cure the wounds they have inflicted. You might perceive
a germ of common-sense expanding into some such
constructive set of proposals as these. For a period of,
say, twenty-five years — no agreement should be unlimited
in time — the British Government would pledge itself to the
continued maintenance of the open-door throughout the
British Dependencies. It would surrender for that period
the preference granted by the Dominions. The French
Government would initiate the policy of the open-door
throughout the French Dependencies, and would undertake
to maintain it for that period. The German Government
would pledge itself to maintain the policy of the open-door
throughout the Dependencies remaining to Germany as
the outcome of the general settlement; and would further
take the first stride towards European free trade by
lowering its home tariff towards all countries alike — a
measure which would benefit the Allies primarily, since it
is the Allies which do the greatest volume of business with
her. Substantially the British Government would say to
the German : —

"We guarantee to you a continuance of that equality
of commercial treatment in the United Kingdom and in
the British Dependencies which you have always enjoyed.
For a quarter of a century you would thus be freed from
the fear of a tariff wall round the British Empire. As a
proof of the sincerity of our intentions, we are even willing
to forego the preference accorded to us by our self-
governing Dominions. In return, we ask for reciprocity
both in your Dependencies and in your home market. So
far as your home market is concerned, we recognise that
you cannot immediately abolish your tariff, but it should
be substantially lowered. In. stipulating this we are
demanding from you considerably less than we have

THE WAY OUT 267

ourselves always accorded you, and what we are prepared,
under these conditions, to go on according you. But we
realise the economic problem you have to face, and we feel
that the British people and the British Empire are
sufficiently great and powerful to give this earnest of their
desire to eliminate future international friction." In so
acting the British Government would be laying the
foundations of international concord, saving its own people
from the disabilities and restrictions inherent in Protection
receiving in return a substantial concession from Germany.
Instead of maturing further impediments to human inter-
course, elaborating further schemes for the manufacture
of human bitterness — the prospect of consolidating an
existent freedom of human intercourse where such freedom
prevails, of undermining the ramparts of existing
Protection where such prevails, of making the first serious
effort to ensure the ultimate economic freedom of the
nations. Which alternative offers most to humanity?
Which is the wisest?

What of France ? What advantages would she derive
from the establishment of commercial freedom in her
African and Asiatic Empire? What disadvantage would
she suffer? "France" would suffer no disadvantage.
"France" would gain priceless advantages. A few
specific French interests would be affected. A certain
pestilent type of politician, journalist, and financier who
has been the curse of the Third Republic, and who thrives
on colonial jobberies, would find his occupation gone, to
the lasting benefit of political purity at home and
administrative decency in the French Dependencies. On
the other hand, it is a fact that nearly all the great
exporting French firms are in favour of "colonial" free
trade, and many of the most experienced French colonial
administrators also. Notably is this the case in French
West Africa, where the most considerable colonial effort
of France has been exercised, and where the greatest
volume of French colonial trade has been attained. The
French West African merchants are dead against
Protection, and always resist an increase in differential
taxation. The French Dependencies themselves would
grow richer and more prosperous with the disappearance
of the differential tariff. Their trade would increase by
leaps and bounds, and as the natural result there would
be more revenue to spend on public works, sanitation,
agricultural development, and native affairs. The whole

268 TRUTH AND THE WAR

character of French over-seas activity would be affected
for the good.

What of Germany? As already stated, Germany, like
ourselves and Holland, has kept the open door in her
Dependencies. But what of the quid pro quo in the shape
of a lowering of the home tariff ? Observe, first of all, the
justice of the standpoint. A British open-door policy
throughout the Empire is of enormous value to Germany.
Granted that we have not kept the open door all these
years from altruistic motives. The fact remains that our
action in so doing has benefited Germany in the measure
of her commercial ability, and as her commercial
ability is very considerable, the advantage has been
very considerable Why should she not begin to
reciprocate in her own market ? She is surrounded
by Protectionist Powers. True. But a very little
actual experience would show her rulers that the
German people as a whole would benefit if the German
tariff were lowered to all comers. And if Germany once
took this step, reciprocity would undoubtedly eventuate.
The mass of the German people would be unquestionably
favourable to such a course of action, and were Britain to
put forward a policy such as this, instead of indulging in
tall talk about crushing, dismembering, overthrowing, and
so forth, the peace and anti-militarist party in Germany
would be enormously strengthened. The vested interests,
the agrarians, the "Junkers" would be up in arms. But
it would be a square fight between them and the German
masses. Who can doubt the ultimate result? Here is a
true democratic policy for Britain to follow, a policy which
would automatically and inevitably cut away the props
which sustain Continental militarism.

Will the British people think it out for themselves?
Will the leaders of British Labour look ahead, or continue
dully to acquiesce in being swept away by a torrent of
loose thought, faulty economics, and sterile passions ? Is
it possible that at least the North of England and Scotland
does not even now contain sufficient elements impregnated
with Cobden's teaching to evolve a counter-programme to
that tariff war which the Government in power, the North-
cliffe Press, which is its insolent master, and the selfish
interests represented by Leagues and combines, are
undoubtedly hatching? If so, these various forces in our
national life must rouse themselves to action before it is
too late

THE WAY OUT 269

Since the above article appeared a great many
statements have been made in the Press, not only by Jingo
editors and contributors of no particular importance to
Jingo newspapers, but by personages who certainly ought
to know better, concerning the future division of the
African and Asiatic tropics between Britain and France to
the exclusion of Germany. Nobody has argued this case
more fiercely than Sir Harry Johnston, whose notable
contributions to our geographical and ethnological
knowledge of Africa it would savour almost of impertinence
for me to praise. And it is with genuine regret that I find
myself in diametrical opposition on this matter with one
who rendered valuable help at critical moments to the
movement for the reform of the Congo, and to whom I
am personally indebted for much generous appreciation
and support of my African work.

Having said so much, I am bound to state that Sir
Harry Johnston's proposal to exclude Germany from any
share in African territorial sovereignty appears to me bad
and impracticable. From the point of view of the
interests of the native population it would be justifiable if
German rule in Africa had shown itself very much worse
than that of other Powers who have exercised, or who
exercise, African territorial rights. But it has not. There
has been nothing comparable in German administration
with the hideous tragedies of the Congo Free State and
French Congo — the latter in such marked contrast to
French administrative rule north of the Bights. The
guerilla warfare against the Hottentots in South-West
Africa was characterised by many atrocious incidents, but
so have other African campaigns waged by other Powers,
as Sir Harry Johnston would be the first to admit. A
European administration in Africa is not to be fairly judged
by what occurs in a state of war ; else whose records would
be clean? German rule in Africa has had certain patent
defects. But it was steadily improving. The last two
German Colonial Secretaries were sincere reformers. The
last one had personally visited the British West African
Dependencies (which is more than any British Colonial
Secretary has ever done), and had openly expressed his
admiration for our policy in Nigeria. He was engaged in
orienting German policy in the same direction when the
war broke out. A powerful school of thought had arisen
in Germany under the leadership of Westermann and
Vohsen in favour of a native policy similar to that which

270 TRUTH AND THE WAR.

we have pursued with success in Nigeria and the Gold
Coast. The administration of native races was quite a
new problem to Germany. She was learning and profiting
by her mistakes. One decided point to her credit as
against the other European Powers, Britain excepted, was
her maintenance of the open door for international trade,
and this has an important indirect bearing upon native
interests. From the point of view of the natives a policy
aimed at excluding Germany from Africa would not,
therefore, be justified.

From the wider point of view it would be very short-
sighted. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the
Allies are eventually in a position to "dictate" peace-terms
to Germany and to impose, as part of those peace-terms,
Germany's exclusion from the Colonial field; they would,
if they so acted, be sowing the seeds, not of a lasting peace,
but of a renewed conflict. It is a moral, physical and
strategic impossibility to bottle up an elemental force such
as that which the German people incarnate. It simply
cannot be done. I suppose no Englishman living has
written more, or more eulogistically, than I have done of
many aspects of France's rule in her vast African Empire
(except where her true policy became deflected for a time
through Leopoldianism). But it is only necessary to
consider the problem of, for instance, the future of French
and German territorial sovereignty in Africa in the hard,
cold light of figures to realise how futile is the idea that any
permanent peace among the nations can. be looked for
under a settlement which, while changing nothing in the
fiscal policy of France in Africa, would extend still further
French sovereign, rights and exclude Germany from Africa
entirely.

When the war broke out France's Dependencies in
Africa covered an area of 4,421,934 square miles, including
the African Islands, but minus Morocco (if you throw
Morocco in, the total is increased by 219,000 square miles).
In other words, France's African possessions were nearly
1,000,000 square miles larger than the area of the United
States. Throughout this area, except where restricted
by Treaties, France differentiated heavily against foreign
merchandise. Before the war France's foreign trade
amounted to ^"583,488,000; her population (191 1) was
39,601,509; her surplusage of deaths over births being
(191 1) 34,869. Germany's Dependencies in Africa covered
931,460 square miles; her foreign trade amounted to

THE WAY OUT. 271

^982,615,000, having increased by 204 per cent, in 22
years (double the ratio of increase of even Britain's foreign
trade). Her population was (1910) 64,925,993, and her
surplusage of births over deaths (1910) 740,431. Now
these figures do not suggest that a nation with a large and
expanding population and a phenomenally developing
foreign trade, a nation more and more dependent,
therefore, upon imported raw materials for the employment
of its industrial population, should dispossess another
nation with a much smaller and a stationary population
and far less dependent upon imported raw material, of the
latter's footing in the tropical world acquired by the blood
and treasure of its sons. But they do suggest the folly of
expecting that any rational scheme of international
reconstruction in Europe can evolve from a policy which
purposely intends to exclude the more numerous,
industrially powerful and expanding unit from a footing
in that same tropical world. If the Allies succeed in
reducing Germany to an unconditional surrender, it is clear
they will be in a position to impose such terms as they
choose. But they cannot destroy the German people or
that people's industrial capacities. Hence I fear that the
sort of "punishment" which Sir Harry Johnston would
like to see inflicted upon Germany would be a punishment
inflicted, not only upon the German people, but upon the
British and French people as well.

The essential condition of Germany's industrial
requirements is, and has been for the past two decades,
free markets over-seas. If she cannot obtain free markets
over-seas under foreign flags, she must acquire over-sea
territories for herself. Short of destroying the German
nation, which is impossible, and undesirable if it were
possible, I fail to see how the problem can be disposed of.
It certainly cannot be by ignoring it. No doubt it would
in the long run be to the advantage of the German people
if they could obtain over-sea free markets without
territorial responsibility. But, putting that consideration
aside, on what logical grounds could "France" be made
to say to "Germany" : "I, with my forty millions of
people, claim the right to possess four and a-half million
square miles of territory in Africa, where I differentiate
against your goods, and I claim the right to increase my
possessions still further. But I deny you, with your
sixty-five millions of people and expanding birth rate and
foreign trade, the right to hold a single inch of African

272 TRUTH AND THE WAR.

soil" ? Or on what grounds of reason could "Britain" be
made to say to "Germany" : "My flag flies over one-fifth
of the world's surface, but although your population is
greater than mine and increasing more rapidly, as is your
trade, than mine, I deny to you, not only the right to
possess an inch of African territory, but I also claim the
right, whenever it may suit me, to encircle the whole of
my enormous domain, with a tariff wall against you"?
That way lies, not peace, but endless strife; not states-
manship, but madness; not relief for the peoples of France,
Britain, and Germany, but added burdens.

CHAPTER XXXIII.
The Betrayal of the Nation, 1906-1911

The honour of a country depends much more on removing its faults
than on boasting of its qualities. — Mazzini.

The great danger of England is the Foreign Office — and much
more the Foreign Office than the Foreign Minister. — The Candid
Quarterly Review. November, 7975. (Conducted by Mr. Thomas
Gibson Bowles.)

When war was decided upon, it was not decided upon by the
House of Commons or by the electorate, but by the concurrence of
Ministers and ex-Ministers. — Lord Hugh Cecil in "The Times,"
April 2Q, 191b.

In practice the Foreign Office and the Chief Ministers of the
Crown direct our foreign policy. There is, it is true, a modern and
fashionable doctrine that Parliament has usurped this control ; but
no sensible man believes it. Sir Edward Grey made a show of con-
sulting Parliament when the country had already been committed to
the Entente policy and, indeed, to the war. — "Morning Post,"
May 24, 1916.

Allied armies have usually had difficulties in the field, for
different national modes of thought are not harmonised in a moment.
But in the case of France and Britain the union of arms began under
fortunate auspices. For some years the two General Staffs hsvd
been in the habit of considering certain problems together, and
British officers had been regular guests at the French manoeuvres. —
Mr. John Buchan, in "Nelson's History of the War." (Thomas
Nelson and Sons.)

I AM profoundly convinced, and I believe the great mass
of Englishmen will be convinced within a very few years,
that if our foreign policy in the last decade had been
controlled by the nation, the situation which has involved
all the great European Powers, ourselves included, in a
general war, would never have arisen.

I am convinced that if the nation had been treated
honestly and fairly by the Liberal Government, the
national future would have been infinitely more secure to-
day than it is; and that hundreds of thousands of the
flower of British manhood, now dead or crippled, would
have been alive and well.

I am convinced that if British foreign policy had been
an open, unshackled policy, the influence of Great
Britain in the councils of the nations would have saved

273

274 TRUTH AND THE WAR

Western Europe assuredly, and quite possibly, all Europe,
from the catastrophe which mutual fears and jealousies
were preparing-.

I am convinced that at no period in our history had
such an opportunity been given to Liberal statesmen to
lead the world along the road of international sanity as was
provided in the decade preceding the war; that the
opportunity was not taken because they allowed themselves
to become implicated almost immediately after they
assumed the reins of power in the Continental maze of
groupings and alliances, and that their implication therein
would never have occurred had the nation enjoyed real
democratic control. What was required was high and
honest statesmanship, not bad and furtive diplomacy.

I hold that the supreme national issue which this war
compels us to confront, is the secrecy with which our
foreign policy has been conducted since 1904, the
consequences which have arisen from it, and the appalling
dangers inherent in such a system.

To slur over that issue, lest in facing it with candour
and in our own most obvious interest, we be forced to shed
the mantle of impeccability in all that touches the origins
of this war, and our part therein, which our rulers have
cast about their shoulders, would be unworthy of our
greatness as a people, and would be to inflict a grave
injustice upon our sons.

It is a misfortune that criticism of our foreign policy
should be interpreted by its apologists merely, or chiefly,
as evidence of a desire on the part of the critic to attack
the particular Minister nominally responsible for its
direction. Inevitably the Minister is comprised in the
criticism. But the trouble from which this country
suffers, the trouble which is its greatest danger, and will,
if unremedied, bring it to ruin, lies much deeper than the
mistakes of a Minister who, like all human beings, is liable
to err, and to err with the best of motives. The trouble
is, that the system this nation tolerates as regards its
foreign policy is a system which suffers from a funda-
mental contradiction. It is a system which in reality
allows to that Minister, and to such of his colleagues
as he may choose to consult, a power, virtually
uncontrolled, to compromise the national destinies;
while professedly allowing him no such power. The

BETRAYAL OF THE NATION 275

result of this conflict between practice and theory is
to create, in the management of our foreign affairs, an
autocracy more complete than that wielded by Tsar or
Kaiser, but unlike the latter, ineffective, because
unaccompanied by executive functions. Thus its Foreign
Minister can — without putting his signature to any
particular document, which would require Cabinet and
ultimately Parliamentary sanction. — commit this country
to a line of action involving war under certain con-
tingencies, without informing the Cabinet or Parliament.
But he cannot, without informing the Cabinet and
Parliament, carry out the measures necessary to give
practical effect, should occasion require it, to the policy
he is pursuing. If he informs the Cabinet, he may split it.
If he succeeds in carrying the Cabinet, the difficulty is not
overcome. There is Parliament and the country to be dealt
with. He is, therefore, at once responsible and
irresponsible. A system of this kind is a sword of
Damocles continuously suspended over the head of the
nation. It has all the disadvantages of an autocracy
without any of its advantages. It makes "democratic"
government quite impossible, and is hideously unjust to
the democracy. The wound this system has inflicted upon
the country is deep. If it is not to prove mortal, the nation
must bring itself to realise how the system has operated
and how the wound has been inflicted. "My country,
right or wrong," is an expression replete with good
intentions. The road to Hell, it has been said, is paved
with good intentions. It was, I think, one of Lincoln's
advisers who supplied the complementary corrective :
"My country, right or wrong ! If right, to be kept right.
If wrong, to be set right."

When the Unionist Administration left office in
December, 1905, it had succeeded in the task of
rehabilitating the credit of this country, which had found
itself during the Boer War without a single well-wisher in
Europe. It had settled a series of long outstanding
disputes with France, and it had slightly improved
our relations with Russia. On the other hand,
Anglo-German relations had become marked by
mutual suspicion and ill-feeling. The Kaiser's telegram
to President Kruger; Germany's determination to
build a powerful navy, and her manner of announcing
it; Mr. Chamberlain's Tariff Reform campaign, in

276 TRUTH AND THE WAR

which the growth of German trade figured so
prominently ; the personal| friction between King Edward
and his nephew, the Kaiser; Germany's ostensible
exclusion, from the international agreements over China;1
Britain's opposition to the Bagdad railway scheme — these
things were probably the chief contributory causes for the
change, with one exception. That exception was
Morocco. I shall not discuss Morocco again here, beyond
remarking that the year 1906, which opened with the
advent of a Liberal Government in. England, ushered in a
second International Conference (at Algeciras) over
Moroccan affairs, a Conference demanded by Germany,
invited by the Sultan, and resisted until the last moment by
the British and French Foreign Offices. It is at this stage,
the specific starting point leading to Britain's eventual
participation in the world-war, that the system under
which the British nation permits its foreign affairs to be
conducted becomes capable of illustration. The illustration
can, I think, be given more fittingly in the form of a brief
chronological precis.

First Stage, 1906 (First Morocco Crisis).

Sir E. Grey expresses to the French and German
Ambassadors his personal belief that in the event of a war
between France and Germany over Morocco, British
public opinion would rally to the "material support" of
France.3

The French Ambassador urges that the potential
military and naval co-operation of Britain and France shall
be facilitated, and for this purpose that the military and
naval staffs of the two countries shall be authorised to
meet in periodic consultation.3

Sir E. Grey consults Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman,4
Lord Haldane, and Mr. Asquith, and consents to the

1 "These three agreements practically closed the ring round China
for the exclusive benefit of what has been described as the China
Pooling Syndicate. This consisted of Great Britain, Japan, Russia,
and France, and excluded Germany and the United States." —
(Editorial note to Baron Hayashi's "Memoirs.")

2 Revealed by Sir E. Grey to the House of Commons on
August 3, 1914.

3 Ditto.

4 It seems incredible that the information can have been conveyed
to Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman in a way which enabled him to
grasp its full significance.

BETRAYAL OF THE NATION 277

French Ambassador's proposal,1 which, however, is to
leave the hands of the Government free.

The Cabinet is not informed of this step until "much
later on."2 There is presumptive evidence that the
Cabinet was not informed until the advent of the second
Morocco crisis in the summer of 191 1 — five years and a-half
later.

Parliament is not, of course, informed at all.

There is presumptive evidence that the official leaders
of the Opposition were given at least a hint of what had
been done; whether in 191 1 or earlier must be a matter at
present of conjecture. There is presumptive evidence that
the consultation of the military and naval staffs became
thenceforth a permanent feature of our secret relations
with France.

Second Stage, 191 i (Second Morocco Crisis).

Sir E. Grey takes "precisely the same line" as he had
taken in 1906.3

Mr. Lloyd George makes, obviously by agreement with
the Foreign Office, a threatening speech against Germany
at the Mansion House; punctuated as such by The Times
the next morning.4

Towards the end of the year, when the crisis is over, it
becomes a matter of common knowledge in political,
military and naval circles in Britain, France, and Germany,
that in the event of a Franco-German rupture, British aid
would have been given to France.

Third Stage, 191 2.

Spring. — Anglo-German negotiations on the subject of
Britain's neutrality in the event of a European war break
down.5

November 22. — As the result of Cabinet discussions,
Sir E. Grey writes an "unofficial" letter to the French
Ambassador, to the effect that consultations between the

1 Revealed by Sir E. Grey to the House of Commons on
August 3, 1914.
* Ditto.
8 Ditto.

4 "Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy" (p. 144).

5 Partially revealed for the first time by Mr. Asquith in
October, 1914. Negotiations of a similar character, apparently at
Germany's suggestion, had taken place in 1909, and again in 1910 —
without result.

278 TRUTH AND THE WAR

British and French military and naval staffs "does not
restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any
future time whether or not to assist the other by armed
force."1

Fourth Stage, 191 3.

March 10. — Lord Hugh Cecil asks the Prime Minister
whether there is foundation for the general belief that the
Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, "have entered
into an arrangement, or, to speak more accurately, have
given assurances which, in the contingency of a great
European war, would involve heavy military obligations on
this country?"; and states that, "there is a very general
belief that this country is under an obligation, not a treaty
obligation, but an obligation arising owing to an assurance
given by the Ministry in the course of diplomatic negotia-
tions, to send a very large armed force out of this country
to operate in Europe. This is the general belief."

Mr. Asquith replies : "I ought to say it is not true."
Similar denials by the Prime Minister follow questions of
a similar tendency asked in Parliament on March 24, 1913,
and April 28 and June 11, 1914.

Let us explore this record.

In the spring of 1906 the Minister in charge of our
foreign relations, with the concurrence of three of his
colleagues, takes a step involving the nation in the issues
of life and death. He authorises the military and naval
advisers of this country to work out a plan of campaign
in the event of war arising in Europe, with the military
and naval advisers of a Power which forms part of one
of the two great rival Groups into which Europe is divided.
In so doing he stipulates that he is not pledging the
Government, of which he is, next to the Prime Minister,
the most important member, to take part in such a war
on the side of the Power with whose military and naval
advisers the military and naval advisers of this country
are henceforth collaborating, and which is itself formally
pledged in a military alliance with another Great Power.
This is literally true, inasmuch as there is no written bond.
But the mere setting out of the fact in other than
diplomatic language shows that the reserve then made (and
confirmed in writing six years later) is in the very nature

1 Revealed by Sir E. Grey to the House of Commons on
August 3, 1914.

BETRAYAL OF THE NATION 279

of the case precarious, and must become more and more
so the longer the collaboration exists. This becomes at
once apparent when the circumstances are examined.

The fact of such an authorisation being- given
constitutes an unwritten bond of a moral, and also of a
material and positive kind, which involves the personality
of the Minister who sanctions it and of the colleagues
whom he consults. Henceforth the whole war mechanism
of the two Powers is linked together : a community of
professional interest and professional thought is created
among the influential national elements connected with the
profession of arms on both sides of the Channel. Those
elements are themselves and of necessity closely related
with the organisations concerned in the manufacture of
engines of war. Between the latter and the world of
politics and Press and finance there are a hundred
filaments. Time alone must tend to strengthen the link
thus originally created. Time will give additional potency
to the unwritten bond in influencing political events. Time
will commit the Ministers responsible more and more
deeply to the logical sequence of their initial action, should
the events which their action contemplated actually occur.
Moreover, contemporary happenings themselves are bound
to be affected by the existence of this secret and unwritten
bond. Its existence will, and must, mould those happen-
ings consciously, or unconsciously, and give them a
particular tendency and a particular direction. To question
all this is surely puerile? We know that the existence of
this unwritten bond had these effects, and we know it from
the Minister chiefly responsible.

Eight years later (August 3, 191 4) Sir E. Grey was to
make the operative force of the unwritten bond, both in its
moral and material aspects, quite clear to the nation. He
told the House in effect that, in his opinion, its existence,
although unknown to the House until that moment, had
placed us under a moral obligation to assist the French.
And he also told the House that on the strength of that
unwritten bond, as part of her share in the authorised plan
of campaign, France had concentrated her fleet in the
Mediterranean, and had left her western and northern
coast-line undefended, and at the complete mercy of the
German fleet.1

1 It is astonishing that the suspicions of the House of Commons
were not aroused earlier in the year, when Mr. Churchill brought in

28o TRUTH AND THE WAR

Let us carry our exploration a step further.

The years that follow the crisis of 1906 are troubled
years. The ill-feeling between Britain and Germany
remains an increasingly menacing portent upon the
horizon. Two efforts to define their respective relations
fail to mature. A naval panic, engineered by interested
parties in this country upon, as it eventually transpires,
inaccurate information, intensifies the prevailing bitter-
ness. The reactionary Press on both sides plays its sinister
rdle. Graver than aught else, from the point of view of
the liabilities contracted in. the unwritten bond, of which
three men in England are now the sole legatees — Sir
Henry Campbell Bannerman having passed away — the
Morocco clouds gather steadily in volume. In France,
Cabinet succeeds Cabinet, and each fresh Ministry sees
its capacity to control the militarists and colonial
Chauvinists, who are bent upon the conquest of Morocco
over the ashes of the Algeciras Act, becoming weaker and
weaker. In vain the Chamber ignorant, as our Parlia-
ment is ignorant, of the secret clauses to the Anglo-
Franco-Spanish Treaties, repeatedly asserts its intention
of safeguarding the independence and integrity of
Morocco. While the Chamber talks, the militarists act.
Germany watches with an impatience which grows as
negotiations begun with one French Cabinet are upset by
another.

And all the while, unknown to the Cabinet, unknown
to Parliament, unknown to the nation, British and
French military and naval experts are carrying out their
instructions, and with devoted zeal are discussing and
arranging all the larger problems of strategy, and all the

his Navy Estimates, and made his statement about the Mediterranean.
The estimates were contested by the Unionists on the
ground of reduction, and a resolution was moved on the
subject of the political and strategic position in the Mediterranean.
In a speech he made on that occasion Sir Edward Grey said he
would "pass very lightly over the question of naval strength in the
Mediterranean." He further said that the policy contested could not
"fairly be called abandoning the Mediterranean." No one, except
Lord Charles Beresford, seems to have realised that such a
re-arrangement must have been the result of some strategic quid pro
quo with France. He indeed remarked : —

"They (the French) are to look after our enormous interests
in the Mediterranean, because we cannot have a fleet there.
What are we going to do for France? It may be very disagree-
able, but we are liable with these Ententes and Alliances."
But apparently the House paid no attention.

BETRAYAL OF THE NATION 281

details of organisation incidental to a great campaign
waged in common against a common potential foe.

And now the storm bursts. The Algeciras Act has
become in the eyes of all men merely a "scrap of paper."
The secret Treaties have come to fruition, although their
existence is still undisclosed. Germany bangs her fist
upon the diplomatic table. At the request of the Foreign
Office, the Minister in the Cabinet who enjoys the greatest
popular following speaks to Germany in diplomatic
language of open menace.

A long smouldering hostility has come to a head.
Britain and Germany are on the brink of open rupture.
But this time the storm passes, and with its passing, some-
thing akin to consternation at the imminence of the peril
infects political circles in this country. Once again
negotiations to reach a modus vivendi are attempted.
Once again they fail.

Let us now consider the situation reached at this period,
i.e., the summer of 191 2, after the failure of the Anglo-
German negotiations following the Franco-German
settlement over Morocco.1

Let us consider it from the point of view of the terrible
injustice and perils inflicted upon the people of this
country by the system under which the nation's foreign
relations are carried on. Three members of the Cabinet
have authorised military and naval consultations based
upon the assumption that the armed forces of the Crown
will, in the event of a general European war, co-operate
on land and sea with one of the Continental Groups, whose
rivalry keeps Europe permanently under arms. I say,
with one of the two Groups advisedly, because
co-operation with France must mean co-operation
with her partner Russia, and involves us, therefore, in
contingent liabilities to Russia. Obviously these
consultations have led to the adoption by the responsible
experts on either side of strategic measures designed to
give practical effect thereto; otherwise the consultations
would be farcical. Here, then, is a positive factor in
actual being which must needs exercise a dominating
influence over our whole international relationships. It
constitutes, on our side, a definite preparation for war.
In the summer of 191 1 its significance is increased tenfold,

1 The failure was not admitted then ; on the contrary — vide
Chapter XXXIV.

282 TRUTH AND THE WAR

owing to the fact that our diplomacy has openly taken the
side of the Power with which we have been carrying on
these professional consultations — even to the point of a
veiled threat of war upon that Power's rival if the quarrel
should end in armed collision. But until that event, until,
i.e., the summer of 191 1, knowledge of this portentous
step has not only been concealed by the three responsible
Ministers from Parliament, but from their colleagues in
the Cabinet. What has been the consequence of this?

The consequence has been that other members of the
Cabinet have delivered speeches in the country during the
period covered by these consultations, of a kind calculated
to make the nation believe that its relations with Germany
are not really dangerous ; whereas, in point of fact and in
the event of a European war, the nation's relations with
Germany have become compromised in advance, virtually
beyond redemption, and, short of a miracle, the nation's
participation in such a war has become a foregone
conclusion. Not only have the other members of the
Cabinet been permitted to speak in this optimistic strain by
their three colleagues, but the latter have themselves made
exactly the same kind of speeches.

In 1908 we find Mr. Asquith stating in the House of
Commons that Britain and Germany "are every year
advancing nearer and nearer to a complete under-
standing";1 Mr. Churchill asserting that "there is no real
cause of difference" between them, that they "have nothing
to fight about, have no prize to fight for, and have no place
to fight in";2 Mr. Harcourt declaring, "with knowledge
and a sense of deep responsibility," that their relations,
"commercial, colonial, political, and dynastic," have at no
period in the last ten or fifteen years been on a firmer and
more friendly footing than they are to-day," denouncing
those who seek to set them at variance as "footpads of
politics and enemies of the human race," as "pariah curs
who foul the kennel in which they live. "3 More interesting
still, we discover Mr. Lloyd George emphasising
Germany's precarious strategic position in Europe,
explaining the anxieties incidental thereto, and the
necessity for her to increase and perfect her army;
proclaiming, in other words, as natural^ right and proper,
for Germany to do that which, for having done, she is

1 March 2, 1908.

2 August 15, 1908, to a demonstration of Miners at Swansea.

3 October 2, 1908, in a speech to his constituents.

BETRAYAL OF THE NATION 283

denounced six years later by the same speaker. In 1909
Sir Rufus Isaacs, Mr. Churchill, Mr. Robertson, Colonel
Seely, Mr. Birrell, and Lord (then Mr.) Haldane, all speak
in language identical in tendency. Lord Haldane
asseverates that he has many friends in Germany, and that
the Germans are much misunderstood.1 Mr. Churchill is
most emphatic as to there being between the two countries,
no "racial, territorial, dynastic, or religious causes of
quarrels which have in the past set the world on edge,"
while the "foundations of European peace are laid more
broadly every year,"2 and, again, declaiming that it is a
"monstrous error" to speak of a "profound antagonism of
interests between the British and German nations which
can only be resolved by a supreme trial of strength,
towards which the tides of destiny are irresistibly bearing
us. ... If a serious antagonism is gradually created
between the two peoples, it will not be because of the
workings of any natural or impersonal forces, but through
the vicious activity of a comparatively small number of
individuals in both countries and the culpable credulity of
M larger classes." In 1910, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Lloyd George,
and Mr. McKenna, figure on the public boards;
"unhesitatingly" does Mr. Asquith assert that there is
no single Power, "basing its calculations upon the
assumption that war between Great Britain and Germany
is inevitable or even possible," in no quarter of the
political horizon is there "any cause of quarrel, direct or
indirect, between us and that great and friendly nation."3
Mr. Lloyd George scorns the very idea of an "inevitable"
war with Germany.4 Mr. McKenna ridicules the scare-
mongers.5

The nation has not only been led to believe that an
Anglo-German collision is unthinkable, the while its
military and naval experts are silently preparing for that
very contingency with their French colleagues. The
nation has been warned off any further military expenditure
both by members of the Cabinet who are not "in the
know," and this is natural enough; but incredible as it

1 December 14, 1909, speaking in the Town Hall, Tranent, East
Lothian.

2 April 14, 1909, letter to the Chairman of the Liberal Association
at Dundee.

3 January 6, 1910, speech at Bath.

4 January 6, 1910, speech at Peckham.

5 October 20, 1910, speech in Wales.

284 TRUTH AND THE WAR

may seem, by the Ministers who have authorised the
secret military and naval consultations.

At the very moment these consultations are initiated,
Lord Haldane,1 then in charge of the War Office, we see,
is adopting measures to reduce expenditure on the Army.
"My Government" — King Edward states on July 28, 1906,
in addressing the 3rd Battalion of the Scots Guards — "has
considered it necessary to reduce the expenses of the Army,
in consequence of which there is to be a reduction both of
our artillery and infantry, and in this reduction your
battalion is included." Mr. Harcourt, in October, has
expressed great satisfaction at "notable retrenchments"
in the Army.2 On a later occasion he has prayed God we
shall never "be organised as a great military nation with
a people in arms."3 Mr. Runciman has congratulated
the country upon a steadily dwindling expenditure on the
Army, and has looked forward to further reductions.4 In
1910, Lord Haldane has gone so far as to declare : "In
naval and military defence we are absolutely and com-
pletely equipped to meet all emergencies and situations.
The person who says we are not is in a blue funk."5 These
words are uttered by one of the Ministers who is cognisant
of the fact that a decisive step has been taken on the road
to commit this country, with an expeditionary force of
under 200,000 men, to participation in a land war against
a State then perfectly well known to be the most formid-
ably equipped and organised for war of any on the
Continent, capable of placing several millions of men in
the field.

Thus for the five years 1 906-191 1 was the nation
permitted to live in a fool's paradise, not as Ministers have
since induced the nation to believe, because they, and,
therefore, the nation, were innocent victims of
Machiavellian cunning on the part of Germany; but
because Ministers were steering a secret course which
reduced all these fine utterances of theirs and of their

1 1 pass no opinion upon the value or otherwise of Lord Haldane 's
Army reforms. I know nothing about it. I am here merely
recording facts in the light of the unwritten bond with France.

2 October 17, 1906, speech to Rossendale Liberal Council.

s October 2, 1908, speech to his constituents.

*■ October 8 and November 18, 1907.

s December 28, 1910, speech at Grimsby.

BETRAYAL OF THE NATION 285

colleagues to so much gibberish, a secret course which
demanded, not reductions in Army expenditure, but a
complete revolution in the whole character of the military
strategy of the Empire, including the adoption of national
service.

CHAPTER XXXIV
The Betrayal of the Nation, 19124914

The story in brief is one of action — hidden from all and especially
from the Cabinet, secretly taken by the Three from 1906 to 191 1, and
bringing England to unavoidable war in 1914. The Three had all
the time been preparing for the war, which they believed was so
probable that it needed a detailed plan of operations beforehand, yet
all the time concealing all from their confidential colleagues in the
Cabinet. The point and the appalling significance of the story lie in
the proof it affords that we live under a political system which leaves
the greatest of all issues in the absolutely uncontrolled hands of one,
or two, or three, acting secretly and without the knowledge of what
they are doing being shared by any of those on whom the real burden
must fall, or even by their own most confidential and trusting
colleagues. For the Wisdom of the many we have substituted the
Conspiracy of the few. — "The Candid Quarterly." May, 1915.

We were all caught 'unprepared. — Mr. Lloyd George : interview
with the Editor of "II Secolo." (Sunderland "Daily Echo,"
January 29, 1916.)

SO far the terrible story, for terrible posterity will
deem it. But there is much yet left to explore, and
I shall attempt it in this chapter.

The year 191 2 was marked by two notable events.
Public opinion here (and also in Germany) had given
unmistakable proof of its desire to heal the breach. Among
the political supporters of the Ministry the feeling was
strong and emphatically expressed. Nor were there
lacking voices on the other side of British politics. Sundry
unofficial bodies sprang, just about this time, into exist-
ence on both sides of the North Sea having reconciliation
and understanding as their aim. The Government sent
Lord Haldane over to Berlin. It was an unfortunate
selection, although at the time public opinion — knowing
nothing of the unwritten bond — regarded the Govern-
ment's choice as a particularly happy one. For Lord
Haldane was well known to the Kaiser and to Germany's
leading statesmen. But Lord Haldane was also one of
the triumvirate responsible for the unwritten bond, and he

286

BETRAYAL OF THE NATION 287

was, moreover, the head of the Department which was
supervising the execution of the bond. In other words,
he was head of the Department which was working out a
combined plan of action with the analogous Department
in France, a combined plan of action in the event of a
European war, i.e., a combined plan of action against
Germany, the country with which he proposed to negotiate.
And the analogous Department in France was working at
the same plan with the analogous Department in Russia —
Russia's hypothetical intentions being at that moment the
object of German fears and suspicions. No Minister
placed in such a false position could possibly have
succeeded in bridging the gulf of Anglo-German misunder-
standing. But the public knew nothing of all this. And,
when Lord Haldane returned, the public was once again
deceived. It was led to believe that Lord Haldane had
smoothed matters over and brought about a permanent
improvement, whereas the smoothing process could only
be superficial and evanescent, by reason of the unwritten
bond. Nevertheless, everything that could be done to
convey the belief that Lord Haldane's mission had been
highly successful was done. Lord Haldane's own florid
references thereto may be set aside, in view of the Prime
Minister's clear and emphatic pronouncement.

Speaking in the House of Commons on July 25 (1912)
Mr. Asquith said : —

"Our relations with the great German Empire are, I
am glad to say, at this moment, and, I feel sure, are likely
to remain, relations of amity and goodwill. Lord Haldane
paid a visit to Berlin early in the year; he entered upon
conversations and an interchange of views, which have
been continued since in a spirit of perfect frankness and
friendship, both on one side and the other."

Thus Mr. Asquith on the Haldane negotiations in 191 2.
Now listen to Mr. Asquith on those same Haldane negotia-
tions two years later. (October 3, 191 4.)

"They (the German Government) wanted us to pledge
ourselves absolutely to neutrality in the event of Germany
being engaged in war, and this, mind you, at a time when
Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive
and defensive resources, and especially upon the sea.
They asked us — to put it quite plainly — they asked us

288 TRUTH AND THE WAR

for a free hand so far as we were concerned, if, and when,
they selected the opportunity to overbear, to dominate, the
European world."

Thus, in 1912, the Prime Minister of Great Britain
despatches one of his most intimate colleagues on a delicate
mission to the Sovereign and Government of one of the
most powerful States in Christendom, a State united to
our own by ties of Royal blood and by centuries of
co-operation, but over whose relations with our own a
sinister shadow of distrust and suspicion has recently been
cast. This mission is of enormous importance to the
people of both States. For, bearing in view the events
of the year preceding it, and the general condition of
Europe, that mission constitutes the touchstone of the
future. If it succeeds, both nations can breathe freely
once more. If it fails, this nation is confronted with one
of the most momentous crises in its history. Even to the
"man in the street" this is dimly apparent. To the Prime
Minister of Britain, who knows how deeply the nation
is committed in ties of honourable obligation towards the
potential foes of that State to which this confidential
emissary has proceeded, realisation of all that hangs upon
the mission must be acute. The emissary returns, and the
negotiations begun by him are continued after his return.
The public mind is full of contradictory rumours. Finally,
the Prime Minister deems the time has come to enlighten
the nation. He solemnly informs Parliament that the
negotiations have been marked throughout by "a spirit
of perfect frankness and friendship" on both sides, and
that our relations with our powerful neighbour are not
merely excellent at the moment, but, he feels sure, are
likely to remain so. . . . Two years pass. For the
first time in a thousand years the British and Germanic
peoples are at war. And how does the Prime Minister of
Great Britain then refer to the proceedings which he had
precedently characterised in the manner stated ? He now
indignantly asseverates that they disclosed an attempt on
the part of the German Government to bind Great Britain
to a shameful neutrality. The "perfect frankness and
friendship" have become transmuted into a species of
bullying blackmail. This State, with which, he assured
the nation, we were likely to retain "relations of amity
and goodwill," had, nevertheless, made clear to us with
a cynicism as indiscreet as it was brutal, that it proposed,

BETRAYAL OF THE NATION 289

when the time had come, to "dominate the European
world."

Comment would be superfluous.

Whether Mr. Asquith's second version of the Haldane
negotiations — substantially endorsed by Sir E. Grey in
May, 1916 — is a fair and accurate account of the German
attitude on that occasion, is a matter upon which students
of the published British and German versions must form
their own judgment. Mr. Lowes Dickinson has put the
matter with great judiciousness and penetration1 : —

"The Triple Alliance was confronting the Triple
Entente. On both sides were fear and suspicion. Each
believed in the possibility of the others springing a war
upon them. Each suspected the others of wanting to
lull them into a false security, and then take them unpre-
pared. In that atmosphere what hope was there of
successful negotiations? The essential condition — mutual
confidence — was lacking. What, accordingly, do we
find ? The Germans offer to reduce their naval programme,
first, if England will promise an unconditional neutrality;
secondly, when that was rejected, if England will promise
neutrality in a war which should be 'forced upon'
Germany. Thereupon the British Foreign Office scents a
snare. Germany will get Austria to provoke a war, while
making it appear that the war was provoked by Russia,
and she will then come in under the terms of her alliance
with Austria, smash France, and claim that England must
look on passively under the neutrality agreement ! 'No,
thank you ! ' Sir Edward Grey accordingly makes a
counter proposal. England will neither make nor partici-
pate in an 'unprovoked' attack upon Germany. This time
it is the Chancellor's turn to hang back. 'Unprovoked!
H'm ! What does that mean? Russia, let us suppose,
makes war upon Austria, while making it appear that
Austria is the aggressor. France comes in on the side of
Russia. And England ? Will she admit that the war was
'unprovoked,' and remain neutral? Hardly, we think!'
The Chancellor, therefore, proposes this addition :
'England, of course, will remain neutral if war is forced
upon Germany? That follows, I presume?' 'No!'
1 "The European Anarchy"; op. cit.

290 TRUTH AND THE WAR

from the British Foreign Office. Reason as before. And
the negotiations fall through. How should they not under
the conditions? There could be no understanding,
because there was no confidence. There could be no
confidence because there was mutual fear. There was
mutual fear because the Triple Alliance stood in arms
against the Triple Entente. What was wrong ? Germany ?
England? No. The European tradition and system."

It is an admirable passage, and a tribute to the equable-
ness of judgment and the sanity of mind which one of our
very few distinguished intellectuals has succeeded in
retaining amid the general declension.

But I cannot altogether subscribe to it. It would, I
think, have been more accurate to say : The Teutonic
combination and the Franco-Russian combination con-
fronted one another — for the Triple Alliance by that time
was a myth : Italy stood apart, and was rapidly gravitating
towards the Franco-Russian combination. These two
combinations, then, confronted one another. But where
did England come in ? Her statesmen denied that she was
bound to the Franco-Russian combination. Yet, only the
previous year, she had clearly intimated that she would
support France, even to the lengths of going to war with
the Teutonic combination, in a quarrel over Morocco where
Germany's case rested upon international law and the case
of France upon the violation of international law on behalf
of French interests. What was the real situation? Would
England lay her cards on the table? Was England's
support of France on that occasion due to the particular
circumstances of the case, or was her support permanent
and unconditional ? Would England say what she would do
if Russia dragged in France over a Near-Eastern struggle
on the strength of her alliance with that country?

The negotiations of 191 2 failed, and were bound to
fail, not because either side desired war. They failed
because, while the commitments on one side were avowed,
the commitments on the other side were concealed. The
primary cause of their failure was not the lack of desire,
but the impossibility in which the British Ministers, in
whose hands the negotiations rested, found themselves
to devise any formula of neutrality which could be made
to square with the obligations they had contracted. The

BETRAYAL OF THE NATION 291

plain fact was that British neutrality, in the event of war
involving the Teutonic combination and the Franco-
Russian combination, had been morally bartered away.
British neutrality in such an event, which was the only
event at issue, was a non-existent quantity at the time
these negotiations took place. It had, morally speaking,
vanished, with the initiation, early in 1906, of the secret
Anglo-French military and naval consultations. It had
disappeared in esse when, on the basis of those consulta-
tions, continued from 1906 onwards, and the accumulating
moral obligations they set up, the British Government had,
in the summer of 191 1, announced its intention, through
Mr. Lloyd George and The Times, of giving material aid
to France in trampling upon the Algeciras Act. It was
with the latter fact overshadowing their deliberations that
the negotiators met. Under such circumstances the
negotiations were foredoomed to sterility. This country
was ignorantly and rapidly drifting into a potential land
war, for which Ministers could make no adequate prepara-
tion without informing the country what they had done
and without disclosing the position into which the country
had been manoeuvred. This Ministers did not dare to do,
for it would have split the Liberal Party from top to
bottom, and probably have sent them individually into the
wilderness. No doubt they honestly believed that such a
double event would be bad for the country. But in every
denunciation of the "preparedness" of the German
Government before the war, which they have uttered since
the war, they pass condemnation upon themselves and
upon the system of which they form part.

For they knew of that preparedness. They knew its
efficiency, its scale, its thoroughness. They proclaimed
their knowledge.

Did not Lord Haldane, for instance, speak on one
occasion of the "great advantage" he had experienced
from frequent visits to Berlin, "and there studying the
German War Office and the German Army system" ? Did
he not express his gratitude for the opportunities freely
given him for studying "the wonderful system, dating
from the days of Moltke and Bismarck, with its lessons
of clear thinking and its instruction of how to produce
definiteness in organisation"?

292 TRUTH AND THE WAR

Moreover, Ministers testified to the inevitableness of,
and the justification for, that preparedness down to the
very eve of the war.

Did not Mr. Lloyd George, for instance, thus unburden
himself to a London newspaper on January i, 1914 : —

"The German Army is vital, not merely to the exist-
ence of the German Empire, but to the very life and
independence of the nation itself, surrounded, as Germany
is, by other nations, each of which possesses armies almost
as powerful as her own."

Did he not point out, as he had already pointed out in
1908, that Germany was compelled by her geographical
and strategic position, to be the strong man armed ? Did
he not insist that while we demanded for our own national
security a 60 per cent, superiority in ships, Germany had
nothing like that military superiority over France alone?
And did he not remind the nation that Germany had, "of
course, in addition, to reckon with Russia on her Eastern
frontier"? Did he not acknowledge, and defend as
natural and inevitable, in view of "recent events" (the
increasing tension between Austria and Russia in the
Balkans) Germany's immense army increases?

Similarly, Ministers condemn themselves when, to
cover up their own conduct towards the nation, they spread
the legend of a Germany desirous of "subjugating
Europe," and of having laboured to that end for forty
years — a statement which at any time but the present
would be held to qualify the maker of it for a lunatic
asylum. If this was the Germany which displayed its
hand to Lord Haldane, why was Mr. Asquith so confident,
in 191 2, of remaining on terms of amity and goodwill with
so detestable a neighbour?

This sort of garment, in which to clothe their failures
and inconsistencies, has been worn threadbare on previous
occasions by other Ministers, with more justification,
perhaps. Was not the Crimean War attributed to
Russia's aims at "universal dominion," to her "arrogant
attitude," to the existence in Russia of a "threatening
military autocracy"?1 Was not Russia then described as

1 "The Life of Lord Granville." Lord E. Fitzmaurice.

BETRAYAL OF THE NATION. 293

"a Power which has violated the faith of Treaties and
defies the opinion of the civilised world"?1 But the people
swallowed it all in 1854 as they swallow it all to-day. For
war psychology, it would seem, never changes.

There were Russians then (and there are Russians
now) who thus insensately boasted, re-echoing in their
fashion the testamentary effusions of Peter the Great.
There have been Germans (and there are Germans to-day)
who have raved to the same purpose. It is always easy
t>- select matter of that kind from the Chauvinistic litera-
ture of every nation, in order to hypnotise the masses with
a fixed idea. But never has the practice been systematised
as it has been in the present war with the sanction of
those for whom the rooting of that legend in the public
mind was essential to their political salvation. Never
before has officialdom stooped to such grotesque falsifica-
tion of history in order to clean its own historical
records. Never before have a few books, written by a
handful of Jingoes, and scarcely read in the enemy country,
been poured upon the station bookstalls in cheap editions,
in order to prove that a people whose blood has fertilised
our own institutions, which has given us our reigning line,
and many of those most eminently concerned in building up
our own Empire — is putrid to the core. Never before has
the inculcation of hate, the advertisement given to the
brutal acts of a maddened soldiery, the appeal to the
passions of revenge and unreason been pursued, in this
country, at all events, as a fine art, with Governmental
support. Never before have our leading men given their
patronage to such vulgar declamation against a foe who
has committed many brutalities, but to whom our soldiers,
at least, do not deny the gift of bravery or the perpetration
of many acts of kindliness and chivalry. Never before
have our newspapers stooped — again with encouragement
from above — to such odious vituperation of a monarch
whose faults, doubtless, are conspicuous but who, as the
ruling classes of every country in Europe, not least our
own, know full well has stood out during the greater part
of his reign as a bulwark of European peace; a monarch
who could have unchained war, and successful war from
the militarist point of view, half a dozen times over in the
past twenty years if he had so willed. We used to pride
ourselves upon being above this sort of thing-.

1 Royal declaration. March 28, 1854.

(21)

294 TRUTH AND THE WAR.

And those who protest against these aberrations, which
have done us incalculable harm among all neutral peoples,
are denounced as "unpatriotic." Unpatriotic, forsooth!
It is "patriotic" to pitchfork your country into a general
European war with a military equipment adequate for
dealing with a few thousand South African Dutchmen.
But it is unpatriotic, after nearly two years' slaughter and
waste, to recommend that your country should be extracted
with honour from the shambles.

It is, then, beyond dispute that the Haldane negotia-
tions in the spring of 191 2, while they improved the general
atmospheric conditions, left untouched the crux of the
difficulty between Britain and Germany — i.e., the true
character of the relations between the British Government
and the Franco-Russian Alliance. They paved the way
for minor accommodations, for the re-opening under more
favourable conditions of certain African and Asiatic
problems which had already formed the subject of mutual
discussion, such as the future of the Portuguese
possessions, the Bagdad railway, the oil deposits of
Mesopotamia, and so on. They must also have influenced
very considerably the collaboration which prevailed in the
critical situation arising out of the Balkan War of 191 2,
and its sequel the following year.

But, fundamentally, the situation remained exactly
what it was, what it had been since the unwritten bond in
1906. The perils of that situation had increased
enormously. The Pan-Slavists, whose High-Priest in the
Balkans was M. de Hartwig,1 and whose inspirer in the
background was M. Isvolski,2 were in full cry against
Russian official diplomacy for its alleged lack of vigour,
and were rapidly acquiring ascendency in the councils of
the Empire. The Pan-Slavists had with them all the forces
of reactionary officialdom. Their prototypes in Austria-
Hungary were stirring up the same sort of trouble. The
growth of the latter's influence was assisted by the
incessant anti-Austrian propaganda in Bosnia directed from
Belgrade and fostered by de Hartwig, and by the con-
tinuous intriguing in Galicia through the instrumentality

1 Russian Minister at Belgrade.

2 The predecessor of M. Sazonoff.

BETRAYAL OF THE NATION 295

of unofficial Russian agents. All this was common know-
ledge. An explosion had been averted in 191 2 owing to
French and British pressure upon Russia on the one hand,
and to German pressure upon Austria on the other. But
Austro-Russian relations had become stretched to cracking
point. They were at the mercy of any untoward incident.
And if they snapped, the divisions of Europe at once came
into play — with Austria stood Germany, with Russia
France : and between France and Britain was the unwritten
bond, constituting, as Lord Lansdowne afterwards
described it in the House of Lords, "obligations not less
sacred, because they are not embodied in a signed and
sealed document."1

Britain's equivocal position was thus infinitely more
dangerous to herself in 191 2 than in 1906, or even in
191 1. The British people went gaily about their business,
believing that their Government was free and untrammelled.

It was in these circumstances that the most distinguished
of living British soldiers came into the open. He knew
the facts. He knew that his country had become so far
involved by its governing statesmen, but without its know-
ledge, on the side of one of the two great combinations of
potential belligerents that it stood morally committed, with
ludicrously inadequate material, to participation in the
most terrific land war ever waged. He flung himself
personally, at an advanced age, into a public campaign on
behalf of universal military training, which he had
advocated for several years previously. The campaign
failed, just as the Anglo-German negotiations of 191 2
failed, and substantially for the same reason. It failed
because the truth could not be disclosed. British traditions
of public life precluded Lord Roberts from saying what he
knew. All that he could do was to try and avert the danger
by the only means open to him. That he should have been
supported by the militarist and jingo elements in the nation
was natural enough. That he should have been opposed
by those whose conception of the international duties and
national interests of Britain differed from theirs, was also
natural. But that he should have been opposed, and not
only opposed, but attacked, by the very men who had
secretly placed the British people in a position where their
national and Imperial future was imperilled without their
cognisance, and, therefore, without adequate preparation

1 August 6, 1914.

296 TRUTH AND THE WAR

— that, surely, will be regarded by future historians as one
of the most amazing incidents in our national annals.

Is it necessary to recall how Lord Haldane in particular
strenuously opposed Lord Roberts' campaign all over the
country, both on the ground of policy — i.e., absence of
necessity — and on the ground of economy? The thing
would be incredible were it not recorded in black and
white.

All through 191 3 and in the spring of 191 4 "the drums
of Armageddon — as Mr. Walton Newbold expresses it in
that remarkable book of his, which may be particularly
recommended to those who place the blame for Europe's
follies upon the shoulders of Germany alone1 — were rolling
more insistently for a struggle now not long to be
deferred." The Teutonic combination and the Franco-
Russian combination were arming to the teeth, each
accusing the other of being the cause of their doing so.
The international armament ring, in which British capital
and many personalities of influence in British official and
• professional life were interested, was making enormous
profits. Our armament firms were turning out with frantic
haste and with sublime impartiality every kind of killing
machine for potential friend and potential foe alike. The
incendiary Press in Germany, France, Russia, Austria,
and Britain was inflaming and exacerbating public opinion
— none playing a more sinister and influential part than
the Northcliffe papers.

Yet all through this period, during which the storm
clouds were gathering, the British people were allowed to
remain in the same fools' paradise in which they had dwelt
since 1906. By this time, as it has been well said2 "we
were tied to France inextricably, tied by countless invisible
threads such as fastened down Gulliver while he slumbered
in the land of little men." The analogy is a doubly perfect
one. And as we were tied to France, so France was tied
to Russia. But in her case the threads were all too visible !
But the Ministers who had so tied us, and such of their
colleagues and prominent personalities among the Opposi-
tion leaders, who must by then have become acquainted
with the facts, persisted in their immoral course of keeping
the truth from the country.

1 How Europe Armed for War." (Blackfriars Press Ltd.)

2 The Candid Review. May, 1915.

BETRAYAL OF THE NATION 297

Ministers denied point blank in Parliament that the
country was in any sense committed.

They denied it on the public platform.

They insisted that our relations with Germany were
satisfactory and improving.

They insisted that our Army was fully sufficient to meet
the requirements of our foreign policy and of our national
strategy founded thereon.

They urged a reduction of our naval expenditure up to
within a fortnight of the outbreak of war.

Then the blow fell. The bullet which put an end to the
life of the Archduke Ferdinand penetrated the magazine
which both the European Groups had been so long and so
diligently filling with explosives. Into that magazine a
dozen middle-aged and elderly gentlemen, half in blind
panic, half in criminal disarray of mind, let fall the torch
which, in falling, lit the funeral pyre of Europe's youth.

But at least the peoples they governed were fore-armed.

Our people were not.

The Nemesis of their own secret acts gripped our
Ministers by the throat. It paralysed their sincere and
desperate efforts to maintain peace. It cast dissension
among them. They could steer no clear or consistent
course. They were unable to take up a definite attitude
towards either party in the quarrel. They could afford to
be honest neither to the British people nor to the world.
They could not hold in check the elements making for war
in Germany by a timely declaration of solidarity with
France and Russia, although morally committed to France,
and, therefore, to Russia; lest by a premature acknowledg-
ment to Parliament of their long course of secret negotia-
tions they should plunge the country into utter confusion
and bring disaster upon themselves. They could not hold
in check the elements making for war in Russia and France
because their military and naval staffs had long since made
all arrangements, with their authority, for common action
with those of France, and, therefore, contingently, with
those of Russia. In vain the Russians and French
implored them to make a pronouncement of British policy
while there was yet time. The Cabinet, as a Cabinet,
could make no such pronouncement, for the Cabinet, as a
Cabinet, declined to admit that it and the country were
committed to the Franco-Russian combination. To the
Cabinet as a whole the character and significance which

298 TRUTH AND THE WAR

the eight years' secret military and naval collaboration had
gradually assumed in the eyes of those members of the
Cabinet who had originally sanctioned it, came as a
staggering and appalling prospect.

The critical days rushed by. The struggle between
contending factions in the Cabinet became acute. Finally
the section which contended that war, having now become
inevitable, we must enter it, being bound in honour to
France and Russia, carried the day. It was materially
assisted by the leaders of the Official Opposition, who, on
August 2, expressed in a letter to the Premier — which
contains no allusion, however distant, to Belgium — their
opinion that "it would be fatal to the honour and security
of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting France
and Russia at the present juncture."

Whereupon a number of members of the Cabinet
resigned.

All but Mr. Burns and Lord Morley reconsidered their
decision when Germany invaded Belgium.

Mr. Lloyd George has since asserted1 that if Belgium
had not been invaded he would not have been a party to a
declaration of war upon Germany. And he added this
very positive statement : —

"If Germany had been wise she would not have set
foot on Belgian soil. The Liberal Government, then,
would not have intervened."

It will not do. Mr. Ramsay Macdonald has been over-
whelmed with abuse because he has from the first resisted
the dishonest plea that the Liberal Cabinet determined upon
war because of Belgium. Mr. Lloyd George's statement
is a legend. That the invasion of Belgium was the chief
factor which inspired the bulk of our people to the greatest
voluntary effort in arms which any people has ever made
in the history of the world (by way of reward, it has been
conscripted !) is unquestionable. That it was the invasion
of Belgium which gave the war its popular backing — that,
too, is unquestionable. That it was the invasion of
Belgium which fired the self-governing Dominions is
equally true. But that the invasion of Belgium determined
our official entry into the war is simply untrue. And its
untruth is conclusively demonstrable. Thus : —

July 31, igi4- Sir E. Grey informs the German
Ambassador that if France and Germany become involved

1 Pearson's Magazine. March, 1915.

BETRAYAL OF THE NATION 299

in war, Britain will be drawn in. (White Book No. 119 :
Yellow Book No. no.)

August 1, 1914. Sir E. Grey refuses to say that Britain
will remain neutral if Germany undertakes not to violate
Belgian neutrality, and refuses, when further pressed by
the German Ambassador, to name any terms upon which
Britain will remain neutral. (White Book No. 123.)

August 2, 1914. Sir E. Grey definitely pledges British
naval aid to France if Germany attacks the French coasts or
shipping.

August j, 1914. (Afternoon.) Sir E. Grey informs the
House of Commons that this definite commitment has been
made to France; that our national honour, in his opinion, is
involved in supporting France; he reveals the military and
naval consultations which have been going on since 1906,
and states that France has, by agreement with us, concen-
trated her fleet in the Mediterranean and left her other
coasts undefended.

August j, 1914. (Evening.) Sir E. Grey informs the
House of Commons of Germany's threat to invade Belgium
(dated 7 p.m., August 2), and adds that he did not possess
that information when he made his statement to the House
in the afternoon.

The final and irrevocable act had, therefore, taken
place before Germany had invaded Belgium ; before she had
threatened to invade Belgium ; and before the Cabinet was
in possession of the information that she had issued that
threat.

And the final and irrevocable act was the fatal and
necessary consequence of the unwritten bond.

A few days later, without any notification to Parlia-
ment, the small British Expeditionary Force was being
despatched to the Continent, there to be extricated only
by consummate generalship and consummate valour from
absolute annihilation.

Where is the original Expeditionary Force to-day?

Such is the story of how the British people were
committed, in blissful ignorance of the fact, step by step,
to support one of the two great rival Groups of the
Continent of Europe, and to a land war on an unprece-
dented scale, with an available Expeditionary Force
(sufficient, they had precedently been informed, for all
their needs) of under 200,000 men; of how, being

300 TRUTH AND THE WAR

gradually, imperceptibly, and furtively so committed, the
British people were, nevertheless, lulled into a sense of
false security by those who had so committed them; of
how those who so committed them repeatedly assured them
that their relations with Germany were excellent; of how
those who so committed them concealed from the British
people that the negotiations of 19 12 with Germany had
failed to establish an accord between the two Governments,
but led the British people, on the contrary, to believe that
they had been successful; of how those who had so com-
mitted the British people opposed every attempt to
increase the military forces of the Crown, and took credit
for reducing the expenditure upon those forces; of how
those who so committed the British people constantly held
out hopes of a reduction on naval expenditure, and even
urged publicly that such reduction should be effected; of
how those who so committed the British people, having
also borne witness on numerous occasions to the efficiency,
preparedness, and magnitude of German military
resources, and having explained and justified the same in
view of Germany's geographical and strategic situation,
proceeded, when war broke out, to describe this efficiency,
preparedness and magnitude of the German military
resources, as conveying proof that the rulers of Germany
had plotted in secret for a treacherous assault upon
uninformed and unsuspecting neighbours, for the purpose
of dominating Europe.

The moral is clear; the lesson plain. No Democracy
which tolerates a system capable of producing such results
can live.

CHAPTER XXXV
The Two Roads

Let us listen only to the experience that urges us on. It is always
higher than that which keeps us back. Let us reject all the counsels
of the past that do not turn toward the future. — Maeterlinck.

THE ruling classes in every belligerent State advise
their peoples not to be content with an "inconclusive
peace." And there are not wanting professional men of
God who echo that advice in the name of the merciful
Christ. By an "inconclusive peace" the ruling classes in
each belligerent State mean, although they take care not
to avow it, a settlement of the war which shall deprive
them of the sweet triumph of standing on the necks of the
ruling classes opposed to them.

For this world-war was made possible by personal
friction between a very few individuals among the ruling
castes in the respective countries engaged in it. These
people now feel their personal prestige to be at stake.
They feel it so much that the horrors of the war take a
secondary place in their minds. They keep away from
the actual battlefields. They live well, feed well; their
ears are deaf to the wailing of the women. If this were
not so the" war would have ended long ago. If this were
not so every individual who had had a share in promoting
this war would either have committed suicide or lost his
reason. The war could end to-morrow if these people
would think less about themselves and more about the
dead.

It is a staggering thought, is it not, that this war
might end to-morrow but for the stiff-necked pride of a
few — a very, very few — middle-aged and elderly gentle-
men, whose incompatibility of temper, unlimited capacity
for intrigue, and traditional notions of dignity brought
the war about? But it is God's truth. A turn of the
wrist; the touching of a lever in the obedient journalistic
machine, and the soldiers would rest in their trenches,
the cannon would cease to growl, and the diplomatists
would be packing their traps to assemble at the appointed

301

302 TRUTH AND THE WAR

meeting place ... to talk together instead of at
each other. Yes, it is God's truth, for these middle-aged
and elderly gentlemen are the principals in this gigantic
duel. The people are their seconds. But the parts are
reversed, for it is the seconds that fight while the principals
look on and extol the peoples' virtues aloud, while musing
in silence upon their gullibility.

When a man has given you advice which you followed,
and which has turned out to be wholly bad, you are a
very foolish person if you grant him your blind confidence
again. The ruling classes in every belligerent State have
been telling the democracy for years that while they them-
selves were extremely anxious to keep the peace, the
fellows next door were a quarrelsome lot, and that the only
way to keep them quiet was to arm to the teeth. "If
you want peace — they said — you must spend and go on
spending your substance on battleships and guns, on
explosives and air-craft; then you will maintain peace,
but not otherwise." Now that advice was hopelessly
wrong. But, undeterred, the very same people who gave
it, now come along with equal assurance and amazing
effrontery with another piece of advice. "If you want
peace — they say — you must go on fighting until the fellows
next door own themselves in the wrong." Now, this is
arrant nonsense. Moreover, this arrant nonsense is
preached to every belligerent people, and, do not forget,
every belligerent people is persuaded, more than ever
persuaded after a two years' war, that the fellows next
door were the cause of all the trouble. So, a complete
impasse is reached.

Well, we must reject that advice, and every people
must reject it

The only compensation possible for the miseries which
this war has inflicted upon the present generation and for
the burdens it has laid upon the next, is that it shall be
militarily inconclusive, and that it shall be brought to a
speedy end by general consent.

A conclusive war, i.e., a war which enables one side to
impose its unfettered will upon the other, means an
inconclusive peace.

A war closing amid universal exhaustion, followed by
a sullen peace, holding out no prospect of international
reconstruction on a different basis of motive and outlook,
means an inconclusive peace.

THE TWO ROADS 303

A militarily inconclusive war, so recognised by general
consent, offers the only prospect of a conclusive peace.

Only if the war be militarily inconclusive will the
nations concerned perceive that the philosophy of war has
become unsound.

Only if the war be militarily inconclusive will the
nations be led collectively to repudiate the doctrines
regulating the intercourse of peoples which their respec-
tive Governments inherited, and which they have main-
tained in an age when these doctrines present no permanent
advantage to be reaped nor true glory to be gained.

Only if the war be militarily inconclusive will each
belligerent nation be inducted to examine both the origins
and the lessons of the war with the determination to seek,
and to find, a road which all nations can tread henceforth
with safety and without dishonour.

A militarily inconclusive termination of the war is the
defeat of "Prussian militarism." It is the defeat of the
French school of La Revanche. It is the defeat of Pan-
Slavism. It opens the door to a Balkan Confederation,
the one constructive policy for that tumultuous area. It
compels a more equitable distribution of political power
in that political mosaic, the Dual-Monarchy. It opens the
eyes of the British people to the injustices, the dangers,
and the ineffectiveness of their political system.

At present the articulate elements in each belligerent
State are busily engaged in distracting attention from
national perplexities, by emphasising the perplexities of
the enemy.

But the national attention everywhere would be better
employed in focusing its own problems, which are
numerous.

In what light does our own national and Imperial
future appear, assuming what I have termed a "sullen"
peace, the result of universal exhaustion; a peace laying
foundations for no real change in the mechanism and
procedure of international intercourse, effecting no settle-
ment of those international problems of economics and of
race distribution which, in the blundering grasp of
so-called statesmen, have produced this war : a peace,
therefore, which will be nominal and ephemeral, little
more than an armistice, which the belligerents will employ
in recuperation and in preparation for another attempt
to solve these problems by another war?

3o4 TRUTH AND THE WAR

That is what concerns our people primarily.

There is much which must give food for grave reflec-
tion in the .actual and potential changes which this war
has created in the strategic conditions of our country,
when we consider those changes in connection with the
great racial movements now in process, and our relation
thereto.

Let us glance, first of all, at a capital factor in the life
of States, the factor of population, and the light which it
throws upon our national and Imperial future. The great
commercial, industrial, and expanding peoples of the
world are the American, the British, the German, and the
Russian. Of the four the British people are now numeri-
cally by far the weakest. This can be seen at a glance.
The totals given are in round figures : —

United States (white population, 1910 census) 82 millions.

United Kingdom (191 1 census) 45 millions.

Germany (19 10 census) 65 millions.

European Russia (191 1 census) 121 millions.

Moreover, of the four the people of the United
Kingdom are increasing at a much less rapid rate, largely
owing to the mishandling of the Irish problem, the popula-
tion of Ireland to-day being less by more than a million
than it was in the opening years of the nineteenth century.
The reliability of the Russian census of 1897 is open to
doubt. If it be accepted, then the population of European
Russia has increased 27 millions in fourteen years. In
any case, the rate of increase is admittedly very large.
The figures for the other countries are as follows : —

The white population of the United States in the
40 years preceding the last census increased by 47 millions.

The population of Germany in the 39 years preceding
the last census increased by 23 millions.

The population of the United Kingdom in the 40 years
preceding the last census increased by 14 millions.

These comparative rates of increase are even more
striking if we take the respective increases in the decade
preceding the last census (the figures for Russia are not
available). We then find that : —

In ten years (1900-10) the white population of the
United States increased 14,832,552.

In ten years (1900-10) the population of Germany
increased 8,558,825.

THE TWO ROADS 305

In ten years (1901-11) the population of the United
Kingdom increased 3,392,263.

If that ratio of increase is maintained during the 50
years following the last census, the result will be as follows,
in round numbers : —

In 1965 the white population of the United States will
be 156 millions.

In 1965 the population of Germany will be 108 millions.

In 1965 the population of the United Kingdom will
be 68 millions.

The above figures, and the lessons they convey, must
be continually in mind when we discuss the problem of
Britain's future in the event of a "settlement" of the war
which leaves its deep seated origins unconfronted, and,
therefore, without prospect of remedy; a "settlement"
which leaves legitimate ambitions unsatisfied, economic
needs disregarded, open sores still festering; a settlement
under which Europe, with a forced temporary respite due
to financial drain, will begin once more to arm.

The first consequence for the United Kingdom
(henceforth dragged into the Continental system) of
such a "settlement" must be a double burden upon the
back of the people of these Islands. For to the burden
of maintaining a supreme Navy would need to be added
the burden of a conscript Army. That Army might in
the early stages be moderate in size, but it would increase
as the recuperative forces of the Continental States re-
asserted themselves. Is this double burden one which
the people of the United Kingdom can bear?

Before the war the single burden was proving heavy
enough. It was absorbing large sums urgently required
for domestic purposes, lacking which millions of our
people were suffering severely from preventible poverty,
from preventible disease, and from preventible educational
and other kindred handicaps. It may be said : "You are
reckoning without the Empire. The Empire will hence-
forth share that burden." Yes, the self-governing
Dominions will share it, and gladly share it, provided you
allow them to share in the direction and control of your
foreign policy. But whatever their contribution may
amount to, it cannot cover the difference between the
single and the double burden. The white population of
the Dominions, it may be noted, is not more than fourteen

3o6 TRUTH AND THE WAR

millions. On the other hand, the burden of existing
taxation upon India cannot be wisely or justly increased.

In considering the future military requirements of the
United Kingdom under the foreshadowed conditions, the
position of France cannot be disregarded. France will
emerge from the war more exhausted than at the close
of the Napoleonic wars. She has already lost — lost defi-
nitely in dead — more than a million of her most virile
elements, and, perhaps, as many more permanently
disabled. What this loss means for France can only be
understood when it is borne in mind that her population
was only 39^ millions at the last census (191 1); that its
increase in the preceding 30 years had been under two
millions, and that before the war she, unlike Germany,
had enrolled every unit into military service, and that the
utmost limit of her military man-power had, therefore,
been reached. France will be in no position to take any
but a secondary part in another great European war. And
her willingness to do even that may well be doubted.
The course the rulers of France have pursued during the
past decade they have pursued with their eyes open. They
at least cannot shift the blame upon others. But it
remains true, nevertheless, that a malign fate has caused
the French people to be ground between the upper and
nether millstones of Russian exigencies and Anglo-
German rivalry. This they will clearly perceive at the
end of the war, and a great reaction is sure. Only the
bitterest enemy of France would wish to see her involved
in another European war. Her only chance of surviving
this one is generations of peace, and this she cannot have
unless she establishes a modus vivendi with her Eastern
neighbour. That she will do so may be taken as one of
the certainties of the future. Her most enlightened sons
had been working along those lines for the past twenty
years, and if France had been free from external commit-
ments they would have succeeded.

But would this assumption by the people of the United
Kingdom of a double burden be sufficient, under the fore-
shadowed conditions, to meet the potential modifications
this war has occasioned in offensive strategy? Assuredly
not.

We have had a long start in sea supremacy, and we
have maintained it. For a thousand years the sea has

THE TWO ROADS 307

saved us from the invader. We have been immune from
the desolation which has ravaged the Continent, and in
which our own legions have often participated. But the
future holds for us none of the security which the past
has held. That security was threatened when we went
to war. At the present moment it is still our rampart.
But the days that it will be so are numbered. And this
for two reasons. In the first place, we cannot build
against the world, and after this war the world will never
consent that one Power — even though that Power may
justly claim not to have abused its strength in time of
peace — shall hold undisputed sway over the natural high-
ways of the globe in time of war, and so arrogate to
itself the right of regulating, according to its strategic
interests, the sea-borne traffic of all nations. Had our
situation been other than it is we should have done our
utmost to dispute such a claim. After the experiences
of the war the world cannot be expected to tolerate it.
In itself the claim is far more comprehensive than would
be a claim on the part of a Continental Power to exercise
a military dictatorship in Europe. And for either claim
the future can hold no place.

We might for some years, by a desperate effort which
would wear us to the bone, succeed in building against
a Continental coalition. But we cannot build against a
Continental coalition and against America as well. And
America appears firmly resolved that if she cannot obtain
by diplomatic action at the settlement, freedom for the
exercise of her sea-borne trade in time of war, and the
abolition of the British claim to capture private property
at sea other than contraband, and to convert into contra-
band, at British pleasure, any article whatsoever; she will
do so by other means. And as she has long contended
for the abolition of the right of capture, she will be
consistent. What other means can she adopt? She can
construct a battle fleet of such dimensions that even the
most powerful maritime State must respect her wishes.
This she will do if we do not abate our claim, and in this
her position is identical with that of Germany. The
community of interest is there; patent, irrefutable. No
consideration of sentiment or of historical connection; no
passing indignation at the ruthlessness of German
methods of warfare; not even a rupture of relations can
permanently remove it. And sooner or later — sooner
rather than later — it must prove a decisive factor in inter-

3o8 TRUTH AND THE WAR

national relationships if the old system of international
intercourse is to continue.

This acknowledgment of an unpalatable truth per-
meates Mr. Balfour's recent pronouncement to the
American journalist, Mr. Edward Marshall (May 18,
1916). For if that statement be carefully read, it will
be observed to be, in substance, a bid for joint Anglo-
American control of the high seas. "Give up — says Mr.
Balfour in effect — the demand for the immunity from
capture of private property which you have persistently
urged at the Hague, and which Britain has as persistently
opposed, and we will take you into partnership as con-
trollers of the high seas." The scheme contains the flaw
common to all proposals which have as their object the
concentration in the hands of a limited number of States,
of a power to dictate the destinies of all nations. On
these lines there can be no permanent solution of the
naval problem or of the military problem. It has no moral
sanction behind it. The true solution, which must, how-
ever, be bracketed with an analogous solution for
Continental militarism, has been well and tersely put by
Sir Charles Bruce : —

"The only way seems to be for the Powers to recognise
that the interests of one are the interests of all; that the
world's commerce can only be protected by a world's
navy, and that, accordingly, the policy of the open-door
must be supplemented by the policy of an open path,
under the protection of an International Naval Police
Force, to be composed of ships of all nations in propor-
tion to the interests of individual States. Such a force
would dispel the anxieties of those States which possess
fleets inferior in power, but which are becoming increas-
ingly dependent upon over-sea commerce for their means
of existence. It would put an end to the perpetual
unrest arising out of the apprehension of a sudden attack
by one sea-Power on another, without a declaration of
war, and insure for international commerce the security
now enjoyed by national trade."1

That is one of the reasons why the future holds for
us none of the security that the past has held. More
and more does commerce claim, and rightly claim, to be
immune from the effects of the madness and selfishness
of contending rulers and castes. More and more does

1 "The English Navy and the Peace of the World." By Sir
Charles Bruce, in The Statist. July 13, 1912.

THE TWO ROADS 309

the sea belong to all men, and not only to some men.1
'But there is another reason. Even were we able by
our own unaided efforts, or in conjunction with America,
to retain a monopoly of sea power — and this would
assume a corresponding ability to cope with any possible
development of submarine power — sufficiently compre-
hensive for our war needs, we should not have solved our
difficulties. For another and rival element has allowed
itself to be partly subjugated by the genius of man, and
his complete triumph over it is only a matter of time.
Sea power alone can no longer assure our security, even
though we maintain directly, or in part by proxy, our
mastery upon it. Air power has circumvented it. And
in air power we do not even compete on equal terms with
some at least of the great States of the Continent.
Germany notably has the start of us, and although Fleet
Street affects to laugh at the Zeppelins, you will not find
naval, or military men, or air men doing so. A decade,
maybe two decades, may pass before air power is suffi-
ciently developed to permit of anything like a serious
military invasion. But we must reckon upon air power
attaining within a comparatively short time such a degree
of perfection that our vulnerable centres will be open to
accurately directed attack, and upon chemistry devising
some further devilish ingredients in the destructive pro-
perties of projectiles.

Moreover, the events of the past two years have shown
that modern warfare will henceforth be waged with
increasing implacability, not against the armies and
navies of the contending Powers alone, but against the
civilian population, which by its monetary contributions,
by its manufacture of the fuel of slaughter, by its agricul-
tural and industrial labours, and by its sanction, maintain
those armies and navies in being. It will become less and
less possible for belligerent States, and more and more
futile for international lawyers, to draw any distinction
between combatants and non-combatants. It is flying in
the face of logic to maintain that the man (or woman)
who fashions the projectiles or the explosive which another
man discharges with deadly effect, is a non-combatant.

1 This Chapter was written before Mr. Wilson's speech at
Washington, on May 27, in which he outlined the kind of Settlement
which would meet with America's support, postulating inter alia.

A universal association of nations to maintain inviolate the

security of the highway of the seas for the common, unhindered

use of all the nations of the world,

(«)

310 TRUTH AND THE WAR

Germany has deliberately adopted the practice of treating
civilian life as of no account when civilian life interferes
with military exigencies — or merely gets in the way. But
is our own procedure different, except in the character of
its manifestation? What does a "war of attrition"
involve? What do our efforts to stop food supplies from
reaching our enemies involve? We know full well what
they involve. By those measures we seek, with equal
deliberation, to inflict such hardships upon the civilian
population of Germany as will result in sufficient pressure
being placed upon the German Government by that civilian
population as will, in turn, compel the German Govern-
ment to sue for peace and to accept the terms we and
our Allies see fit to impose. When the Germans say that
we are making war upon their women and children, they
are but giving rhetorical expression to what is true in
substance and in fact.1

In their respective ways, therefore, both Germany and
England have, by their actual practices in this war,
admitted that, in order to be fully effective, modern war-
fare must be waged against the civilian population.

The effect of this admission upon air power and its
perfectibility and upon our national position in relation
thereto, is obvious. In any future war the population of
our cities and towns will be at least equally exposed to
wholesale slaughter as the population of the cities and
towns of the Continent — unless we all take to living under-
ground.

Our strategical situation has, therefore, undergone a
complete revolution. Formerly the Continent could not
get at us. Our officials, well-to-do City men, and Fleet
Street heroes could afford to be intensely patriotic at the
expense of the soldiers and sailors whom they sent to fight
and whom (incidentally) they paid (and pay) very meanly,
and to whom they denied (and deny) full political rights.
The Continent can now get at us sufficiently to make us
feel uncomfortable at nights. But to-morrow it will be

1 Hardly a day passes that our Press does not express jubilation
at the thought of a starving civilian population in Germany. One
wonders whether the anonymous persons who are responsible for these
effusions ever bear in mind that Germany claims nearly two million
Allied prisoners, and whether they ever ask themselves what the
fate of these prisoners is likely to be if the time really comes when
the German Government is unable to feed its civilian population?
The levity, to say nothing of other aspects, with which the matter
is treated in the British Press is as staggering as it is revolting.

THE TWO ROADS 311

air fleets, not nocturnal visitors in twos or threes, that
we must contemplate.

In a word, we have ceased, strategically speaking, to
be an Island.

And this revolution in our strategic situation, occa-
sioned by the new aspect of the exercise of sea power
which this war has projected upon the international screen;
by the double burden resulting from our entry into the
Continental system, and by the development of air power,
must needs modify very profoundly our ability to sustain
what has been for several centuries the chief purpose of
our traditional foreign policy. We need not here discuss
whether, in endeavouring throughout the centuries to
prevent any one Power or combination of Powers from
acquiring a leading position on the Continent [however
fitted to exercise such it or they might be, through the
possession of the same kind of qualities which we think
justify us in controlling one-fifth of the habitable globe],
our policy has been dictated by a desire to preserve the
liberties of Europe; or whether that policy has been due
to a perfectly intelligible ambition to minister to our
own security and to increase the boundaries of our over-
seas Empire. It is enough to point out that whatever
the guiding inspiration may have been, the conditions
which ensured the successful prosecution of the policy have
passed away. This war will bring many revelations as
well as many revolutions. It will reveal to the peoples
of Europe that their divisions are not fundamental, but
superficial. This process of revelation was, indeed,
making rapid headway when the war came. As its
natural complement is the growth of democratic tendencies
within States, which makes for a corresponding weaken-
ing of autocracy, monopoly, and militarism— the triple
demons which curse humanity — it is more than probable
that resistance to the process by the latter played its part
in precipitating the conflict. Be that as it may, the
Europe of Pitt and Palmerston is a thing of the past, and
can never be revived. Alike through the growth of popu-
lation, the centralisation of authority, the ramifications of
commerce and finance, and the realisation of a basic
solidarity among the peoples — which in the fullness of
time will rise, phcenix-like, from these ashes — British
traditional foreign policy is no longer practicable. We
cannot now prevent the Power or Powers most qualified,

3i2 TRUTH AND THE WAR

from acquiring- a leading position on the Continent of
Europe. We can, however, materially influence that
Power, or those Powers, towards liberalism or towards
reaction, by the course our statesmen steer during the next
few years, which will be crucial ones in casting the mould
of the new Europe. For example, the future of the
European peoples — of the whole world, indeed — depends
for many generations to come upon whether reaction in
Russia and Germany joins hands against Democracy in
Germany and Russia — or the other way about. We can
turn the hopes of the German people towards the more
liberal West or towards the reactionary East in the
measure in which we attempt — or do not attempt — to
make this war an excuse for interference in their constitu-
tional and domestic affairs; and in the measure in which
we either ignore their economic needs, and endeavour to
stifle their legitimate expansion, or recognise that there is
room in the world for them and for us, and that "if you
press down the lid upon an industrial and commercial
country that lid will infallibly be blown off."1 Far-
reaching consequences will ensue from the choice we
make.

But, having made that choice, we shall no longer be
able to control the issue. We can always influence, for
good or ill : we can no longer control the destinies of
Europe. The sooner we recognise it the better for our-
selves, and the better for Europe.

Having these various factors in consideration, I am
led to conclude that events have brought — more speedily
than might a few years ago have been anticipated — the
British Empire to a point whence two roads diverge. One
leads straight to eventual decay and disruption. The
other leads to the only safe and tolerable future, alike for
the British people and their kitrf and kin across the seas,
for the peoples of the Continent, and for the races whom
Europe, in her arrogance, calls "coloured." The funda-
mental interests of all these people are common. Injustice
to either is injustice to all.

If we wish to direct our footsteps along the former
road, all that we have to do is to adopt the policy so voci-
ferously commended by the Jingo and ultra-Imperialist

1 "Peace with Honour." By Vernon Lee. (The Union of
Democratic Control : Price 3d.)

THE TWO ROADS 313

section of the official and political classes, and their
following in all classes. It looks the easiest road
to tread. Probably it is, for it requires little or
no mental effort and allows of plenty of cheerful
shouting in the approved "patriotic" style. Facilis
descensus averni. If we select it, we shall make up our
minds to prolong the war as long as our Allies can do so.
We shall even urge them to prolong it, in the hope of
"bringing Germany to her knees." We might conceiv-
ably succeed in doing that, and, assuredly, quarrel with
our present Allies as the outcome. But, whether or no,
we shall, in any case, resolve to make it as difficult as
possible for the Central Powers to make peace. We shaM
do our utmost permanently to cripple the States of Central
Europe, whose divisions and accessibility to invasion were
the bane of Europe for five centuries. We shall welcome
a large increase of Russian territory in Europe at the
expense of Austria-Hungary. We shall decline to coun-
tenance any solution of the Polish problem which does not
put back the greater part of the Poles under the Tsar.
In defiance of our claim to be fighting for the liberties
of the smaller peoples and for the rights of nationality, we
shall agree to an Italian protectorate over a considerable
proportion of the Southern Slavs, and we shall restore
Macedonia to Serbia. We shall insist either upon
retaining for ourselves, and the Dominions, all the over-
seas possessions we have taken from Germany, or make
a present of them to France, and we shall obstruct any
combination by which Germany can obtain compensation
for their loss in other directions. We shall encourage the
French to maintain their monopolistic and differential
fiscal systems in the French dependencies. We shall
exclude Germany from any share in the economic develop-
ment of Asia-Minor.

Having gone thus far, we shall proceed to erect a
tariff barrier against the trade of the Central Powers, both
in our home market and in our dependencies, as a first step
towards that Protectionist and self-contained Empire which
is the dream of Mr. Hughes. Having thus invited the
world to ask itself how long 59 million white people are
to be permitted to monopolise the natural resources and
the labour of one-fifth of the habitable globe, we shall
continue to direct our foreign policy on the cherished
principle of the "Balance of Power." Having thus defi-
nitely consecrated the British Empire to an aggressive

314 TRUTH AND THE WAR

policy, we shall jealously observe any signs of recupera-
tion in Germany. We shall watch with equal suspicion
the enormous accretion of Russia's power which our
policy will have given her. And, whenever the "Balance"
seems to us endangered we shall be as ready to shift our
friendships and to promote fresh combinations as we have
been in the past, recalling with complacency that we have
fought now against, now in alliance with, almost every
State in Europe, and have come out top every time. We
shall refuse to modify the advantage which our para-
mountcy at sea gives to us to superimpose our will in time
of peace upon the over-sea expansion of Continental
Powers; and, in time of war, to sweep enemy merchant-
men from the seas, confiscate our enemy's trade, and seize
our enemy colonies — if he has any. If America objects
we will be hectoring at first, but as a pis alter we will
grumblingly endeavour to buy her off and probably quarrel
with her irremediably.

In our domestic concerns we shall continue to mis-
manage the affairs of the nation and Empire within the
portals of a single Legislature. We shall continue to
make the health and education of the proletariat a matter
of Party controversy, wasting the time of our legislators
in fantastic discussions while the nation perishes. And,
of course, we shall preserve in all its essential features
a land system as ridiculous as it is iniquitous.

Our ruling classes will have finally elected to present
the spectacle of a class perishing through sheer lack of
intellectuality and, through its own invincible repugnance
to learn, leading the nation to suicide.

Or we can follow the other road.

The goal at the end of it is an Internationalism, which,
while asking no people to part with the institutions and the
body of tradition which have made them one; while asking
no people to surrender one iota of their pride in the land
of their birth, in the social customs, the ideals and associa-
tions clinging about it : will demand of every people, in
the interests of all peoples, some sacrifice of accepted
sentiment, some surrender of national vanity, some aban-
donment of a philosophy largely rooted in arrogance and
largely founded upon phrases meaning very little in them-
selves, but which long familiarity has invested with an

THE TWO ROADS 315

artificial significance. That Internationalism will be
directed to ensuring the interests of all States, not merely
the most powerful in size, in the number of their inhabi-
tants, and in their financial resources.

It will be directed to the preservation of the welfare
of the peoples, not the white peoples alone, but the non-
white peoples whose evolution has not yet reached the
point where they can stand alone and confront, single-
handed, the powerful economic and financial forces of
modern civilisation.

It will be creative of the spirit by which alone the
motive inspiring the relationship of nations shall respond
to the real needs and aspirations of humanity, and through
whose operating force the monstrous doctrine of defensive
and offensive armaments shall be extirpated finally and
for all time.

That Internationalism must embrace all States : none
must be excluded from its beneficent operations. It must
be directed by a Council to whose judgment in inter-State
disputes all States must give allegiance, and whose
deliberations and decisions shall be public.

Behind its sanction every State must feel secure.
Every State must feel that there is advantage to
itself in entering it. And for the false concep-
tion of the word "State," which rulers and
small privileged castes, politicians, and militarists have
imposed upon the world to its undoing, must be substituted
the true conception which shall enable the people at last
to come into their own and to be the conscious, controlling
guides of their destiny.

The indispensable preliminary to an advance upon that
road must be a speedy settlement of this war, marked by
mutual concessions.

If that be attained, progress along it will be rapid or
slow, according to the sincerity of the statesmen and the
capacity of the democracies to select the right men and to
keep them to their mandate.

For British statesmanship the opportunity is unique
and will not recur.

Is British statesmanship capable of rising to it?

Is British democracy sufficiently determined to will that
the opportunity shall be taken?

EPILOGUE

To the Belligerent Governments

Wider and wider the spread of your devastations.

Higher and higher the mountains of the dead — the dead
because of you.

Ever more extensive the boundaries of the cemetery you
fashion.

All the wars and all the plagues were as nought to the
madness of your doings.

Like unto the breath of a pestilence this madness sweeps
through the plains and valleys of Europe, destroying
in multitudes the children of men.

The weeping of women is unceasing ; their tears mingle
with the blood which flows continuously at your
bidding.

What have the people done to you that you should treat
them so ?

Have they not sweated for you?

Have they not grovelled to you and licked the hand that
smote them?

Have they not stocked your Treasuries ?

Have they not lacked that you might be filled?

Have not great masses of them submissively endured
poverty, squalor and want while you prated to them
of Liberty and Equality, of Patriotism and Empire?

And, in return, what have you done for the peoples?

316

You have abandoned them in their need, neglected their
interests, mishandled the substance their labours
brought you, abused the powers their loyalty and
trustfulness gave you.

You have cheated them and laughed at their bewilderment.

You have kept them asunder and traded on the prejudices
you fostered in them.

You have humiliated and pauperised them and waxed
strong on their weaknesses.

You have left them ignorant, the better to hold them sub-
servient to your purposes.

You have taught them a false ideal of national honour and
national greatness.

You have pumped fear into their hearts in order to uphold
that militarism you use to crush and drain them.

You have encircled them with chains which, with grim
irony, you have lured them to fashion and fasten upon
themselves.

Continuously, cynically, deliberately you have sacrificed
them to your secret manoeuvres and your sordid
' quarrels.

Your armies, dead-locked in foul embrace, sway backwards
and forwards advancing here a little, there a little — but
at immense cost.

Long and weary months they have grappled thus, the
while your coffers run dry and the peoples murmur.

At this spectacle apprehension and rage possess you. For
you have staked all on ''Victory," and if "Victory" is
for none of you, therein your common doom is writ;
the doom of your systems, your caste-privileges, your
monopoly of the sources of production, your unfettered
command of the labour of millions of men — aye and of
women and children too.

Baffled, you order the death and mutilation of multitudes,
you rain death upon sleeping cities, you decree the
slow starvation of whole communities, you strew the
floor of the sea with the bodies of the helpless.

And the scribes and Pharisees you pay with this intent,
dupe and mystify the peoples.

3i7

Your hireling Priests call upon the Deity to sanctify your
deeds, and nail once more the Christ upon the Cross.

Constantly you seek to involve more peoples in the
general ruin of which you are the architects.

From the uttermost ends of the earth you conduct fresh
contingents to the slaughter, men with brown skins
and yellow; black men of whom you boasted awhile ago
that you had rescued them from barbarism.

For your lust is insatiable and your hypocrisy measureless.

You sow the world with lies, with malice and with un-
charitableness.

You ingeminate the cancer of unreason.

You invent and trick, distort and vilify.

Under your moulding Humanity becomes misshapen,
ghoulish, revolting.

You murder the body and you putrefy the mind.

An' you were able, you would kill the soul.

You hope to mitigate your crimes against the day of
reckoning by repudiating an initial responsibility which
is collective.

For you are all guilty — every one.

One and all you prepared for this saturnalia of massacre.

One and all you squandered the communally earned wealth
of your peoples in engines of destruction, and gave high
awards for the most potent.

One and all you lied and plotted and spied, span webs of
intrigue, dug pits, laid traps, contrived ambushes for
your neighbours.

One and all you betrayed your peoples.

" Victory I"

What means this "Victory" you proclaim to be your goal?

The victory you seek is a victory which shall perpetuate
your empire over mankind; keep Humanity bound in
fetters to your cruel and senseless systems; maintain

318

your castes and your monopolies; strengthen your
embargo upon the peoples' liberties; leave your heel
firmly planted on the peoples' necks.

Profiting by the passions you have loosed, you hope to
blind men for ever to your designs.

They will be richer, you say, if more territory be added to
your demesnes which, you falsely tell them, are their
demesnes.

They will be more secure, you say, if you can crush,
humiliate and dictate terms to your rivals who, you
falsely state, are their rivals.

They will prosper, you say, from the ruin of their neigh-
bours, with whom they must henceforth neither buy
nor sell.

All this is false, and you know that it is false.

It is false, because if you rob, the robbed will not rest until
they have won back what you stole from them, and your
people must once more bear the burden of your pre-
datory instincts.

It is false, because dictation, humiliation and crushing
bring no security to those who inflict them, but only
breed, hatred and revenge against which the perpetrators
must be ever on their guard.

It is false, because the more impoverished your neighbours,
the less they have to spend, and your people who supply
their wants and whose wants are supplied by them, will
suffer from their lessened ability to perform these
human functions.

Thus your notion of " Victory" means for the peoples
increased poverty and a renewal of fears and hatreds
upon which you have thriven, by which you retain
them in subjection to your will and through which they
perish.

For the peoples, your "Victory" means Death.

There is but one victory which can bring salvation to the
peoples and heal the wounds which your disorderly
ambitions and monumental selfishness have inflicted
upon them; and which can create a fairer world for
their descendants.

3*9

That victory is the victory which shall prove, finally and
for all time, that warfare between great nations can
yield no decisive residts, can achieve nothing but
disaster and misery for all concerned.

It is a victory which shall secure the practical demonstra-
tion of the futility as well as the vileness of your
practices, expel your philosophy from the councils of
mankind, shatter your systems and sweep them, and
you along with them, into oblivion.

It is the victory which shall precipitate a great awakening
in the hearts and minds of men, causing the scales to
fall from their eyes, and the jungle of error in which
they have so long wandered to be clearly revealed.

It is the victory which shall turn the nations in loathing
from you and from the idols of power and greed, and
jealousy you have bidden them worship to their
undoing and to your profit; which shall open out to
them the road to Peace and good-will towards all men,
domination over none, co-operation and partnership
with all in the common tasks of social service which
know no frontiers; and in the concentration of human
effort upon honourable rivalry in arts and crafts, and
all branches of constructive knowledge.

It is the victory which out of this chaos of desolation will
lead to Understanding.

For none but YOU does that victory spell defeat.

And without your defeat, utter and complete, Understand-
ing is hidden from the peoples.

So, in praying that the kind of victory you one and all
desire shall not be yours, we pray for the victory of
justice over injustice, of truth over falsehood, of liberty
over thraldom, of understanding over ignorance — that
ignorance wherein lie the seeds of every sin against
the light.

May, 1916.

INDEX

Aerenthal (see Austria).
Alsace-Lorraine :

French invasion of, 18 (foot-note).

French desire to regain, 24, 25, 98,
99, 148 (see also under Boucher
and Sembat), 173, 174, 197.
Anglo-German Relations, speeches on :

Mr. Asquith : March 2, 1908, 282 ;
January 6, 1910, 283 ; July 25, 1912,
287; October 3, 1914, 287.

Mr. Churchill : August 15, 1908, 282 ;
April 14, 1909, 283.

Mr. Lloyd George, July 28, 1908, 95,
96, 282 ; January, 1910, 283

Lord Haldane : December 14, 1909,
283 ; December 28, 1910, 284.

Mr. Harcourt : October 2, 1908, 282,
284; October 17, 1906, 284.

Mr. McKenna : October 20, 1910, 283.

Mr. Runciman : October and Novem-
ber, 1907, 284.
Anti-German League, the, Ch. XXV.
Anti-German Union, the, 187, Ch. XXV.
Armaments, private industry of, 182.
Asquith, Right Hon. H. W. :

Assents to Anglo-French military
and naval consultations, 276.

Reply to Sir William Byles, March 24,
1913. 36, 278.

Reply to Lord Hugh Cecil, March 10,
1913. 35. 278.

Reply to Mr. Joseph King, March
24. i9I3, 36, 278.

Speech in Dublin : 112, 174, 176, 180.

Speech on Anglo-German relations,
March 2, 1908, 282 ; January 6,
rgio, 283.

Version of Anglo-German, 1912, nego-
tiations (July 25, 1912), 287-88, 292.

Version of Anglo-German, 1912, nego-
tiations (October 3, 1914), 287-88.
Austria- Hungary :

Acceptance of Anglo-German pro-
posal to stop at Belgrade, 134.

Date of mobilisation against Russia,
29, 31 (foot-note).

Date of mobilisation against Serbia,
29. 31 (foot-note).

Effect of Archduke's murder, 132.

Military expenditure and prepara-
tions, Ch. X. and note : 97, 144 ;
Ch. XVIII.

Naval Expenditure, Ch. XVII., XVIII.

Note to Serbia, 146 (and foot-note).

Relations with Germany, 29-33, 56-7,
69, _i29-34,_ 140.

Relations with Russia, 124, 127, 129,
i3i._ 132, 139, 145, 162.

Relations with Serbia, 131, 132, 139,
140

Treatment of Poles and Ukrainians,
174.
Author :

Extracts from speeches, 1912-13, 1-2.

Letter of resignation to Birkenhead
Liberal Association, 1-13.

Public work of, personal foreword.
Avebury, Lord, 88.

B

Bagdad Railway, 276, 294.

Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J., 308.

Balkans, problem of, 197.

Belloc, M. Hilaire, 15.

Benedetti, M., 15.

Beyens, Baron (Belgian Minister at Ber-
lin), 131.

Beresford, Lord Charles, 207, 280 (foot-
note).

Berne, conference at, 257-9.

Bethman-Hollweg, Chancellor (see under
Germany).
Bismarck, Count, 17, 18, 129.
Bonar Law, Right Hon., 14.
Borden, Sir Robert, 239.
Bosnia, 71, 127, 129, 139.
Botha, General, 69, 70.
Boucher, Colonel, 15, 18, 24-25, 47, 98-100.
Bourdon, M. Georges, 149.
Buchanan, Sir Ceorge, 30, 34, 135-6.
Buchan, Mr. John, 14, 207, 273.
Bunsen, Sir Maurice de, 29, 30, 33, 146-7

(foot-note).
Burns, Right Hon. John, 8 (foot-note),

298.
Buxton, Mrs. C. R., personal foreword.
Buxton, the Brothers, 130.
Brailsford, Mr. H. N., 7 (foot-note), 21

(foot-note), 139, 226.
Byles, Sir William, 35 (see also under

Asquith).
Bright, John (on Russia), 198 ; (on Pro-
tection), 255 ; (on secret diplo-
macy), 235.
Bruce, Sir Charles, 308.
Belgium :

Despatches from diplomatic repre-
sentatives abroad, personal fore-
word and under Beyens, Cartier,
Grootven, Greindl, Guillaume,

Lalaing, Leghait ; France and
Morocco.
Future of, Ch. XXL, 194-5.
Invasion of, 119-20, 190-1 (see also
under Germany and British Foreign
Policy).
Neutrality of, 3 and 4 (foot-note), 14-
27 (Palmerston on) 21 (foot-note) ;
British attitude towards (in 1871),
15 ; (in 1887) 20, 21 ; (in July-
August, 1914), 13 ; (French attitude
towards in 1866), 15.
Position in event of general war, 10,

n, 14, 26-27, 162.
Relations with Entente, 3 (foot-note).
Sacrifice of by Perpetuation of war,
120, 191 (see also under Lambert
and British Foreign Policy).
Britain :

British Foreign Policy (see also under

Grey, Morocco, and Foreign Office).

Affected by condition of France after

the war, 305.
Attitude towards Franco-German re-
conciliation, 149, 151.
Attitude towards Belgium, Ch. I.,

190.
Blockade policy, 211, 309.
British Commonwealth, 184-5, l87.
Characteristics of, 55, 181, 264, 273.
Condition of working-classes, 187,

305-
Fettered by understanding with
France and Russia, 9, 10, 12, 191,
281, 282, 296, 297.
Fiscal policy, 252, 256.
Fundamental contradiction of, 274.
Growth of population and trade com-
pared with Germany, 254.
Imperialism and domestic policy, 185,

186, 188.
Imperialism and International rela-
tions, 252, 256.
In Morocco affair, Ch. IX., 89, 236
(see also under Morocco and
Grey).
Judged by Belgian diplomatists, 81-
83. 87-90 (see also under Beyens,
Guillaume, etc.)
Land problem, 188.
Military and naval burdens, 305.

Military and naval consultations with

France, 3-4 (foot-note), 5-9, Ch.

IV., 237, Ch. XXXIIL, XXXIV.
Naval preparedness for war, 63.
Naval expenditure, Ch. XVlI. and

XVIII.
Negotiations with Germany in 1912,

237. 277. 286, 287. 288, 289, 290,

291, 294 (see also under Asquith,

Grey, and Haldane).
Objects of, Ch. XXII., 203, 207,

224, 253, 311-12-
Population, extent and growth com-
pared with other States, 304.
Relations with Dominions, 178, 180,

239, 240, 315.
Relations with Ireland, 247, 304.
Relations with India, 180, 263 (and

foot-note).
Relations with United States, 232,

307, 308.
Sea-power and international relations,

264, 306-09.
Secrecy of, 26, 37-40, 79, 80, Ch.

XII., 177, 180, 235-8, Ch. XXXIIL,

XXXIV.
Strategic position after the war, 264,

Ch. XXXV.
Trade with Germany, 228-9.
Uncertainty of, 26.
War on German trade, 211, Ch.

XXV., XXVI., 265.

c

Cartier, M. (Belgian Charge d'Affaires in

London), 88.
Gavel), Miss, 223.
Caillaux, M., 84, 149.
Cecil, Lord Hugh, 35, 273, 278.
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston, n, 12, 14, 63,
172, 173-4, J89, 2ii, 279-80 (foot-
note), 282.
Chamberlain, Mr. Austen, 104.
Campbell-Sannerman, Sir Henry, 279 (and

foot-note), 280.
Clarendon, Lord, 52.
Clemenceau, M. Georges, 152, 153.
Colonial policy of France, 252, 269, 270.
Great Britain, 252, 269.
Germany, 253, 269, 270.
Monoplies and European peace,
personal foreword, 258-9.
Conway, Professor, 36, 38.
Congo Question, personal foreword, 22,

72, in, 263, 269.
Courtney of Penwith, Lord, 105, 222.

D
Dardanelles, Austro-Russian policy in re-
gard to, 139.
Dicey, Professor Edward, 64.
Dickinson, G. Lowes, 7 (foot-note), 104,

155. 183, 289, 290.
Dilke, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W., 17, 18.
Diplomacy, secret, personal foreword, Ch.
XII., 165, 175, 177, Ch. XXVIII.
Walter Bagehot, 105.
John Bright on, 235.
Carlyle on, 105.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain on, 104.
Lord Courtney of Penwith on, 105.
Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson on, 104.
Mr. J. A. Hobson on, 235.
Mr. Arthur Ponsonby on, 104.
(See also under Britain, Grey,
Foreign Office, etc.)
Delaisi, Francis, 7 (foot-note).
Deicasse, M., 56, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 153,

154

Economic problems and the war, 193-4,

226-7, Ch. XXX., 257-9.
Edgcumbe, Sir Robert, 207.

Edward, H.M. King, speech to Scots

Guards, 284.
Expenditure upon preparing for war, by

belligerent Powers, Ch. XVIL,

XVIII.

Fear, relation of to war, Ch. XVIII. , 175-

6 (see also under Germany).
Fisher, Lord, 61.
Foreign Office (see also under Britain).

Composition and powers, 107-112.

Reforms required, 179, 180, 239.

Danger to Britain, 273-5.
France :

Attitude towards Germany 47, 69, 98-
100, 148-9, 306.

Belgian diplomatists' views of, 81-3,
87-9. 153-5-

Colonial wars, 63.

Colonial possessions, 252, 253, 256,
260, 267-8, 270.

Effect of war upon, personal fore-
word, 201, 305.

Foreign policy :

Influenced by Russia, personal fore-
word, 7, 9, 128, Ch. XVI.

Foreign trade, 253, 270.

Imperialism and international rela-
tions, 253, 270-2.

In Morocco, Ch. IX.

Jaures' view of, 71.

Militarism, Ch. XVI. (see also under
Boucher, Grouard, Sembat, Jaures).

Military expenditure and prepara-
tions, Ch. X., 97, 101, 144, Ch.
XVIII.

Military relations with Russia, 142-3.

Naval expenditure, Ch. XVIL, XVIII

Population before the war, 253 (foot-
note), 270.

Position in event of a General Euro-
pean war, personal foreword.

Rivalry with Britain, 68, 75, 181, 256.

Strategy, 17, 18, 23-5, 47-8, 99-101.

Three years military law, 143, Ch.
XVI.

G
Gardiner, Mr. A. G., 200.
Germany (see also under British Foreign
policy, Grey, Belgium, France,
Morocco, Kaiser, etc.)

Alleged refusal to combine against
Britain, 68-70, 164.

Alleged plot to " subjugate Europe,"
49. 53. 58, 60, 64, 96, 97, 103, 121,
126, 160-4, 300-

Attitude over Austro-Serbian crisis in
i9I3. 130-2-

Attitude over Morocco, 71-90 (see
also under Morocco).

Belief she is fighting a defensive

- war, 28, 49, 213.

Colonial possessions and policy, 122,
123, 204, 212, 270, 271.

Economic problems of, 197, 227, 243-
6, Ch. XXX., 271-2.

Effect of Morocco affair upon, 66, 69,
72, 86, 87.

Effect of Belgian diplomatic des-
patches upon, 212.

Effect of Russian General mobilisa-
tion upon (see under Russia).

Efforts to avoid conflict with France,
23, 58. 81-2.

Fear of Russia, 24, 25, 56, 97-9, 102-3,
128, 135, 140, 141, 143, 164 (see also
under Repington, Lloyd George,
Boucher, etc.).

Fiscal policy in Germany and Ger-
man colonies, 256-7, 268.

Foreign trade, 245, 254, 271.

French view of character and policy,
47, 98 (foot-note), 102-03.

Future policy of, 121-2, 251.
271, 304.

Invasion of Belgium, 3 (and foot-
note), 12, 14-27, 48-50, 120.

Militarism, 2, 5, 60, 61, 62, 122, 135,
141, 163, 204, 208, 210, 213, 223.

Military preparations and expendi-
ture, 22, 56, 61, 62, 67, 91-4, 97, 103,
144, 163, Ch. XVIII.

Naval preparations and expenditure,
Ch. XVII., XVIII., 291.

Neglected opportunities for waging
war in Europe, 64, 122, 164.

Population problem, 244-6, Ch. XXX.,

Probable demand for right of way
through Belgium, 15, 19, 20, 21, 26,
162.

Reactionaries in, 202, 205.

Relations with Austria (see under
Austria).

Relations with United States, 232.

Responsibility for the war, 28-34, 48,
Si. 53, 54. 60, 63, 67, 68, 69, 70, 99,
103, 126, 129, 132-6, 140, 141, 155,
164, 260.

Strategic position in Europe before
war, 17, 49, 50, 54-7, 127, 128, Ch.
XVIII.

Views of Colonel Repington (15,
16, 18, 58, 141), views of Colonel
Boucher (15, 18, 98, 99, 100), views
of Sir Charles Dilke (17), views of
Dr. Holland Rose (97), views of
"An Islander" (97), views of Mr.
Lloyd George (95-7, 103), views of
M. Marcel Sembat (101-3).

Strategic railways on Belgian fron-
tier, 21-22.

Trade development and competition,
217, Ch. XXVII., 233-4, 276.
Qioiitti, Signer, 131.

Codart, M. Justin de (French Under-
Secretary for War), 153.
Granville, Lord, 15.

Greindl, Baron (Belgian Minister in Ber-
lin), 81, 82, 87, 88.
Grey, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward (see also
under British Foreign Policy, Mor-
occo, etc.).

And German Ambassador, 26 (and
foot-note), 27.

Assents to Anglo-French military and
naval consultations, 276, 278 ; in-
terprets their significance, 279.

Assurance of material support to
France in rgo6, 276.

Attitude after Algeciras, 79, 80, 276,
277.

Attitude after Agadir, 83-5, 128, 277.

Despatch to British Ambassador at
Berlin, July, 29, 33.

His " unofficial " letter to French
Ambassador, Nov. 22, 1912, 277.

Misunderstanding with German Am-
bassador, 23.

Pledge to French Ambassador,
August 2, 1914, 49, 299.

Prediction of popular revolt against
war-taxation, 164.

Proposed assurance to Germany, 120.

Reply to Sir William Byles, June n,
1914, 36.

Reply to Mr. F. W. Jowett, M.P., 48,
49. 57, 58.

Reply to Mr. Joseph King, M.P.,
April 28, 1914, 36.

Reply to Mr. Joseph King, M.P.,
June n, 1914, 36.

Speech to House on August 3, 1914,
39, 276, 277, 299.

Speech on March 22, 1915, 60, 92.
Speech on Mediterranean situation,

280 (foot-note).
Speech in May, 1916, 289.
Statement to German Ambassador on
July 31, 1914, 298 ; August 1, 1914,
299.
Suggestion that Austria should stop
at Belgrade, 133-4-
Grootven, M. van (Belgian Charge d'

Affaires in London), 87.
Grouard, Lieut. -Colonel, 24, 101.
Cuiilaume, Baron (Belgian Minister in
Paris), 89, 90, IS3-S-
H
Haldane, Lord:

Attacks upon Lord Roberts, 296.
Mission to Germany, 286, 287, 292.
On Anglo-German relations, 283.
On the Kaiser's responsibility, 60, 65,

91. 94-
Reduces army expenditure, 284.
On German preparedness, 291.
Hartwig, M. de, 124, 294.
Hate, as a creed, Ch. XXV.
Hayward, Charles, 7 (footnote), 71.
Heath, Mr, Carl, 96.
Hirst, Mr. F. W., 157.
Hobson, Mr. J. A., 202, 235.
Holland, Colonial fiscal policy of, 257

(foot-note), 259.
I
India (see under Britain).
International Council, 120, 182, 198, 225.
International problems, insolvable by war,

225.
Internationalism, 184, 314-15.
Iswolski, Mr., 124, 294.
Italy:

Negotiations with Austria and Ger-
many over Serbia in 1913, 131.
Tariff friction with France, 256.
International irritant, the tariff as, Ch.

XXXI., 265.
Internationalisation of Colonial trade, 261-

S (see also under neutralisation of

dependencies).

J

Japan, and China, 230 (and foot-note),

250 (foot-note).
Jaures, M. Jean, 71, 149.
Johnston, Sir Harry, 212, 249, 269.
Jowett, F. W., M.P., 48, 49, 57, 58.

K

Kaiser, telegram to King George, 23, 58.

Abuse of, 293.

Advice to Archduke Ferdinand, 131.

Alleged conversation with von Moltke,
100.

And Viennese Court, 130.

Attitude in the Boer War, 68, 69, 70.

Daily Mail's opinion of, 64.

Factor making for peace, 65, 66, 91,
98 (and foot-note), 101.

French Ambassador's opinion of, 65.

Telegram to President Kruger, 275.

Visit to Tangier, 77.
King, Mr. Joseph, M.P., 35, 36.
Kipling, Mr. Rudyard, 207.

L
Langlois, General, 14.
Lalaing, Comte de (Belgian Minister in

London), 82, 87, 88, 89.
Lambert, M. Henri, 1S9, 192, 193, 194, 259

(and foot-note).
Lansdowne, Lord, 295.
Lascelles, Sir Frank, 88.
Lee, Vernon, 312.
Leghait, M. (Belgian Minister in Paris),

87, 88.

Leopold, King (see under Congo).
Lloyd George, Rt. Hon. David, 25 (foot-
note).
Mansion House speech, 84, 86, 89,

277, 291.
Opinion of German Army, 91, 292.
Opinion on Germany's strategic posi-
tion, 95, 96, 97, 103, 143/292.
On Anglo-German relations, 282, 283.
On British unpreparedness, 286.
On invasion of Belgium, 2-98.
Long, Mr. Crozier, 32, 33.
Loreburn, Lord, 222.

M

Macdonald, Mr. J. Ramsay, M.P., 72 208
Maguire, Dr. Miller, 62.
Malmesbury, Lord, 52, 218 (and foot-
notes).
Maude, Colonel, 62.

Militarism, 61, 62, 63, 68, Ch. X., 120 (and
Sea-power), 265 (German), see
under Germany (French), see under
France (Russian), see under Rus-
sia.
Morley, Lord, 8 (foot-note), 84, 298
Morocco: personal foreword-
Attitude o*f British Government in
i9°5, 79-

Attitude of British Government after
Algeciras, 80, 83-4, 87-8, 141.

Attitude of German Government after
Algeciras, 81-3, 280.

Attitude of Spanish Government
after Algeciras, 80.

British interests in, 73-76.

Effect of 1911 crisis in France, 86
12S.

Effect of 1911 crisis in Germany, 66
86, 128.

First International Conference, 74.

French bargain with Britain, 75.

French bargain with Italy, 75.

French interests in, 73-76.

French policy after Algeciras, 80, 83

French offer to Spain, 75.

German interests in, 73-4, 78.

Germany's first intervention, 77-8

Inaugurated era of Treaty-breaking
in Europe, 71, 72.

Influence in producing the great
war, 71, 72, 86, 280.

Position when the Panther anchored
off Agadir, 83.

Revelations in French Chamber, 85
(see also under Grey, Britain, Ger-
many, etc.).

Second International Conference, 78
276.

Spanish interests in, 73.

Starting point of Anglo-French mili-
tary and naval consultations, 72, 79,
276.

The Secret Agreements, 6, 9, 76, 80,
177, 236, 281.

Views of Belgian diplomatists, 87-90.
Murray, Major Stewart, 62.

N

Nationality, Principle of, 174.

Native races, treatment of by Europe, per-
sonal foreword, 252, 261-3, 3r5-

Navalism, European (see under Sea-
power).

Neutralisation of dependencies, 263-4.

Newbold, Mr. Walton, 296.

Nippold, Professor 0., 4.

Nogi, General, 14.

Otlet, Mr. Paul, 192, 194,

259.

Perris, Mr. G. H., 52, 57.
Picton, Mr. Harold, 184.
Pigou, Professor, 51.
Poincare, President, 143, 145, 146, 145
152-5-

Poland, the problem of, 173, 174, 197
Ponsonby, Mr. Arthur, M.P., persona! fore-
word, 104, 169, 222.
Price, Mr. Phillips, 28, 31 (foot-note), 130,

135-
Prussia, East, first invasion of by Russian
armies, 31 (foot-note), 136.
R
Rankin, Lieut. -Colonel, 130.
Repington, Colonel, 15, 16, 18, 58, 141 (see

also under Germany).
Richmond. Sir W. B., 207.
Roberts, Lord, 295-6.
Robertson, Mr. J. M., 207.
Rose, Dr. Holland, 249.
Rouvier, M., 84.

Runciman. Rt. Hon. Walter, 37, 38.
Russell, Hon. Bertrand, 7 (foot-note), 71.
Russia:

Date of partial mobilisation, 31.
Date of General mobilisation, 31, 134.
Effect of alliance with France upon
European equilibrium, personal
foreword, 16-20, 25-6, 47-56.
Influence upon French foreign policy

(see under France).
Effect of general mobilisation, 30,

130, 133-36, 137-
Reply to Sir E. Grey's proposal that
Austria should stop at Belgrade,
134-
Militarism, 126, 135, 136, Ch. XV.
Military expenditure and prepara-
tions, Ch. X., 97, 138, Ch. XV.,
XVIII.
Naval expenditure and preparations,

Ch. XVII., XVIII.
Policy, 55, 63-4, 6g (note), 99-100,

i58._
Relations with Serbia, 131-2, 139 (and

foot-note).
Rivalry with Germanic Powers, 9, 12,
99-100, 124-127, 145, 162.
S
Sazanoff, M., 10, 30, 34, 159.
Scott, Sir Percy, 61.
Sea-power, 121, Ch. XVII., 264, 306-09.
Sembat, M. Marcel, 47, 54, 98 (foot-note),

101-103, 149.
Serbia, relations with Russia (see under
Russia).
Objects of Serbian policy, 139.
Relations with Austria (see under
Austria).
Sifton, Sir Clifford, 240.
Stanley, Lord, on Crimean War, 196.
Stepankowsky, M., 139 (foot-note).

T
Tariff Reform campaign, 275.
Tariffs, and international relations (see
under Internationalism), Ch. XXX.
Trade, proposed war on German trade

(see under Britain).
Trevelyan, Charles, M.P., 8 (foot-note),

222.
Tsar, the late:

Note to Powers of Aug. 24, 1898, 68.

U

Union, the, of democratic control, origin,
formation, objects, Ch. XIX., 239.
United States of America :

And Sea-power, 307-09.

Population, 304.

Relations with Britain (see under

Britain).
Trade with Germany, 232.

V

Van Faulkenhausen, General, 22.
Vickers, Ltd., 159.
Von Tschirsky, 124.
W

Warfare, modern warfare and civilian

population, 309-10.
Wilson, President, appeal to, Ch. XIII.

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